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PREFACE  
 
The problem of responsibility is a topic that has been extensively investigated from 
the pre-Socratic period until nowadays. The concept of responsibility is also a 
developing and dynamic concept that reflects our understanding of history, our 
interaction with other persons in a society, and our response to living situations. The 
questioning of the ethical significance of responsibility was paradoxically raised in 
the 1940s, after World War II. Since that time, not only has the problem of 
responsibility but also the significance of morality been radically questioned, 
especially within the fields of philosophy and theology. 
 
This study aims at re-thinking and arguing for the ethical structure of 
responsibility, in light of Dietrich Bonhoeffer‘s and Emmanuel Levinas‘s thoughts. 
Chapter one presents the origin of the problem of responsibility, the development of 
different theories of responsibility, the historical background of Bonhoeffer and 
Levinas and the reason why we need to rethink this concept regarding these two 
thinker‘s thoughts. Chapter two then presents Bonhoeffer‘s question ‗what is man?‘ 
by discussing his consideration on the issue of language in his ‗non-religious 
interpretation of Christianity‘ and on the issue of Christ as the Other in his 
Christological articulations. Chapter three further analyses Heidegger as an essential 
link between Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s thoughts. Chapter four turns to the 
investigation of Levinas‘s question ‗who is the other?‘ as an answer for Bonhoeffer‘s 
question, by discussing his consideration on the issue of language in the form of 
response and on the issue of the Other as an incarnate subject. Chapter five provides 
a systematic analysis of the ethical structure of responsibility with regard to ‗the 
Other‘ and ‗language‘ as two indispensable elements. In this chapter, too, we apply 
this structure to a discussion of some central issues in religion, pluralism and 
Western-Chinese communication. 
 
Much attention has been paid to the phenomenological background of 
Levinas‘s ethical elaboration of the concept of ‗the Other‘ and the diachronical 
analysis of ‗the Saying‘ and ‗the Said‘. Much has also been written so as to interpret 
Bonhoeffer‘s ethical consideration of his Christology as well as his statement of 
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‗non-religious interpretation of Christianity‘ with regard to the role of ‗language‘. 
Little, however, has been said about the inspired relationship between these three 
elements: ‗the Other‘, ‗language‘ and ‗ethical concern‘, especially in relation to the 
concept of responsibility advanced by these two thinkers. This is the essential reason 
for writing this study, and we argue that these three elements constitute the ethical 
structure of responsibility. Along with our analyses of and discussions on the 
similarities, the differences and the relationships between Bonhoeffer‘s thought and 
Levinas‘s thought, these three elements will be further interpreted, discussed and 
constructed into a stable and comprehensive ethical-structure. Each element is an 
indispensable angle of an ethical triangle, which is fundamental and necessary for 
considering a responsible human relationship. 
 
The concept of language in this study, therefore, is not treated as an 
instrument for communication, but will be shown to be the expression of the 
invisible order in the ethical relationship. The concept of ‗the Other‘ is not treated as 
a stranger, an alien, or a reciprocal partner in social relationship, but will be shown to 
be the trace of the tension between the responsibility and the freedom of subjectivity. 
The concept of ‗responsibility‘ is not treated as a legal or accountable term that is 
used in the court, commercial contracts and even social convention, but will be 
shown to be an appropriate disproportion or asymmetry of the moral consciousness 
between the unique subjectivity of the Other and the self.  
 
In this study, we also deliberately discuss the intellectual influence of Karl 
Barth on Bonhoeffer and analyse the concept of ‗the Other‘ with regard to the 
influences of Martin Buber‘s ‗I-Thou‘ relationship on Levinas. Furthermore, we also 
articulate the concept of ‗being‘ and ‗language‘ in Martin Heidegger‘s Dasein 
analysis in order to stress the deficiency of ethical concern in Heidegger‘s 
existential-hermeneutical approach, which is criticized both indirectly and directly by 
Bonhoeffer and Levinas. All of these examinations provide not only the substantial 
backgrounds for our discussion but also the essential connection of central issues in 
this study. 
 
In sum, therefore, these three elements: ‗the Other‘, ‗language‘ and 
‗responsibility, all link closely together as a circle of a systematic interpretation. The 
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distance lies between the self and the other, the ethical order embeds in the 
expression of the language, and the difficulty implied in the fulfilment of 
responsibility reveal the paradoxically existential situation of human relationship. 
Thus we conclude that: to be responsible is to take the responsibility for the 
responsibility of the Other; to speak responsibly is to hear and answer the language 
for the language of the Other. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank Prof. Xian (Thomas) Zhang, Institute of Sino-
Christian Studies (ISCS) and Tommy Murphy, for their recommendation, without 
which I would not have this chance to study in Ireland and thank the four years 
support that I received from the John & Pat Hume Scholarship, which enabled me to 
carry out my doctoral study and research at the National University of Ireland, 
Maynooth. I would also like to thank Prof. Thomas Kelly, without whose acceptance 
of my application I would not have started my study in Maynooth. I would also like 
to thank Dr Michael Dunne, for his guidance and encouragement to continue with 
and complete this thesis. I would also like to thank Prof. Stephen Williams, who 
continuously encourages me on the study of Bonhoeffer‘s thoughts. I would like to 
thank Marian O‘Donnell for her support with the ‗Tutor‘s Scholarship‘, as well as 
her inspiration on artistic reflection on the problem of the other and the approach of 
dialogue and understanding.  With the help of the Department of Philosophy at NUI 
Maynooth, especially Ms Ann Gleeson‘s generous help, I could balance the time 
between teaching, researching and writing. I would also like to thank all of those 
who helped me on my life and in my study during these four years. Last, in 
particular, I would thank my parents, for their patience and understanding throughout 
this time — they have been a great support to me from the beginning and to the 
completion of this project. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is generally agreed that one of the most important and most disputed concepts in 
the twentieth century is the concept of freedom, but in the writings of both Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer (1906–1945) and Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) we find an argument 
that reflection on what freedom is or may mean, without reflection on our 
responsibility to the other, cannot lead to an ethical concept of responsibility. Both of 
these thinkers, of course, are inspired by religious writers and religious thinkers and 
by their own particular religious faith backgrounds, but Bonhoeffer‘s concept of a 
‗non-religious conception of religion‘ and Levinas‘s concept of responsibility for 
‗the Other‘ are concepts that are thought and defended philosophically by their 
authors on their own bases.
1
  Their accounts are also highly controversial because 
they call into question any ethical theory of responsibility that is grounded 
exclusively in possibilities characteristic of freedom of the individual self, however 
limited that freedom is as a ‗being-for-death (sein-zum-Tode)‘, as famously 
recognized and most forcibly argued by Martin Heidegger in his unfinished essay, 
Being and Time (1927).
2
   
 
Not all philosophers have given attention to the concept of responsibility in 
their thinking, but this can be true of any major concept in philosophy. Some 
philosophers, however, have, and this study looks at in particular the emergence of 
an ethical concept of responsibility in the writings Bonhoeffer and Levinas in the 
twentieth century. Both Bonhoeffer and Levinas were born in the same year and they 
shared the same historical-political background that led to the untimely death and 
execution by the Nazis of Bonhoeffer and to the tragic death of several members of 
Levinas‘s immediate family and friends. Yet their reflections span more than the 
times upon which they reflected, and that is why they are as important today as they 
were during their respective life-times. 
 
                                                 
1
 See, Ebeling, Gerhard, Word and Faith, trans. by James W. Leitch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1963) and Theodore De Boer, The Rationality of Transcendence: Studies in the Philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1997). 
2
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962); Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927, 1957); also published in separate 
printing in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, ed. by Edmund Husserl, 
Vol. 8 (1927) 1–438.  (Henceforth: abbreviated in notes as BT.) 
 2 
This study is divided into five chapters.  In chapter one we note that part of 
the problem with the concept of responsibility is that it can mean several things in 
several different contexts. This needs to be clarified first.
3
 So, the first chapter of our 
study outlines the etymological origin of the term and reviews early pre-Socratic and 
Aristotelian accounts of responsibility. Furthermore, chapter one also discusses some 
of the main features of contemporary theories of responsibility that are relevant to 
their evaluation. In light of all of these examinations, we will point out the necessity 
to re-think the concept of responsibility according to Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s 
thoughts. 
 
Chapter two analyses Bonhoeffer‘s thoughts which relate to responsibility by 
means of the analysis of two essential elements, namely, the other and language. 
Bonhoeffer was influenced by Karl Barth‘s work on dialogue and on the relationship 
between the ‗I‘ and ‗Thou‘.4 The first section of this chapter, therefore, discusses 
Barth‘s distinction between the ‗Wholly Other (Totaliter aliter)‘ and Man, and his 
account of the relation between ‗the Word of God‘ and ‗the word of Man‘. By 
clarifying Barth‘s thoughts of the relationship between the Wholly Other, his 
embedded Kenotic Christology, and his articulation of the human Kerygmatic 
response, we will shed light on Barth‘s influence on Bonhoeffer‘s thoughts 
concerning his concept of a ‗non-religious‘ interpretation of religion and ethics. In 
the second section, I will discuss Bonhoeffer‘s thoughts on the connection between 
                                                 
3
 The Oxford English Dictionary gives two definitions for ‗responsibility‘ and six meanings for 
‗responsible‘. Responsibility is defined, firstly, as: the state or fact of being responsible, i.e., of the 
thing done or to be done; and, secondly, as: a charge, trust, or duty, for which one is responsible, i.e., 
a person for whom one is responsible. As for the meaning of responsible, it gives: (i) correspondent or 
answering to something; (ii)  capable of being answered; (iii) answerable, accountable (to another for 
something), liable to be called to account; and, morally accountable for one‘s actions; capable of 
rational conduct. (iv) answerable to a charge. (v) capable of fulfilling an obligation or trust, and of 
respectable appearance; (vi) involving responsibility or obligation, and an actor who undertakes to 
play any part which may be temporarily required. The Oxford English Dictionary, Being A Corrected 
Re-issue with an Introduction, Supplement, and Bibliography of a New English Dictionary on 
Historical Principles, Vol. VIII Poy-Ry, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 542.  Thus the term can 
span from meaning the cause of something happening, such as, for instance, a fire heating and thus 
cooking a dinner in a pot, to human purposeful agency, the cook cooks the dinner in the pot, to legal 
responsibility in a court of law, but not all legal obligations are moral obligations, and so, 
responsibility can also refer to the moral concept of responsibility (for whom is the food to be given, 
is it to be distributed to those in need, and/ or is the food poisoned and the foil for an assassination 
attempt), and so forth. It is the ethical concept of responsibility with which our study is concerned.  
4
 See, Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. by Douglas Horton (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1957); Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie (1924). (Henceforth: abbreviated as 
WGWM.)  Barth and Bonhoeffer‘s work is also inspired by Martin Buber‘s work, especially his I and 
Thou, trans. by Walter Kaufman (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clarke, 1970); Ich und Du (Berlin: Shocken, 
1923). 
 3 
Christ and man, and his development of a socio-theological oriented ethics. By 
delineating Bonhoeffer‘s existential interpretation of Christology and his non-
religious interpretation, we will formulate the structure of responsibility in terms of 
his Christological analyses.  Bonhoeffer‘s Christological analyses include the ‗I‘ and 
‗You‘ relationship both in the church as a responsible community and in his 
deliberation on the role of language in his analyses of ethics. 
 
Central to both Bonhoeffer and Levinas‘s account of ethical thinking is their 
rejection of Heidegger‘s influential account of the self as a being-in-the-world that is 
responsible primarily for that being‘s own self in ‗the call of conscience (der Ruf des 
Gewissens)‘ to ‗proper (eigentlich) selfhood‘.5 In Chapter three, we will discuss both 
the indirect and the direct influence which Heidegger‘s thought  exercised on 
Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s thought in order to draw attention to the problem, which 
Levinas identifies, of the ‗indifference‘ of Heidegger‘s ethical thought, which was 
also criticized by Bonhoeffer.
6
  Though a separate treatment and detailed 
presentation of Heidegger‘s philosophy will not be given, our discussion of 
Heidegger‘s philosophy is both an essential and a pivotal link between Bonhoeffer 
and Levinas. We will examine Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s thoughts respectively 
which relate to Heidegger‘s standpoint by means of the analysis of Heidegger‘s 
reasoning on ‗the question of the meaning of Being‘ and ethics, especially from the 
perspective of Heidegger‘s Dasein analysis and his exploration of language. The 
discussion of Being and ethics in Heidegger‘s ‗Being-question‘ (Die Seinsfrage), 
however, is derived from an implicit egocentricity and his discussion of Dasein and 
language will lead to our analyses of the inter-connection between the Other, 
language, and ethical problems, which we will argue are three central elements of the 
structure of an ethical concept of responsibility.  
                                                 
5
 See, BT, Division Two, Section Two: ‗Dasein's Attention of An Authentic Potentiality-for-being, 
and Resoluteness‘, §§ 56–60, which are on the problem of conscience as the call of care. On the one 
hand, Bonhoeffer criticized the epistemological endeavour of an autonomous understanding of Dasein 
by philosophy understood as ontology in his Act and Being: Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology 
in Systematic Theology, trans. by Martin Rumscheidt (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), p.33, pp.60–81. 
(Henceforth: abbreviated as AB).  On the other hand, the style employed by Bonhoeffer in this 
habilitation thesis is, it seems similar to Heidegger‘s. Cf. 1) Bonhoeffer‘s thought of this-worldliness 
and Heidegger‘s ‗being-in-the-world‘, and 2) his reflections on Bultmann‘s methods that were 
influenced essentially by Heidegger‘s existential phenomenology. 
6
 See, Emmanuel Levinas, The Levinas Reader: Emmanuel Levinas, ed. by Seán Hand (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1989), p. 180. Levinas argues against Heidegger‘s indifference in his statement: ‗My 
responsibility for the other is precisely the non-indifference of this difference — the proximity of the 
other.‘ In Chapter IV, we discuss this point further. 
 4 
In chapter four, we present Levinas‘s ‗responsible response‘ to the ‗Other‘ as 
an answer to the question of Bonhoeffer‘s non-religious interpretation and the 
extension to Bonhoeffer‘s unfinished attempt at thinking the structure of responsible 
life. The first section will focus on the relationship between the Other and the 
exteriority as ‗face‘. This section deals with the problem ‗how the Other becomes the 
Other‘ by clarifying the concept of ‗separation‘ in Levinas and the ethical 
significance of ‗face‘ in the case of the ‗incarnate subject‘. After we define the 
concept of ‗face‘ in the ethical relationship, especially in Levinas‘s notion of 
responsibility, the second section will concentrate on the relationship between face 
and language. This section argues that the ‗face‘ is the beginning of language via a 
structural explanation of language by distinguishing it from causal and instrumental 
views of language.
7
  Based on this presupposition, we intend to explore the ethical 
significance of language within the diachronical context of time. This will lead our 
discussion to Levinas‘s concepts of ‗the Saying‘ and ‗the Said‘ and how this pair of 
concepts is entailed by ‗proximity‘ and ‗substitution‘ in a responsible relationship.8 
In the end, we will conclude that, though man‘s response is finite, the responsible 
significance of this response is infinite. It is the response to the Other via language 
that manifests the significance of responsibility. Responsibility, in this new sense, 
provides a possible approach for explaining Bonhoeffer‘s idea of non-religious 
interpretation of Christianity and his exploration about the structure of responsible 
life. 
 
In chapter five, we will further analyze, systematically, the role of depth of 
the Other and language in the ethical structure of responsibility. Firstly, we will 
examine another possible approach to detect the ethical significance of responsibility 
                                                 
7
 Thus language, in our study, is not regarded as an instrument that can be picked up and put down by 
ourselves; rather, we belong, in a sense, to language far more than it belongs to us, and through this 
we can find the place and meaning of human being in a particular time and society. Therefore, how 
language speaks and hears in a dialogical way, especially in communication with the Other/ other, in 
both a theological and a philosophical sense, is a central concern in this study. Moreover, we shall 
argue that the role of language in the Other/ other and responsibility is dialectical: that is to say, to 
explore the nature of language is to point to the subjects who exist in this language, and language is an 
unavoidable and fundamental perspective to explore the relationship between these subjects in various 
forms of dialogues. Only by means of dialogue can we fix both the centre and the boundary between 
the speaker and hearer.  This view of language guides our reflections on the structure of responsibility 
that is discussed in this study, and that is based on Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s relevant thoughts.  
8
 See Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. by Alphonso Lingis, 
(Dordrecht and Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1978); Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence (The Hague 
and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974). (Henceforth: abbreviated in notes as OB.)  
 5 
from Alfred Schutz‘s (1899–1959) phenomenology of sociology.9 After we discuss 
the merit and demerit of Schutz‘s approach, and identify ‗the Other‘ and ‗language‘ 
as indispensable elements in any ethical analyses of responsibility, we will apply this 
structure to explore two important problems. The first one is to analyze the concept 
of ‗religion‘ in the ethical structure of responsibility; the second one is to analyze the 
concept of ‗responsibility‘ in Western and Chinese perspective. As for the first 
aspect, to re-consider the nature of ‗religion‘ in an era when God does not play the 
same role as before and human being‘s response to this change corresponds to 
Bonhoeffer‘s reflection on the relationship between religion and faith.  It also serves 
to develop further what he means by a ‗non-religious interpretation of Christianity‘ 
which is also significant for researching the location of the ethical significance of 
responsibility in the reconsideration of religion. As for the second aspect, the ethical 
significance of responsibility for the other is regarded as a fundamental and universal 
value that can be understood and communicated in any background. This is why it is 
important to compare western and eastern philosophic approaches to ‗the other‘ and 
the concept of ‗responsibility‘ and ‗language‘. This will demonstrate that though the 
value is basically comprehended, the approaches or the forms of its manifestation 
can never be the same and will never be the same. Responsibility to the other (à 
l‟autre) and in front of the other (devant l‟autre) and for the other (pour l‟autre) 
preserves the otherness of the Other (l‟Autrui). Therefore, in the last section of this 
chapter, we will tentatively and briefly show the similarities and differences between 
the Western and Chinese perspectives on responsibility in order to detect the genuine 
approach to treat each other differently and responsibly.  
 
                                                 
9
 Alfred Schutz: Austrian social scientist. He integrates sociological and phenomenological tradition 
to explore human relationship with a method of social phenomenology. His thought was influenced by 
Max Weber, Henri Bergson, William James, as well as Edmund Husserl.  See, Ch. V, § 1. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS  
CENTRALITY IN ETHICS 
 
 
Although the word ‗responsibility‘ is a relatively new invention in the English 
language,
1
 the concept of responsibility has been discussed throughout the history of 
Western philosophy and down through the ages in various ways and in different 
contexts.   For instance, it has been used in the context of the explanation of natural 
phenomena, or as an evaluation of a character‘s blameable behaviour, or as a legal 
concept in the proceedings of a court of law.     In the twentieth century, however, 
this concept takes on a particular ethical significance both in the philosophy of 
Levinas and in the religious thinking of Bonhoeffer.   The emergence of this concept 
is the focus of this chapter.   The chapter begins, first, with a brief consideration of 
the etymological origin of the word and then examines the development of some of 
the main theories of responsibility and meanings attributed to this concept in 
philosophy up to and including its emergence as a central ethical concept in the 
writings of Levinas and Bonhoeffer.   
 
 
SECTION ONE 
THE ETYMOLOGY OF THE TERM ‗RESPONSIBILITY‘ 
 
‗Responsibility‘, in English, is an extended noun, relating to ‗response‘ and 
‗respond‘ (both from c. 1300).   ‗Response‘ is Middle English and derives from Old 
French respons or Latin responsum, a neuter past participle of respondere, meaning 
‗something offered in return‘.   ‗Respond‘ is late Middle English from Old French, 
from respondre ‗to answer‘, which derives also from Latin respondere, from re- 
‗again‘ and spondere,  ‗to pledge‘.   This meaning of responsibility can also be found 
in the German Verantwortung, which emphasizes the meaning of answering 
                                                 
1
 The Oxford English Dictionary notes that the formation of the words ‗responsible‘ and 
‗responsibility‘ in the English language dates from c. 1558–9 and c. 1787, respectively. 
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(Antwort).    ‗Responsibility‘, therefore, is a word that is quite new in origins and 
arrives in Western ethics rather late.
2
   It first appeared in German, then in English, 
and eventually in French in the seventeenth century.
3
  Regarding the philosophical 
use of this term, Albert Jonsen  remarks, 
 
The word has its philosophical debut in David Hume‘s Treatise of Human 
Nature (1740): ‗actions may be blameable […] but the person not 
responsible for them.‘  It is from the beginning used in political literature, 
as exemplified in Alexander Hamilton‘s Federalist Papers (1787): 
‗Responsibility in order to be reasonable must be limited to objects within 
the power of the responsible body.‘4 
 
Here, responsibility points to the responsibility of the state and what is within the 
limits of the state to regulate (actions by the state, in this case, may be considered 
blameable as the state is responsible but the individual person may not be held 
blameable because that individual is not responsible for them).   Thus, what we could 
regard as personal responsibility is not covered or features in this meaning of ‗socio-
political responsibility‘.   
 
J. R. Lucas notes that the Homeric heroes had little use of this socio-political 
concept ‗responsibility‘, focusing instead their moral vocabulary on merit and 
kudos.
5
   Bernard Williams, nevertheless, provides sources for us to trace the 
meaning of this word ‗responsibility‘ back to some passages of early Greek texts.   
We can find various aspects about responsibility in Homeric epics, such as for 
instance, responsibility as accepting;
6
 responsibility and cause;
7
 the elements of 
                                                 
2
  See, Gerald P. McKenny, ‗Responsibility‘, in The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics, ed. by 
Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp 237–253. 
3
 It appeared in English in the late eighteenth century. See, supra, n. 1. 
4
 Albert R. Jonsen, Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethic (Washington: Corpus Books, 1968), p. 3. 
See, also, Richard McKeon, ‗The Development and Significance of the Concept of Responsibility,‘ in 
his Freedom and History and Other Essays (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
5
 See, J. R. Lucas, Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 5. and, n. 1. Cf., also, A. 
W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon, 1960), esp., ch. 3; H. Lloyd-Jones, The 
Justice of Zeus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); and Mary Margaret Mackenzie, 
Plato on Punishment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), ch. 6.  
6
 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 53.  As 
Williams further points out: ‗(W)hen Telemachus was to blame, one thing involved in this was that it 
might be his business to make up for it. But when Agmemnon says, unlike Telemachus, that he was 
not aitios, he does not mean that it is not his business to make up for it. On the contrary: ―But since I 
was deluded and Zeus took my wits away from me, I am willing to make all good and give back gifts 
in abundance. However his actions came about, he must compensate Achiless. In that sense, he does 
accept responsibility. […] It is in virtue of what he did that he must pay.‖‘ ibid., p. 187.   
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responsibility;
8
 the relationship and intention,
9
 moral responsibility,
10
 responsibility 
as self-ascribed,
11
 and skepticism about responsibility.
12
   A. W. H. Adkins makes the 
point that the Greeks lacked indeed a concept of responsibility because their ethics 
does not centre on the idea of duty;
13
 however, the Greek texts still supply a useful 
background for us to re-consider the meaning of the concept of responsibility. 
                                                                                                                                          
7
 Williams, pp. 56–58: ‗The first of these elements, cause, is primary: the other issues can arise only in 
relation to the fact that some agent is the cause of what has come about. Without this, there is no 
concept of responsibility at all‘ (p. 56). Therefore, ‗the aim is that the response should be applied to a 
person whose action was the cause of the harm.‘ (ibid.). In this manner, then,, ‗(T)he link between 
cause and response was for the Greeks built into their language. The verb aitiaomai means ―to blame‖ 
or ―censure‖.‘ (p. 57) ‗The word aition is, from the Hippocratic writings on, a standard word for 
―cause‖, and its relative aitia kept connections with both kinds of sense: it meant a complaint or an 
accusation, but already by the time of Herodotus‘s book it can mean simply ―cause‖ or 
―explanation.‖‘, ‗This primary link to the idea of a cause may help us to understand some Greek views 
of responsibility that we find more problematical‘ (p. 58). 
8
 William, p. 55: ‗Just from these two Homeric incidents, then, we have four ideas: that in virtue of 
what he did, someone has brought about a bad state of affairs; that he did or did not intend that state of 
affairs; that he was or was not in a normal state of mind when he brought it about; and that it is his 
business, if anyone‘s, to make up for  it. We might label these four elements cause, intention, state, 
and response. These are the basic elements of any conception of responsibility.‘ 
8
 William, pp. 63–66: ‗Critics have suggested that the whole discussion in the Tetralogies rests on a 
primitive conception of responsibility, essentially connected with magical notions and basically 
different from our own conception. But while we would not demand a ―whole person‖ response in 
such a case, it is not true that the conceptions of responsibility being deployed here are all that 
different from some of our own‘ (p. 63). ‗The fundamental point is that insofar as we do deal 
differently with criminal responsibility under the law, this is because we have a different view, not of 
responsibility in general, but of the role of the state in ascribing responsibility, in demanding a 
response for certain acts and certain harms.‘ […] ‗We have conceptions of legal responsibility 
different from any such conception the Greek had, but that is because we have a different concept of 
law – not, basically, a different concept of responsibility‘ (p.65). 
9
 William, pp. 63–66: ‗Critics have suggested that the whole discussion in the Tetralogies rests on a 
primitive conception of responsibility, essentially connected with magical notions and basically 
different from our own conception. But while we would not demand a ―whole person‖ response in 
such a case, it is not true that the conceptions of responsibility being deployed here are all that 
different from some of our own‘ (p. 63). ‗The fundamental point is that insofar as we do deal 
differently with criminal responsibility under the law, this is because we have a different view, not of 
responsibility in general, but of the role of the state in ascribing responsibility, in demanding a 
response for certain acts and certain harms.‘ […] ‗We have conceptions of legal responsibility 
different from any such conception the Greek had, but that is because we have a different concept of 
law – not, basically, a different concept of responsibility‘ (p.65).  
10
 William, pp. 56, 64–67, 95: ‗All conceptions of responsibility make some discriminations, as 
Telemachus did, between what is voluntary in this sense and what is not; at the same time, no 
conception of responsibility confines response entirely to the voluntary‘ (p. 66). ‗Very importantly, 
they include some purpose of justice. But these purposes can be identified only by working back to 
what we require of the law and other agencies that ascribe responsibility, from more general 
considerations about the relations of the individual to social power.‘ (ibid.). 
11
 William, pp. 68–71: ‗so far we have been concerned with responses that are demanded by some 
people, or by a legal system, of other people. But there is another aspect to responsibility, which 
comes out if we start on the question not from the response that the public or the state or the 
neighbours or the damaged parties demand of the agent, but from what the agent demands of himself.‘ 
(p. 68).  
12
 William, pp. 56, 67: ‗If we push beyond a certain point questions of what outcome, exactly, was 
intended, whether a state of mind was normal or whether the agent could at a certain moment have 
controlled himself, we sink into the sands of an everyday, entirely justified, skepticism.‘ (p. 67). 
13
 See, Adkins, Merit and Responsibility. 
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SECTION TWO 
THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS ON RESPONSIBILITY 
 
We can find relevant discussions about responsibility from pre-Socratic 
philosophers, other than from the Homeric epics.   Ethical speculations have been 
carried out by the Sophists and by Democritus, although Aristotle holds that it was 
Socrates who was the first to really invent moral philosophy.
14
   Barnes notes that 
‗responsible‘ in Greek is αἴτιος (aitios), means, 
 
to be anointed with the same oil and sometimes in saying of someone that 
he is responsible for a certain state of affairs, we mean to hand out blame: 
calling someone responsible is calling him guilty.  ‗Aitia‘, according to 
Liddell and Scott, means ‗responsibility, mostly in the bad sense, guilt, 
blame, or the imputation thereof, i.e., accusation‘.15 
 
‗Responsible‘ in this context may indicate the imputation of agency and the 
causation.   For this reason, ‗responsible‘ has both a causal and an evaluative use.   
These two aspects can be considered respectively, but they can also be examined 
inter-connectedly.  Gorgias‘s Helen, for example, is a proper case for us to 
understand how he judges the causation and think about this evaluation,
16
 even 
though it is still a matter of controversy to decide whether the discussion of this case 
is an intellectual contribution to moral philosophy or just a rhetorical exercise.   
Gorgias classifies his argument into four sources of actions:
17
 If I X, then (1) either 
my X-ing was accidental in which case it falls under ‗divine necessity‘; or (2) my X-
ing was forced upon me; or (3) my X-ing was the result of thought, in which case I 
was ‗persuaded by argument‘, my own or someone else‘s; or, (4) finally, I X-ed 
impetuously, driven on by my feelings.  
 
For Gorgias, these four aspects can be used to explain various situations that 
are relevant to actions of ‗responsibility‘.   The first two can be considered together 
because both of them relate to ‗chance‘.   This, indeed, is one of the most important 
                                                 
14
 Jonathan Barnes, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (London:  Routledge, 1982), p. 402. 
15
 Ibid., p. 415. Cf. The term ‗Christ‘ is the English term for the Greek Χριστός (Christós) meaning 
―the anointed‖, which as a translation of the Hebrew       (Mašíah), carries much of its original 
Jewish meaning of ―Messiah‖—―one [who is] anointed‖ or appointed by God with a unique and 
special purpose (mission) on Earth. 
16
 Barnes, pp. 415–416. 
17
 Ibid., p. 416. 
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aspects that might remove the agent‘s responsibility in legal debate.   The reason for 
this is that causal responsibility can include what happens by chance, even though 
moral responsibility might not.   This, in turn, is related to an important concept in 
Aristotle‘s theory of responsibility: force (bia).   If I am forced to do something, then 
I am not responsible for doing this.   This is an ambiguous argument because whether 
an action is forced or not will ultimately be connected to the problem of choosing to 
act (or refraining from choosing act which itself is a choice).   To depend, 
nevertheless, on the imputation of this choice alone cannot indicate a fair judgment 
on whether I need to be also responsible or not.   Yet it plays an important role 
regarding the evaluation of the responsibility.   We will evaluate the fourth one, 
which is about the problem of emotion and leave the third one as Barnes does, 
presently, because the third one is the most interesting one.   In the fourth case, 
people do X under emotions like fear, love, hatred and so on, and then will not be 
responsible for what they did.   As Barnes argues, the third one, however, is the most 
interesting one because it is about ‗the Logos, the rhetorical sophist‘s engine and 
delight‘.18 In the case of Helen, Logos is comparable to force (bia), which can be 
treated as a persuasion.   Gorgias means people are not responsible for their acts, if 
he or she was persuaded by the others to do X.   Barnes concludes, then, that Gorgias 
fails to defend this argument from the other aspects – of chance, force and emotion – 
because if we treat logos as a cause, then we can find other causes to be responsible 
for the previous cause.   This will be an endless circle of explanation.    
 
From the above brief review of Gorgia‘s case of Helen, we can see Gorgia‘s 
rhetoric skills cannot defend his position.   His argument, however, opens up the 
door for later philosophers to consider the problem of responsibility, focusing 
especially on the problem of determinism, force and freedom.   
 
SECTION THREE 
ARISTOTLE‘S ACCOUNT OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Lucas remarks that ‗Aristotle was the first to discuss responsibility, and much of our 
understanding derives from him.‘19  The first sentence of Aristotle's Nicomachean 
                                                 
18
 Barnes, The Pre-Socratic Philosophy, p. 419. 
19
 Lucas, Responsibility, p. 247. 
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Ethics concerns the nature of the human good or human happiness eudaimonia.
20
  
For Aristotle, what characterizes a human being is that being‘s capacity for 
‗discourse‘ (logos) or that being‘s ability to exercise ‗reason‘ (zoon echon logos).   In 
this regard, human beings  by comparison to other living beings (animals and plants), 
are to be identified with their logos and this is what makes human beings what they 
are for Aristotle.   Human function, therefore, is the characteristic activity of that 
living being‘s soul in accord with reason.   And reason is the source of the virtue 
(ἀρετή; Aretê).   Correspondingly, that which makes an action right is its being 
virtuous.   Moreover, Aristotle also uses the word ‗reason‘ in his account of the 
determination of the mean and the power of knowledge.   Therefore, we can say, 
human good is achieved when the human function is performed well, and this human 
function is performed well by being performed in accord with virtue.   From this it 
follows, for Aristotle, that eudaimonia is the activity of the soul in accord with 
virtue, which is partially constituted by virtuous acts themselves.   
 
 Goods, Aristotle thinks, can be classified into three groups: external goods, 
goods of the soul, and goods of the body.   Only goods of the soul are the ones that 
are most strict and special.
21
  To look for human good and happiness, we have to 
consider human virtue.    Human virtue, however, refers to the good of the soul, not 
to the good of the body because happiness is an activity of the soul.
22
  Furthermore, 
the soul also can be seen as bipartite, with a rational and a non-rational part.    And 
‗the rational part is the source of the intellectual virtues, the most important of which 
in connection with ethics is practical wisdom.‘23  The rational part constitutes the 
virtue of thoughts including wisdom, comprehension and prudence.   The non-
rational part is concerned with nutrition and so on, which is shared in reason, but not 
part of human virtue.  
 
 After we examine the relation between good and virtue, it is necessary to 
examine the preconditions of virtue in a deeper sense.   This is related to the 
                                                 
20
 ‗Every skill and every inquiry, and similarly every action and rational choice, is thought to aim at 
some good; and so the good has been aptly described as that at which everything aims.‘ Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, translated and edited by Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000),  p. 3.  
21
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, p. 13. 
22
 Ibid., p. 20. 
23
 Ibid., p. xiv. 
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discussion of action, which is a tendency in contemporary ethics.   Ancient writers, 
however, discuss ‗right‘ action more in terms of a human being‘s life as a whole 
because actions will lead one to develop the corresponding character.   Right action 
is what the virtuous person would do in any circumstance.   Thus the values that one 
subscribes to play a central role in the formation of one‘s own character which, in 
turn, determines the way one behaves or acts in particular circumstances.   All of this 
— the interconnectedness of the way values form character and formed-character 
determines conduct — is ‗ethos‘ for Aristotle and the ancient Greeks.   And 
Aristotle‘s doctrine of virtue as the mean between two excesses works especially 
well when we have a morally neutral action or feeling at the right time to get the 
largest amount of well-being, but to avoid an extreme situation.    It is in this context 
that Aristotle recognizes virtuous actions as praise-worthy and vicious actions as 
blame-worthy, when they are voluntary.   This leads Aristotle to reflect on free will 
and the issue of  reward and punishment in relation to actions undertaken.   
 
          In his examination of reward and punishment, Aristotle begins by 
distinguishing two conditions of actions, those that arise from ignorance (di‟agnoian) 
and from force (bia), which generates his philosophical and legal accounts of 
responsibility.
24
  In this context, Aristotle further distinguishes the voluntary 
(ἑκούσιον) act that the agent who knows the particulars from decision, or not, from 
decision (i.e. culpable ignorance), and the involuntary (ἀκούσιον) act that the agent 
contributes nothing from ignorance or not from ignorance, as well a third category: 
the non-voluntary, which is related to whether it is regretted, or not.   These further 
refinements bring forward the internal views and external views of humans.  The 
internal view, for Aristotle, signifies what is ‗known to us‘ and decides our daily 
lives and responses to each other as persons in practical actions.   By contrast, the 
external view signifies what is ‗known without qualification‘ and what is judged to 
be true through science and through the construction of a systematic ordering of 
perception of the world in theoretical observation.   The former constructs Aristotle‘s 
thoughts of responsibility, that is, his is ‗an account of the causal conditions in which 
an agent merits praise and blame for what he or she does.‘25  There are two tasks for 
                                                 
24
 Ibid., III.I, 1110a-b. 
25
 Susan Sauvé Cause, ‗Introduction‘, Aristotle on Moral Responsibility: Character and Cause  
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 3. 
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Aristotle‘s theory of moral responsibility.   The first is to ‗identify the features that 
properly subject an agent to these demands, expectations, and evaluations.‘26  The 
second, is ‗to identify the circumstances in which a morally responsible agent is 
morally responsible for some particular action.‘27  As Lucas remarks,  
 
Responsibility is not just a physical concept subject to the standard 
physical constraints of locality and temporal antecedence, but is, rather, 
concerned with the significance of actions and their interpretation, where 
is perfectly possible for the meaning to be altered ex post facto.
28
 
 
Therefore, Aristotle would allow or even encourage us to interpret and develop his 
theories of responsibility.   The theory of responsibility can be interpreted along the 
lines of Aristotle‘s theory of the ‗four causes‘ because many Aristotle scholars regard 
that the thought of ‗four causes‘ is a theory of explanation. 29   As a theory of 
explanation, it would be useful to explain his own theory of responsibility in these 
terms; this will be  especially relevant for us to comprehend the ‗substance‘ of his 
account from this point of view rather than the more modern aspect of ‗cause-and-
effect‘ emphasized in some theories of responsibility.   Again, this will be helpful for 
us to clarify the ways in which the theory of the ‗four causes‘ still exercises an 
influence on other theories of responsibility.   
 
 In brief, the theory of the four basic explanations and causes can be listed as 
below, which Aristotle developed in the Physics, book I-II (αἰτίαι): 
 
(1) The essence (to ti estin, to ti ēn einai) and the form (hē morphē, to eidos) 
of a thing; 
(2) The matter (hulē) of the thing; 
(3) The source of the change and especially of the generation of the thing (to 
kinoun); and 
(4) The end (telos) at which the change and especially the generation of the 
thing is directed.
30
 
 
                                                 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid., p. 4. 
28
 Lucas, Responsibility, p. 277. 
29
 Cf., Cynthia A. Freeland, ‗Accidental Causes and Real Explanations‘, in, Aristotle‟s Physics: A 
Collection of Essays, ed. by Lindsay Judson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 49. 
30
 Vasilis Politis, Aristotle and the Metaphysics(London: Routledge, 2004), p. 51; Cf., W. Charlton, 
Aristotle‟s Physics, Books I and II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 27–31, 194b1-
195b30. 
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The main purpose of the theory of ‗four causes‘ is to solve the problem of the 
essence of changing things, which was evoked by both Parmenides‘ and Plato‘s ideas 
about the same problem.   Parmenides denies the reality of change and regards that 
only the changeless is real.   Plato argues that there are separate forms for different 
changing things.   Aristotle thinks both of these two views are unacceptable.   He 
argues, instead, that the intelligible world of forms is visible in the changeable and 
sensible reality of substances that we encounter all around us.   It is in this context, 
then, that Aristotle develops his own theory of the four explanations and causes in 
order to supply a clear account of the relationships of permanence and change in the 
changing things.    
 
 As for employing the theory of ‗four causes‘ to elucidate the nature of moral 
responsibility, the first cause ‗formal cause‘ and the second cause ‗material cause‘ 
are static factors whereas the other two causes ‗efficient cause‘ and ‗final cause‘ are 
dynamic factors.
31
  The ‗formal cause‘ pertains to what responsibility is in virtue of it 
being the very relationship it is; and the essence of relationship determines to what 
general kind the particular responsibility in various situations belongs.   The 
‗material cause‘ concerns how actions change or transform and especially how these 
actions of responsibility can be generated or come to be.   As Aristotle emphasizes, 
matter cannot exist on its own but is in potency and only in a material thing with 
certain form.   Thus, this idea can be employed to explore the inner elements that 
constitute the nature of responsibility in the following chapters of this thesis.   The 
‗efficient cause‘ is also sometimes referred to a ‗moving cause‘.   It addresses the 
question, what generates responsibility in the first place? Aristotle argues that ‗what 
generates a particular thing is an already generated thing that belongs to the same 
general kind‘. 32   A proposed answer would be that the intentions of the agent 
generate responsibility.  The ‗final cause‘ focuses on the result of such actions in the 
end-state (telos) or that towards which the actions of responsibility are directed, or, 
more simply put, the thing that it is produced for.   It responds to two questions, then: 
‗what is responsibility good for‘ and ‗for whom is responsibility a good‘? 
 
                                                 
31
 The explanation of the contents of the ‗four causes‘ refers to Vasilis Politis‘s idea in his Aristotle 
and the Metaphysics, pp.53–55.  
32
 Politis, p. 54. 
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 Setting this approach aside, we will turn to contemporary theories of 
responsibility in the following section, since this is of importance to the discussion 
on responsibility in this study.  
 
 
SECTION FOUR 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Responsibility covers a wide-ranging area of investigation, and so, it is not surprising 
that there have been many approaches to and studies of various aspects and 
dimensions of responsibility.   Contemporary theories of responsibility, however, 
concentrate attention, generally speaking, on three main attributes of responsibility, 
namely: retrospective responsibility, prospective responsibility, and responsible 
agency.
 33
   These three aspects of responsibility also include concerns that are 
relevant to our study; in particular, the two main questions that we are addressing in 
this study: (1) what is it to be responsible? and (2) what is a person responsible for?   
 
 Turning to the issue of retrospective responsibility, first, this aspect of 
responsibility concerns what we have done, or failed to do, and its result.   This issue 
of retrospective responsibility occupies an important place in both moral and legal 
domains of enquiry.   Prospective responsibility, on the other hand, concerns the 
foreseen effects of that what we will do, or avoid doing.   In this sense, retrospective 
responsibility is partly determined by prospective responsibility and prospective 
responsibility is partly based on retrospective responsibility.   In other words, 
retrospective responsibility is a kind of ascription of responsibility that focuses on 
the doing of the factual act and the consequences of this action, rather than on the 
possible results, or on probable intended outcomes of actions, or on the moral 
character of the agent.    Prospective responsibility, therefore, is a kind of assumption 
of responsibility that concentrates on ‗whatever or whoever is holding someone 
responsible be willing to accept the transfer of responsibility to another‘.34  Whatever 
                                                 
33
 Cf., R. A, Duff‘s entry on ‗Responsibility‘ in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by E. 
Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 290–294. The discussion in the original article includes a part 
of ‗Responsibility as a Virtue‘. We adopted the first three aspects in our discussion above. 
34
 William Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), p. 151. 
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we have responsibility for is a matter of morality, of course, but this does not imply 
that the law is concerned with every dimension of morality.   There are many things 
that the law is concerned with that do not have a moral dimension, such as, for 
instance, matters of practical planning (e.g., regulation of traffic with traffic lights at 
a crossroads in order to enable traffic flow more freely).   There are also moral 
matters of personal judgement that are not the concern (or can be the concern) of the 
law (e.g., wishing one fellow human being well or ill).    Morality, in other words, 
extends to what is outside the mind and to what is inside the mind and takes into 
consideration a much wider field of enquiry than matters pertaining to law.   This is 
reason why, nevertheless, both retrospective and prospective responsibilities can be 
evaluated both in moral and in legal systems, even if what is the morally right thing 
to do is not (or cannot be) prescribed by law or the legally required thing is not the 
morally required thing.  One, then, can be held, accountable or ‗responsible‘ on the 
basis of retrospective and prospective responsibility from either a moral or a legal 
point of view separately.  
 
 To be a responsible agent, then, involves both retrospective and prospective 
responsibility.   In this regard, a responsible person is one who assumes moral 
responsibility or legal liability for what he or she has done, or failed to do.   
Likewise, an irresponsible person is one who tries to evade responsibilities, or who 
does not take responsibility seriously (which is tantamount to evading 
responsibility).   For example, people who are subject to the obligations of civil law 
or penal law but who compromise the other, when it is his or her own fault, or accept 
punishment when not one‘s own fault, are still people who are responsible for their 
actions.   In other word, a responsible agent, as one commentator puts it, is someone 
‗who can answer (be responsible) for his or her actions and intentions before 
someone who questions the agent, even if that ―someone‖ is the agent himself or 
herself‘.35 
 
 Looked at in this way, we can see that, in the contemporary contextual use of 
the responsible agent, most modern thinkers approach responsibility with a causal or 
naturalistic explanation of human thought and action because his perspective 
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 Schweiker, p. 55. 
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provides a firm response to juridical responsibility.   As mentioned above, however, 
whatever we have responsibility for is a matter of morality, even if the law does not 
concern itself with such matters.   To deliberate upon this ‗overflowing‘ from a 
juridical use into the moral thinking of responsibility, it will be useful to integrate the 
approaches of William Schweiker‘s and Gerald P. McKenny‘s towards a 
classification of contemporary theories of responsibility because later, in the final 
section of this chapter, we will argue for the need to re-think responsibility in line 
with Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘ thoughts precisely because these thinkers take both 
the ethical and the religious dimensions of responsibility into consideration in their 
reflections on responsibility.
36
  
 
 Following Schweiker‘s classification, the development of contemporary 
theories of responsibility can be divided into three types of theories: the agential 
theory, the social theory, and the dialogical theory of responsibility.   The agential 
theory corresponds to the representative action, the social theory corresponds to the 
accountability/ imputability of the actions, and the dialogical theory corresponds to 
the answerability of the actions.    As we shall see, theories focusing on causal 
responsibility play an essential role in the elaboration of moral theories, but in the 
twentieth century the idea of responsibility has been interpreted more in line with 
how to understand the existential situation of a human being.   The question is not 
simply ‗what caused something to happen?‘ but ‗who is responsible?‘ 
 
 If we take a person as a responsible agent, we must give an account of his or 
her individual conscience or social roles, the former focuses on the internal 
dimension and the latter concentrates on the external dimension.   Both of these 
dimensions show that responsibility is an indication for the answer to the ‗who‘ in 
the question of ‗who is responsible?‘ In this context, responsibility is a description of 
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a state of human relationship, rather than the pointing to and  finding out the endless 
causes in a sequence of events.   Responsibility itself is an event, in which an agent 
responsibly interacts with others.   In this regard, the idea of responsibility 
concatenates the action and agent and embodies a metaphysical sense of self-
understanding.   
 
 The issue of human self-understanding, however, brings up the complex 
problems of pluralism.   Is it possible for people from different cultural background, 
educational background, and religious background to reach genuine human self-
understanding and make moral judgments together? Is it possible to find a ‗neutral 
moral language‘ as a platform that can translate different moral beliefs into a way 
that people can understand and communicate their values together? These two 
questions cover (i) the interpretative dimension about ‗what is going on?‘, (ii) the 
practical dimension about ‗what are we to be and to do‘, (iii) the essential dimension 
about ‗what does it mean to be an agent?‘, (iv) the normative dimension of ‗what is 
the norm for how to live?‘ and (v) the meta-ethical dimension about ‗how do we 
justify moral claims?‘.37 
 
 From these questions, therefore, the only one thing that we can clearly confirm 
is that the meaning of responsibility will not mean the same in each theory.   There 
may be ‗a family resemblance‘ among theories in their use of explaining the term 
‗responsibility‘; 38  the most important thing, nevertheless, is to disclose the 
fundamental elements that determine the meaning of responsibility rather than to 
seek the common or similar understanding of responsibility.   The ‗self‘ of the person 
as a moral agent appears in the activity of responsibility.   The word of ‗person‘ 
comes from Latin persona, which was the mask that an actor wears in a play and 
thus the meaning of ‗persons‘ originally refers, to ‗character in a drama, mask‘.   
Therefore, the idea of responsibility is embedded in the modern debate on how to 
understand human existence.
39
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 Before we explore the contemporary theories of responsibility in detail, it will 
be useful to bring McKenny‘s ‗formula‘– X is responsible to Y for Z – to explain 
theories of responsibility from the aspects of imputability, accountability and 
liability,
40
 which is from F. H. Bradley‘s essay ‗The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility 
and its Connection with the Theories of Free Will and Determinism‘ (1876).   
McKenny interprets that the part of ‗X is responsible‘ corresponds to imputability; 
the part of ‗responsible to Y‘ corresponds to accountability; the part of ‗responsible 
for Z‘ corresponds to liability.   In view of this, McKenny‘s interpretation of 
Bradley‘s classification is overlapped with Schweiker‘s way of classification, even 
though the emphases and the methods they employed are not the same.   We can 
integrate McKenny‘s interpretation of Bradely‘s classification into Schweiker‘s 
approach, however, to examine contemporary theories of responsibility as a whole. 
 
§1.4.1   Agential Theory – Accountability/ Imputability 
 
 
As outlined above, the agential theory elaborates the meaning of responsibility in 
terms of accountability.
41
 To be a moral agent is to be responsible primarily for 
oneself first, and then, perhaps, for others.
42
  The focus here is on the relationship 
between the agent and that agent‘s act. The acting agent determines the rightness of 
acts of praise and blame. The agential theory, therefore, emphasizes the primacy of 
moral autonomy. In this case, responsibility is a matter that is ‗up to us‘.43 
 
 Aristotle represents the early theories of agential responsibility, but the 
Aristotelian theory of responsibility is a ‗weak‘ theory because it centres on the 
relation between agent and act in determining the moral rightness of praising and 
blaming.
44
 An obvious characteristic of this weak theory is: ‗whether the action 
originates in the agent‘s power to act or not [to] act‘.45  The praise and blame is the 
condition for the agent‘s power — in other words, the issue of the freedom of the 
agent is still at stake.   With this premise, the utmost possibility to realize an agent‘s 
freedom depends on the outside condition.   Correspondingly, for Christian ethics, it 
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refers to the bondage of will.   It brings forward the question in relation to ‗how 
human beings can be responsible for sin, if they are in bondage to sin‘.46  ‗Sin‘, 
however, is a religious term denoting some break in the relationship between the 
human being and God or some alienation of the human being from God.   How 
exactly we treat each other and are responsible is connected to the way in which our 
relationship with God is maintained (or broken or reconciled) will be addressed in 
detail.  It is suffice to note, at the moment, however, that  contemporary theories 
‗reverse the line of reasoning found in the traditional account‘.47  The traditional 
reasoning of agential theory believes that praise and blame are only proper responses 
to voluntary actions and states of character.   The voluntary actions means that the 
agent has the knowledge of what he or she has done, is doing or will do, but not in 
the state of ignorance.   The discussion of the voluntariness gives rise to the debate of 
freedom.   For Aristotle, the representative of the weak agential responsibility, praise 
and blame is the core of holding responsibility.   For contemporary agential theories, 
however, freedom is the premise and (pre-)condition for the carrying out of a moral 
action, not praise and blame.    
 
 Kant‘s theory about responsibility is representative of these modern theories.   
To be sure, Kant does not use the term responsibility in his ethics.
48
  In his theory of 
ethics, nevertheless, an agent should be directly responsible for what they caused to 
happen but not for the consequences of what they did.   The question for Kant is not 
about whether the agent has the power to choose to do, or not because it is assumed 
that the agent is free to choose to do.   The concept of will which the theories of 
Christian ethics have been wrestling with falls outside of Kant‘s consideration.   The 
reason is that, for Kant, the freedom that the agent owns is bound up with the will, 
which leads to the occurrence of all actions but prior to all the choices.   Kant frees 
the will by emphasizing the autonomy of the will and by suspending the ‗is‘ and 
replaces it with ‗ought‘ that is based on the standard of rationality.   The rational will 
must be regarded as autonomous and this frees the moral agent from external laws 
according to Kant‘s third formulation of the categorical imperative – ‗the Idea of the 
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will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law.‘49  In this sense, 
Kant‘s ethics is a strong agential theory of responsibility because the status of our 
moral role is that of universal lawgivers rather than universal law-followers.   The 
moral agent, for Kant, has the self-legislating freedom to ‗act only in accordance 
with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law.‘50  From this point of view, the purpose of morality, for Kant, is not to 
promote the goodness itself in the world, but to promote the goodness of the moral 
agent‘s will. 
 
 In contrast with Kant‘s autonomy, Paul Tillich used the idea of ‗theonomy‘ to 
develop a Christian version of an agential theory of responsibility, according to 
Schweiker.
51
  The similarity with Kant‘s autonomy is found in the fact that Tillich 
concentrates on the actualization of the self, and the relationship between the moral 
law and the essential being of human.   The process of growing from a disintegrated 
self to an integrated self is an ethical issue for Tillich and only ‗agape‟ (love) can 
make this development come true.   If Kant‘s autonomous view of responsibility is 
absolute because of the categorical imperative, then Tillich‘s ‗theonomous‘ view of 
responsibility is also absolute, but because of the love of God.   However, the 
agential theories of responsibility only pay attention to the role of the self and its 
inner development.   What, then, is the role of the community in the development of 
the self? Which one is the priority, the self or the community? Are they 
complementary to each other simultaneously? 
 
§1.4.2   Social Theory – Representative Action 
 
 
Compared with the focus on the self-initiative activity of agential theories of 
responsibility, social theory examines the importance of representative action in the 
moral life.   This theory focuses on social roles, vocation, stations, and thus 
communal unity, as well as the practices, which constitute the identity, and roles of 
persons and communities.
52
  It is not only about the ‗ought to do‘ action decided 
                                                 
49
 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4:432. 
50
 Ibid., 4:421. 
51
 Schweiker, p. 82. 
52
 Cf., Ibid., pp. 65, 86, 93. 
 22 
upon by the agent and ‗what‘ the self as an agent ‗is‘ or ‗is to be‘, but the stress is put 
on the kind of people we ‗ought to be‘ in terms of social practices and discourse.   
The self is no longer the decider of the laws in the world, but is the organ of the 
social world.   If we use McKenny‘s ‗formula‘ — X is responsible to Y for Z — to 
explain the social theory in this case, then it refers to the part of ‗responsible to Y‘, 
which highlights the relational attribute of responsibility.  It is, therefore, the 
community as a social entity, and not the individual, that plays the central role in the 
moral discussion.   
 
 In fact, such social theory can also be traced back to Aristotle, for the practice 
of praise and blame is an important matter for Aristotle‘s theory of responsibility.   In 
Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes the voluntary and the 
involuntary, which is the foundation of his reflections on the legitimacy of bestowing 
praise and blame on anyone‘s action.  For Aristotle it is other social members who 
decide what constitutes praise and blame, not the ‗self‘; so, we can say that Aristotle 
begins with a social practice of praise and blame.  Aristotle‘s purpose, nevertheless, 
is not focused on how these social practices are to be carried out, but what the proper 
reasons for praise and blame are.   From this point of view and for this kind of social 
theory, the social role of the self in a society is the key to penetrate to the structure of 
responsibility.   It does not depend on the inner-self as an accountable self for it is 
related to an individual-collective integrity.    The difference between agential theory 
and social theory, nonetheless, lies in the fact that in the former the focus is on free 
will and the ambiguous issue of self-consciousness and self-determination (because 
the identity of the self that is conscious and what it is that is determining that self is 
not immediately given or determined), whereas in the latter the concentration is on 
the efficacy of moral (social) responsibility itself.   From this point of view, the 
essential claim of moral responsibility is that the ‗ought to do‘ relies on the ‗ought to 
be‘ in the social order.   The assumption of this theory of responsibility, therefore, 
relies upon exterior elements like social laws, norms, and cultures, etc., rather than 
on interior elements like personality, conscience, or free will and so forth.  
 
 In the same way, we could also analyse Christian ethics regarding the social 
role of the self in responsibility.   For Christians, ‗the crucial social practice of the 
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Church is telling the story of God‘s action in Christ‘53 and to fulfil it in the daily life 
within the church.   Compared to Tillich‘s theonomous theory of responsibility that 
focuses on the essential being of human existence, the social theory relies on the 
remembrance and interpretations of God‘s Word, the Scripture, as the framework for 
understanding life.   In this circumstance, the Scripture is not guidance for Christian 
existence but a contextual constitution for everyday moral life in the church.   
Viewed in this light, to be responsible for a Christian, particularly for the reformed 
tradition, is to practice the scriptural vision of life towards each other in the Church, 
and not to depend on the rationality or freedom of will.   As a result, the Christian 
ethics of responsibility, as well as the general social theory of responsibility, is a 
weak theory of responsibility.   
 
 The social theory of responsibility accentuates the agent‘s identity in a society 
and draws attention to the appropriate roles of the self and the collectivity, in which 
and through which the social practice of blame and praise play an important role.   
By comparison with the agential theory, the social theory goes beyond the strict 
limitation of the nature of human subjectivity because the emphasis upon the self 
neglects the social function and the relational attribute of the concept of 
responsibility.   There are, nonetheless, some problems which emerge regarding 
social theory, such as, for instance, ‗who will decide the standards of the social 
practice of blame and praise?‘, ‗Why should we comply with these standards or 
laws?‘, ‗How can we know the validity, the universality, and the justification of these 
standards?‘   Is it a matter of the majority of opinion in establishing the validity of 
social customs? In matters of morality, however, we should not be impressed by 
unanimity for such unanimity does not guarantee or warrant, even, the correctness of 
the moral judgment.   (Most people believed slavery to be right, buring witches to be 
right, or that certain human beings were superior to other human beings, e.g., racism, 
sexism, and so forth.)  In order to find out the answer to these questions, therefore, 
we need dialogue and negotiation.   The dialogical theory is conceived to explore the 
agentic-relational attribution of responsibility.   
§ 1.4.3   Dialogical Theory – Answerability 
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Dialogical theory focuses attention on possible ways to solve the problems 
mentioned above and it seeks to provide an interpretation regarding the role of the 
other, the event of the encounter of the self, and the role of the other in the 
community, that is relevant to the understanding of responsibility.   In terms of 
McKenny‘s ‗formula‘ (X is responsible to Y for Z), the dialogical theory 
corresponds to the part of ‗responsible for Z‘, which stresses the domain of ‗con-
science‘.   In this instance, the ‗self-disclosure of the other to us and how we respond 
to the other constitute us as persons.‘ 54   The preposition ‗for‘ designates the 
connection with others, or, more precisely, the claim that the other places on me and 
so unfold as a call of the self into question.   Compared with the agential theory that 
also concerns the problem of agent and action relation, the dialogical theory centres 
on the internal reaction to the external calls, and stresses the liability to the other. 
Compared with the social theory, which also concerns the social relationship — the 
relation between the agent and the community, the laws and norms that have been 
reached through praising and blaming — the focus of dialogical theory is on the 
event of multifarious self-other encounters.  
  
 The central thought of this ‗self-other‘ encounter is that ‗the self needs a Thou 
in order to be‘.55  In this respect, the dialogical theory of responsibility attempts to 
integrate the emphasis of the self with agential theory and the focus on the self-
community relationship from social theory.   Furthermore, it also proposes to 
penetrate to the phenomena of responsibility and detect the structure of 
responsibility.     The dialogical model of responsibility, therefore, holds open the 
possibility of exploring an integrated horizon of the critical elements that constitute 
the essential and basic structure and nature of responsibility.  In this respect, Martin 
Buber‘s thought is a direct influence on the dialogical theory of responsibility.  
 
 For Buber, responsibility involves plurality for to be a responsible person is to 
confront one another (responsible persons) in a living mutual relation.
56
  According 
to Buber, there are three main types of relation that exist in this world.
57
  The first 
one is the relation of our life with nature, and in which the relation clings to the 
                                                 
54
 Ibid.,p. 65. 
55
 Ibid., p. 63. 
56
 See, Buber, I and Thou, p. xi. 
57
 Ibid., pp. 6, 101. 
 25 
threshold of speech; the second is our life with men, in which the relation takes on 
the form of speech; and the third is our life with intelligible forms, where the 
relation, is a being without speech, yet begets it.   These three kinds of relation give 
an indication for an address and answer, from which is shown a primordial 
relationship prior to forming, thinking, and acting.    Responsibility entails these 
types of relation, or in Buber‘s words, ‗Love is responsibility of an I for a Thou.‘58  
 
 As noted above, the agential theory stresses the role of the self and the social 
theory emphasizes the role of praise and blame.   For Buber, both of these theories 
are unable to reveal the true structure of relation as ‗I-Thou‘.   As for the first theory, 
the ‗I‘ is at stake because, for Buber, the ‗I‘ only becomes ‗I‘ through the relation to 
the ‗Thou‘.   The agential theory, however, lays stress only on autonomy.   As for the 
second theory, measure and comparison is the issue at stake whereas, for Buber, 
relationship as concrete reality is immeasurable.   These two theories are in the 
domain of the primary word ‗I-It‘, which ‗makes it appearance as individuality and 
becomes conscious of itself as subject (of experiencing and using)‘.59  The dialogical 
theory, by distinction, is located in the presupposition of the primary situation of the 
‗I-Thou‘ relationship, which ‗makes it appearances as person and becomes conscious 
of itself as subjectivity (without a dependent genitive)‘. 60   The a posteriori 
organization makes the external order of the world, but each meeting of the I and 
Thou composes the signs of the world-order itself.   Thus Buber reasserts his views 
in the end of his renowned work I and Thou, ‗the community that is built up out of 
relation, and […] the collection of human units that do not know relation – modern 
man‘s palpable condition of lack of relation‘.61  Buber‘s insightful but mysterious 
style of writing influenced many thinkers who endorse the ‗dialogical theory‘, even 
though their concerns or methods are not completely the same.   His thoughts about 
relation and the word also influenced Barth and Levinas, which we will discuss in 
detail in the following chapters.   
 
 This brief review of Buber‘s influence on dialogical theory, now leads us to 
examine two basic forms of this theory.   The first is Karl Barth‘s ‗divine command 
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ethics that continues some agential theories of responsibility, but concerns the 
encounter with the other‘; and the second one is H. Richard Niebuhr‘s 
‗representative ethics that continues some social dimension of responsibility, but 
again, respect to the demand to respond to others.‘62  
 
 Buber is keen on the I-Thou relationship but does not explicitly indicate the 
connection between the ‗I-Thou relationship‘ and responsibility.   Both Emmanuel 
Levinas and Karl Barth follow Buber‘s way of thinking, but are also concerned with 
the question ‗how is the event of encounter with the other understood within an 
ethics?‘63 Levinas‘s answer is the ‗face of the other‘, which penetrates the meaning 
of reality that struggles to free ‗the other‘ from the view of the self.   Barth‘s answer 
is God as the Absolute Other, who reveals Himself and encounters the self as 
‗Commander‘.   From Barth‘s focal point on divine command ethics, we could say 
his theory is ‗a weak dialogical ethics of responsibility‘ because it is about the divine 
meta-ethical elements of the source of morality that is outside the centre of the self.   
Barth ‗defines responsibility (Verantwortung) in terms of an obedient answer 
(Antwort) to the command of God.‘64  In other words, Barth‘s theological ethics is the 
‗answerability‘ to an other who is external to oneself.65  The answerability is located 
in the form of the command of God that we hear and respond to in the ultimate 
goodness and Word of God.   Therefore, in the sense of exploring the meaning of 
goodness, Barth‘s theory is meta-ethical.    In the sense that the Word of God is 
incarnate in Jesus, his theory is normative.   In sum, Barth‘s dialogical theory 
concerns the derivation of morality from God but not human action itself.   The self 
is defined by the command of God who is Jesus Christ.
66
   In this case, revelation, as 
the incarnation of the Word of God in Jesus, rather than responsibility, is morally 
fundamental.   How a self is responsible depends on how this self responds 
appropriately to the Other, that is to say, to God‘s Word.   We will return to this 
further, in the second chapter.   
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 Contrary to Barth‘s theory, Niebhur regards responsiveness as the designating 
self-knowledge to be essential, and also the first task of ethics.   Therefore, Niebhur 
develops three fundamental types of agent.   The first is ‗man-the-maker‘,67 which 
can be equated with agential theory because human beings in this sense have the 
capacity to determine their destiny by themselves.   The second is man-the-citizen, 
which can be equated with social theory because human beings in this sense are 
organic parts of the community.   The third is man-the-answerer, which signifies the 
dialogical theory, which emphasizes the role of the answerer who responds to action 
on humans/ us.
68
 The question of ‗what we are‘ is present in all of the actions we 
choose to do and the interpretation on these actions that affects the meaning of 
responsibility.   Therefore, for Niebhur, responsibility is a first principle which 
constitutes selfhood and the moral agent.   
 
 These three types of agent can be sorted into three progressive elements with 
respect to the structure of responsibility.
69
  The first responsible action is a response 
to the action itself.   Then the second one is the responsible action of the 
interpretation about that action.   As regards Niebhur‘s classification, the former 
deals with the external part of the structure of responsibility, which can be analysed 
using methods inspired by phenomenology which will be employed in this thesis.   
Correspondingly, the latter deals with the internal part of the structure of 
responsibility, which can be analysed with the methods inspired by hermeneutics, 
which also will also be used in this thesis.    
 
 So far, the concept of responsibility has been analysed both from the 
retrospective and prospective dimensions.  We cannot, however, just stop at the 
theory of dialogical theory. To be responsible, one has to anticipate a response to our 
past, present, and future actions with regards to the Other, which constitute the 
structure of the concept of responsibility. The concern that is exhibited in the 
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diachronical response in relation to the Other in a responsible relationship goes 
beyond the dialogical theory that counts only in the subject‘s answerability in the 
synchronical and present dialogue with the other in a reciprocal relationship. Thus a 
deeper dimension to the structure of responsibility — one that takes into account the 
diachronical dimension of responsibility — needs to be addressed. In other words, 
the need to re-think the structure of responsibility, over time and in time, is necessary 
to the analysis of the contemporary concept of responsibility. 
 
 
SECTION FIVE 
A TURNING POINT: THE NEED TO RETHINK RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Thus far, we have looked back to the etymology of the term of responsibility.  We 
have also reviewed the pre-Socratic philosophers‘ thoughts on responsibility and 
examined Aristotle‘s first systematic reflections on responsibility.  We also reflected 
upon contemporary theories of responsibility.   From these reviews, we have mapped 
the practical and intellectual development of the concept of responsibility, taking into 
consideration the self as the evaluating subject, the self as a social role balanced in its 
relationship in the community, and dialogue as a type of connection between the self 
and the other.   The concept of responsibility, however, is not static but dynamic.   
That is to say, the concept of responsibility is a dynamic word that challenges us to 
face it when it changes, but at the same time, it also urges us to grasp the 
fundamental elements that determine the nature of responsibility itself.  The concept 
of responsibility also implies action and relationship, thus we need to investigate 
actions and relationships in any elucidation of the meaning of the concept of 
responsibility.   
 
 The concept of responsibility, however, is not without its critics in the history 
of thought.   Nietzsche, for example, is a pioneer in the attempt to provide a critique 
of the responsible subject in his Genealogy of Morality.   Nietzsche, of course, 
criticizes all moral values and holds that all the intrinsic worth of these values must 
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be, radically, called in question.
70
  The reason for Nietzsche‘s suspicion is, ‗what if 
morality should turn out to be the danger of dangers?‘71 Thus Nietzsche undertakes 
an examination of the long history of the origin or genesis of the concept of 
responsibility in this book and attempts to show that ‗how the responsible subject is 
not realized in a transcendental act of self-positing, but is rather the product of a long 
history of often violent social practices.‘72  A major implication of this Nietzschean 
critique, therefore, is that when theories of responsibility have developed to this point, 
the question of both responsible action and the responsible agent is no longer stable.  
 
 In view of this situation, the consideration of the concept of responsibility 
should no longer be reflected upon in a horizonal dimension, that is to say, as 
pertaining to ‗a responsible subject‘ or as that which exists between responsible 
subjects or in the connection with the responsible subject to the others only.   It is 
inevitable that we have to reconsider the concept of responsibility in a vertical 
dimension by examining the basic elements that constitute the structure of 
responsibility, especially from the perspective of ‗the other‘ as the starting point, and 
the role of ‗language‘ as not only a tool to understand specific aspects of 
responsibility but also as a phenomenon to understand the nature of responsibility 
itself.   The development of Stanley Hauerwas‘s thought is an example of this 
reversal.
73
  His early thought is still within the horizon of Kantian responsibility so 
that the role of otherness is estranged from the self on the one hand; narrative as a 
manifestation mode ‗replaces the act of will as what constitutes the subject‘ on the 
other hand. 
74
  In his recent work, however, Hauerwas holds that the subject should 
not exist prior to the ‗story‘ that forms him or her.    This is a profound reversal on 
the traditional views of responsibility.   It is no longer the self that constitutes itself 
as moral subject before the influence of language works on it, it is rather the 
application of language employed by the self that constitutes the self as responsible.   
Another significant shift, for McKenny, is ‗from the Kantian theme of responsibility 
as the constitution of a subject distinct from desires and inclinations to the 
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Aristotelian theme of responsibility as a factor of social practices of praise and 
blame.‘75   In what follows below, however, this shift will be analysed as a dialectical 
development.   In other words, these two ideas will be seen to collide with each other 
in a complicated way.   This viewpoint has been elucidated in different versions, for 
example, by Kierkegaard in his Fear and Trembling, by Levinas in his later works, 
by Karl Barth in his summons to responsibility issued by the Word of God, and also 
by Bonhoeffer in his consideration of ‗deputyship‘ and its relationship to 
responsibility.    
 
 There is a common characteristic in these thinkers‘ concerns: responsibility is 
not only formulated either by the self or by the community retroactively but also by 
‗the other‘ prospectively.   In Schweiker‘s estimation, 
 
This act of understanding is how the imperative of responsibility becomes 
constitutive of a person‘s or community‘s identity.   The idea of radical 
interpretation links the theory of value, the imperative of responsibility, 
and a theory of agency in an integrated ethics of responsibility.
76
 
 
 
In contrast with Schweiker‘s integrated ethics of responsibility, this thesis intends to 
explore the structure of pre-moral elements in order to reveal the mask that has 
covered the ‗person‘ for such a long time, not, however, by this person‘s bodily 
existence nor by his social roles, but by the linguistic address and designation from 
the other.   We called this radical responsibility, and it is closely linked to 
Schweiker‘s method of radical interpretation: ‗a way to articulate how moral identity 
is constituted and transformed through an act of understanding.‘77  Indeed, this is a 
position taken regarding the epistemological principle in ethics.   Emmanuel Levinas 
is the most important philosopher who has written on the internalization of 
responsibility.   He can function as a counterpart and answerer to Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer who raises questions about the meaning of responsibility as 
representative action, as acting for others.   In the next part, we will briefly introduce 
Bonhoeffer and Levinas‘s historical background and explain the reason why we 
choose them as the central thinkers to be addressed in this study.   
 
                                                 
75
 Ibid. 
76
 Schweiker, p. 152. 
77
 Ibid., p. 176. 
 31 
 
SECTION SIX 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SHARED HISTORICAL  
BACKGROUND TO BONHOEFFER AND LEVINAS‘S REFLECTIONS ON RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Both Bonhoeffer and Levinas‘s thought share common concerns about the problem 
of ‗the other‘ and of ‗otherness‘.   Otherness, from the point of view of ordinary life, 
refers to the quality or condition of being other, or different.   From the perspectives 
of theology and philosophy, however, this concept contains a continuing and 
intriguing question that has been pursued for a long time, from Plato to Levinas, by 
many theologians and philosophers, relating specifically to the question: What is the 
position of human being in the world? At the end of Bonhoeffer‘s lectures on the 
history of systematic theology in the twentieth century Bonhoeffer poses the 
question: ‗where do we stand?‘78 As for Levinas, he remarks that ‗we are unable to 
hide from ourselves, what we discover is a self riveted to its being‘79 and this serves 
to establish his position.   These two thinkers gave their unique response to this 
question in different ways.   
 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a German theologian, Lutheran pastor and martyr in 
the early 20th century.   His brief but abundant life and precious theological ideas has 
had an enduring legacy that people, perhaps, may never take advantage of, but they 
will never lose this legacy, for,  as the author of Bonhoeffer‘s biography, and also his 
close friend, Eberhard Bethge, writes,  
 
Perhaps it is the consistency and credibility of his admirable 
understanding of his culture and church traditions, and the way in which 
he accepted the shaking of these foundations, while he lived and 
conceived a new Christianity for the future.
80
 
 
Born in the same year as Bonhoeffer (1906), in Kaunas, of Jewish family, Levinas 
influenced the French philosophical community by introducing the thought of 
Edmund Husserl.   He is probably best known for his initial reflective philosophy of 
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ethical thought with the aim of going beyond the ethically neutral tradition of 
ontology (promoted  by Heidegger).  Levinas, however, did more than just re-direct 
phenomenological inquiry to ethical concerns he rethought the sources of ethics and 
its relationship to theology, and therein inspired various comparative topics and 
monographs on his thinking in discussions on postmodernity. 
 
 Bonhoeffer gave his reply to the ethical problems through his works: Act and 
Being (1930), Christ the Center (or Christology, 1933), and Ethics (began from 
1940), as well as his action as a martyr.   Levinas gave his reply to the ethical 
problems through his works, Time and the Other (1947), Existence and Existents 
(1947), Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (1961), Humanism and the 
Other (1972), Entre Nous: Essays on Thinking-of-the-Other (1979), Ethics and 
Infinity: Conversations With Philippe Nemo, (1982), and many more studies, as well 
as in his experiences from the persecution of Jews by the Nazis. 
 
 Why, nevertheless, should we compare Levinas and Bonhoeffer‘s work on 
responsibility? Is it just because they were born in the same year and faced the same 
historical era? Yes, this historical reality is important to both thinkers but it is not the 
only reason.  
 
Levinas was an unconventional phenomenologist who subverted the 
traditional Husserlian conception of phenomenology as a rigorous scientific way of 
investigating the intentionality of consciousness, that is to say, the nature of 
consciousness and its objectivities, by pointing to ‗the other‘ as source of meaning.  
In this, Levinas is one of the most influential thinkers on Jacques Derrida and his 
project of deconstruction.   Bonhoeffer, as a devotional Christian theologian, 
criticises the traditional concept of religion and re-evaluates the situation of 
Christianity in the twentieth century.   In this, Bonhoeffer is one of the most 
significant thinkers who inspired the existential hermeneutic on Christianity and 
Christological interpretation of the suffering God.
81
  Moreover, at the end of both of 
their reflections, both focus on and appeal to ethics in order to highlight their 
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Bonhoeffer‘s thinking because both these two ways of thinking concern the problem of faith in a 
changing era and of man‘s changing understanding of the role of God in this context. 
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viewpoints on responsibility.   Therefore, their perspectives are full of interlacing 
possibilities for offering answers to our re-understanding of ethics and the centrality 
of the concept of responsibility to that re-evaluation.   
 
While both Levinas and Bonhoeffer share the same historical situation and  
have their own respective different religious backgrounds, both of them see the 
nature of ultimate reality as a strength that can daily renew life from ‗otherness‘ and 
both of them endeavour to express this through speaking about transcendence in a 
dialogical sense.   In this regard, both of these thinkers provide us with both useful 
and specific hermeneutic resources to re-examine the concept of responsibility in our 
contemporary situation.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE INTER-CONNECTEDNESS BETWEEN  
BOUNDARY, POSSIBILITY, LIMITATION AND ETHICAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN MAN 
 
Barth and Bonhoeffer both relate their reflections on responsibility to an analysis of 
the other and language.   Indeed, Barth‘s early thinking on these issues had a 
significant influence on Bonhoeffer‘s later ideas.   This chapter, therefore, begins by 
outlining Barth‘s distinction between the Wholly Other (Totaliter aliter) and Man, 
with particular reference to his reflections on the relationship between the Word of 
God and the word of Man.   These twin elements are essential to his conception of 
what ‗man‘ is  and Barth‘s thoughts of the relationship between man and the Wholly 
Other, his embedded Kenotic Christology, and his articulation of the human 
Kerygmatic response shed light on Bonhoeffer‘s elaboration of a ‗non-religious‘ 
interpretation of religious consciousness and of the ethical-religious dimension of 
human existence.   In the second section, I will discuss Bonhoeffer‘s account of the 
connection between Christ and man, and his reflections on a socio-theological 
oriented ethics.   By delineating Bonhoeffer‘s existential interpretation of 
Christology and his non-religious interpretation of Christianity, we will begin to see 
the appearance of a formulation of the structure of responsibility in terms of his 
Christological analyses, and one that has profound implications for answering the 
question ‗what is man?‘1  Bonhoeffer‘s Christological analyses include the ‗I and 
You‘ relationship in the church as a responsible community as well as deliberations 
on the role of language in his analyses of ethics.  Thus the work of Buber will also 
need to be considered in this chapter.   In conclusion, the inter-connectedness of 
                                                 
1
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boundary, possibility, limitation and responsibility in that limitation in man will be 
highlighted as what indicates the dimension of ethical responsibility characteristic of 
Bonhoeffer‘s conception of man.  
 
 
SECTION ONE 
BARTH‘S DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE WHOLLY OTHER AND MAN,  
THE WORD OF GOD AND THE WORD OF MAN 
 
For Barth and Bonhoeffer, to know man, both myself and the other, is to know the 
Wholly Other as Christ.   In this section, we will deal with Barth‘s distinction 
between the Wholly Other and man, and the human kerygmatic response to this 
distinction. 
 
In his early theology, Karl Barth (1886–1968) was the student of teachers 
who advocated German Protestant Liberalism, such as, for instance, Wilhelm 
Herrman (1846–1922).   At this stage, Barth begins to change his mode of thinking 
from monologue to dialogue.   During the time of the First World War, however, he 
turns to the German and Swiss Religious Socialist movement and is influenced by 
Franz Overbeck (1837–1905), Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) and others.   Then, 
Barth develops his own thoughts and method of dialectic and expression.   After that, 
Barth thinks that German scholars overestimate man‘s subjective capacity to know 
God.   The theology of Schleiermacher represents this trend, to which Barth was 
openly opposed.   The first milestone for Barth is his commentary The Epistle to the 
Romans (Der Römerbrief) [First edition written in 1919, second edition, 1922].
2
   In 
this book, Barth reacts against German Protestant Liberalism, and the study can be 
regarded as his first major work to attempt to explain the absolute distinction 
between God and man dialectically.   From this publication onwards, we can see his 
elaboration of the static dialectic and dynamic dialectic, which relates to Barth‘s 
discussion of the analogia entis and analogia fidei.   In this period, Barth is also in a 
movement known as ‗Dialectical Theology‘ (Dialektische Theologie), whose 
members include Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976), Eduard Thurneysen (1888–1974), 
                                                 
2
 Karl Barth, The Epistle to Romans, trans. by E.C. Hoskyns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968). 
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Emil Brunner (1889–1966), and Friedrich Gogarten (1887–1968).   After Barth 
writes the Barmen Declaration (or The Theological Declaration of Barmen 1934 – 
Barmer Erklärung) and organizes the Confessing Church (Bekennende Kirche), he 
returns to Switzerland because of his open opposition to Hitler.   After that, Barth 
concentrates on writing the thirteen-volume Church Dogmatics (Kirchliche 
Dogmatik), until his death in 1968.   In this magnum opus, Barth expounds on 
comprehensive theological themes.   For our purpose here, we will only pay attention 
to the topics of Word of God and Barth‘s analogy of the I-Thou encounter and God-
man relation.   
 
§ 2.1.1  Wholly Other and Kenotic Christology 
 
 
The first term that we will explore is the ‗Wholly Other‘ (Totaliter aliter). Barth 
speaks extensively of the Wholly Other in a 1920 lecture on ‗Biblical questions, 
Insights, and Vistas‘.3  Later, he continues to explore this characterization of God as 
the ‗Wholly Other‘ more comprehensively in the second edition of The Epistle to the 
Romans.  The ‗Wholly Other‘ is that which ‗locates God beyond everything man is 
capable of knowing‘.4 Barth holds that God is the transcendental ground as ‗origin‘ 
for human knowledge, which devotes Himself to man in Christ.  Therefore, the 
purpose of the writing of his theology is not to keep or to break the theological or 
academic tradition, but to repeatedly renew the beginning or the origin of the witness 
to the triangular relationship between the Wholly Other, Christ, and man. To 
investigate the ‗origin‘ of this relationship means to trace the path back over the 
history of the development of this origin. Because it is ‗nothing new, but the oldest; 
not particular, but the most universal; not historical, but the presupposition of all 
history‘. Therefore, Barth also ‗repeated and endorsed the chief characteristics of the 
theology he had been taught: ―religious individualism‖ and ―historical relativism‖.‘5 
For Barth, the relationship between faith and history seems paradoxical because 
‗faith cannot be traced to a historical foundation‘,6 but at the same time, man has to 
learn from history, live in history, and even create history.  This, however, raises the 
                                                 
3
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following critical questions: How can man know both the nature of history and the 
place of man in the history? What are the role of God and the role of faith in history? 
Can God reveal Himself in history, and if so, how? 
 
Barth would say that this is ‗a movement from Christ outside us to Christ 
inside us‘.7  The mediation between the triangular relationship is the ‗Christological 
self-mediation of the Word‘.8 From this point of view, it is the first time that Barth 
asserts his theological criticism of religion in the lecture about ‗Religion and 
Socialism‘.9  To focus on the role of Word in faith is to take off the garment of 
religion and to present the origin of faith.   This new perspective on faith and of faith 
would dispel the dichotomy between the historical explanation of revelation in God 
and the revelation of God in history.  We can also say that here the triangular 
relationships between the Wholly Other, Christ, and man is also reflected in a 
parallel triangular relationship between God, revelation, and history.  The self-
revelation of God‘s Word in Jesus Christ will be a concrete event that breaks through 
the boundary between God and history. 
 
As mentioned above, the Wholly Other is discussed by Barth in  his The 
Epistle to the Romans. What, however, is its relation to the Kantian-Ritschl-
Herrmann moral presupposition in their definitions of religion? I will argue that 
Barth intends to replace this question regarding my encounter with God with my 
concrete encounter with my neighbour. Barth‘s concern is not only about theoretical 
moral principles but also with the practical encounter, the event of Jesus Christ as 
revelation in our daily life. 
 
In Barth‘s collected lectures Word of God and Word of Man, he explicitly 
states the meaning of the ‗Wholly Other‘, 
 
the Wholly Other [is] the infinite aggregate of all merely relative others.  
He is not the form of religious history but is the Lord of our life, the 
eternal Lord of the world. He it is of whom the Bible speaks.
10
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The other, which we try to represent by parables in our thought, speech 
and action, the other, for whose actual appearing we yearn, being tired of 
mere parables, is not simply some other thing, but is the wholly other 
kingdom which is God‘s.11 
 
Steven G. Smith, in his doctoral study The Argument to the Other, summarises this in 
four points.
12
 Firstly, God is wholly other than the human; Secondly, God is other 
than the temporal or historical.
13
 Thirdly, God is wholly other than all human 
experience or possible objects thereof. Lastly, God is wholly other than any possible 
concept we might have of Him. I agree with Smith that this absolute Wholly Other 
will ‗involve us in serious difficulties, since concepts are our only means of 
thought‘,14 but the most difficult problem is still the same: the inner tension between 
God and man. Barth emphasizes this tension and accepts the unavoidable existence 
of this tension. Therefore, his intention is not to solve this original tension but to shift 
this tension to another perspective, kenosis. 
 
The term ‗kenosis‟ in Barth‘s thought ‗does not indicate any alteration in his 
divinity, but it does indicate that He truly took on humanity‘.15 In other words, the 
interpretation of the kenosis of God will also provide possibilities to solve the 
questions that we ask above about the paradoxical relationship of I and Thou 
between revelation and history. To discuss this relationship, we have to explore the 
influence of Martin Buber‘s ‗I-Thou relation‘ on Barth‘s thought, something which 
will also be related to Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s discussion, as we shall see later. 
 
§ 2.1.2  Martin Buber‟s Influence of the „I-Thou‟ Relation on Barth‟s Thought 
 
 
Martin Buber (1878–1965) was an Austrian-born Jewish philosopher who presents a 
philosophy of dialogue  that centres on a fundamental distinction between the I-Thou 
relationship and I-It relationship. Many Christian thinkers and theologians have 
adopted the I-Thou schema, but recast it in the context of their own arguments and 
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line of thought, and sometimes in ways incompatible with Buber‘s own thought.16 
This is something that Barth also does. As one commentator remarks, ‗Karl Barth in 
varying degrees equates I-It with man‘s sinful nature, and I-Thou with the grace and 
divine love which are only present in their purity in Christ.‘ 17  What Barth 
emphasizes here, however, is a limitation of man‘s sinful nature that obstructs entry 
into the I-Thou relationship. Owing to Barth‘s emphasis on the gap between man‘s 
fallen nature and God‘s divine love, he makes the distance between the I and the 
Thou greater than Buber does. This is a point that Bonhoeffer later sought to address 
and settle, but did not resolve it.  We will argue that Levinas can provide a solution 
here, and will discuss this from Levinas‘s perspective in chapter four. The problem, 
nevertheless, is one that Barth bequeaths to his followers, including Bonhoeffer, and 
thus it needs to be understood first. 
 
Barth develops a kind of representation of Protestant Christianity that 
accentuates both the separation between God and man and the role of revelation as a 
suspension of all separateness. Buber, as an influential figure of Judaism, stresses 
how the mysterious inner particular faith of the individual is nonetheless universal. 
Both of them, however, have difficulties in finding a resolution. Barth attempts to 
draw revelation down to the encounter between man and man, but at the same time 
seeks to maintain the untouchable and inexplicable attribute of revelation. This, 
nonetheless, would lead to an unsolvable conflict since it will be impossible for a 
man to verify the revelation when the absolute gap between God and man has been 
set up. Buber likewise has a similar problem regarding man‘s relationship to each 
other, for, as Friedman notes,  
 
the conflict [arises] between two men through the fact that each of them is 
as he is. It is the tragedy of the contradiction, which arises from the fact 
that men cannot and do not respond to the address that comes to them 
from that which is over against them.
18
 
 
In contrast to Barth‘s insistence on keeping the distance between God and Man 
thoroughly unbridgeable, Buber keeps trying to solve this problem by his promotion 
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of genuine dialogue as a means by which each man would let the other man and God 
also into the world in everyday life through the infinite sphere of responsibility. This 
is a responsibility before the infinite,
19
 and which restricts the danger of excessive 
power that would lead to radical violence in the real I-Thou relationship.  
 
Barth‘s concerns centre on the wholeness of the relationship between God 
and man and its analogy to the relationship between man and man, while Buber‘s 
concerns focus directly on the wholeness of the relationship between man and man.  
The differences come from their starting point. Barth‘s starting point is vertically and 
internally bidirectional from one pole to the other. By comparison, Buber‘s starting 
point is horizontally and externally a mono-directional reciprocity between two 
poles.  For Buber, his main concern to view the other as an end in himself is to 
eliminate the subject-object mode in moral considerations. He resolves this tension 
through the method of discourse that leads to a real responding to the other. The 
genuine human encounter dwells in this responsible dialogue and through dialogical 
responsibility.
20
  For Barth, genuine human encounter takes place between two poles 
and is based on two aspects.
21
  Firstly, the real I is a subject that we cannot fully 
comprehend.  Secondly, in a real encounter, each person would break through the 
barriers to comprehend a Thou who is like himself. For Barth, this possibility of the 
I-Thou relationship indicates an ‗analogy‘ between God and man and leads to the 
possibility of a ‗Revelation of the Word of God‘ to ‗the word of man‘, which is a 
central concept in Barth‘s discussion on all topics including responsibility. 22 For this 
reason, we will discuss the relationship between divine revelation and the human 
based on the aforementioned analyses. 
 
§ 2.1.3  Divine Revelation and Human Response  
 
 
Revelation, from Old French is revelacion, from Latin is revelationem (nom. 
revelatio), which derives from revelatus (uncover), generally means ‗disclosure of 
facts‘. In Barth‘s thought, as well as that of Bonhoeffer, revelation has a ‗most 
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specific‘ Christological identity.23 Revelation is a recounting that is both internal and 
external to the self,
 
 and which provides the possibility of dealing with Barth‘s God-
man problem.
24
 In this sense, revelation as the foundation of Barth‘s theory already 
implicates a dialectical significance for his articulation of human speech and God‘s 
Word.  
 
The early Barth deals with the problem of revelation with a pietistic, 
Romantic attitude of the notion of imago Dei, but the later Barth understands the 
imago Dei as the subjective possibility for the reception of revelation.
25
 Barth treats 
of revelation in the second edition of The Epistle to Romans and in the first volume 
of his Church Dogmatics extensively. His discussion includes the relationships 
between Bible, the Word of God, and Christian faith, and even the possibility and the 
impossibility of revelation, as well as the relation between the Word of God and 
history. For Barth, however, our ‗―memory of God‖ is one of absence, not [of] 
ontological participation‘ 26  because our memory is the ‗memory of that lost 
relationship with God‘.27 Barth‘s imago Dei, nonetheless, can be better understood 
with the characteristic of analogy, therefore, it is ‗not like the Platonic recollection 
and Augustinian memory, but more akin to Kierkegaard‘s dread or Heidegger‘s 
Sorge (which, of course, it pre-dates)‘. 28 In other words, revelation happens as an 
event that is a recognition of the problem of temporality, which separates us from 
eternity yet connects the present and eternity through the power (vis, as Augustine 
held) of memory. At the same time, it also awakes the present according to the 
eternity. According to Barth, revelation is not continuous but is ‗recalled again and 
again within what is representational and human‘ in a historically conditioned 
moment.
 29
 Barth locates the Christological role in the Old and New Testaments as 
‗the time of the revelation‘.30 ‗The Old Testament is the ―time of the anticipation‖, in 
which Christ was revealed in anticipation, and the New Testament is the ―time of 
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remembrance‖, in which the same Christ is the subject of the narrative‘.31 For Barth, 
this invisible process from anticipation to remembrance has to be dialectical because 
revelation as personal encounter lies in the speech act and in the words used by 
people. Smith explains this by noting that,  
 
Barth frequently calls attention to the discontinuity between what God 
offers man and what man is even capable of conceiving, but also to a 
realized identity between God‘s work and the human world. He speaks of 
a new immediacy between God and man restoring their original 
relationship, of a new ‗organism‘ effectively functioning in human 
history, and of God‘s Kingdom as the actual fulfilling content of the ideal 
empty forms of man‘s morality.32 
 
Smith‘s interpretation provides the perspective that reveals the relationship between 
God‘s revelation and man‘s morality as based on the Otherness. ‗God‟s “Otherness” 
means His revelation.‘33 We can put Smith‘s brief but dense statement in this way: 
God reveals Himself as the Other to man, and when God‘s revelation is to be 
received by man, God is no longer as an Other for man. This is a dialectical 
relationship that can be regarded as a foundation for Barth‘s theological ethics 
because it includes the dimension of space and time in history. The dialectical 
relationship is treated as an analogy between God‘s being and human being as well 
as between human beings, which is ‗a hermeneutical declaration of principle‘ or ‗a 
hermeneutic of simultaneity‘.34 This simultaneity lies in Barth‘s hermeneutical circle 
regarding the relation between that which is understood as being from the self and 
that which is to be understood for the Other.
35
 
 
This hermeneutical circle, however, is not without some major 
epistemological problems. How does the self know that the other knows something, 
especially God? How does the self know that the other‘s language about something 
truly speaks of something, which also can be applied to the case of God? Barth has 
not answered these questions directly but points out a way and insists on it till the 
end: revelation, which is ‗pure act, pure decision, pure creation, pure sovereignty and 
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freedom‘. 36  All of these aspects represent the righteousness of God because for 
Barth, ‗every man – lifts up from the depths of his nature the cry for righteousness, 
the righteousness of God‘.37 However, to indicate does not mean to provide the 
answers for the questions of man, such as: How did the history of God in the Bible 
happen? How did that one historical event happen and follow from another? Is there 
any natural cause of these things? Why did the people in the Bible speak those words 
and how did the authors of the Bible record these words? How can we understand 
these words now, etc.?  
 
Therefore, these questions, as examples, point to the tension arising from the 
distance between the nature of God and the knowledge of God which has been 
formulated by man in history. This tension, as we mentioned previously, is the 
foundation for human ethics because it relates to ‗Yes‘ and ‗No‘ which are embodied 
in every detail of daily ethical behaviour. This ‗Yes‘ and ‗No‘, in Barth‘s words, 
would set up a duality or a dualism in the human person. ‗We admit our knowledge 
of God only as an antithesis to another knowledge. Knowledge of God as an 
antithesis to other knowledge.‘38 The human response as ‗Yes‘ and ‗No‘ will not be 
determined once and for all, but is re-compared and re-evaluated with the knowledge 
that is formulated in man‘s own history and in the interpretation of God‘s revelation. 
 
The necessity to rethink ethical problems, for Barth, is that man is conscious 
of the transcendental origin of the ethical problem and not only the answer to the 
ethical question in actual life. Thus the difficulties of speaking about God turn into 
the problem of ‗our obligation and our inability and by that every recognition give 
God the glory‘39 because Barth stresses: 
 
Man as man cries for God. He cries not for a truth, but for truth; not for 
something good but for the good; not for answers but for the answer – the 
one that is identical with its own question. Man himself is the real 
question, and if the answer is to be found in the question, he must find an 
answer in himself; he must be the answer.
40
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Thus, the question must be the answer, but as questioners, humans just cannot give 
the answer. Man needs revelation to travel through this barrier according to Barth. 
 
Balthasar, interestingly, deduces three stages of God‘s personal self-
revelation from Barth in order to show Barth‘s approach when dealing with the 
problem of boundary.
41
  Firstly, God discloses himself from a hidden situation. In 
this situation, man just can hear and accept this revelation from the Word of God, 
‗which is its objective order (fides quae) and its source of understanding (fides qua) 
in the subjective order.‘ This is a good example of how dialectics functions as a 
theological methodology. Understanding lies in the dialectics between ‗Yes‘ and 
‗No‘. Secondly, dialectics in the background of revelation serves as a signifier to 
signify the understanding of the revelation. Thirdly, dialectics will keep the purity of 
revelation in order to guard against any distortion by human thought.  
 
Thus far, we can see that Barth emphasizes the role of revelation in the 
relationship between God and man; its importance for the relationship between man 
and man; and also to clarify the function of dialectics as a theological method in the 
foregoing arguments.  Barth, however, presents a theological negation of the values 
of society, even though he does discuss the man-man relationship because of his 
emphasis on revelation. Barth has not provided enough explicit discussion on the 
role of revelation in society, which is what Bonhoeffer aims to explore in his early 
thought where he holds that the revelation of God should be made concrete in the 
community. This is fundamental to the dialogicalism. We will examine this in a later 
section on Bonhoeffer. 
 
§ 2.1.4  „God is dead‟ and Barth‟s Kenotic Christology as Precursor of the „Non-Religious  
 Interpretation of Christianity‟ 
 
 
As discussed above about the rethinking of ethical problems, ‗the priority of the 
answer over the question becomes the indispensable hermeneutic of Barth‘s 
subsequent theological work‘.42 There are two aspects of hermeneutics here. The first 
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is the method of hermeneutic that Barth applies to analyse the God-man relationship.  
The second is that aspect of the method of hermeneutics as applied to understanding 
to the dialectical style of Barth‘s thought itself. When someone asks the question as 
to whether God is righteous, or not, the tower of Babel falls into pieces.
43
 It is a fatal 
question that reveals the changing understanding of the role of God. ‗It is clear that 
such a god is not God‘.44 This god is just an idol produced by man, and ‗God is dead‘ 
(as Nietzsche would put it). Barth‘s hermeneutics is the exegetics of the Bible with 
the questions that we asked previously, but these answers return to the questioner. 
This seems to be a vicious circle, or a cul de sac. Barth does not stop here, however, 
but changes the perspective:  
 
The Bible tells not how we should talk with God but what he says to us; 
not how we find the way to him, but how he has sought and found the 
way to us; not the right relation in which we must place ourselves to him, 
but the covenant which he has made with all who are Abraham‘s spiritual 
children and which he has sealed once and for all in Jesus Christ. It is this 
which is within the Bible. The word of God is in the Bible.
45
 
 
Barth‘s emphasis, in other words, changes from the question of ‗who is God‘ into 
‗how does He as the Other reveals himself‘, and finally turns towards the Bible, the 
Word of God as an historical document of God‘s revelation. The answers exist in our 
questioning attitude towards it. This history is a concept of ‗primal history‘, which  
 
Barth appropriated from Overbeck but used in a way Overbeck had never 
intended, it signifies an ‗impossible possibility‘, ‗a ―Moment‖ which has 
no before or after‘, reminiscent of Plato‘s exaiphnēs (that which is 
between motion and rest and thus not in the time sequence).
46
 
 
Barth clarifies that this special moment is not necessarily related to religious 
emotion. He also emphasizes that ‗religion and thought concerning God have never 
meant the same thing‘. 47  From this point, to some extent, we may know why 
Bonhoeffer would say Barth is the first one to think over the ‗non-religious 
interpretation of Christianity‘. For Barth, the content is as of importance as is the 
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form of that religion when we consider ‗true‘ religion. Just as the internal power of a 
movement is as important to the functioning of motion, so, too, everyday life is as 
important to the unfolding of the consecrated life. In other words, ‗religion forgets 
that she has a right to exist only when she continually does away with herself‘.48 
‗True‘ religion, in this regard, exists in this world, but it is also ‗a competitive power 
over against this world‘, not against the ‗godless world‘ but against the ‗religious 
world‘ when religion becomes conscious of religion psychologically and 
historically.
49
 
 
Following from this, Barth emphasizes the origin of ‗true‘ religion in our 
daily life, and if we compare this point with Bonhoeffer‘s theory, we can see that the 
latter focuses on the structure of the role of ‗true‘ religion in the life of community. 
Barth wants to ‗cast doubt over life‘s possibilities […] where on the human side we 
have the question arising, is it true?‘50 He later provides a dialectical ‗answer‘: ‗one 
simply cannot ask or hear the ―question‖ without hearing the answer‘. 51  If we 
understand Barth‘s statement as ‗the question is the answer‘, then it means the 
questions are asked by men and the answers to these questions only can be ‗learned‘ 
by man who is continually questioned by God, who appeared as the Word of God, 
even when man does not realize it. This is the origin of ‗true‘ religion for Barth: to 
question the Other and at the same time to be questioned by the Word of God. The 
purpose that Barth keeps seeking, the origin, then, is also closely related to our 
previous discussion of Barth‘s hermeneutics. This is the dialectical hermeneutics of 
Barth, purposefully configured in order to avoid the danger of ‗fake‘ religion and to 
understand the meaning of ‗the Word of God‘. In Barth‘s words, this is to ‗recollect 
what we had forgotten and continually forget: God‘s revelation and our own faith‘,52 
even when, perhaps, we have failed to do so. For Barth, when we forget God‘s 
revelation, this means the traditional meaning of God has left us, and gone. The 
response of man to the revelation of God only can be achieved in the way of Kenotic 
Christology. In Bonhoeffer‘s words, it is the way of a ‗non-religious interpretation of 
Christianity‘. 
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Bonhoeffer, then, thinks that Barth is the first one to raise the problem of the 
‗non-religious interpretation of Christianity‘. In this section, we have concentrated on 
Barth‘s thought on God as the Other and its relation to human response to the Word 
of God. In the following section, we turn our attention to the specific instances of 
human response, in terms of Barth‘s theory of analogy, language and ethics. 
 
§ 2.1.5  The Human Kerygmatic Response 
 
 
Barth advocates that to know God means to know His hiddenness.  What we ‗know‘, 
therefore, is primarily a kind of absence.  For Barth, however, this absence is a 
preparation for us to ‗re-conceive Jesus of Nazareth as the Logos‟.53 This raises other 
questions: ‗does history not provide other figures whose lives express an ethical 
excellence? Why is Jesus in particular the Christ?‘54 Nearly all Christian thinkers 
devote their life to answering these questions. Barth is also no exception.  He 
believes the answer should consist in the theology of the Word as Christ, which is to 
understand the revelation of God with and beyond the philosophy of language.
55
  
 
In what follows, therefore, we will consider what Barth consider to be the 
relationship between the divine Other and language as the Word of God, seeking to 
clarify, firstly, the similarity and difference between, Analogia fidei, Analogia entis, 
and Analogia Relationis. This distinction is the basis of Barth‘s dialectical 
hermeneutics and his theory of theological language. Then we will explore the 
modes for the nature of language, especially concerning the relationship between 
human response and ethical significance. Finally, we will examine the connection 
between theology of the Word and revelational ethics.  
 
 
§ 2.1.6  Dialectic and Analogy: Analogia Relationis, Analogia Fidei, Analogia Entis 
 
For Barth, as methodology, a doctrine of general revelation is a doctrine of 
analogical correspondence, and vice versa.
56
 And the analogical thought of Barth is 
closely related to the development of dialectical theology at that time. The term 
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‗dialectical theology‘ represented the movement as promoted by Barth, Brunner, 
Bultmann, Gogarten, and others, and the style of their language was genuinely 
dialectical. Barth‘s dialectical thought is not reflected in dialectical language as a 
writing style, or as a theological method, but it is to be found in his emphasis on the 
dialogical framework that constitutes the relation of self both to and with the other. 
Why he insists on doing this, is because, 
 
the dialectic is a condition of Christian existence, a condition of distance-
in-relationship to God. Dialogue takes place within this condition or 
relation, and dogmatic thinking is the critical exegesis of this ‗dialectical 
dialogue‘ [...]. Dialectical theology was Barth‘s way of avoiding the 
immediacy and directness of dialogicalism. Dogmatics became the 
exegesis of the dialectical relation, the dialogue between the transcendent 
other and the immanent self.
57
 
 
Compared to the dialectical theologians, Barth insists on a theological foundation for 
speech about God, rather than on a replacement of this basis with other concepts. 
Barth wants to reveal God as God Himself by way of analogy because analogy can 
help towards an understanding of what is manifested in revelation whilst also 
preserving the original matter as itself, and at the same time keeping the analogical 
meaning as itself.  In this way, Barth manages to apply his universal hermeneutic to 
fill the gap, whilst, at the same time, maintaining the wholeness of God as the 
Wholly Other. 
 
In terms of the analogical approach of interpretation, liberal theologians, such 
as Bultmann, think that to interpret biblical texts is the same as interpreting all 
secular texts.
58
 Barth, however, insists that all secular texts should be explained in 
the same way as biblical text.
59
  Barth, in other words, changes both the direction and 
the primary analogate of analogy in the interpretation of secular and biblical texts, 
and in doing so, changes the problem of historical understanding. 
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We can thus understand why, for Barth, dialectics is not an end in itself, but 
only a means or a method to arrive at the ‗real thing‘.60  Barth‘s thoughts on the 
analogy of being (analogia entis) is influenced by Przywara‘s work on the analogy 
of being, but Barth‘s central theological and linguistic concerns are about the notion 
of the analogy of faith (analogia fidei).
61
  The term analogia is used by Barth in its 
Latin form.  The term, however, derives from the Greek, it means a ‗proportion‘ or 
‗ratio‘ in the philosophical sense.  It is combined with the root ‗ana-‘, which means 
‗upon, according to‘, and the other part ‗-logos‟, which means ‗ratio‘, but also ‗word, 
speech, reckoning‘.62  In other words, analogy is a form of argument for the nature of 
what is.
63
  By this token, Barth‘s purpose is neither to find a new form of expression 
nor to incorporate revelation into a philosophical system of interpretation, but to find 
out the nature of the ‗happening‘ of faith in the Word of God, which is expressed by 
the word dialectic (dia-lektikē).64  
 
[The word ‗dialectic‘] refers to a process of setting one word against 
another (dia, apart, over against) in order to point out a direction or find a 
way through this unavoidable vis-à-vis (dia, through). If we stress the first 
stage of the process, we come up with a more static and dualistic dialectic 
(e.g., Kierkegaard); if we stress the second stage of the process, we come 
up with a more dynamic and tripolar dialectic (e.g., Hegel).
65
 
 
The first stage shows that a static and dualistic dialectic lays the emphasis on the 
separation of the subject-object relationship, and the second stage signifies that the 
dynamic and tripolar dialectic stressing the identification of the subject-object 
relationship.  The relationship between the first and the second stages are dialectical 
itself, which also represents the development of the tradition of Western philosophy. 
Man‘s curiosity begins from the nature of the things outside himself.  At this stage, 
however, man has not become aware of the distinction between the self and the 
object until he locates the nature of the object in his system of knowledge.  Under 
these circumstances, man‘s knowledge of the object never equates with the nature of 
object itself. Hence, knowledge of the object just covers some parts or aspects of the 
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object.  The remaining parts that are unattainable by our knowledge need an 
analogical interpretation in order to fill the gap between our knowledge of the object 
and the nature of the object.
66
  In Barth‘s discussion of the dialectic of the Word of 
God, the analogical interpretation becomes the necessary condition in order to ascend 
higher on the scale of knowledge, from the being of the object in man‘s mind, so as 
to become a real subject itself.
67
  In other words, the process of the ‗leap‘, from the 
projection of the object in man‘s mind to the real knowledge of the subject itself, and 
the method that is applied to understand this ‗leap‘ are important for Barth, as it was 
for Kierkegaard.
68
  
 
As we have mentioned above, Barth‘s focus is on the concrete Word of God, 
which becomes incarnate in Jesus Christ.  The dialectic proposed by him is not 
‗simply the God-human divide, but more the way that divide manifests itself within 
discourses discoursing about that divide.‘69  What we need to consider regarding 
Barth‘s thought and its relation to the topic of our thesis is the relationship between 
‗the immediacy of revelation and the mediation of language‘.70 
 
Following this line of thought, therefore, to discover the right analogy will 
enable one to have a right understanding of revelation through using a proper kind of 
language.  The problem of the gap between subject and object, therefore, now 
becomes, in turn the problem of the analogy between the ‗received language‘ and the 
‗original language‘.71  Barth, nevertheless, does not suddenly replace dialectics with 
analogy because analogy is not Barth‘s end but the means to understanding the Word 
of God.
72
  For this reason, it is the ‗happening‘ of the language, as action, which 
‗makes man‘s decision in faith similar to God‘s‘.73  In this sense, analogy draws 
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together two extremes, one is the man or this-world and the other is God or the other-
world, into a middle way. 
 
It thus follows that ‗in terms of Barth‘s theology of language, analogia fidei 
precedes analogia entis, precedes onto-theology, and yet simultaneously constitutes 
it. Analogia fidei is the condition for analogia entis.‘74 In other words, it is the 
analogia fidei which constitutes the realm of the middle way of the ‗in-between‘, 
rather than the analogia entis. The reason for this is precisely because  the notion of 
being advocated by analogia entis  is limited to expression in a single pole of those 
two extremes.  In this instance, ‗the analogy of being‘ cannot be applied and the 
concept of ‗being‘ would be treated as a finite concept in a theological sense. 
Theological analogy, however, needs to make clear what is the process of 
‗acceptance-response‘ as regards the ‗question-answer‘ mode on the problem of 
‗God-man‘. 
 
When Barth set the ‗God-man‘ relationship into an analogical mode, his 
intention was to draw the ‗understanding‘ of the wholly Other down to the 
‗encounter‘ of a real Thou as a Word to respond to as the real significance in 
revelation. In other words, ‗(T)he ego is ego in its interaction with another thou in 
this world; and this is what is presupposed in the fact that it finds life in an encounter 
with God‘. 75  In this way, Barth avoids the danger of the ‗objectification‘ of 
revelation, which has been changed into a revelation where God reveals Himself in 
words of the historical event. We may compare Barth‘s analogia fidei with Levinas‘s 
‗analogy of appresentation‘, 76  however, Barth‘s focus has always been on the 
Christological interpretation of revelation because ‗Christ is the condition for 
language.‘77 Next, we will explore how Christ conditions language and the detailed 
modes of the nature/ essence of language in Barth‘s sense. 
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§ 2.1.7  Modes of the Essence of Language 
 
 
When we consider Barth‘s thought on language in the context of German philosophy 
of language, we cannot avoid the similar problems that have been reflected on by the 
philosophers of dialogism and Heidegger because all of them are concerned with the 
clarification of the transcendental conditions of language.
78
 Barth‘s considerations, 
however, are unique since he concentrates on the role of language as a mediation of a 
revelation that is conditioned by Christ.  He also intends to establish understanding 
of revelation as an objective knowledge,
79
 rather than as an inner experience.
80
 Thus, 
we could hold that, for Barth, language is the essential bridge between God and 
human being. 
 
As one commentator points out, therefore, for Barth, God‘s language is a 
‗direct and immediate transferral of meaning from object to word, the proper 
adequation of signifier and signified‘, but, as Ward continues and also notes, 
‗(H)uman language, on the other hand, is caught up in the transcendental subjectivity 
of perception and conception.‘81 To connect God‘s Word and human language, we 
have to consider the divine attribute and the social attribute as well as theological 
epistemology and human knowledge at the same time. 
 
Two aspects, therefore, need to be considered. The first is the origin of God‘s 
Word and the origin of man‘s word. The second is the relationship between God‘s 
Word and man‘s word, as well as the relationship between each man‘s word. For 
Barth, the origin of God‘s Word is from God, and man can only understand God‘s 
Word by Christ as Logos. Revelation, as we mentioned before, is like a memory in 
that it enables us to look back in history and bring it back to the present and also for 
the future. In this sense, revelation gives rise to interpretation in the form of language. 
In other words, ‗we read this language by faith, through faith, to faith; we read the 
language as analogous by revelation, through revealedness to the revealer‘.82 
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In this sense, Barth‘s argument is not that God is just the Wholly Other and 
has nothing to do with man because when we speak of God as the Wholly Other we 
will already find ourselves in the light of revelation;
83
 that is to say, the distance 
between God and man has been overcome by language.
84
 There is a contradiction 
that exists in this distance, however, for we must but cannot speak God.
85
 The 
dialectical role of revelation is to remove this contradiction by this kind of 
statement – ‗to speak of God can only mean to let God speak‘.86 It now follows for 
Barth that analogical interpretation can be understood and applied under three 
aspects: Firstly, as the analogy between the triune God; Secondly, as the analogy 
between the revelation of God and the biblical language of faith which interprets it; 
and thirdly, as the expressive power of revelation and that of the dogmatic 
assertions.
87
   
 
Again, the very identification of analogical interpretations in these three 
aspects is to clarify the task of theology for Barth, which is, namely, to awaken faith 
rather than to make man‘s knowledge about God reliable.88  To this extent, man‘s 
‗thought means recollecting the meaning of what we say and do‘ that corresponds to 
the revelation of God.
 89
  In other words, to speak of God means to speak God‘s word 
in the realm of revelation and faith. In these words, God becomes man.  The Word of 
God becomes the foundation of the ethical language. In Barth‘s words, ‗(T)he Gospel 
is not a truth among other truth. Rather, it sets a question mark against all truths.‘90 
The Gospel as the Word of God questions human life and seeks to make itself known 
to men.  Therefore, ‗true‘ faith for Barth is decided by whether man can perceive the 
questions that are being asked by God and give his own answers, or not.
91
  That is to 
say, the Word of God is not only a speaking [Rede] but a speaking to [An-Rede].
92
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The characteristic of Word is ‗to be spoken by I to Thou, reason to reason‘.93 Man‘s 
speaking of the Word of God is to thus speak of man‘s becoming aware of it.94  
 
Language, then, is a potentiality that would only be actualized by revelation. 
And this actualization cannot be accomplished by the means of communication and 
semiotics. In the process of communication, words are used to express interlocutor 
A‘s meaning and to understand interlocutor B‘s meaning, and vice versa; but not to 
directly construct the reality of the object of the communication.  In the semiotic 
understanding, the speaking of the reality of the object has been determined by the 
interpretation of this object.  For Barth, both of these two ways are not enough to 
understand the Word of God, or even human words. Revelation, as the incarnation of 
Christ, is a particular historical event that manifests the Word and, at the same time, 
conditions man‘s understanding of the Word.95  Analogical interpretation happens in 
the tension between this manifestation and condition in an existential, or in a more 
comprehensive ethical sense. 
 
§ 2.1.8  Theology of the Word and Revelational Ethics 
 
 
The relationship between the Word of God as well as human words and the ethical 
problem is inseparable in Barth‘s thought. In Barth‘s First Edition of The Epistle of 
Romans, he already views ‗God‘s revelation as the answer to the moral question 
presented by the humanly knowable‘ in the way of an ‗ideal and unfulfillable moral 
law‘.96  That is to say, our understanding of the meaning of God and our response to 
what God does and communicates as revelation, will directly shape human actions. 
This shaping implies three moments in the subjective response to revelation: the first 
is ‗reflection‘ (Nach-denken), my perception and recollection of the message offered 
in words heard or read; the second is, ‗Co-thinking‘ (Mit-denken), in which I 
accompany what is said to me with my own thoughts; and the third is, ‗Self-thinking‘ 
(Selbst-denken), in which the Word becomes my word.
 97
 These three moments 
describe a movement from God‘s revelation to human‘s understanding.  At this 
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point, the connection between God and man and the moral implication of this 
connection in Barth‘s mind is not a formal categorical imperative but a pre-
descriptive transfer from divine Word to concrete moral words. This is a 
fundamental operation of the Trinity and a transformation from the kenosis of Christ 
to an ethics of kenosis.
98
  
 
Kenosis (κένωσις, kénōsis) is a Greek word for ‗emptying out‘, which is 
usually used as a theological term that recalls the fact that Jesus emptied himself, 
therein showing how the believer should be transformed into the ‗likeness of Christ‘. 
In Barth‘s case, kenosis is not the original reason for the revelation but it is the 
revelation itself.  This means, the kenosis of Christ brings the revelation of Christ 
into the relationship between the self and others. When the self can empty itself in 
order to accept others as themselves, the primary ethical and existential relationship 
of human being has been established.  At this point, ‗Barth‘s economy of living on to 
God is structurally close to Levinas‘s phenomenological account of substitution, of 
living-for-the-other.‘99  
 
As we will see in chapter four, with regard to Levinas, ‗time‘ also plays a 
foundational role in the analysis of language and of the Other when we explore the 
pre-condition of the ethical structure of responsibility. Barth also pays attention to 
the role of time and distinguishes ‗time‘ into two types, the ‗unqualified time‘ and 
‗qualified time‘.100  Revelation, as an ‗event‘, reveals that the meaning of God‘s 
Word happens in a ‗qualified time‘, in the ‗now‘ and in the recollection of this 
‗now‘, which is ‗a string of successive moments bearing unborn potential and the 
eternal ―Now‖ of revelation which can actualize the potential of such moments‘.101 
The analogy between the ‗now‘ and the recollection of this ‗now‘ constitutes the 
foundation of the analogy of faith. In other words, the kenosis of Jesus is the 
incarnation of God in the form of God‘s Word, which reveals time as the creation of 
the triune God. 
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From the above analysis, the emphasis of what God is in Himself shifts into 
the question of what God is for men.
102
  In Barth‘s words, 
 
We must let conscience speak, for it tells of the righteousness of God in 
such a way that that righteousness becomes a certainty. Conscience, as 
everybody knows, may be reduced almost to silence or crushed into 
oblivion; it may be led astray to the point of folly and wrongdoing; but it 
remains forever the place, the only place between heaven and earth, in 
which God‘s righteousness is manifest.103 [...] We hear the alarm and rush 
out sleepily before we have found out what is really the matter and what 
must first be done if anything else is to be done.
104
 [... however] This is 
difficult for us to hear.
105
 
 
Only when man hears the Word and words, will the inner meaning and law of our 
conduct be awakened, and then man will discover that he himself is responsible.  The 
difficulty for Barth, then, lies not only in the seeking of the revelation but also in the 
acceptance and the proof of the revelation.  That is to say, to seek is an autonomous 
action that begins from the self, while to accept is a heteronomous action that 
originates from the  other.   In this case, the certainty of things will no longer be 
determined by myself and regarded as truth, but by the others and be concerned 
about the good.   This, then, both shows up and highlights the foundational 
relationship between the Word and ethical issues in the perspective of revelation.   
 
Why, nonetheless, is Barth so insistent on the point that the relation between 
language and revelation is necessary with respect to  the priority of the other, rather 
than of the self? Barth‘s reasons are that, without the focus on the priority of the 
other, it would not be possible to identify the original and transcendental nature of 
‗good‘.   ‗The problem of the good calls into question all actual and possible forms of 
human conduct, all temporal happenings in the history both of the individual and of 
society.‘106  Barth‘s key word in this statement is ‗happening‘, which contains the 
elements of language, time, and the priority of the other, which concerns us in our 
study.   A typical question about ethical issues is ‗what we ought to do‘.   This 
question is asked by ourselves but, at the same time, we have to give the answer from 
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ourselves, from every yesterday until every tomorrow, from what we have said 
before to what we are saying now, from the centre of the self to the position of the 
other.   In other words, it is not up to ‗us‘ to go in search of the answer to the ethical 
problem but, on the contrary, it is the ethical problem that takes us on and that we 
cannot escape from different situations which are related to the existence of others. 
‗We are faced not with a problem but with the problem‘.107 When we consider the 
ethical problem seriously, then, we will become aware that we are living through 
questions that will cause new questions.   There is no standard answer to these 
questions, but, for Barth, a responsibility that exists a priori in the problem of ethics 
would provide us with a balance between the wrestling/ struggling of questions and 
answers about the good.    
 
Barth understands clearly the tension between freedom and nature, that 
morality and happiness lie in the structure between questions and answers which 
derive from people themselves.
108
  He does not continue along the way of Kantian 
ethics which culminates on the postulate of God but, instead, asks another question 
‗How can any idealistic ethic be developed except as a criticism of all ethics‘?109 
From this we can see even though Barth is concerned with the ‗universally 
applicable law of humanity‘,110 he pays most attention to the ‗moral objective‘ in the 
‗subject of society‘ as a goal of history. 111   This implicates responsibility as a 
balanced pivot in our conduct here and now because a moral objective only exists in 
the moment when morality and history meet.
112
 
 
Meeting, of course, is a ‗happening‘ that is inherent in any social movement, 
including the movement of Christianity, but Barth emphasizes ‗a movement from a 
third dimension‘,113 namely, 
 
[a movement] which transcends and yet penetrates all these movements 
and gives them their inner meaning and motive; a movement which has 
neither its origin nor its aim in space, in time, or in the contingency of 
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things, and yet is not a movement apart from others: I mean the 
movement of God in history or, otherwise expressed, the movement of 
God in consciousness, the movement whose power and import are 
revealed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead.
114
 
 
In other words, ‗God in consciousness is actually God in history‘.115  Accordingly, 
we can divide Barth‘s ethical thoughts into three types which have a significant 
influence on Bonhoeffer‘s thought about situational ethics.116  Firstly, we can see the 
anthropological and existential orientation in Barth‘s The Epistle of Romans from his 
concern regarding the God-man relationship and man‘s response to God‘s revelation, 
which determines man‘s ethical decision; secondly, we can see the ‗theological 
actualism‘ in Barth‘s works from the development of Barth‘s thought on the Word-
event, which emphasizes his concern about the ‗happenings‘ in this-world, and not 
only in the other-world; thirdly, the keynote of Barth‘s position on ethics is still 
Christological because, for Barth, Christianity ‗is not a system of ethics and has no 
special ethics of its own.   The Christian can only ponder the same questions that 
every man must ponder.‘ 117   This is true also precisely because ‗the Christian 
problem is the problem of existence‘.118  
 
Concerning the relationship between language and ethics in the sense of 
Word of God, there are two related aspects that would help us to make a further 
distinction.   The first is Luther‘s law-gospel mode; the second is Barth‘s gospel-law 
mode.
119
  The differing order in the priority of the law and gospel influences, in turn, 
the different things that Luther and Barth address.
120
  Even though the gospel for 
Luther makes us move away from ourselves and outside of ourselves, Luther 
emphasizes the priority of law in human conscience.   This, for Barth, would cause 
difficulties for the role of gospel in the form of the Word.   Correspondingly, Barth 
emphasizes the priority of gospel and appeals to the concretization of the Word of 
God as revelation, Bible, and proclamation.   Barth states that the ‗gospel is the Word 
of God addressed to humankind in the grace of God; and the law is the Word of God 
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which lays claim to human kind for the grace of God‘.121  This distinction is the basis 
for Barth‘s consideration of theological ethics. 
 
Barth‘s theological ethics can be regarded as a revelational ethics.   
Revelation as the Word of God connects ‗the gospel to human being and the law to 
human activity‘.122  Luther thinks that when we can be away from ourselves and 
outside ourselves, then the Word would be heard both receptively and passively.   
Barth‘s anthropological concern, however, situates the human being as an image of 
God‘s being.   What the human being, therefore, can do is only to receive the Word 
of God.   In making this point, Barth sets up the tension between anthropology and 
Christology that stresses the uniqueness of God.
123
  There is a question about man‘s 
receptivity/ passivity and freedom which emerges when man lives and exists before 
God.   Barth‘s solution is to concretize ‗the obedience to the divine Other in service 
of the Other person‘.124   In this way, then, the question of the truth of the divine 
Other has been transformed into the responsibility for the Other.  
 
As stated previously, Barth provides a perspective and analyses regarding the 
relation between revelation and the moral problem of our existence.   He articulates 
this perspective from the point of view of the wholly other, the relationship between 
God‘s Word and man‘s response, the problem of time, etc.   From Bonhoeffer‘s point 
of view, however, even though Barth is the first to put forward the notion of a ‗non-
religious interpretation of Christianity‘, inspiring Bonhoeffer‘s own thoughts on this 
matter, Barth‘s absolute separation of Christology and anthropology makes it 
difficult for him to find the solution to the problem that he himself correctly 
identifies, the interrelatedness of the Word of God and the word of man.   For this 
reason, in the next section of this chapter, we will continue to discuss the necessary 
pre-condition of responsibility from Bonhoeffer‘s perspective.   
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SECTION TWO 
BONHOEFFER‘S CONNECTION BETWEEN CHRIST AND MAN 
 
In the previous section, we have discussed Barth‘s distinction between the Wholly 
Other (Totaliter aliter) and man, and the human kerygmatic response to this 
distinction.   This discussion provides a preparation for us to think about the 
limitation and possibility of man and the question of ‗what is a man‘ from the 
perspective of revelational ethics.   Although Bonhoeffer praised Barth as the 
‗epoch-making theologian‘, and as one who recognized the need to expound a ‗non-
religious‘ theology,125 Bonhoeffer was not satisfied completely with Barth‘s attempt 
to ‗render unto human the things which are human‘s, and unto God the things that 
are God‘s.‘   In Bonhoeffer‘s estimation, this position leaves revelation as the Word 
of God as something that is accepted passively by man when it is the happening of 
revelation, as Bonhoeffer argues, that reveals the ethical choice for human.   The 
difference between Barth and Bonhoeffer, then, lies not in relation to the facts, but in 
relation to their respective methods and perspectives or concerns.
126
  Both of them 
intend to explore a new way of manifesting faith towards God.  Barth‘s concern is 
with the eternity of the otherworld and God; Bonhoeffer‘s focus is on the temporality 
of the human situation and relationships.   As Andreas Pangritz argues, 
‗Bonhoeffer‘s intention was not to overcome Barth‘s theology but to develop some 
aspects within Barth‘s approach in a way, which had not yet been carried out by 
Barth himself.‘127 
 
In Bonhoeffer‘s early thinking, he believes that God makes human beings 
free in order to be responsible for our choice, and to create our own ethical life 
through the incarnation of God in the world.
128
  This is why he addresses extensively, 
in this thought,  questions regarding the situations that man lives in, the relationships 
that man establish, and the approaches that man use to understand his ‗self‘ and ‗the 
others‘.   By taking all these elements into account, Bonhoeffer, therefore, re-directs 
Barth‘s question about God in the other world to the question of Jesus Christ in the 
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world, who hides and empties himself but also reveals himself at the same time when 
the world has come-of-age and no longer needs him. 
 
For these reasons, we will explore Bonhoeffer‘s two key topics: (1) Christ 
and the social interpretation of Christology and (2) the non-religious interpretation of 
Christianity as socio-theologically oriented ethics.   Christology is the cornerstone 
for interpreting Bonhoeffer‘s thought precisely because the idea of non-religious 
interpretation of Christianity is a manifestation of Bonhoeffer‘s Christological 
thought. The social interpretation of Christology prepares a pre-linguistic foundation 
for a further understanding of human relationships.   This is an essential precondition 
towards understanding the essence of ‗non-religious interpretation of Christianity‘, 
which is put forward by Bonhoeffer, but which was not fully elaborated by him.   
Thus, it is necessary to clarify Bonhoeffer‘s Christological thought and his idea of 
the non-religious interpretation of Christianity before we are able to come up with an 
analysis of the structure of responsibility according to Bonhoeffer from these 
presuppositions that underpin his ideas.   
 
Bonhoeffer‘s life was short, his works were not completed, his thought is 
inspiring but need to be further interpreted.   The questions that he left for us, and the 
space that these questions encourage us to explore, are precisely his valuable legacy.   
In this section, nevertheless, we will focus on his four main works: Ethics, 
Sanctorum Communio, Act and Being, and Letters and Papers from Prison.   
 
Ethics is the work that was written by Bonhoeffer from 1940–1943.    It is his 
most mature work and is considered to be his major contribution to theology.   One 
of the chapters is entitled ‗The structure of responsible life‘ (Die Struktur des 
verantwortlichen Lebens).
129
  In this chapter, Bonhoeffer emphasizes the tension 
between the bond that connects man and God and man‘s freedom.   Responsibility 
comes from this tension and is essentially a relation of man to man.   He also 
explains that responsibility is ‗fundamentally a matter of deputyship,‘130 and ‗respect 
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to oneself as a man‘.131  Deputyship, for Bonhoeffer, is open to two abuses: man 
treats himself as absolute or treats the other as absolute.    Both of these two points of 
view, however, exaggerate the power of man and neglect the reality of man‘s living 
situation in this world.   Bonhoeffer‘s discussion about deputyship, in fact, can be 
traced back to his ideas on ‗What is man?‘ in his early thinking.132  He stated that 
there are two possibilities when answering question of ‗what is man‘? One is that 
‗man seeks to understand himself from his achievements or from his limitations‘;133 
the other is that ‗the I sees itself as something which is transcendent to itself.‘134  The 
first possibility implies a potential danger to the power of man, especially when 
conscience is regarded as an absolute responsibility towards the other.   To avoid this 
danger, it is necessary to ask what constitutes a man‘s unity with himself in the 
tension between obedience to God and freedom of choice.   The call of conscience 
brings man into a judgment on good and evil from man‘s own understanding.   
Bonhoeffer objects to this view as a ‗[Socratic] philosophizing‘ way because it lets 
man question himself without being able to provide a thorough solution to this 
question.   Bonhoeffer expounds upon his arguments about this problem in his early 
two academic works, Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being (Akt und Sein).   
 
Regarding his dissertation Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer considered this 
work as theological research rather than a sociological study.   This is why he gave it 
a sub-title: ‗A Theological Study of the Sociology of the Church‘.   This book, in 
many respects, can be read as ‗Bonhoeffer‘s attempt at completing Barth‘s ―theology 
of revelation‖ with respect to sociality‘.135  He synthesized all the viewpoints from 
Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, Karl Barth, and Bonhoeffer‘s supervisor, Reinhold 
Seeburg, in order to comprehend and integrate the idea of Church as a responsible 
community.   The principal argument of this work is that human being is a social and 
responsible existence, which is based on an inter-connection of ‗I-You‘.   
Community, as a theological concept, has been destroyed owing to the existence of 
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sin.   The sin of humanity is embodied in the individual.   Paradoxically, there is only 
one sin that is from Adam.   The Church, of course, is the place where Christ 
incarnated, but Bonhoeffer is aware that there is a dialectical tension between the 
‗religious community‘ on earth and the ‗Kingdom of God‘.   This early work, to 
some extent, anticipates his concern with social theology and his transcendental 
viewpoints of ethics.   We also can detect some hints of his later Christology in this 
work.    
 
As for Act and Being, the main task of this work is to deal with the 
relationship between the objectivity of God as the being of revelation as well as 
arriving at an adequate conception of cognition as a mental act which knows the 
objectivity of revelation.   From this relationship, the being of revelation can be 
grasped from reflection on the being of the human being.   On the one hand, 
Bonhoeffer analyses transcendental philosophy, idealism, and ontological philosophy 
(of Heidegger) respectively, in order to demonstrate the limitations of reason in the 
discussion of faith.   On the other hand, he uses an antithesis between ―act‖ and 
―being‖ to analyse faith and revelation in the mode of ―act and being‖ from the 
discrimination of ‗direct consciousness‘ (actus directus) and the ‗consciousness of 
reflection‘ (actus reflexus). 136   From the distinction between these two aspects, 
Bonhoeffer further clarifies how the analyses of the mode of ―act and being‖ could 
be used to deal with the problem of the knowledge of the ―I‖ and (Heidegger‘s) 
Dasein in respect of revelation about the self and community.   In the last part of this 
work, Bonhoeffer puts forward the notion of ―Being in Adam‖ as an old form of 
humanity and ―Being in Christ‖ as a new future, as in the case of a child.    
 
The above brief summary shows Bonhoeffer‘s main concerns and the train of 
his thought in his early academic stage.   He focused much of his reflection on the 
search for a new perspective on theological methodology.   This was in preparation 
for his attempt to justify faith when it is confronted by the challenge of reason.   He 
attempts to provide both sociological and ethical evidence for what is supposed to be 
true faith, and how this faith plays an essential role in personal being in the form of 
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being-in-relationship.   In this work, Bonhoeffer also points out that the early Barth 
held that revelation is a form of behaviour of pure acceptance and neglects God‘s 
Freedom and Man‘s responsibility.   Bonhoeffer considered that the freedom of God 
lies in Christ and the Word of God, and one that can be received in the responsible 
community as Church.   This implies that Bonhoeffer has revised Barth‘s views on 
revelation, yet he still maintains the independence of God‘s freedom from human 
being, something that he, in turn, inherited from Luther‘s view that God is the God 
for us.    
 
Letters and Papers from Prison is Bonhoeffer‘s last work.   He wrote it in 
Tegel.   This is also the most influential work of Bonhoeffer.   It reflects upon the 
role and the function of Christianity in the modern world and its central theme is 
about secularization, this-worldliness and the nature of the autonomy of human 
being.   The ‗Coming age of this world‘ and the ‗non-religious Christianity‘ are the 
two major themes discussed in this work, in the form of letters.   ‗Religion‘ against 
the backdrop of secularization is a phenomenon of history but is not an inner ability 
that is given by God.
137
  Bonhoeffer also put forward another related topic – the 
‗non-religious interpretation of Biblical concepts‘, which is constant throughout his 
thought: in the context of the modern world, how is one to understand the existence 
of God, and how is one to understand Christ‘s existence, existence for the 
Other/others.   
 
Based on the interpretation of Bonhoeffer‘s thought from these four works, 
we will attempt to answer Bonhoeffer question: ‗what is man‘ and aim to continue 
and develop his unfinished notion of the ‗non-religious interpretation of 
Christianity‘.    
 
This movement is a development from ‗Christ the centre‘ to ‗Christological 
universalism‘138 and Christological sociality.   For Henrich Ott, to confront before 
God reveals the situation of man‘s existence.139  Man‘s response to God‘s revelation 
manifests the structure of the human relationship between the ―I‖ and the I-Other 
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relations. For Bonhoeffer, this introduces the problem of interpretation of 
personhood in the dialogue between self and God in a theological sense, from which 
the response to reality is revealed.   The reason is that ‗the weak Christ‘ as ―the one 
for others‖ shapes and forms the strong and autonomous ego of modern people into a 
Christian life as ―existing for other.‖‘140  Bonhoeffer considers personhood within a 
contextual or historical-contextual perspective because this points to the personal and 
social matrix.   Bonhoeffer, in other words, intends to use his arguments on 
personhood to work out a solution to Barth‘s unsolved tension between the 
Christological and the anthropological interpretations of the relationship between 
God and man.
141
  The concept of personhood, which involves both individual and 
social aspects, also involves a boundary or limitation (Grenze) in the mutual 
interaction of communal life.   From this line of thought, Bonhoeffer points out that 
‗the personal-communal presence of Christ in revelation and the concomitant socio-
ethical interpretation of transcendence‘ will bring forward a new humanity.142  This 
is a humanity which can be explored through the sociality of the other, the ethics of 
difference in the backdrop of historicity, and the role of language in the boundary 
between the I and other.
143
 
 
Within this context, we can argue that the ‗non-religious interpretation of 
Christianity‘ is a ‗reformation‘ of theological language by reflecting both on the 
nature of faith and by criticizing the form of religion and its relation to faith.   This 
reflection is not only from the inside (Christians and churches) but also from outside 
of Christianity.   This aim is to pursue the true understanding of Christianity, for 
Christians, in a situation of coming-of-age.   At the same time, however, it also 
means to seek for a new linguistic perspective in order to have a new understanding 
for the people who are outside of Christianity.   Bonhoeffer is conscious of the 
importance of the problems arising from how language is organized in relation to the 
expression of the true faith for people from different backgrounds and situations.
144
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This indicates a first issue concerning what the role of language would be in the 
formulation of a religion and that leads to the uniqueness of that religion.   This is 
also closely related to the second issue, namely, that when people express their faith 
(which is not necessary religious faith) through their specific approaches in 
organizing language, how do they relate their own existential situation to these 
approaches and let other people understand their faith? This, in turn, leads to a third 
issue, which is central to our study, namely, determining how Bonhoeffer endeavours 
to ‗think‘ and ‗do‘ theology in this world, in communities, in historical decisions, 
and in ethical relationships in the context of how language can embody people‘s 
responsibility when they face each other.
145
  We will investigate these three main 
issues, following a discussion on Bonhoeffer‘s Christology and ‗non-religious 
interpretation of Christianity. 
 
2.2.1  Christ and the Social Interpretation of Christology  
 
 
Bonhoeffer scrutinizes the God-man relationship under two aspects: the sociality of 
Christ and humanity and the problem of transcendence.   Bonhoeffer uses the term 
‗person‘ and its relation to God in a new way.   Person entails Christ‘s presence pro 
me, for me.   This ‗pro me‘ structure refreshes the traditional discussion regarding the 
God-man relationship and introduces ethical responsibility into the I-You encounter 
in order to re-interpret Revelation.   All of these demonstrate that the relationship 
between Christology and anthropology is no longer as strained as it was in Barth‘s 
discussion.   Based on this transformation of the concept of person and the structure 
of relationship within Bonhoeffer‘s existential interpretation of Christology, the non-
religious interpretation of Christianity could be further developed.   
 
§ 2.2.2  Image of God, Obedience to God and Freedom from God 
 
 
First, in order to discuss these three relationships with God, there is a preparatory 
step towards understanding Bonhoeffer‘s Christological thought.   Bonhoeffer‘s 
interpretation of Christ renews traditional thinking on these three relationships.   
Moreover, Bonhoeffer‘s treatment of the ‗person‘ is not a way towards interpersonal 
‗personalism‘, even though Bonhoeffer‘s personhood is a fundamental notion that 
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provides meaning for man‘s existence and his value.   The reason is that Bonhoeffer 
intends to leave space for Christ-as-the-Other in his interpretation, while sharing the 
main point of personalism that a person‘s nature is social being.  His idea of 
‗person‘, nevertheless, is also not the one associated with traditional theology, and 
which lays the emphasis on Christ as one person with two natures, divine and human. 
The reason for this is that Bonhoeffer intends to analyse what role Christ plays in a 
community, and not just to focus attention on the attributes of Christ.   Therefore, we 
could say that Bonhoeffer‘s considerations begin from some similar concerns in 
personalism but it does not end up with personalism.   For Bonhoeffer, the meaning 
of communio not only includes that people share similar values in a society to 
promote a mode of being in which people can fulfil themselves but also entails the 
characteristics of Sanctorum, in which God‘s transcendence is not a remote other, as 
was Barth‘s propose, but a real and present other who encounters me.   Revelation, in 
this regard, is not an entity but an event that implies an encountering relationship, the 
timing of this encountering in history, and the methods that used to interpret this 
encounter. 
 
Understanding ‗revelation‘ in this way also has significant implications, in 
Bonhoeffer‘s thinking, for the understanding of the position of human in three 
situations: when man is regarded as the image of God, when man shows his 
obedience to God, and when man attains freedom from God. 
 
The image of God for Bonhoeffer is called the analogia relationis. 
Bonhoeffer does not follow the traditional meaning of the ‗image of God‘, namely, 
that human beings are created in God's image and, therefore, have an inherent value 
independent of their utility or function.   Instead, he follows Barth‘s argument 
regarding the relational Imago Dei.   As noted in the previous section, in his analyses 
of the analogia relationis Barth stresses man‘s obedience to God and the freedom of 
God.   Bonhoeffer agrees with Barth that God is free, but he disagrees with Barth‘s 
formal understanding of God‘s freedom in revelation as a restraint on man‘s freedom 
and responsibility.
146
  Man is another important figure in revelation; and this is 
precisely why Bonhoeffer does not think that man can only show his obedience to 
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God passively.   In other words, the freedom of man is an indispensable counterpart 
to the freedom of God because ‗freedom is freedom for‘.147  God shows his freedom 
via his revelation to man, and man shows his freedom via his response towards God. 
From Bonhoeffer‘s point of view, freedom, in the language of the Bible, is not 
something that people have for themselves, then, rather it is something that they have 
for others.
148
  To be free is ‗being-free-for-the-other‘.  Obedience, viewed in this 
light, is a responsible freedom that demands liberation from egocentric wilfulness.
149
  
 
In this regard, Bonhoeffer, in fact, addresses an important issue on ‗power‘. 
His discussion on power does not only refer to the power of God, or to the power of 
man, but, most significantly, the power that man uses to know and interpret his 
relationship to God as the almighty Other.   This is also the reason why Bonhoeffer 
attacks nearly all of the methods of philosophy because philosophy limits methods 
only in human reason, especially in Kantian philosophy.   When man abuses his 
power in interpreting the encountering with the other, this self-interpretation leads to 
a self-dominating power over the other.   Herein, the ‗created sociality is violated‘.150  
This violation is a process of objectification of the other people and of God under the 
lordship of self-power.  Bonhoeffer reminds us that one of the dangers in this process 
is precisely human conscience.  Bonhoeffer, in No Rusty Swords, notes, 
 
He [human being] is anxious at this lordship over a dead world, and in his 
anxiety he breaks the fearful silence of his solitude and snatches himself 
away from himself, confronts himself, in order to fill the place of the 
missing other, and accuses himself.   That is conscience.
151
 
 
The problem, therefore, lies in the point that conscience ‗fills the place of the missing 
other‘.  
 
Conscience, then, in the view of Bonhoeffer‘s theological thought regarding 
human responsibility and human relationship plays an important role in 
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understanding the difference and the relation between the image of God, obedience 
to God, and freedom from God.  In Bonhoeffer‘s Creation and Fall, he points out 
that sin originates from man‘s violent use of conscience because man imitates God in 
judging other people with his conscience.
152
  In Bonhoeffer‘s The Cost of 
Discipleship, he holds that obedience leads to liberation, which is not a self-willed 
conscience but an other-willing freedom.   In Bonhoeffer‘s Ethics, the ‗for me‘ 
structure guarantees the true freedom to let the ‗extra [outside] me‘ encounter me 
through the event of revelation via Christ, which is a counterpart of responsibility.
153
  
In sum, the problem of conscience obscures the boundary or barriers of the I and the 
other, which is the key to understand Bonhoeffer‘s Christology. Bonhoeffer‘s new 
interpretation of Christ in terms of personhood would eliminate the danger of the 
power of human‘s conscience.154   This significant insight also directly gives rise to 
Bonhoeffer‘s later thoughts regarding the non-religious interpretation of Christianity 
because his aim is to clarify the role of Christ in the absence of God in the coming-
of-age.  
 
After describing the backdrop of Bonhoeffer‘s Christology, we will then 
investigate what is the role of the I-form and You-form of Person in the 
interpretation of Christology? What is the significance of this relationship in 
exploring Bonhoeffer‘s social interpretation of revelation? Why is revelation an 
important concept for understanding Bonhoeffer‘s thought regarding responsibility? 
 
§ 2.2.3  I-Form and You-Form in the Interpretation of Christology 
 
 
The I-You relationship will remind many of Martin Buber, whose book, I and Thou, 
which was published in 1923, four years before Bonhoeffer finished his doctoral 
dissertation Sanctorum Communio, and before his habilitation thesis Act and Being, 
where Bonhoeffer puts forward his social and theological understanding of the I-
Form and You-Form.  
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Buber distinguishes existential relationships into two: I-It and I-Thou 
relationships.   For Buber, the I-It relationship is ‗experience in its relation to I‘.155  
The I sets up a barrier between subject and object, therefore, ‗the primary word I-It, 
[is] the word of separation.‘156   In the I-Thou relationship, ‗the inborn Thou is 
realized in the lived relations with that which meets it, [... and] through the Thou a 
man becomes I.‘ 157   In other words, for Buber, the I-It relationship refers to a 
situation of objectification that separate subject and object and the I-Thou 
relationship refers to a situation of mutual encountering that establishes a primary 
inter-subjectivity. 
 
Bonhoeffer formulates his own theological and anthropological viewpoints 
on the I-You relationship explicitly in Sanctorum Communio but it is not the same as 
Buber‘s idea of I-Thou relationship.158   Bonhoeffer calls attention to the point that,  
 
The individual exists only in relation to an ‗other‘; individual [therefore] 
does not mean solitary.  On the contrary, for the individual to exist, 
‗others‘ must necessarily be there.159 
 
Bonhoeffer defines the other person as a boundary to the self, but not a boundary 
made by the self as in the ‗I-It‘ relationship of Buber.   When the self encounters this 
boundary, he is obliged to respond to this other.
160
  Without this response, the self 
and the other would exist in isolation.  This response, therefore, is exactly what 
constitutes a ‗personal-ethical model of transcendence‘ in Bonhoeffer‘s theology.161 
 
It is clear that Buber intends to highlight the danger of treating the other and 
God as an object or a thing as in the I-It relationship, and wishes to establish a 
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mutual understanding between each other as in the I-Thou relationship. 
Correspondingly, Bonhoeffer intends to reveal the reality of our individual and social 
identities in the place of our difference.   In other words, the I-Thou relationship in 
Buber is reciprocal, but for Bonhoeffer, the I-You relationship is You-oriented 
because this You has the attribute of the human other and the divine Other as Christ: 
the I, in other words, is to be located by the You.   Besides, Bonhoeffer tries to make 
it clear throughout his works, especially in his early works, that his I-You relation is 
beyond the epistemological subject-object relation.   Therefore, ‗encounter‘ is a 
kernel point to understand in relation to Bonhoeffer‘s thinking on responsibility, as 
‗for Bonhoeffer, human beings truly encounter each other only in the ethical sphere 
of claim and responsibility.‘162  This is because ‗in the encounter with the other his or 
her claim is a barrier for me which forces me to decide if I want to answer this claim 
or not.‘163  Bonhoeffer,  therefore, remarks, 
 
It is a Christian insight that the person as conscious being is created [...] in 
the situation of responsibility, passionate ethical struggle, confrontation 
by an overwhelming claim; thus the real person grows out of the concrete 
situation. [Thus, the true encounter between two human beings takes 
place when...] the other ... places me before an ethical decision. [...] The 
person exists always and only in ethical responsibility.
164
 
 
Based on this, Bonhoeffer distinguishes three basic structures of human types: 
‗Einzelperson‟ (the I), the ‗community of persons‘ (the I-You relations), and the 
‗collective person‘ in order to develop his thoughts on responsibility.165  With this 
distinction, Bonhoeffer turns away from ‗the subject-object relationship and towards 
a more communitarian understanding of ―person‖ within the framework of the 
church-community, the Gemeinde.‘166  At the same time, he keeps his thought in a 
Christological direction to argue that Christ exists as this church-community.
167
  
When the individual person exists responsibly for others, then ‗collective person‘ 
comes into being. For Bonhoeffer, ‗collective person‘ is the form of ideal 
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personhood.   It is, then, the claim from the ontologically relational other and my 
response to that other which implicates new social relations, in Bonhoeffer‘s thought. 
 
Bonhoeffer illustrates four ways of basic social relationship in Sanctorum 
Communio and associated problems as a preparation towards proposing his thinking 
on new social relations. 
168
  First, is the ancient Greek Platonic-Aristotelian 
approach, wherein, 
 
human beings only become persons insofar as they participate in the 
species reason […] according to Plato‘s Timaeus, only the rational part of 
the soul, […] is immortal.  Thus, essential being lies beyond individual-
personal being. [...] the collective form, as more nearly approaching the 
genus, is therefore ranked higher than the individual person.
169
 
 
In Platonic-Aristotelian thought, person, who is regarded as a rational form of human 
being, can be organized into a collective form.   From this point of view, person as a 
genus concept is higher than the concept of individual being.   The form as universal 
genus eclipses, however, the particular.
170
  In this case, the personhood of the person 
is an impersonal universal, which Bonhoeffer disagrees. 
 
Second is the Stoic approach.   Here, as Bonhoeffer remarks, 
 
The Stoic school was the first in the history of philosophy to formulate, 
[...] the concept of the ethical person.  The human being becomes a person 
by subordination to a higher imperative.  […] The ethical, rational being 
of persons is their nature, and at the same time it negates the person as an 
individual.
171
 
 
Compared to Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine that emphasizes the universal form of the 
‗I‘, the Stoic one takes the ‗I‘ as self-sufficient because this ‗I‘ reaches the fullness of 
reason.   Thus, I as a moral person who share similar reason would be thought as ‗a 
relation of like to like‘.   The core of the ‗personhood‘ moves from the ‗ideal form of 
person‘ to the ‗ideal relation of social philosophy in common.‘ 
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Third is the Epicurean approach. This approach asserts that, 
 
human social formation (Vergesellschaftung) only serves to heighten the 
pleasure of each individual. Social formations thus have a purely 
utilitarian basis, arising only from an agreement and so are inconceivable 
as natural community.  […] One person is fundamentally alien to the 
other.
172
 
 
Compared to the previous two approaches, the Epicurean breaks down the 
characteristic of totality of ‗ideal form‘ into an ‗I-Alien‘ relation.   In this case, 
however, both the I and the other have self-serving utilitarian concerns, which 
Bonhoeffer would not agree with.   
 
Fourth is the Cartesian approach.   This approach generates a different way of 
viewing the ‗self‘, for, as Bonhoeffer notes, 
 
Descartes‘s transformation of the metaphysical question into an 
epistemological one casts the concept of person into a different light from 
previous theories.   This was realized in essence by Kant‘s development 
of the epistemological concept of person: the knowing I becomes the 
starting point of all philosophy.
173
 
 
For Bonhoeffer, this Cartesian approach is thought of as the starting point to criticize 
all philosophy because of its danger of an overuse of human self-power. 
 
After examining these four social relationships, Bonhoeffer explores the 
notion that it is not the subject-object paradigm but the tradition of idealist 
epistemology that separates the wholeness of knowing and being.   This separation 
helps to totalize the other into the ‗I‘.   Bonhoeffer‘s new proposal is to avoid this 
totality of the subjects, and instead to reach the reality of the other – let the other as 
other be.   This is a ‗dialectical emphasis on otherness in ontology which mirrors the 
sociality of the epistemological paradigm‘s concern with the status of objectivity.‘174 
If we use Theunissen‘s words, this is ‗a kind of ―decentering‖ of the I,‘ the 
‗perceptivity of the world dominated by the subject for the basis upon which the I 
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first arises in the meeting with the Thou. […] The encounter with the Other-as-Thou 
refutes the idealist premise of ‗the I as the midpoint of the world.‘175 
 
Thus far, we have elucidated the distinction between Buber and Bonhoeffer‘s 
I-Thou and I-You relationship; we have examined the role of I and You in four basic 
social relationships and Bonhoeffer‘s criticisms of them; we have also explored 
Bonhoeffer‘s analyses of his criticism of the traditional viewpoint on the I-You 
relationship.   There are, however, still many problems left for us to solve in the 
following sections in this chapter: What exactly is the encounter between I and You? 
What role does the boundary between the I and You play in the interpretation of the 
concept of ‗person‘? How would this encounter make man a responsible individual?  
 
In brief, Bonhoeffer‘s concept of ‗person‘ is relational, corporate, and 
collective.   Man is to be man only in the encounter.
176
  For Bonhoeffer, personal 
encounter is ethically present in the light of Revelation.   For Henrich Ott, revelation 
includes Bonhoeffer‘s understanding of history together with the collective 
understanding of man.
177
  The reason for this lies in that, on the one hand, the history 
of revelation for man is the history of man‘s understanding of revelation; on the other 
hand, man‘s understanding of revelation is a collective history regarding man‘s 
understanding of himself. The presence of Christ represents the collective 
personhood in community.   Only in this collective personhood can we interpret the 
reality of revelation; only from the other can we discover my genuine existence when 
the boundary between I and You stands face to face with me; only in the historical 
continuity of revelation can we have a guarantee that our understanding on the 
boundary is genuine.   Therefore, in next section, we will discuss Bonhoeffer‘s 
concepts of ‗pen-ultimate‘ and ‗ultimate‘, after which we will explore the role of 
history as a valued-related time in revelation.   
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§ 2.2.4  Valued-Related Time and Revelation: Pen-ultimate and Ultimate 
 
As discussed previously, the dialectical being between I and You brings to mind the 
dialogical philosophy of Martin Buber. We also pointed out, however, that 
Bonhoeffer‘s unique understanding of personhood arises from his post-metaphysical 
doctrine of revelation, which develops his thought in a different direction from 
Buber.   Revelation is of importance to Bonhoeffer not only because it indicates a 
certain  tension between Christology and anthropology in Barth‘s thought and this 
influenced the formation of Bonhoeffer‘s ideas on Christological society but also 
because, 
 
revelation names that situation of openness, where reality is always and 
only to be understood ‗in reference to‘ (in Bezug auf) the thinking subject, 
whose process of thought is ontologically ‗suspended‘ (Aufgehobensein) 
in being that it has not created.
178
 
 
The key words of ‗in reference to‘ and ‗suspension‘ imply that revelation is an 
indirect and contingent process that is dependent upon and thus that has to take in 
account the thinking subject who lives historically in time and in this world.   In his 
Ethics, Bonhoeffer discusses this relationship of pen-ultimate and ultimate in 
connection with his reflection on the intimate connection between revelation, history 
(as time), reality, word of God, and man‘s ethical decision in this world. 
 
Bonhoeffer defines ‗pen-ultimate‘ as follows: ‗it is everything that precedes 
the ultimate, everything that precedes the justification of the sinner by grace alone, 
everything which is to be regarded as leading up to the last thing when the last thing 
has been found.‘ 179   Bonhoeffer does not provide a definition of the ‗ultimate‘, 
because ultimate and pen-ultimate are mutually exclusive contraries, and yet, though 
mutually exclusive concepts, the meaning of these concepts are, at the same time, , 
mutually inter-dependent.   They are different but they are inter-dependent because 
‗a thing becomes pen-ultimate only through the ultimate‘ and ‗it is the ultimate 
which determines the penultimate.‘180  Moreover, ‗it is the freedom of the ultimate 
that validates the pen-ultimate.‘181  In other words, the pen-ultimate prepares the way 
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for the ultimate; and the ultimate, correlatively, confers the value or necessity of the 
pen-ultimate.   Bonhoeffer, therefore, stresses the point in particular that to prepare 
the way is to prepare for the word: ‗this is the purpose of everything that has been 
said about the things before the last.‘182  There are two important things here, for 
Bonhoeffer, which play important roles in the discussion of the pen-ultimate in 
relation to  being man (Menschsein) and being good.   In the context of Ethics, this 
means that humanity and goodness are embodied in Christ as the word of God, and 
this word is the final word in the sense of time.   Therefore, the time that God 
creates, and awaits and prepares for man with ethical significance to respond, will 
become one of the key topics in Bonhoeffer‘s later thought.   
 
However, in his early thought, Bonhoeffer already shows his concern 
regarding the relation between time and revelation.   He points out that the concept of 
present is defined from without rather than from within.
183
 In Bonhoeffer‘s 
interpretation, future can be embodied as Christ, who will project beyond the past 
and come to the present from the word of Scripture.   This is the answer for the 
question about the nature of revelation: ‗how a discovery of the eternal in the 
temporal is possible.‘184  Moreover, Bonhoeffer also introduces the relation between 
revelation and word. 
 
We too may say that the Word of God and the word of man are joined in 
Holy Scripture; but they are joined in such a way that God himself says 
where his Word is, and he says it through the word of man.   The word of 
man does not cease to be a temporal, past word by becoming the Word of 
God; it is the Word of God precisely as such a historical temporal 
word.
185
 
 
Here, Bonhoeffer states that the Word of God and word of man can be fitted 
into the paradigm of the word of the ultimate and the word of the pen-ultimate. 
However, it is not enough to distinguish between them as between eternal word and 
temporal word because revelation happens both in the temporal and eternal word. 
The translation of the Word of God with word of man needs both freedom and 
responsibility.   This is an important issue which allows us to reflect on the relation 
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between the traditionally established moral norm and the present changing moral 
perceptions.   Certainly, Bonhoeffer ponders this issue against a backdrop of 
Christian ethics, but the reason that he has to rethink it is because he finds that a non-
religious influence has been influencing Christian ethics; on the other hand, it will be 
significant to show, how the non-religious influence changes Christian ethics and 
how the ―words‖ of Christian ethics have been changed in history.186  
 
Once we have analysed the role of ‗time‘ and ‗word‘ in the mode of pen-
ultimate and ultimate, we need to explore the relationship between this mode and 
revelation as an encounter between the word of man and the Word of God in a 
specific historical situation.   This encounter is to be conceived as a ‗value-related 
moment‘ 187  by means of which we can understand the pre-linguistic moral 
experience of the You because this encounter is not just a casual meeting, but the 
event of meeting the ‗ethical barrier‘.188  When the I is addressed by the You, the 
barrier or boundary is being passed through by the I who is enacted and renewed by 
the You.   This is a purely moral transcendence that emphasizes the response towards 
the Other.   This Other demands the I in a historical happening to be responsible as a 
person who has a social personhood.   In other words, ‗this process is something like 
―ethics of revelation‖, which is in contrast to the conservative Lutheran concept of 
―orders of creation‖ (Schöpfungsordnungen).‘189  This ‗orders of creation‘ refers to 
the relationship between the natural world and human‘s ethical responsibility in the 
explanation of the creation of this world.   For Bonhoeffer, the preparing word in the 
pen-ultimate time is the ‗orders of preservation‘ towards Christ.   This ‗orders of 
preservation‘ refers to humans as moral or responsible creatures who preserve and 
integrate all existents in this world.   Then, the pen-ultimate time is the time of 
ethical responsibility towards the ultimate time of divine eternity.   For Bonhoeffer, 
the reality of revelation lies in this process but not in a static eternal and timeless 
situation.    
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We interpret this point in the following way: if we define God as a divine 
Other, then there is a history that shows this divine Other‘s revelation to man, which 
is recorded as the Words of Bible; however, at the same time, there is another history 
that is the history of man‘s interpretation and response to the record of this divine 
Other‘s revealing.   Therefore, the response to this divine Other is a history of God 
and also a history of man.   When we analyse Bonhoeffer‘s non-religious 
interpretation of Christianity we need to take both of these two histories into 
consideration.   The ethical significance of the ‗Reality‘ of revelation in this context 
means that ‗it is not a new ―you ought‖ but ―you are‖,190 ―not in the ideas, but in the 
historical facts; not in imperatives, but in indicatives; not in generality, but in 
onceness‖.‘191  To put this idea in another way, it is not the ethical language that 
regulates what we are saying, but we are the ones who were recorded as ethical 
language that is to be said in history.   In other words, ethical language would be 
manifested or embodied by the subjectivity that is both creating history and created 
by history. 
 
In the first part of this section, we have examined the inner relationship 
between the image of God, obedience to God, and freedom from God according to 
Bonhoeffer‘s thoughts on freedom and responsibility; we also have distinguished 
between the thoughts on the I-You relationship between Buber and Bonhoeffer and 
clarified Bonhoeffer‘s unique consideration of the boundary which is related to his 
thoughts on revelation; finally, we have investigated the element of history as time, 
in the formulation of language, and their relations to revelation as a social and 
historical encounter.   All of these prepare for the next part of this section which 
deals with Bonhoeffer‘s later thought, the non-religious interpretation of Christianity, 
and which leads to an interpretation of socio-theological-oriented ethics on this topic.   
 
§ 2.2.5  Non-religious Interpretation of Christianity as Social Theologically-Oriented Ethics 
  
 
In a letter of 5
th
 May 1944, Bonhoeffer explains in more detail what he meant by the 
topic of ‗religionlessness‘ and the implications of this position for him, remarking,  
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A few more words about ‗religiouslessness.‘ I expect you remember 
Bultmann‘s essay on the demythologizing‘ of the New Testament? My 
view of it today would be, not that he went ‗too far,‘ as most people 
thought, but that he didn‘t go far enough.   It‘s not only the 
‗mythological‘ concepts, such as miracle, ascension, and so on (which are 
not in principle separable from the concept of God, faith, etc.) but 
‗religious‘ concepts generally, which are problematic.   You can‘t, as 
Bultmann supposes, separate God and miracle, but you must be able to 
interpret and proclaim both in a ‗non-religious‘ sense. Bultmann‘s 
approach is fundamentally still a liberal one (i.e., abridging the gospel), 
whereas I am trying to think theologically.
192
 
 
One month later, on 8 June 1944, Bonhoeffer discusses this topic again in relation to 
Barth, Tillich, and Bultmann.   About his own emphasis on the critical point ‗not to 
make religion a precondition of faith‘, he remarks ‗only in this way [of a religionless 
religion], I think, will liberal theology be overcome […] the world‘s coming of age is 
no longer an occasion for polemics and apologetics, but is now really better 
understood than it understands itself, namely on the basis of the gospel and in light of 
Jesus Christ.‘193 
 
If Bonhoeffer‘s early theory begins from a theology of sociality,  his later 
thought, which faced a unique historical situation at that time, and his fundamental 
desire is to ‗articulate a theology of life‘ continues to reinforce the social 
interpretation about the community.
194
 The task of the second part of this section, 
therefore, is to explore the social significance of the ‗non-religious interpretation‘ 
based on the previous discussion of the Christological reflection on the relationship 
between God and man, and on I and You in revelation. 
 
§ 2.2.6  Humanity in Adam and Broken Community 
 
 
Bonhoeffer first considered the idea of ‗Humanity in Adam‘ and ‗Broken 
Community‘ in Act and Being.  This idea leads the way to Bonhoeffer‘s later 
thoughts on the world, which, as he puts it, is in the situation of ‗coming-of-age‘.   
Bonhoffer diagnoses that humanity ‗in Adam‘ means a fallen humanity because of 
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four reasons.
195
  The first is the power of the knowing and interpreting ‗I‘. The 
second is that the attitude of this ‗I‘ is one of domination.   The third is that this ‗I‘ is 
isolated.   And the last is that this ‗I‘ accuses himself in conscience.   From all of 
these reasons, Bonhoeffer draws the conclusion that the fallen Adam is essentially 
‗being-for-itself‘, which is ‗extremely egocentric.‘196 
 
We have already analysed the I-You relationship, the role of personhood in 
this relation, and its significance in the development of an other-oriented social 
relationship in a previous part of this section.   Now, we will reflect upon 
Bonhoeffer‘s thoughts on social forms as community and society, from which basis 
we will move on to clarify the socio-theoretical foundation for his non-religious 
interpretation of Christianity.   
 
Bonhoeffer develops a typology of social forms.   One is ‗community‘ 
(Gemeinschaft) and the other is ‗society‘ (Gesellschaft), both of which he 
appropriated and modified from the well-known distinction of Ferdinand Tonnies.
197
 
Community constitutes a ‗structure of meaning‘, which is oriented towards its self-
preservation of personhood of each person in this community.
198
  Society constitutes 
a ‗structure of purpose‘, which is oriented towards the pragmatic intention of each 
person.
199
  From this distinction, ‗only a community has a personality in the way 
Bonhoeffer means it‘.200   Having established the collective characteristic of this 
personality, Bonhoeffer proceeds to carry out his social interpretation regarding 
‗individual sinful act and collective sin of all humanity.‘ 201   This interpretation 
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relates to another paradigm from Bonhoeffer: the personification of Adam and Christ 
as two fundamental styles of human relationship and social forms.
202
 
 
The key point of these classifications is the role of ‗personification‘ in 
Bonhoeffer‘s thoughts and method.   Bonhoeffer does not purely identify Christ and 
Church but emphasizes their dialectical relationship.
203
  Church, for Bonhoeffer, is 
the life of the community of the new humanity with the ‗personification‘ of Christ 
when man encounters each other in a responsible personhood. Certainly, 
Bonhoeffer‘s discussion at the time did not concern itself with how this 
‗personification‘ can be applied to people who are outside of the institution of the 
Church.   His incomplete reflections on the non-religious interpretation, the social 
interpretation of revelation, and his discussion of the response to reality provide 
resources, nonetheless, for us to think further about.   
 
§ 2.2.7  Being-in-relationship: the Social Significance of Revelation and Correspondence to Reality 
 
 
As we discussed earlier (in § 2.2.1.2 and § 2.2.1.3), revelation for Bonhoeffer is only 
understandable in relation to sociality.  Again, his interpretation of original sin is also 
in terms of a social conceptuality.   Man lives and shares the structure of meaning 
with each other in the same community.  However, there is a question that is related 
to this understanding which needs to be answered: How can Bonhoeffer‘s theology 
solve the conflict between an individual‘s responsibility in individual sinful acts and 
the collective sin of all humanity in this structure of meaning? 
 
According to the ‗pro-me‘ structure and the collective personhood, ‗the act of 
the individual person and the collective person is one and the same.‘ 204   In a 
meaning-oriented community, the collective person is not the sum of the individual 
persons. Only when the individual person encounters the barrier or boundary 
[Grenze, Schrank] and responds responsibly to the other via this boundary does true 
humanity come into being and is shared by both sides of this boundary. 
205
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203
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Therefore, the individual‘s responsibility is closely linked to both the 
individual‘s sinful action and collective sin of all of humanity in Bonhoeffer‘s 
thought.   For him, the transcendence of the ethical relationship depends on how both 
the individual‘s sin and the collective sin of all humanity in the broken community 
can be solved by the socio-ethical revelation in terms of Christ‘s presence in man as 
Word in the primal community.   As seen in the previous discussion, conscience as a 
man‘s power of will constitutes ‗limits‘ for others, but at the same time, when each 
man encounters other man‘s will, they participate in a process of pursuing the reality 
of their relationship.    
 
In Bonhoeffer‘s case, revelation is not only present in a personal encounter, 
but also in the history of the continuous understanding of this encounter.   The latter 
leads to problems: What is the role of remembrance between the meaning of the 
original encounter and the living present situation? What is the difference between 
individual remembrance and the remembrance of the collective person in a 
community? What is the significance of responsibility in interpreting the difference 
between individual remembrance and the remembrance of the collective person 
which is recorded in the Bible and interpreted by man? Answers to all these 
problems can be located in the paradigm of the pen-ultimate and ultimate of 
word/language, which is also related to Bonhoeffer‘s reflections on the non-religious 
interpretation of Christianity.   The world is coming of age, the role of religion in this 
world is changing, and the understanding and interpretation of religion is also 
changing.   In this context, Bonhoeffer puts forward his notion of ‗religionless 
Christianity‘ or ‗non-religious interpretation of Christianity‘.   If the form of religion 
is no longer the same as before, then what should Christians do with their Christian 
faith when their remembrance encounters the remembrance of non-Christians in 
history? Bonhoeffer‘s endeavour is to find out a way to revive the ‗looking to‘ 
Christ, and at the same time to reform the relationship between Christology and 
anthropology in a new tension: between the dominating power of the ego and the 
mature strength of self in the root of ‗religion‘. 206   Thus, we will next discuss 
Bonhoeffer‘s interpretation of non-religious Christianity. 
 
                                                 
206
 See, Green, p. 171. 
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§ 2.2.8  Non-Religious Interpretation of Christianity 
 
 
Before we discuss the term ‗non-religious‘, we need to know what Bonhoeffer means 
by the term ‗religious‘.   According to Clifford J. Green, Bonhoeffer diagnoses 
‗―religion‖ as something rooted in human weakness and a dependency upon the 
power of God‘ under eight headings‘. 207  Bonhoeffer also criticises Schleiermacher‘s 
views on religion and church from five headings.
208
  Bonhoeffer tries to clarify the 
distinction between religion and Christianity because, as Ebeling notes, ‗religion has 
always been a garment of Christianity.‘ 209   His criticisms regarding Barth‘s 
revelational positivism
210
 and Schleiermacher‘s social attribute of religion 211  are 
from different perspectives; however, Bonhoeffer‘s point is that he tries to avoid the 
abuse of man‘s self-consciousness as conscience, which would fall into the danger 
that religion is only anthropology. 
 
For Bonhoeffer, to be ‗religionless‘ is to find out the a priori religious, which 
is a ‗historically conditioned and transient form of self-expression.‘212 Accordingly, 
‗Non-religious interpretation‘, as Ebeling points out, ‗is for Bonhoeffer nothing other 
than Christological interpretation.‘213  In other words, it concerns the question of 
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 Green, p. 16, also see Green, 263 1) religion is episodic. (‗God‘ as stop-gap, deus ex machina, and 
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inward. 4) religion‘s individualism 5) Otherworldliness. [...] Religious otherworldliness looks for the 
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hypothesis when a limit is reached in human knowledge is simply dishonest. 7) Religion is 
humiliating. This is seen in common forms of apologetics and proselytism; 8) Religion is self-
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for-others.‘ 
208
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‗Who Christ really is, for us today‘ in relation to language.   Bonhoeffer comes to 
realize that,  
 
our church is ‗incapable of bringing the word of reconciliation and 
redemption to mankind and the world at large.‘214 [and he finally stated] : 
‗The church must get out of  its stagnation.   We must move out again into 
the open air of intellectual discussion with the world.‘215 
 
Eberling, however, detects that Bonhoeffer‘s view of the coming changes in this 
connexion is ‗simply not concerned at all with the problem of form, but with the 
problem of language‘, and that,  
 
It will be a new language, perhaps completely unreligious, but liberating 
and redeeming like the language of Jesus, so that men are horrified by it 
and yet overwhelmed by its power.  It will be the language of a new 
righteousness and truth, a language which proclaims the peace of God 
with men and the advent of his kingdom.
216
 
 
In Bonhoeffer‘s early thought, he was already aware of the immaturity of 
Protestant theological language and Barth also faced this problem when he looked 
for a philosophical terminology for his theology, especially from Kant and the Neo-
Kantians.
217
 However, Bonhoeffer points out the danger of systems in 
philosophizing, as something decided by the thinking ego.   He analyses Kant‘s and 
Hegel‘s ways of dealing with the relationship between thinking and transcendence. 
In Bonhoeffer‘s words, Kant holds that ‗thinking is not an act which ever involves 
transcendence, but refers to it.‘218  Kant sets the limit between man‘s reason and 
transcendence in order to renew this limit.  Hegel, nevertheless, holds that the 
purpose of setting up these limits is to overcome them. For Bonhoeffer, neither Kant 
nor Hegel could provide an exhaustive solution to the relationship between reason 
and transcendence because they use reason to limit reason, or use thinking to limit 
thinking, which is a circle of egocentricity or a circle of philosophy.
219
  Bonhoeffer‘s 
purpose is to know the reality, which is revealed from revelation as encountering the 
boundary between I and You.  For Bonhoeffer, man is in limitation, which is 
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identical with Kant‘s purpose.   The difference lies in this that, for Kant, thinking can 
only refer to the Other/other by reflection [reflexus] because of the limits of reason; 
however, for Bonhoeffer, revelation is the direct action [actus directus] that 
identifies man‘s thinking as act and man‘s existence as being.  Based on the identity 
of act and being, Bonhoeffer can then put forward a non-egocentric way to interpret 
religion. 
 
Ebeling thinks that Bonhoeffer‘s non-religious interpretation is a concrete 
interpretation of faith, and faith is regarded as a prerequisite of the hearing of the 
Word.
220
  The hearing of the Word concerns both believers and non-believers who 
confront faith.   From this, we may define the problem and its origin as below.
221
  
Firstly, the non-religious interpretation raises a problem of language, that is, not only 
to change the old concepts or words into new forms but also to deliver the essence of 
faith with and within a new linguistic form.   Secondly, the non-religious 
interpretation also implies the I-You relationship in a community that shares a 
collective personhood in history because the interpretation would be variously 
determined by the confrontation of man‘s own existence with other people, who may 
not be religious any more.  Thirdly, this interpretation grants a measure of freedom 
and responsibility as regards what types of old presuppositions that should be kept, 
or discarded in the process of this interpretation.  
 
As noted above, nevertheless, this is not a linguistic problem only, but a 
problem about how language bears the significance of faith.   Bonhoeffer thinks that 
Barth and Bultmann are the pioneers in exploring this problem.    Barth does not go 
far enough, in Bonhoeffer‘s estimation, because his strategy of adopting 
philosophical terms is not effective.   As for Bultmann, he also does not go far 
enough in the sense that he still ‗keeps thinking in ―religious‖ categories‘222, and yet 
he goes too far in reducing the content of religious faith down to only an existential 
significance remain (a position later developed by Heidegger into an entirely 
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aetheistic-existentialism in Being and Time).
223
  Bonhoeffer, therefore, is clearly 
conscious of these problems and he retains his early social thought in his later 
reflection on the ‗non-religious‘.  For him, the non-religious interpretation is 
necessary in order to reveal the meaning of word as an event in community.  Word is 
extra-me but at the same time pro-me.
224
  Christ as the logos of word and living 
address exists between persons.  The encounter of I and You in this stage is the 
encounter of the address between persons in community and in history.   This is the 
original meaning of communication and of genuine dialogue.  
 
Genuine dialogue does not only concern the existence of a person in an 
epistemological sense but also the structure of person in a relational sense. The 
language that the non-religious interpretation intends to use bears the significance of 
ethical relations. A person who uses this kind of language constitutes ethical 
significance in every word.  Words, therefore, are not constituted by man, rather they 
constitute man. In other words, personality has a verbal nature from which a word 
has an ontological sense. When people encounter the other, face to face, the 
boundary is uncovered by the words that each use in a responsive attitude. 
 
This responsive attitude leads to the central issue, ‗responsibility‘, in the 
discussion of a non-religious interpretation. Responsibility, in the first instance, is 
‗the basic answering (Verantwortung) of a person to life itself, the fundamental 
response of one‘s own life to life as constituted in and by relationships.‘225  To use 
Bonhoeffer‘s terms: responsibility is ‗the total and realistic response of man to the 
claim of God and of our neighbour.‘226  This response contains both obligation and 
freedom.
227
  Obligation is thus embodied from vicarious or representative action and 
its correspondence with reality via language. Freedom is embodied from the personal 
accountability of life and thus the free wager of concrete decision.  These two 
aspects help man to ‗observe and recognize in his own existence collective 
responsibility and collective guilt.‘ 228  As Ott comments, responsibility is not 
identical to a pure ‗ought‘.  And the responsibility of the collective person is also not 
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identical to a pure ‗collective ought‘.   Action, according to an ‗ought‘, is based on 
the understanding of one‘s existence as linguisticality. 229   Responsible action, 
however, stems from an understanding of reality through language but not from the 
understanding of language only.  
 
For Bonhoeffer, it is in and through the Word, that is, both the Word of God 
and word in general, as revelation via encounters, that unites God and man.   If we 
explore the difference between ‗word‘ in Greek and ‗word‘ in Hebrew as examples, 
we can further clarify the meaning of ‗understanding reality through language.‘ 
Logos in Greek means ‗word,‘ ‗account,‘ or ‗reason‘.   It derives from the verb legō 
(λέγω): to count, tell, say, and speak in a coherent way.   In Christian thought, it is 
identified with the Word of God.   On the other hand, word as the unity of language 
in Hebrew is davár [   ], which also means a thing‘s manifestation.   From these two 
examples, we can detect a common point: words are happening words that serve 
human self-understanding of man in the flow of time.   Man‘s responsibility is 
manifested in his existence as a response to the people whom he encounters in his 
life.   In this sense, language is not static but dynamic.   Language reveals man‘s 
past, manifests his present, and also constitutes his future.   The unique attribute of 
language lies in the fact that language presents invisible and promising things which 
awaken faith within man.   Man‘s conscience is questioned in the process of 
speaking and hearing words from the Other.    Man, in this sense, does not ‗have‘ a 
conscience, rather he is conscience when he gives a response responsibly to the 
Other.
230
  By this process, the mind of man has been formed according to, but is not 
decided by, the mind of the Other (for Bonhoeffer, it is the mind of Christ).   This is 
not leading people to be a religious man, but leading to ‗the man.‘231 
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§ 2.2.9  Some Preliminary Conclusions: Man, Limitation and Possibility, and the Boundary  
 Between the Condition of Possibilities and the Connection of Limitations which  
Implicate Responsibility 
 
 
When Bonhoeffer raises the question of ‗what is man‘ in his early work, he seeks a 
theological basis for ethics.
232
  Ethics, then, for him, is a way from man to God, but 
Christianity speaks from God to man. The ethical discussion in Christianity, 
therefore, is not about what is right and wrong, or good and evil, but ‗only between 
one evil and another‘ in history.   Thus, for Bonhoeffer, responsible action would be 
determined by its identity with the true reality.   This is why, for Bonhoeffer, the ‗I‘ 
who carries out responsible acts awakes only in the conscience of being called.   And 
in Bonhoeffer‘s case, this calling is face to face with God as the Other.   It is a 
boundary situation, in other words, where man stands before God and with God, but 
lives without God.
233
  
 
It thus follows for Bonhoeffer that responsibility, in this context, does not 
provide a standard of moral norm on what man ‗ought‘ to do.   It is not concerned 
with the judgment of conscience on what man ‗can‘ do.  Responsibility, rather, 
focuses on the personhood of who I ‗am‘, who you ‗are‘, and who we ‗are‘.  This 
idea of responsibility emphasizes the priority of difference in opposition to any 
philosophy of totality as a systematic ontology.  This also reveals individual and 
social relationships concerning their respective identity of being and thinking.   Thus 
Bonhoeffer endeavours to avoid the priority of either being or of thinking, but 
intends to prove the dialectical inter-wovenness between being and thinking.   An 
idealist epistemology, after all, can only raise and does raise the question of the 
limitation of man‘s reason, and traditional ontology can only and does only help to 
prove this limitation, but Bonhoeffer‘s Christian universalism put this boundary as its 
centre. 
 
In sum, Barth‘s distinctions between God as Wholly Other and man, and the 
Word of God and the word of man set the scene intellectually and raise essential 
questions that both allow and engender Bonhoeffer to raise his own questions 
regarding religion, faith, reality, person, and the role of language. All of these 
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discussions serve to clarify the question ‗what is man‘.   From the analyses of this 
chapter, we can conclude that to understand ‗what is man‘ does not come from man‘s 
possibility but from his reality.   Man‘s possibility is founded in man‘s own 
limitations and achievements; man‘s reality, however, is determined through man‘s 
response to the Other when they encounter each other.   In this regard, Bonhoeffer‘s 
position not only inherits but also criticizes Barth‘s thought, and raises again the 
question of ‗what is man‘ for us.   Bonhoeffer also draws attention to and considers 
both Heidegger‘s historical way of addressing the question of the meaning of being 
and time and Scheler‘s continuous but static approach to this topic.   Bonhoeffer 
holds that Heidegger‘s way is better than Scheler‘s, but Bonhoeffer argues that 
Heidegger fails in his discussion regarding death and totality because Heidegger‘s 
interpretation is a self-understanding that is founded in a self-enclosing hermeneutic 
circle.   In the next chapter, therefore, we will discuss Bonhoeffer‘s conceptual 
criticism and Levinas‘s ethical criticism of Heidegger‘s position, both of which will 
help to clarify further the inter-relatedness of the concepts of the other, language, and 
ethical responsibility (and which we will elaborate further in chapter five in relation 
to Levinas‘s thinking).   
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CHAPTER III  
 
BONHOEFFER‘S AND LEVINAS‘S  
CRITIQUE OF HEIDEGGER‘S ANALYSIS OF BEING,  
LANGUAGE, RESPONSIBILITY AND DASEIN  
 
 
Martin Heidegger‘s (1889–1976) work Being and Time (1927) is considered to be 
one of the most important philosophical works of the twentieth century.   Moreover, 
his thought has strongly influenced not only philosophy but also theology and the 
humanities.   Heidegger‘s support for National Socialism and the Nazi Party in the 
1930s, however, reveal real flaws inherent in his thought, and it brought criticism 
from several of his students, including Hannah Arendt, Emmanuel Levinas, and Karl 
Löwith, and many others.
1
  Faced with the same historical background as Heidegger, 
Bonhoeffer and Levinas were concerned with similar ethical problems, but they 
argued against Heidegger‘s position on what constitutes ‗authentic existence‘ (in the 
strong Kierkegaardian existentialist‘s sense of concretely lived existence).    Because 
of the major influence that Heidegger‘s philosophy was exercising on others, both 
Bonhoeffer and Levinas thought it incumbent upon them to express themselves on 
Heidegger‘s thought and the controversial issues that he brought forward.   In this 
regard, the discussion of Heidegger is an essential link between Bonhoeffer and 
Levinas as it forms an important philosophical background to both the significance 
and the exigency of the emergence of an ethical concept of responsibility in the 
twentieth century.   
 
This chapter examines Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s thoughts which relate to 
Heidegger‘s standpoint and in particular to his analysis of Dasein and his exploration 
of language in addressing ‗the question of the meaning of Being‘ (die Frage nach 
dem Sinn von Sein).   We shall see that Heidegger‘s discussion of the meaning of 
Being and his conception of (existentialist) ethics is founded upon an implicit 
                                                 
1
 See, Hannah Arendt, ‗Martin Heidegger at Eighty‘, in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. by 
Michael Murray (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 293–303; Karl Löwith, Mein Leben 
in Deutschland vor und nach 1933: ein Bericht  (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), p. 57. 
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egocentricity which prevents him from being able to address the ethical  inter-
connection between the Other, language, and ethical problems.  
 
In order to illustrate the significance of Heidegger‘s egocentric thought on his 
articulation of Being, we will begin, briefly, by outlining three stages in Heidegger‘s 
thought (in section one). This will clarify the main points which influenced 
Bonhoeffer and Levinas, but which they also radically criticized.  In the second 
section, I will compare the centrality of the question of meaning of Being in 
Heidegger and the centrality of the meaning of Christ in Bonhoeffer. By formulating 
this comparison between Heidegger‘s Dasein analysis and Bonhoeffer‘s rethinking 
of the Logos and Christology, we will show the fundamental difference between 
Heidegger‘s and Bonhoeffer‘s thought on ethics. In addition to this, we will discuss 
Bonhoeffer‘s critique of Rudolf Bultmann‘s dependence on Heidegger‘s early 
philosophy. It is well known that Bultmann applies Heidegger‘s existential thoughts 
to his de-mythological interpretation of Christian exegesis. Bonhoeffer considers that 
this brings forth new perspectives on interpreting Christian thought, but he also 
shows that this project of demythologization of Christian faith produces the problem 
of regarding the individual person as ‗the possibility of being‘, deviating from the 
essence and value of Biblical perspective and information of man before God and the 
relation between man and man before God. We will conclude this section, therefore, 
by analysing Heidegger‘s disinterested logos and Bonhoeffer‘s Christological and 
ethical anti-logos. 
 
In the third and final section of this chapter, we will turn to and examine 
Levinas‘s response to Heidegger‘s concept of the ‗ontological difference‘ (Being is 
not a being). Firstly, we will compare Heidegger‘s concept of Being and Levinas‘s 
notion of the Other. Moreover, we also will explore Heidegger‘s stress on 
temporality and Levinas‘s thinking on time, especially on diachrony. By delineating 
these central concepts, we can explore Levinas‘s critique of Heidegger‘s ethical 
deficiency. Secondly, we will investigate Levinas‘s response to Heidegger‘s concept 
of language. In order to elucidate this point, we need to review briefly the 
development of his reflections on language from the early stage to his later stage. In 
view of above-mentioned background, we will point out the differences regarding the 
role of language in Heidegger and Levinas. Levinas puts much value on Heidegger‘s 
 92 
Being and Time and his early thought; however, the reflection of language in 
Heidegger‘s later thought is similar to Levinas‘s deliberation on language, although 
the concerns behind their discussions are not completely the same. We will discuss, 
therefore, Levinas‘s response to Heidegger‘s early linguistic thought on the one hand 
and explore the similarities and differences between them on the other. Lastly, we 
will conclude this section by comparing Heidegger and Levinas‘s thought on ‗face 
and language‘ in order to illustrate the importance of ethical significance of ‗face-to-
face‘ overlooked by Heidegger.  
 
 
SECTION ONE 
THREE STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HEIDEGGER‘S RELIGIOUS 
 AND ANTI-RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 
 
The development of Heidegger‘s thought is complicated and outside the limits of this 
study to address. We will focus, however, on those significant religious themes in 
this development that are relevant to their understanding and evaluation.
2
 Heidegger 
himself, after all, in his later thought, admitted that ‗without this theological 
background, he would never come onto the path of thinking [about die Seinsfrage].‘3 
The first stage in the development that Heidegger recounts, is his conversion from 
Catholicism to Protestantism (1917–1919).4 In this period of his early teaching career 
at the University in Freiburg (1917–1924), Heidegger lays the foundation for his 
writing of Being and Time.
5
 Though Heidegger had been versed in medieval 
                                                 
2
 See, John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 
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 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. by Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 
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4
 See, Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. by Allan Blunden (London: Fontana Press, 
1993), esp., Part Two The Struggle with the Faith of My Birth, The Break with the ―System of 
Catholicism‖, pp. 106–121. 
5
 For an extensive and meticulous examination of the many sources (e.g., from theology, 
existentialism, hermeneutics, Husserlian phenomenology, Dilthey‘s historicism, Augustinian 
philosophical anthropology and many more) that influenced the composition of Heidegger‘s Being 
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philosophy and medieval mysticism, and completed his doctoral and habilitation 
studies on Duns Scotus,
6
 from the outset of his teaching career Heidegger had moved 
away from and rejected the ‗catholic eye‘ that is characteristic of ‗natural theology‘, 
and accepted the ‗protestant ear‘ that is characteristic of hermeneutic-biblical 
scholars interested in exploring the significance of the meaning of the life, death and 
resurrection (what the protestant theologians called ‗facticity‘) of Jesus Christ for our 
human self-understanding.  The second stage in Heidegger‘s thinking is a turn from 
Protestantism to a heroic and atheistic-Nietzschean voluntarism (1928–1929). This 
year also marks the return of Heidegger to Freiburg University, to succeed Husserl 
who had retired and bequeathed the chair of philosophy to him. Before this, 
Heidegger taught at Marburg University (1924–1928), where he made the 
acquaintance of Rudolf Bulmann among others. In his return to Freiburg in 1928, 
and in the years to follow, Heidegger was engaged in activities supporting National 
Socialism into the early 1930s. The third period in Heidegger‘s thought, however, 
begins from about 1936, when he moves away from his early voluntarism and 
existentialist‘s concerns, and towards a more mytho-poetic meditation on Being and 
thinking.   
 
In his first turn from Catholicism to Protestantism, Heidegger‘s philosophical 
interest moves from a strict Husserlian phenomenology to a hermeneutical 
phenomenology. This is mainly influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey‘s concept of history 
and the history of ideas, and also by Schleiermacher‘s hermeneutics, which 
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Heidegger read extensively, (as well as Husserl‘s texts in phenomenology), during 
his early student days and teaching-career in philosophy.
7
 Based on these sources, 
Heidegger developed his thoughts on the history of the disclosure of Being and the 
kairological moment [Augenblick] of truth in Being and Time. The main purpose of 
Being and Time is to locate the existence of human being into a factical structure and 
to provide an ontological and neutral interpretation of the life of human being. This 
leads to Heidegger‘s distinction between ‗existential‘ and the ‗existentiell‘, or ‗the 
ontological‘ and the ‗ontic‘. However, Heidegger‘s emphasis on historicity lies in his 
intention to discover an essence [Wesen] of history, which is ahistorical and 
essential.
8
 Therefore, the essence of the universal a priori human-life structure 
replaces the core Christian belief structure. In this sense, Heidegger‘s concern 
regarding the question of ‗What is Man?‘ lies in the unspoken words of  what man 
should be when God no longer functions in society as before. This leads to the 
second turn of Heidegger‘s thought from Protestantism to voluntarism. In this 
turning point, Heidegger‘s considerations are actually quite similar to those of 
Bonhoeffer‘s, however, they went in different directions. Bonhoeffer continues his 
way in the pursuit of the ethico-religious God, and Heidegger, in his third stage, 
continues from voluntarism to a mytho-poetic meditation on Being, to pursue a 
cosmo-poetic god. 
 
If, as Heidegger says in his later work On the Way to Language, origin (der 
Ursprung) always comes to meet us from the future (die Zukunft), then we need to 
excavate more hints from his early work to clarify the ultimate concern in his theory, 
in particular his early work Phenomenology of Religious Life.
 9
  This work presents 
the text of Heidegger‘s important lectures on religion from 1920 to 1921. Heidegger 
provides a sense of what phenomenology would come to mean in the mature 
                                                 
7
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9
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expression of his thought in this work. Following Dilthey, Heidegger points out that 
‗philosophy arises from factical life experience‘ and that this experience designates 
two aspects: one is the experiencing activity and the other is that which is 
experienced through this activity.
10
 From this distinction, we can see that Heidegger 
(unlike Dilthey) methodologically separates the experiencing activity itself and the 
understanding of this experiencing activity.
11
 This indicates that Heidegger‘s 
elaboration of the distinction between Being and beings has fermented during this 
period because being (Seiende) refers to the subject who experiences and ‗Being‘ 
(Sein) refers to the questioning of the meaning of what is experienced by beings. 
However, Heidegger does not think that Being and beings should be completely 
separated because ‗the experiencing self and what is experienced are not torn apart 
like things that expresses what is essential in factical life experience.‘12 Heidegger‘s 
distinction between Being and beings, then, replaces the Neo-Kantian distinction 
between objectification and subjectification because, for Heidegger, the approach 
that the object is to be drawn into the subject is no longer possible (i.e. is ahistorical) 
as both object and subject should be integrated into the context of the world in 
history. From this point onwards, Heidegger develops his philosophizing self-
understanding together with a phenomenologically historical method. History is in a 
process of becoming and human being is a becoming being in history. Human being 
bears his or her life but also fulfils his or her life in history. In other words, human 
being is the product of history but history is also the product of human being. Thus, 
from the outset, Heidegger is critical of Husserl‘s ahistoricality in the reduction of 
the natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological attitude of pure 
consciousness (and its objectivities).
13
 Following Dilthey‘s cue, instead, Heidegger 
insists that it is only in history and through history that the meaning of life 
experiences and human self-understanding unfolds. 
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From this analysis of history, Heidegger moves on to ‗the attitudinal 
character of the relation to history because each ―attitude‖ has the character of a 
―relation‖.‘ 14 It is not the perception, but the attitude that is prior to this perception 
of determining the order of man‘s self-understanding. Heidegger adopts Husserl‘s 
differentiation between two concepts: Generalization (Generalisierung) and 
Formalization (Verallgemeinerung).
15
 Generalization deals with the problem of 
‗what‘ and formalization deals with the ‗how‘ (wie). We can say that, for Heidegger, 
generalization is the ordering of the activities of beings and formalization is the 
essence of this ordering. Following from this distinction, what Heidegger‘s 
phenomenology attempts to explore is the essence of the totality of activities for the 
purposes of finding out the ‗Logos of the phenomena‘.16 In this sense, generalization 
and formalization are just two different stages in one process to search for the 
essence of the relation between human being and this world.  
 
Next, Heidegger applies this method to analyse the phenomenology of 
Christian religiosity.
17
 In this regard, Heidegger further distinguishes object-
historical understanding and phenomenological understanding.
18
  The former focuses 
on the relations that the observer is not involved in, and the later brings in the 
observer‘s attitude.  Christian religiosity, as well as other different types of 
religiosity, however, contains both of these two understandings because, for 
Heidegger, Christian religiosity exists transcendentally in the factical life experience 
of believers on the one hand and, on the other hand, the believers receive Christian 
information through language (e.g. Word of God) and ‗empathizing‘ with a situation, 
which is treated as a phenomenological term.
19
  According to Heidegger, the 
situation of the Christian believer lies in the two important stages of experience and 
history.
20
  The believer experiences their having-become and they also have a 
knowledge of their having-become. In other words, their having-become is their ‗to 
be (sein)‘ now.21   It is this very experience of ‗having-become‘ that provides a 
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perspective for that individual human being to have a knowledge of the relation 
between his own self-world and a transcendental world. For Heidegger, however, to 
have this relational sense does not mean that the Christian can integrate the self-
world and transcendental world. This brings difficulties to any Christian worldview, 
similar to the contradiction between the ‗to be‘ (of the meaning of Being [Sein]) and 
beings (Seiende). Dasein is the solution that Heidegger proposed in his early stage, 
for only this being can question the meaning of Being in relation to that being‘s own 
being (als Seiendes), but he had not completely elucidated this concept and, in his 
later thought, he turns back to the meditation on the meaning of Being from a 
linguistic perspective. 
 
In general, Heidegger‘s early thought originates from his concern about the 
understanding and interpretation of the interaction of human being and the world 
around that individual human being. Therefore, his analysis of Dasein as an 
awareness of the coherence of Being-in-the-world becomes a new perspective for 
theologians, such as, for instance, Rudolf Bultmann, Heinrich Ott and others to 
develop their theological thoughts. In many respects, the reflection of Bonhoeffer on 
Bultmann‘s existential way of Christian exegesis brings forth Bonhoeffer‘s non-
religious interpretation of Christianity. And Ott‘s rethinking of Bonhoeffer‘s 
Christological interpretation expands and corrects Bultmann‘s approach. All of these 
show that it is necessary for us to clarify the main issues which concern Heidegger 
and Bonhoeffer. Based on this, we can point out their divergences and from these 
divergences we will explore the main points which Bonhoeffer emphasizes but does 
not yet complete, and which is developed through Levinas‘s arguments criticizing 
Heidegger‘s thought. 
 
 
SECTION TWO 
HEIDEGGER AS A KEY DIALOGUE PARTNER OF BONHOEFFER 
 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Heidegger led remarkably different lives.
22
  In 1927, 
Bonhoeffer completed his doctoral dissertation Sanctorum Communio, when 
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 See, Charles Marsh, ‗Bonhoeffer on Heidegger and Togetherness‘, Modern Theology, 8:3 (July 
1992) 263–283. 
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Heidegger published his Being and Time.   Because of a certain similarity between 
their ideas and concepts in Bonhoeffer and Heidegger, Charles Marsh thinks that 
Bonhoeffer ‗may have read Being and Time (or previously published sections of the 
book) while he wrote the doctoral thesis, although there is no evidence of that in the 
text‘.23 When Bonhoeffer finished his habilitation thesis, Act and Being, in 1929, we 
can see his reflective and critical arguments on Being and Time in his early work, 
especially on the problem of revelation primarily through being.
24
  Bonhoeffer had 
Heidegger‘s thought in mind after his inaugural lecture, even though there was no 
direct comment on Heidegger‘s philosophy in Bonhoeffer‘s later works.   However, 
compared with the obvious impact of Being and Time on Act and Being, Stephen 
Plant points out that Bonhoeffer‘s essential formative lecture series on Christology 
was methodologically influenced by Heidegger‘s phenomenological theology. 25  
Thus, in this section, we will examine whether and how Heidegger is a partner in 
dialogue with Bonhoeffer. 
 
§ 3.2.1  The Meaning of Being (Sinn von Sein) and from Being to Dasein 
 
First of all, we will discuss Heidegger‘s definition of Being and his formal structure 
of the question of the meaning of Being.   As for the definition, Being is the most 
universal concept, which is not that of a class or genus.
26
  The concept of Being in 
medieval ontology is also designated as ‗transcendens‟.  In this sense, Being is 
indefinable and cannot be conceived as an entity (als Seiendes), therefore, its 
meaning is self-evident.
27
  This self-evidence of the meaning of Being, however, 
requires investigation, and so, far from cancelling any questioning of its meaning, it 
(re-) invites it.   Thus, as regards the question of Being, Heidegger begins from the 
activity of asking as a seeking about the meaning of Being because Being constitutes 
what is asked about (Sein Gefragtes).
28
  This asking mode of Being is Dasein.   The 
essential constitution (Wesensverfassung/ Verfassung) of Dasein raises the problem 
of history (Geschichte), because the historical element is prior to knowledge, which 
is distinguished by Heidegger as ontological (ontologisch) and ontic (ontisch) 
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inquiry. 
29
 Both of these two types of knowledge answer to existence (Existenz) and, 
following Kierkegaard‘s stress that one can only argue from one‘s own, actual 
individual existence (and not to existence), ‗Dasein always understands itself in 
terms of its existence.‘30  Following this line of thought, Heidegger further states that 
the understanding of one‘s existence is ‗existentiell‟, and the context of such 
structures is called ‗existentiality‘.31 All of these constitute the fundamental ontology 
that locates Dasein‟s understanding of Being (Seinsverständis) within this world 
(innerhalb der Welt) in its ordinary everydayness. This everydayness implicates 
timeliness (Zeitlichkeit) as temporality (Temporalität). To understand Being is to 
find the meaning of Dasein‟s Being in history, and that, for Heidegger, means in 
time (or, more precisely speaking, in temporality).
32
  We can conclude that the 
definition of Being and the formal structure about the question of Being reveal a 
historical form of life and that the individual human being can investigate an 
irresistible power of becoming of his life in this world.  Questioning the meaning of 
Being itself, then, is an achievement of the individual human being from within that 
being‘s own factical life situation.33 
 
Having examined Heidegger‘s definition of Being and Dasein, we now move 
on to the discussion about Being and responsibility according to Heidegger‘s 
arguments.   In Being and Time, Heidegger does not analyse responsibility explicitly.   
Heidegger, however, does discuss several times the ‗voice of conscience‘ (Stimme 
des Gewissens).
34
  The call (Ruf) that is hidden in the voice is a mode of 
‗disclosure‘. 35   John D. Caputo supposes that ‗Being leaves us with a deep, 
unsettling, indefinite ―sense of responsibility‖ because conscience is the call that 
calls Dasein back to itself.‘ 36   We agree with this point in the sense that the 
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existential analytic cannot help to carry out the responsible significance from the call 
of conscience.   This is the origin of the ethical deficiency in Heidegger because the 
authentic Dasein ‗never has a ―good‖ conscience.‘37 The attribute of the authentic 
Dasein is ‗mineness‘ (Jemeinigkeit),38 by means of which Heidegger intends to avoid 
the accusation of egoism.   Indeed, it is precisely because Dasein is ‗mine‘ that I can 
either own or dis-own the call of its self to itself in conscience.   Mineness, in other 
words, is a condition for both authenticity and inauthenticity but not a moral criterion 
of ‗good‘ human action or decision; neither can it stipulate what it is, or to whom one 
is responsible.    From this perspective, we can both see and suppose that 
Heidegger‘s thoughts on the call of conscience and the mineness of Dasein 
implicates an ontological responsibility, but it is not an ethical responsibility.   This 
ontological responsibility calls for responsible response from the essence of the 
meaning of Being only and exclusively to each ‗my-own-self‘.   The conscience of 
Dasein answers to the essence of the Being of responsibility.   In this sense, 
individual Dasein‟s conscience is both closely related to and also determined by 
collective Dasein‟s conscience in a society.   The voice of the individual dissolves 
into the voice of the collective, allowing das Man to both take up and take over the 
responsibility of Dasein, when they confront a call in a specific historical 
background.   It is difficult, however, to define ‗who is people‘ and ‗what is a 
people‘s response‘ in this situation.   In Being and Time, Heidegger‘s notion of 
facticity cannot solve this problem but this problem leads to another problem: 
totalitarianism precisely because the direction of the response from the being of 
beings towards the meaning of Being itself is not a response that is constituted from 
one person to another by hearing and answering, but from a general principle to a 
greater power: the essence of Being. 
 
This brief analysis of Heidegger‘s thought on Being and Dasein is suffice  to 
point out the danger or the problem that Heidegger‘s theory leads to, and to which 
Bonhoeffer‘s alternative standpoint that runs from Logos to the Anti-Logos of 
Christology is a critical response.  
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§ 3.2.2  From Logos to Anti-Logos (Christology) 
 
Bonhoeffer‘s series of lectures on Christology were given in 1933.   His later 
writings, nonetheless, are a development of his early thought, especially from his 
consideration of ethics.   Even though the main arguments and writing style in the 
early and later stages are not the same, their starting point and ultimate concern never 
change as we noted in Chapter one.   As we also mentioned, at the beginning of this 
chapter, Bonhoeffer‘s Christological thought is methodologically influenced by 
Heidegger‘s re-direction of Husserlian strict, ahistorical phenomenological approach 
towards a more hermeneutic and theologically faith-based existential-
phenomenological method of analysis, even if Heidegger himself does not think 
through the significance of such religious faith itself.   Moreover, the examination of 
Logos and Christology lies at the core of Bonhoeffer‘s thought.   Therefore, we will 
first discuss Bonhoeffer‘s Christological thought in relation to his ethical concern 
before we move on to his criticism of Bultmann‘s dependence on Heidegger.   
 
Bonhoeffer‘s focus of attention in Christology is how man understands 
himself.   In another early work No Rusty Sword, Bonhoeffer thinks that man cannot 
understand himself from himself but only from the other, Christ, and in the 
community because ‗from the Word, which the community hears and without which 
the community does not exist.‘39  From this point of view, Bonhoeffer stresses the 
role of the Word as the incarnate Christ in a human being‘s understanding of the 
Word and its relationship to the formation of morality. Originally, the Word exists 
outside of people.  This is why is can only be addressed to people, but it is addressed 
to people in a form of law from which one chooses to act, rather than morality. That 
is to say, only when the Word has been incarnated and understood by people from 
within, and when man becomes what he is with this understanding of this Word from 
without and the incarnation of Christ from within, can morality (as ethical 
responsibility) come into being.  In this sense, the difference between Heidegger and 
Bonhoeffer is not as clearly evident as it may seem.   Heidegger‘s focus, however, is 
on ‗mineness‘, while Bonhoeffer‘s core is Christ as other.   Heidegger, therefore, 
explores the relation between Dasein and the world, with mineness as the 
prerequisite, while Bonhoeffer, by distinction, emphasizes man‘s likeness to Christ 
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and thus, as Kierkegaard would put it, identifies the necessity and the problem of 
becoming a Christian.   This is why, for Bonhoeffer (but not for Heidegger), when 
man is concerned with the relation of Christ to the newly matured world, a central 
question will appear.
40
  This is an ultimate question for Bonhoeffer: ‗where does God 
now take refuge.‘41  As we discussed in chapter two, Barth is the first one to realize 
this problem and attempts to solve it via his analyses of the distinction between the 
word of man and the Word of God and between religion and Christ.   For 
Bonhoeffer, Barth does not succeed in developing a new way of theological 
interpretation, even though Barth has pointed out the problem.   At the same time, 
Bultmann advocated a new approach, which is similar to Bonhoeffer‘s idea of non-
religious interpretation. We will discuss Bultmann‘s existential approach of 
interpreting Christian thought and Biblical words after we examine Bonhoeffer‘s 
development of Christological thought. 
 
Bonhoeffer‘s Christological thought is composed of three aspects: Word, 
Sacrament, and Church.   These three aspects are interwoven, but the strongest part, 
which is also the part most related to our study, is his discussion of the meaning of 
the Word.   Bonhoeffer‘s question on Christ leads to an examination of the self 
because Christ interprets man‘s being.42  The interpretation of Christ is the science of 
the Word of God and Bonhoeffer calls it Logology.
43
  Here Bonhoeffer introduces 
and embraces the tension between man‘s logos and God‘s Logos as Barth does.   
However, Christ in Bonhoeffer represents God‘s Logos as an Anti-Logos of man‘s 
because this Logos is not an idea but an incarnate Word.
44
  Compared to his 
Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being, Bonhoeffer maintains his consideration of 
the relationship between persons in a community but deepens and emphasizes the 
ethical perspective of it.   He brings forward a ‗who‘ question and a ‗pro me‘ 
structure from his Christological thought. 
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For Bonhoeffer, ‗the question ‗Who?‘ is the question of transcendence while 
the question ‗How?‘ is the question of immanence.‘45 The transcendental question 
‗Who?‘ is raised in the encounter of strangeness and otherness.   It is the question for 
‗the very existence of the enquirer himself.‘46  Man will find his limit of Logos when 
he encounters the boundary with the alien-ness. This boundary delineates the 
limitation of man‘s existence, but, at the same time, it opens up the possibility 
towards the other‘s existence transcendentally.   Thus, the question of existence is 
the same as the question of transcendence for Bonhoeffer.   We have discussed this 
in chapter two, where we already referred to the importance of ‗person‘ in 
Bonhoeffer‘s discussion of I-Thou.   In his Christology, the ‗Who?‘ question 
emphasizes the incarnate characteristic of the personal structure of Logos.   For 
Bonhoeffer, the death of God is equal to the death of the Logos of God because ‗the 
Logos of God incarnate must be crucified by man‘s Logos‟.47  The crucified and 
risen one as Christ is the first statement of Christology and Christ who presents 
himself in the church as a person is the second.
48
 Bonhoeffer then distinguishes 
between personality and person: personality is an apersonal concept because 
personality represents ‗power‘ and ‗value‘ while person goes beyond these.49  The 
person is to be understood in the pro me structure of the God-man Jesus Christ.
50
  
For Bonhoeffer, this ‗pro me‟ means that Christ‘s relation to me in an ontological 
sense can only be conceived in the community. The ‗pro me‘ structure emphasizes 
the priority of the other, but this other refers to the I.  In other words, the ‗pro me‘ 
structure provides an opposite point of view on the problem of ‗otherness‘: I am the 
other for the otherness.  I am addressed from the other as this other‘s otherness.   
This address leads to the act of answering and it is answerable because I am 
questioned from the other.  My answer shows my existence and the relation of my 
existence to the world.   This is the inner meaning that we interpret from 
Bonhoeffer‘s ‗who?‘ question: the I becomes a stranger for the other and the Word 
that I am addressed renews me.   Thus, the communication between the words of 
man creates the form of the community; similarly, the communication between the 
Word of God and the words of man creates the form of the religious community.   
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This interpretation of Bonhoeffer‘s train of thought shows the ethical significance of 
word and its relation to person, including the I and the other. 
 
For Bonhoeffer, then, Christ is the Other who ‗stands in my place where I 
should stand but cannot.‘51 As we discussed in chapter two, the boundary is the place 
that I cannot stand but have to encounter and understand. This understanding 
determines the existence of human being.  Heidegger also seeks for this 
understanding but he leaves no room for Christ, or, in other words, there is no room 
for the Otherness but only for the mineness, even though he provides a creative 
viewpoint on the relation between this mineness and the world.   The world of 
coming-of-age for Bonhoeffer has similar features to Heidegger‘s thought on the 
mineness-world relation: if the role of God as the ultimate Other has been changed 
by this world, then in what way we will know this God and how he addresses us? 
Bultmann has similar concerns to Bonhoeffer. Bultmann, however, adopts 
Heidegger‘s existential approach to interpret Christianity, which Bonhoeffer 
criticizes. 
 
§ 3.2.3  Bonhoeffer‟s Critique of Bultmann‟s Dependence on Heidegger‟s Philosophy 
 
Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976) was a German Lutheran theologian, and one who is 
generally regarded as the most conspicuous example of Liberal Theology in the 
twentieth century.
52
 Bultmann believes that what concerns faith not only lies in 
history (Historie) but the continuing significance of the past in the present 
(Geschichte).
53
 Based on this presupposition, Bultmann proposed his project of 
demythologization (Entmythologisierung).   This means to use existential language 
to translate or interpret mythological language.   Bonhoeffer thinks that Bultmann 
can go further and should go further and more thoroughly, for, 
 
It is not only the mythological conceptions, such as the miracles, the 
ascension and the like (which are not in principle separable from the 
conception of God, faith and so on) that are problematic, but the 
‗religious‘ conceptions themselves.   You cannot, as Bultmann imagines, 
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separate God and miracles, but you do have to be able to interpret and 
proclaim both of them in a ‗non-religious‘ sense.   Bultmann‘s approach 
is really at bottom the liberal one (i.e. abridging the Gospel), whereas I 
seek to think theologically.
54
 
 
Bonhoeffer‘s analysis is incomplete and far from finished, therefore, he leaves many 
possibilities for us to interpret and to develop what he has not finished.   Bonhoeffer 
both uses Bultmann‘s thoughts to argue for Barth‘s interpretation of the love 
commandment and debates with Bultmann‘s theology about the question of the 
relation between philosophy and theology on revelation.
55
 Thus, we will examine 
Bultmann‘s existential de-mythological approach in Bonhoeffer‘s direction but also 
attempt to clarify and develop Bonhoeffer‘s non-religious interpretation on 
understanding and language based on this examination.  
 
§ 3.2.4  Bultmann‟s Existential De-mythological Interpretation 
 
If we return to Bultmann‘s early thought, we will find that his concerns are quite 
similar to Bonhoeffer‘s, namely, God as ‗Wholly Other‘ and the limits of human 
powers.
56
 Bultmann is aware of the importance of existential consciousness in 
understanding God and the Christian faith at this period, before he was influenced by 
Heidegger‘s thought.   Bultmann begins from the most fundamental concept of 
human existence ‗experience‘ to explore both my existence and the other‘s existence.   
He emphasizes the uniqueness of the other in his early thought, because, for him, the 
other ‗gives us a part of himself that opens up to us a view into his depths.‘57  With 
this understanding as presupposition, Bultmann first introduces this existentialist 
point of view in his theology in 1925 from two essays ‗The Meaning of Speaking of 
God‘ and ‗Existential Interpretation of Scripture‘. 
 
In his later thought, Bultmann shifts his focus from a primitive reflection on 
human experience to a hermeneutic and linguistic interpretation on the relationship 
between God and man.   He distinguishes between two modes of speaking: speaking 
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of God and speaking about God. 
58
  For Bultmann, to speak about God is to speak an 
object that is alien from man himself; on the contrary, to speak of God is to speak of 
man himself.
59
  This consideration, which shares with Bonhoeffer‘s concern, shows 
that the self-understanding of man‘s speaking of his existence has to be rethought 
along with the change of world-view (Weltanschauung). Both Bultmann and 
Bonhoeffer detect the paradoxical existence of man in a coming-of-age world: man is 
becoming independent from God and he has to take on a world-view that is 
constituted by himself.   This means that man‘s existence is no longer a part of this 
world-view but the designer of this world-view.   On the one hand, he has to take 
responsibility for his own concrete existence as a subject; but, on the other hand, his 
existence in this world is subjected to the other‘s existence.   This will lead to the 
difficulty as to how man can truly speak to or respond to the other‘s existence. 
 
When Bultmann argued the problem of a theological exegesis of the New 
Testament in 1925, he brought in the dimension of history, as Heidegger did, to try to 
solve this difficulty.   He asks, ‗What is the content of what is said, and to what kind 
of reality does it lead?‘ and ‗what does it mean for me and how am I to understand it 
on its objective ground?‘60 The first question leads to the problem of history and the 
second one leads to the problem of hermeneutics.    For Bultmann, history is 
regarded as the boundary for our existence because, 
 
we stand in history and are a part of it, [then] every word we utter about 
history is necessarily a word about ourselves; that is, it discloses how we 
interpret our own existence.
61
 
 
In other words, our interpretation opens up the possibilities of our existence when we 
encounter history in a living relationship with the Other.
62
  On the other hand, in 
order to transcend this boundary, Bultmann relates God‘s Word and man‘s word in 
order to deal with this problem: the encounter of God‘s word lies in the 
communication of man‘s words, therefore, it is necessary to change theological terms 
of the past into the existential concepts of the present. In this way, we will come to 
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an objective understanding for all exegetical biblical information. This paves the way 
for Bultmann‘s later hermeneutic thoughts in 1950.  
 
We find that Dilthey‘s question shares Bultmann‘s life-long hermeneutic 
concern: ‗how can one individual come to an objective, generally valid 
understanding of another individual‘s expression of life as given through the 
senses?‘63 Bultmann applied Heidegger‘s hermeneutical way to emphasize the role of 
questioner in asking, which reveals one‘s true existential situation.   To find out an 
objective ground for understanding, Bultmann‘s approach can be traced back to 
Heidegger‘s fore-structure of understanding.   This indicates that the meaning lies 
prior to man‘s question, but it needs to be revealed by this questioner according to 
his hermeneutic perspective.   Thus, it is impossible for the starting-point to be 
neutral, which leads to a hermeneutic circle.   As the first one to explore this 
hermeneutic circle, Schleiermacher shows the significance of the historical and 
psychological background of the reader who interprets a text.   Compared to 
Schleiermacher‘s inner psychological approach, Heidegger develops this concept by 
relating this psychological subject to his situation.   In other words, Heidegger 
locates this subject in his everyday existence to explicitly find out that he is in the 
inescapable relationship between his self-reference or a priori prejudice of his 
understanding and the others‘ in this world.  
 
Bultmann employs Heidegger‘s notion with his own term of ‗pre-
understanding‘ (Vorverständnis) to point out the problem and emphasizes the role of 
presupposition in interpretation.
64
  Thus, this presupposition is regarded as another 
boundary for understanding our existence.   Bultmann‘s solution is, 
 
The point, then, is not to eliminate the pre-understanding but to risk it, to 
raise it to the level of consciousness, and to test it critically in 
understanding the text.
65
 
 
This solution is determined by the questioner who understands and interprets the 
historical phenomena.   Bultmann, therefore, supposes that because we have to 
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accept this pre-understanding, the ‗most subjective‘ interpretation is the ‗most 
objective‘.66  If we examine this point from a Christian theological perspective, then 
the understanding and interpretation of God‘s revelation would depend on whether 
this man truly questions his human existence. 
 
To sum up this part, both Heidegger and Bultmann emphasize what the 
meaning is for the subject, but no longer meaning from the text and context together 
with the author‘s intention as traditional hermeneutics does.   Heidegger‘s approach 
provides a new dimension for Bultmann to explore the structure of factical Christian 
existence.   Bonhoeffer regards Bultmann‘s starting point as valuable but he also 
believes that he is moving in a wrong direction.    
 
§ 3.2.5 Bonhoeffer‟s Critique of Bultmann‟s Dependence on Heidegger‟s Philosophy Re-Visited 
 
As we discussed above, Bultmann‘s intention is to find a universal, objective, and 
existential basis for Christian existence and Heidegger‘s existential and hermeneutic 
approaches provide support for that task. Correspondingly, Bonhoeffer‘s non-
religious interpretation of Christianity also intends to discover a universal 
understanding of human existence from a Christian perspective.   The difference 
between Bultmann and Bonhoeffer is that the former overestimates the role of self-
understanding along with Heidegger‘s Dasein analysis; the latter insists that the role 
of self-understanding always depends on God‘s word from the outside, as 
revelation.
67
 
 
Bonhoeffer discussed Bultmann‘s existential approach with his own 
‗religiouslessness‘ problem in mind in two letters contained in Letters and Papers 
from Prison.   One is in a letter on 5
th
 May 1944 and in another letter on 8
th
 June 
1944.
68
  These two passages raise the following question: did Bultmann‘s de-
methologization influence Bonhoeffer‘s ‗religionless Christianity‘, or are these two 
points of view parallel.
69
  From the ongoing analyses, we tend to agree that 
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Bonhoeffer was inspired by Bultmann‘s attempt to find a new way to re-interpret 
Biblical words that can be understood by people in a world of coming-of-age. 
However, the hermeneutical and existential approach that Bultmann adopts would 
deviate from nature and would narrow the scope of the kerygma of Christianity 
because of its liberal ‗reductionism‘.   As Frick remarks in his paper ‗Rudolf 
Bultmann, Paul Tillich and Dietrich Bonhoeffer‘ (including what we have discussed 
regarding the problem of ‗possibility‘ in Bonhoeffer in chapter two), 
 
Bonhoeffer rejects what he understands to be Bultmann‘s position, 
namely, that a person has the ontological-existential possibility to arrive 
at a proper understanding of self-based on a (Heideggerian) analysis of 
self and (almost) apart from revelation.   Decisive for this complex 
discourse are the concepts of ‗possibility‘ or ‗potentiality‘ and 
‗revelation.‘70 
 
 
Revelation not only plays an essential role in Bonhoeffer‘s theological thought but 
also in his ethical thought.   The significance of encounter and exteriority constitute 
the nature of revelation and man‘s ethical existence via the true response to this 
revelation.   It is difficult, however, to find this significance in an ontological-
existential interpretation of possibility. 
 
Being in Christ call for a certain kind of continuity.   Heidegger‘s Dasein 
calls for continuity, too, but it is a continuity of perpetual cries in which 
decisions are called for, a continuity of ‗always-being-already-in-guilt‘, 
which means – in Bonhoeffer‘s devastating judgment – that ―Heidegger‘s 
concept of existence is of no use for the elucidation of being in faith‖.‘71 
 
 
Bonhoeffer‘s critique of Bultmann‘s dependence on Heidegger, therefore, refers not 
to its methodological sense, but to the divergence of the theological and ethical 
concern of the self-understanding. 
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§ 3.2.6 On Language: Heidegger‟s Non-Ethical Concern and Bonhoeffer‟s Ethical Concern  
 
As for the ethical concern of Heidegger, we can trace it back to the influential debate 
between Heidegger and Ernest Cassirer in Davos in 1929.   Cassirer points out that 
Heidegger‘s ‗fundamental ontology‘ lacks standards.72  Heidegger faces the problem 
that ethics has perhaps completely disappeared in his thought, or, to put it in another 
way, Heidegger doubts whether ethics is possible at all.
73
  This is a fundamental 
question for Heidegger because it questions a human beings mode of existence and 
our relationship to others, a question also shared by Bonhoeffer and Levinas.  In 
other words, all of them have similar concern and all of them deal with the relation 
between language and being, but the question is whether and how these would lead 
to genuine ethical considerations.  
 
Heidegger‘s starting point is whether understanding and interpretation is in 
accordance with its existential meaning, which is also Dasein‟s own potentiality-for-
Being.
74
  This potentiality will be revealed by the assertion [Das Ausgesagte] as a 
primary and authentic ‗locus‘ of truth because assertion is the most familiar type of 
discourse or the first step of discourse. This is also an important concept for 
Heidegger to connect the issues between language and the relation of beings because 
the primary signification of assertion is pointing out [Aufzeigen], communication 
[Mitteilung], and speaking forth [Heraussage] to the other being to ‗share with‘ 
[teilt…mit] what we see in common. 75   This paves the way for his distinction 
between apophantical ‗as‘ and existential-hermeneutical ‗as‘ of the assertion.76  The 
former shows the structure of the assertion, which can be found in the latter one 
which is embodied as a structure of interpretation.
77
  Both of these two structures 
also depend on the disclosure of the Dasein: Dasein‟s understanding. For Heidegger, 
this is the logic of the Logos (λόγος), which rooted in the existential analytic of 
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Dasein.
78
  This logic of Dasein analytic, however, has been interpreted in a way that 
is ethically inadequate, even though Heidegger himself is conscious of this problem. 
Heidegger is aware of this aspect of his later thought in his work On the Way to 
Language.  He emphasizes that he does not search for something about language, but 
a different relation to language.
79
  Even though he detects this problem, he admits 
that our relation to language is vague, obscure, almost speechless.
80
  In the later part 
of this work, he again discusses our relation to language, which should become 
memorable in the form of ‗Saying‘, and human beings are located within this 
Saying.
81
 
 
Our exploration of the crux of this problem in Heidegger is not only to point 
out the indifference towards ethical considerations in his thought but also to uncover 
the most fundamental and central perspectives in order to discuss the possibility of 
ethical considerations.   When we talk about ethical issues, like responsibility, what 
are we truly talking about? If we just talk about something that ‗shows itself to be 
seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself‘ in a 
phenomenological and metaphysical way, how will this truth have something to do 
with me?
82
 Heidegger distinguishes the authentic self (my-own-self) and the 
inauthentic self (‗the One‘ or ‗the They‘ (Das Man), or the-They-self (my-unowned-
self) when they carry out the logic of Logos, but what would the result be when ‗the-
They‘ faces my authentic self and vice versa? From these questions, we can see that 
what Heidegger neglects is the ‗who‘ question, while he provides a profound 
understanding of the ‗what‘ and ‗how‘ questions.   Compared with Heidegger‘s 
pursuit of the ‗what‘ and ‗how‘ questions of Being via asking the Being of language 
and showing the neutrality of the language of beings, Bonhoeffer takes up the ‗who‘ 
question to pursue the anti-Logos via asking the meaning of Christ who reveals the 
‗pro me‘ structure in the form of language.   A non-religious interpretation of 
Christianity is an attempt by Bonhoeffer to carry out this ‗pro me‘ structure of 
language but he never completes it.    
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Thus far, we have briefly reviewed the development of Heidegger‘s thought 
as a preparation for our discussion; we have also specifically clarified Heidegger‘s 
argument from Being to Dasein, which is a counterpart to Bonhoeffer‘s critical 
thought from Logos to anti-Logos; we then have discussed Bonhoeffer‘s critique of 
Bultmann‘s dependence on Heidegger after we analysed Bultmann‘s existential de-
mythological approach.   Finally, we have concluded this part by comparing 
Heidegger‘s and Bonhoeffer‘s different concerns on language in order to indicate the 
formulation of the problems and the relationship between these problems in these 
related thinkers.   Bonhoeffer‘s ideas were not completed, but he pointed out the pro 
me structure and reflection on language, which was made clear by comparison with 
Heidegger‘s thought.   Thus, based on the foregoing discussion, we will argue that 
Levinas‘s thought could be regarded as a strong supplement and development for 
Bonhoeffer‘s thought.   Before we turn to the part on how Levinas develops and 
completes Bonhoeffer‘s thought, it is necessary to examine why Heidegger is also an 
important dialogue partner of Levinas.   By doing this, we will make the intellectual 
connection clear as well as the similarities and differences of ethical concern by 
means of a discussion of the role of the Other and the role of language between 
Bonhoeffer, Heidegger, and Levinas.   
 
 
SECTION THREE 
HEIDEGGER AS A KEY DIALOGUE PARTNER OF LEVINAS 
 
Compared to the analyses of the relationship between Heidegger and Bonhoeffer, 
there have been much more discussion and investigations into the intellectual 
relations between Heidegger and Levinas.   This should make it easier for us to find 
out the crucial points of contact between these two thinkers but it also makes it 
difficult to clarify their complicated connections.   In order to elucidate the essential 
elements of responsibility, the Other, and language from the real connections 
between their thought, we are going to explore their intellectual relations in terms of 
their analyses on ‗Being‘ and the Other, temporality and diachrony, and their views 
on language.    
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§ 3.3.1 Levinas‟s Relationship to Husserl and Heidegger 
 
Before the publication of Totality and Infinity in 1961, Levinas was always regarded 
as a follower and translator of Husserl and Heidegger.
83
  After this publication, 
Levinas‘s arguments attacking the ethical background of Heidegger‘s ontology were 
widely noted.
84
 Based on this critique, Jacques Derrida thought that Levinas 
‗misunderstands and misrepresents Heidegger‘s philosophy‘ and he ‗concludes by 
suggesting that Levinas‘s discourse is not really philosophy at all.‘85  There are two 
bodies of opinion on the differences
86
 and convergences
87
 between the thought of 
Heidegger and Levinas.   Both of these considerations reveal the complexity of 
discussing the true relations between Heidegger‘s thought and Levinas‘s and it is 
regarded as one of the most difficult topics in the field of post-phenomenology.
88
  In 
Levinas‘s own words, he appraises Heidegger‘s Being and Time as one of the 
greatest works in the history of philosophy.
89
  This makes it more complicated to 
identify in which respects Levinas agrees with and disagrees with Heidegger.  We 
agree with Manning‘s evaluation that ‗(I)ndebted to Heidegger as Levinas is, he is no 
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Heideggerian.‘90  Levinas argues against Heidegger‘s phenomenological ontology as 
first philosophy, but at the same time develops his own phenomenological ethics as 
first philosophy based on his critique of Heidegger in a dialectical way.
91
  Compared 
to Heidegger‘s insistence on exploring the knowledge of Being, Levinas proclaims 
the priority of the Other which we are responsible for in the inter-subjective 
relations. If we say that Heidegger‘s concern is about what man can experience, 
understand, and interpret from the mineness the Being, then Levinas‘s concern is 
about what man cannot constitute via the actions mentioned above from the 
Otherness of the Other. 
 
§ 3.3.2 Levinas‟s Response to Heidegger‟s Ontological Difference 
 
In Levinas‘s later work God, Death and Time, which consists of transcripts from his 
lectures delivered in 1975–76, he pointed out six fundamental motifs in Heidegger‘s 
thought. These six motifs focus on different aspects of Heidegger‘s famous 
ontological difference.
92
  The first and the second motifs are about the concept of 
being and the distinction between Being and beings; the third motif is about 
Heidegger‘s well-known but obscure slogan ‗language is the house of being‘ and 
which locates the site of this difference; the fourth points out the forgetting of this 
difference in Western thought and the thinking of being becomes the knowledge of 
God as theo-logy; and the fifth indicates that this movement of onto-theo-logy will 
lead to the will to power and the springing up of technology which also results in the 
death of God.   The last aspect pointed out by Levinas is that Heidegger ceases to use 
the term ontology but replaces it with ‗the thinking of being‘. 
 
Together with his examination of these six aspects, Levinas further advocates 
that Heidegger‘s emphasis of the forgetting of the ontological difference posits 
man‘s thinking in the limit of being, which implies that one cannot think beyond 
being.
93
 However, another emphasis of Heidegger is in the task of being: ‗to-be‘.   
Then the emphasis on the limit of being imposes restrictions on the emphasis on the 
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‗becoming‘ of being. Nevertheless, the difficulty of solving the problem of the 
understanding of one‘s own being and the subjective understanding of the other‘s is 
exactly the starting point for Levinas to put forward his own thought.   Next, we will 
analyse Levinas‘s response to Heidegger‘s terms of being and time with his central 
terms of the Other and diachrony.   Robert Manning‘s book Interpreting Otherwise 
than Heidegger provides a clear and precise discussion about this topic.   Based on 
Manning‘s discussion, we will develop our arguments on how Levinas‘s discussion 
about Heidegger‘s ontological difference leads to Levinas‘s articulation of 
responsibility in the relation to the other and to language.   
 
§ 3.3.3 Being and the Other 
 
As we have already discussed the concept of Being from Heidegger in the section on 
Bonhoeffer in this chapter, we will now discuss Levinas‘s response to the relation 
between Being and the Other directly.   In Levinas‘s later thought, he changes 
Heidegger‘s motif of Being-Other into Same-Other because the interpretation of the 
meaning of Being in the manner of Heidegger‘s Being and Time will give rise to the 
self-projection of the Other into one‘s own interpretation of potentialities.   This is a 
process of assimilation of the Other into the Same.   According to Levinas, ethical 
significance cannot be found in sameness because ethical questions will not be raised 
when everything is the same.   Or to put it another way, the ethical significance can 
only be found when the Other is treated as Other for questions are to be raised from 
differences.  
 
But this later reflection on Heidegger‘s deliberation of Being can be traced 
back as early as 1947, when Levinas states that he attempts to ‗use 
phenomenological methods to overcome phenomenology‘.94 Compared to his later 
expression ‗same-other‘, Levinas is concerned with ‗the other side of being‘ [au-dela 
de l'être], which is similar to Plato‘s idea of the Good.   This concern becomes the 
title of Levinas‘s later important work ‗Otherwise Than Being‘ [Autrement qu'être].   
What Levinas wants to draw attention to in the above discussions is the neutrality of 
Being from Heidegger‘s thought.   Thus, we can say that Levinas‘s thinking begins 
with the il y a (there is), which corresponds to a neutral situation that exists before 
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Being comes to be Dasein in Heidegger.   Il y a in Levinas specifically refers to ‗a 
neutral, continuing existence without existents (and so never capitalized).‘95  From 
this point, we can conclude that the difference between Being and il y a lies in the 
different attitudinal which is a keynote of the basic state of being in Heidegger and 
Levinas.  Heidegger starts his analyses from the premise that human being is in an 
inauthentic ‗fallenness‘ and needs to affirm its mineness in the world, while Levinas 
begins his analyses from the presupposition that fallenness is the basic but not the 
prior state of human being and the human being needs to affirm its existence from 
the Other.   Thus, the ‗il y a‘ is the first target to be surmounted for Levinas in order 
to move on to his ethical deliberation of the otherness of the Other.   
 
A question, here, arises.   If being is manifold, as Levinas argues, and not as 
One or as the Same or as Mineness, as Heidegger contends, then ‗how can Otherness 
on the other side of being be thought?‘ 96  In order to answer this question, 
Heidegger‘s approach to an understanding that is based on my own Dasein is no 
longer effective because the Other has its own unique quality of otherness that lies 
beyond one‟s own comprehension.   Thus, on the one hand, what really matters, for 
Levinas, is not the forgetting of the ontological difference as Heidegger insists, but 
the forgetting of the dignity of ‗the other person‘ (l‟autre homme); on the other hand, 
the meaning of Being, in Heidegger‘s view, is to appear or to become manifest(ed) 
by man in order for it to unfold its truth in the course of history, but the meaning of 
the otherness of the Other, for Levinas, is to discover the intrinsic justice and 
righteousness in the being-between because justice is prior to existence.
 97
   In other 
words: 
 
Levinas is more concerned with justice than with the authenticity of 
existence, which is existing vis-à-vis existence as a whole; such care for 
the whole is typical of the ethics of a philosophy of totality.
98
 
 
 
Thus, Levinas‘s critique of Heidegger‘s concept of Being is embodied in his 
criticism of totalitarianism in Western philosophy under three aspects: truth, 
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exteriority and totality.
99
  No matter what aspect Levinas wants to examine, however, 
the essential key concept that he uses to criticize is the Other. 
 
For Heidegger, beings meet and co-inhabit the other as being-within-the-
world (innerweltlich Seiendes) in a similar and parallel way. From this precondition, 
the understanding and the knowledge of the Other can be accessed from my self-
understanding because of the similarity of the Being of everyone in this world.   In 
the meantime, when my self-understanding is revealed from the solitude 
(Vereinzelung) of authentic existence then the self can be confirmed.   However, 
questions will be raised from this corollary: how and to what extent can this self-
understanding can be really ‗shared‘ by a co-state-of-mind (Mitbefindlichkeit)100and 
reach the co-understanding in Heidegger‘s words if my self-understanding can only 
be revealed from the solitude? If this shared co-understanding is ‗already‘ based on 
the understanding of Being, what is the significance of seeking another being-in-the-
world who is similar to myself? These questions lead to our examination of the 
concept of ‗we‘ in both Heidegger‘s and Levinas‘s thought.  
 
‗We‘ is an important but controversial concept.   In Robert Bernasconi‘s 
words, 
 
The identity of the ―we‖ has been the subject of some controversy.   For 
Heidegger the standpoint of the ‗we,‘ the observers who simply observe 
the correlation of knowing and object as it takes place within natural 
consciousness, is attained only in absolute knowing.
101
 
 
 
The complexity of the concept of ‗we‘ lies in the overall consideration from 
experience, words, and subjectivity.   In other words, the analysis of ‗we‘ entails the 
paradigm of the being-knowing analysis.   As Heidegger states, ‗Experience is the 
movement of the dialogue between natural and absolute knowing.‘102  From this 
statement we can clarify the concept of ‗we‘ from Heidegger under three aspects.   
The first aspect refers to the natural knowing of one‘s being by using one‘s natural 
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consciousness.   The second aspect refers to the absolute knowing of the relationship 
between one‘s being and the other‘s being (i.e. one‘s subjectivity) in the movement 
of the dialogue by using words to detect what I lack in this dialogue.   The third stage 
refers to how the I can be fulfilled from the knowing of the other in this movement.   
If our interpretation of Heidegger‘s statement is correct, then we will argue that the 
concept of the ‗absence‘ points out both a similar standpoint as well as a different 
direction in Heidegger and Levinas.   The similarity lies in both of them admitting 
the absence of the experience of the other when we extend the knowing of the being 
of myself to the being of the other.   However, Heidegger takes this absence for 
granted, and affirms the subjectivity of Dasein by reducing the absence of the 
difference between the self and the other into sameness.   By contrast, Levinas takes 
this absence in the experience as the starting point of his ethical thought because this 
absence of the experience of the Other calls on the self to establish a responsible 
relation that is in accordance with but not necessary restrained by the presence.   
Dasein is in a situation of throwness, which means that the ‗sein‟ (being) cannot 
determine ‗Da‟ (there) in this situation.   Levinas would agree that the ethical I also 
cannot choose my primordial condition as an ethical creature.
103
  Nevertheless, the 
sein (being) is made to be Da (there) in the situation of fallenness and thrownness, 
while the ethical I is made to be himself with the other person.   From this analysis, 
we can conclude that the initial consideration of the ‗we‘ from Heidegger and 
Levinas are quite similar but their different presuppositions and concerns lead to 
different directions of their development of paradigm of ‗being-knowing‘.   In other 
words, Levinas‘s challenge to Heidegger‘s articulation of being is not to find out the 
authentic realness of being but the ethical being towards the good.
104
 
 
After we clarify the similarities and differences with respect to their initial 
concerns regarding Being and the Other, we can argue that the difference between 
Heidegger‘s Being and Levinas‘s ‗the Other‘ would lead to different linguistic poses. 
These linguistic poses, on the one hand, show Heidegger‘s intention of using 
language to ‗connects ontological inquiry to historical existence‘105 in order to fill up 
the gap between Being and beings; on the other hand, further are contrasted with 
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Levinas‘s argument of ‗good beyond being‘ is an inevitable development based on 
his critique of this ontological difference.   The reason why Levinas can point out 
this blind alley of Heidegger‘s ontological difference lies in his insight that ‗the 
question of the meaning of being involves the way to escape from being‘106 and 
language is the most possible approach for man to question his being but at the same 
time to keep track of the uniqueness of his existence.   In the second section of this 
part, we will discuss the role of language in Heidegger and Levinas‘ thought based 
on our previous discussion regarding ontological difference. 
 
§ 3.3.4 Temporality (Synchrony) and Diachrony 
 
Time is a basic question in Heidegger‘s Being and Time as well as in his later 
thought on the reality of history and the thinking of Being. In other words, time is an 
important reference frame for Dasein.   Heidegger discusses time in ontic mode and 
in the ontological mode of temporality.   In the first, time is in a serial temporal 
manner while in the latter, time is a primordial one which is ‗outside-of-itself in and 
for itself‘. 107  This ‗outside-of-itself‘ is a characteristic that is derived from 
Heidegger‘s ontological difference because this ‗outside‘ indicates the distance 
between Being and beings.   For Heidegger, death is the end of Dasein because it 
reveals the authenticity of Dasein: Being-for-death (Sein-zum-Tode).   Here, as 
paradoxical as it may sound, the mineness of Dasein is to be determined but, at the 
same time, to be eliminated by death.   Death, for Heidegger, is like a terminal point 
of Dasein which defines our facticity as an ‗a priori past‘ but which also reminds 
man to recollect the forgotten and original structure of time in the form of past, 
present and futurity.
108
 
 
By contrast, for Levinas, to transcendentally understand death is to 
understand the Other or the non-self.   If death as a terminal point confirms the 
mineness of Dasein for Heidegger, then death as a starting point confirms the 
otherness of the Other for Levinas.   Both Heidegger‘s and Levinas‘s arguments 
reveal to the subject a future that exceeds the present but whereas Heidegger leads 
                                                 
106
 Manning, p. 57. 
107
 BT, p. 377. 
108
 See, De Boer, pp. 122–123. 
 120 
this future back to the self Levinas extends this future outwardly to the plural Other.   
This is exactly Levinas‘s purpose: ‗to transcend Being: to move beyond or to the 
other side of Being and Time‘109, and to move from finitude of Being to its infinity 
of Goodness: 
 
It is not the finitude of Being that constitutes the essence of time, as 
Heidegger thinks, but its infinity. […] the aim […] is to show that time is 
not the achievement of an isolated and lone subject, but that it is the 
subject‘s very relationship with the other.110 
 
Thus, for both Heidegger and Levinas, time constitutes history by returning to the I 
after experiencing being of the other and forming one‘s history.   Compared to 
Derrida‘s argument, however, ‗in a closed totality and in actual infinity there is no 
history; history occurs as the difference between the totality and infinity‘,111 Levinas 
critically holds that the problem of history in Heidegger‘s thought does not rest with 
the difference between totality and infinity but lie in his totalizing of the infinity into 
an essence (Wesen).  The characteristic of this essence in terms of time is synchrony 
of Dasein and other beings. And this synchrony in terms of language is the act of 
assertion of Dasein to the other beings in this world.  The understanding of the other 
being would be achieved by the hearing and answering of each one‘s assertion in the 
presence of each other. 
 
By comparison, for Levinas, time in the form of history is diachrony, rather 
than synchrony.   And this synchrony in terms of language is the act of the Saying 
and the Said of the Other towards one‘s self.   The understanding of the Other would 
be achieved by the hearing and answering of each one‘s ‗precondition for the 
unsaying of what has first been said.‘112  This linguistic diachrony closely relates to 
the ethical diachrony because, 
 
the priority of responsibility relative to freedom signifies the goodness of 
Good [la bonté du Bien]: the Good must elect me before I may choose it. 
The good must elect me first. […] This is the strong sense of what we are 
calling diachrony. It is an irreducible difference that does not enter into 
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the unity of a theme; an untraversable difference between the Good and 
me; a difference without simultaneity of unmatched terms.
113
 
 
In other words, this time in diachrony indicates both the distance towards infinity and 
the openness towards infinity.  This indication contains Levinas‘s critique of 
Sameness in Heidegger‘s sense because Heidegger interprets time only in terms of 
the self-centred sameness of each individual Dasein and not in terms of social and 
ethical relation.   Thus his phenomenological ontology cannot really be open towards 
the infinity of one‘s past and future, but only the utilitarian present in synchrony.114  
If we interpret this in the theoretical framework of Levinas‘s thought on ethics and 
language, then Heidegger‘s analysis of synchrony and language just emphasizes the 
reduction of the ethical and plural Saying into the temporal and contemporary Said. 
But what does the temporality and contemporary of ‗the Said‘ mean in Heidegger‘s 
thought?  
 
In order to address this question, we need to include the question of language 
in Heidegger‘s history of Being.   Robert Bernasconi has provided a substantial and 
comprehensive discussion of this topic.   In the lecture 1962 lecture entitled ‗Time 
and Being‘, Heidegger stated that ‗the sequence of epochs in the destiny of Being is 
not accidental, nor can it be calculated as necessary‘.115  As for Being, Heidegger is 
interested in the essence of the destiny of Being rather than the reason that lies 
behind  this destiny in history. This is why, even though Heidegger discusses time as 
temporality in Being and Time, a genuine understanding of the history of Being is 
lacking.   Bernasconi points out three aspects of the reason why Heidegger intends to 
ignore it.
116
  First, Heidegger holds that if there is a unity in the thinking of the 
history of philosophy, then its end would not be visible until the development 
finishes in the end.   The sequence of different historical words for Being, however, 
is undetermined. Therefore, this thinking of remembrance is impossible.   Second, 
the sequence of understanding these historical words is free.  It is very difficult, 
therefore, to find out the most decisive elements in a series of reasons.   Third, the 
understanding of history needs remembrance, which is a different way of thinking.   
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These three aspects lead to Heidegger‘s distinction between the question of aletheia 
(understood as the ‗unconcealedness of what is‘) and the question of truth.117  Truth, 
for Heidegger, is ‗correspondence, grounded in correctness, between proposition and 
thing‘,118 while the essence of truth is the history of man‘s essence.119  Thus, the 
question of truth is the question of the correspondence and the correctness in the 
history of man, and every truth has its time.
120
  The question of aletheia, however, is 
to search for ‗the trace‘ (Spur) that lies behind and gives rise to the history of human 
essence as unhiddenness and the essence of truth will not change in time.
121
   This 
can explain why we previously mentioned that Heidegger‘s thought talks about 
history while being still essentially a-historical.   As Bernasconi shows, the history of 
Being begins with the forgetfulness of Being and the oblivion of Being can appear as 
concealed in language.
122
  In sum, the history of Being and history of beings are 
counter-aspects of the same history because the searching of the Being in the form of 
language (as trace) in history as the pursuit of the essence of truth constitutes the 
history of human essence as an existing and understanding being.
123
   
 
From the ongoing analyses, we can see that language plays an important role 
in relating these two aspects of truth in the sense of history.  Dasein can only 
understand its history in terms of language in the form of the Said in the history of 
being.   Therefore, these previous analyses also answer the question regarding the 
meaning of the temporality or contemporaneity of the Said.  With this in mind, 
Heidegger also discusses the ‗historical return‘ because ‗in the end it is historical 
return which brings us into what is actually happening today‘ when he discusses the 
essence of truth.
124
  And this history is always ‗a matter of the unique task posed by 
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fate in a determinate practical situation, not of free-floating discussion.‘125  From 
what Heidegger says, we can further confirm Heidegger‘s priority to the search for 
the essence of truth and the role of language as the voice of Being in this searching. 
Therefore, to explore the essence of truth is to explore the history of human essence, 
which is also to explore the essence of language as the voice of Being.  We can 
conclude, therefore, that Heidegger‘s emphasis of the essence of truth repeats itself 
in the synchrony of language.   
 
In Levinas‘s view, the diachrony of personhood in the I and the Other also 
repeats itself in the diachrony of language.
126
 The diachrony in Levinas‘s 
phenomenological concern is to show that ‗time is something more than merely the 
structure of being.‘ 127   Levinas‘s diachrony of language is embodied in his 
distinction between the Saying and the Said. This distinction was Heidegger‘s before 
being Levinas‘s. 128   Heidegger and Levinas, therefore, share this distinction, as 
Levinas also considers not only ‗what words teach us, but in what they hide from 
us;‘129 however, the way they use it is not the same.   Levinas‘s concern is that the 
emphasis on the essence of language would lead to a closed language and speech 
would have lost its speech in the sense of ontological totalitarianism.
130
  We will 
analyse this difference in detail in next section on the discussion of language 
between Heidegger and Levinas.  
 
§ 3.3.5 Levinas‟s Response to Heidegger‟s Thought on Language 
 
The role of language in Levinas‘s thought is as important as it is in Heidegger‘s. 
However, Levinas questions the role of language in the Western tradition in order to 
point out the problem of language, especially with regard to Heidegger‘s position:  
 
In the Western tradition, linguistic expression has importance for meaning 
as meaning: there is no meaning if there is no language. And this meaning 
qua meaning is a manifestation of being. ([…] and Heidegger preserves 
this position]) […] But if it is correct that meaning is only shown in 
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language, must we likewise argue that logical exposition does not contain 
a manner of speaking [pour-ainsi-dire]? Must we not ask ourselves 
whether the logical exposition of meaning does not call for an unsaying 
[dédire]? […] Must we not ask whether speaking shows a gap between 
meaning and that which is manifested of it, between meaning and what, in 
manifesting itself, takes on the ways of being? 
131
 
 
With regard to Levinas‘s questions on the relationship between meaning and 
different ways of being, we will discuss three aspects in this section on language.   In 
the first aspect, we will briefly review Heidegger‘s deliberations on language, both 
from his early and his later thought.   After we outline the main arguments on 
language from Heidegger, in the second aspect we will discuss how Levinas 
responds to Heidegger‘s concept of language specifically in relation to Levinas‘s 
ethical concern.   In the last aspect, we will explore the discussion of ‗face and 
language‘ in both Heidegger and Levinas, especially the similarity and difference 
between Heidegger‘s later thought and Levinas‘s ethical arguments.   From the 
discussion of these three aspects, we intend to firstly clarify the extent to which 
Heidegger‘s thought on language influences Levinas‘s; secondly we will argue that 
Levinas‘s ethical priority determines the difference regarding his articulation of 
language from Heidegger; and thirdly we will develop the ethical significance of 
language as related to Levinas‘s discussion of ‗face‘ with respect to the critique of 
Heidegger‘s neutral attitude towards language.    
 
§ 3.3.6 Language in the Early and Later Heidegger 
 
Language plays an essential role throughout Heidegger‘s thought because ‗there are 
no paths to [the meaning of] being (Sein) except those which are grounded in 
language […]‘.132  Heidegger‘s view of language, therefore, is in the sense of a 
transcendental ontology in that it attempts, as White emphasizes, to find out ‗how 
language can be‟.133  In other words, Heidegger attempts to find out the essence of 
language in order to reveal the essence of Being because language shows how  
human beings locate themselves as being in the world.   Compared to the idea that 
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language is an instrument that we can use, Heidegger in his later thought points out 
that ‗language is the house of Being, the home in which man dwells.‘134  
 
The origin of this famous but intricate slogan can be traced back to 
Heidegger‘s Being and Time when he discusses language in the form of discourse. 
For Heidegger, language as discourse or talk (Rede) is the existential-ontological 
foundation in the existential constitution of Dasein‟s disclosedness.135  Language, for 
Heidegger, is the totality of words in an ontological sense rather than in a semantic 
and ethical sense in the form of speaking and listening.  Not only can we trace the 
theme of language back to Being and Time, but we can also find this theme in 
Heidegger‘s early work On the Essence of Language.136  Heidegger thinks that the 
‗human being‘ has ‗language‘ and the ‗word‘ has the ‗human being‘ because 
language can make something manifest.
137
  In other words, Heidegger, in these 
lectures on language, aims to reveal the origin of language in order to find out the 
ground for beings.   From this work we can find both similarities and differences on 
language between Heidegger and Levinas.   
 
According to Heidegger‘s examination based on Herder‘s analyses, ‗word‘ 
can be divided into inner word and outer word.   The inner word refers to what lies 
before inside and the outside word refers to what lies before outside.
138
  For 
Heidegger, the inner word is the reflective awareness or ‗mark formation‘, which is 
the ‗tightly held view of the difference.‘139 The outside word is the sound or ‗the 
becoming‘ of this inner word. The inner word is ‗the nomination-by-naming of 
something to something‘, 140  which is at the center of the consideration of 
languageand exists prior to the ‗sounding-towards‘ outer word.141  Heidegger also 
stresses the role of sensibility to connect across from inner word to outer word: 
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Sensibility provides the ground for the formation of marks insofar as the 
senses are modes of representation of the soul. The sensibility provides 
the ground for the outer word insofar as the senses are modes of feeling of 
the soul.
142
 
 
The reflective awareness of the inner word will become outer when it is speaking out 
or announcing, which is a process to reveal the existential significance of human 
being in the form of language.   For Heidegger, this will let a human being have a 
chance to look at himself both from reason as an inner form and from language as an 
outer form.   Sensibility connects these two forms.   The idea that sensibility is the 
foundation of the unity of the inner and outer words can be found in Levinas‘s two 
important works where he discusses the relationship between sensibility, enjoyment 
and existence in Totality and Infinity and when he further discusses the relationship 
between sensibility, proximity and expression in the way of ‗the saying‘ and ‗the 
said‘ in his Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence.   We will discuss Levinas‘s 
discussions about word, expression, and language shortly but it is of importance to 
return to Heidegger, and to  his later work On the Way to Language, where 
Heidegger continues to intensively explore the possibility that ‗language is the house 
of the dialogue‘ even though the approach and the emphasis of his discussion has 
changed from ‗language as a way to disclose Being‘ into ‗language as the foundation 
of thinking of Being‘.    In other words, Heidegger‘s focus is no longer on ‗what we 
discuss‘ but ‗in the way in which we tried to do so‘.143  In this period, Heidegger 
affirms the impossibility of ‗a dialogue from house to house‘ and admits the problem 
of his ‗too far and too early‘ articulations on language in Being and Time. 144 
Hermeneutics, in this period for Heidegger, is not the art or function of 
understanding and interpretation but the nature of interpretation on hermeneutic 
grounds, which differentiates it from that of Dilthey and Schleiermacher.   Thus, in 
this sense, Heidegger continues his priority on the inner word in the analyses of the 
structure of language in the mode of sound and script, significance and sense,
145
 but 
in a mystical change.   He even doubts whether the phrase ‗house of Being‘ can 
sufficiently convey the meaning of the nature of language.   Therefore, Heidegger 
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turns to the exploration of the pre-linguistic element, which bears the message and 
determines hermeneutics.   This indicates that language plays a prior role to the 
interpretation of the subject-object relation and the ontological difference.   The 
reason is that language makes man a message-bearer of the message.   In this 
perspective, language walks through the boundary of the subject-object relation and 
the ontological difference.   Heidegger further clarifies the concepts of ‗saying‘ and 
‗said‘, and his position is quite close to Levinas‘s.   Saying, for Heidegger, means 
both ‗saying as what is said in it and what is to be said.‘146  From this we can see that 
Heidegger turns from the ‗what question‘ to the ‗how question‘ by locating the 
‗saying‘ as ‗showing‘ in the first place rather than ‗the said‘, like the inner word in 
his early thoughts.   Heidegger attempts to depart from the hermeneutic circle, as he 
maintained in his early work, but his mystical and poetical interpretation ‗language 
or speech, speaks‘ (Die Sprache spricht) is still not clear and sufficient enough to 
explain the authentic dialogue of language.  
 
We argue that Heidegger tries to avoid the elements that might misrepresent 
the structure of language in the thinking of being, but at the same time he proposes 
that in order to find out this structure of language, it is necessary to discover our 
relation to language.   This is Heidegger‘s definition of meta-language, which is also 
an experience that we undergo with language when this experience brings us face to 
face.
147
  For Heidegger, this experience of the individual which they encounter face 
to face is a process of bringing a thing into being by language.
148
  Heidegger himself 
names this change from his early thoughts on language to later as ‗the being of 
language becomes the language of being.‘149  Correspondingly, the stress on this 
question in his early period turns to the focus on listening, and to ‗the promise of 
what is to be put in question.‘150  In other words, when we speak, the meta-structure 
of language already restricts or pre-constructs and pre-figures what we are going to 
say. What we are saying is to manifest this meta-structure and what we have said will 
change this structure for the next time, when we speak again.   This meta-structure 
corresponds to our thinking experience, to the relation of word to thing.   Thus, 
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Heidegger‘s intention is to detect the equivalence between our thinking and 
language.   That is to say, for Heidegger, when we use language as an instrument we 
are speaking merely about language, while we need to let language show its own 
structure from which it also reveals the genuine relation of human and things.   We 
could summarize Heidegger‘s development of language with William J. 
Richardson‘s classification: in the first stage, Heidegger tends to use the method of 
phenomenology to clarify our speaking about language while in the second stage, he 
focuses on the process of the thinking of being in order to detect our speaking in 
language.
151
 
 
From this foregoing analysis, the characteristic of essence both Being and 
Language in Heidegger‘s thought is anonymous because a human being is just a 
resonance by being addressing, actualizing and revealing in this presupposition.
152
 
Therefore, even though Heidegger attempts to move away from the hermeneutical 
circle with his examination of language in either the inner-outer word or said-saying 
mode, his investigation is still in a regressus ad infinitum.   Although Heidegger 
changes his attention from ‗what it signifies‘ to ‗the signifier‘ from his early to his 
later thought, the path of the dialogue in which two people speak is still on the way 
to the ‗clearing‘ (die Lichtung): language discloses.153  As Charles Taylor concludes, 
in his article ‗Heidegger on Language‘, there is a long philosophical history on this 
Dasein-related clearing.
154
  In the process of the clearing, a conversational common 
space will be set up.  Hegel stands for the first aspect: expression brings something to 
manifestation and reveals reality as the self, which is embodied as self-expression in 
a cosmic spirit or process.  The representative of the second aspect is the 
Humboldtian one: language does not bring something to light, but brings it about, 
which is a more radical subjectivism by creating the symbol as a medium in which 
some hidden reality can be manifested.  Compared to the first aspect, the second one 
not only focuses on its self-expression, but also its self-completion. According to 
Taylor, Derrida stands for a third aspect because he turns from self expression and 
completion to the question of the ‗who‘ of expression.  If we use Taylor‘s analyses as 
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a reference point, then Heidegger‘s deliberations cover the first two aspects, but not 
the third one. It is exactly with regard to the third aspect that Levinas criticizes 
Heidegger‘s early thought the most, even though in his later stage Heidegger is 
already conscious of this aspect.  Heidegger shows the humble side of the human 
being‘s use of language in a form of silence, from which the human being will not 
‗cover the sources of the clearing in darkness.‘155 
 
In this section, we have briefly reviewed and intensively analysed 
Heidegger‘s exploration of language and its ontological characteristics.  With this 
discussion, we make it clear that Heidegger‘s analysis is not wrong, but it also will 
not provide what is right or good.  It just ‗manifests‘ what humans are by the means 
of the clearing of what language itself expresses. This is a process of retrieval.   
However, the ‗who‘ question will push this process to go beyond itself: it is not only 
about the responding in the clearing of Being but responding to the plurality of 
historico-linguistic standpoints.
156
  Thus, in next section, we will discuss Levinas‘s 
response to Heidegger‘s concept of language in terms of his ethical priority rather 
than ontological priority. 
 
§ 3.3.7 Levinas‟s Response to Heidegger‟s Thought on Language (Heidegger, Buber, Levinas) 
 
We cannot discuss Levinas‘s thought on language without mentioning an influence 
from two thinkers.  One is Heidegger, who we have been examining alongside our 
study, another one is Buber who influences Levinas both on the themes of ‗the 
Other‘ and of dialogue.  As Ward points out, however, 
 
Levinas‘s project, unlike Buber‘s, does engage with the 
phenomenological; but Levinas‘s project, unlike Heidegger‘s, appeals to 
monotheism‘s God. It is this theological appeal that determines the ethical 
emphasis in his work upon social responsibility and intersubjectivity.
157
 
 
Ward‘s words directly point out the characteristics of Levinas‘s approaches in his 
examination of language: a phenomenological perspective and an ethical emphasis in 
the linguistic sense.   These two aspects, nonetheless, are dependent on each other in 
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order to examine the role of language in ethical interpersonal relationships.   The 
approach of phenomenology provides the horizon for ethics to investigate the pre-
linguistic elements that are fundamental to the constitution of ethical relation while 
the priority of ethical requirement provides the motivation for phenomenology to 
explore the genuine significance of language in the relationship of mineness and 
otherness.   With these two aspects in mind, Levinas‘s consideration of language 
must be transcendental rather than immanent because it concerns when the cogito 
speaks towards the other and also to the collective.   This proceeds towards beyond 
the thinking of being because it aims to ‗a description of a relationship between the 
‗logos de l‟infini‘ and the finite.‘158 
 
Levinas‘s response to Heidegger‘s thought on language is derived from his 
critique of Heidegger‘s knowing things in their ontological totality.  The reason is 
that:  
 
Heideggerian ontology subordinates the relation with the other to the 
relation with the Neuter, Being, and it thus continues to exalt the will to 
power, whose legitimacy the Other (Autrui) alone can unsettle, troubling 
good conscience.
159
 
 
Levinas holds that this ontological tradition begins from Plato and develops in two 
directions, Husserl is one and the other is Nietzsche.
160
  Heidegger‘s early work, 
which Levinas mainly focuses on, is a synthesis but also a new development of these 
two directions at that period according to Levinas.
161
  As previously analysed, 
Levinas uses the key terms that Heidegger uses in order to criticize Heidegger‘s 
thought from its inner side: to argue the otherness from the deficiency of sameness. 
 
Thus, we will now further examine the similarity and difference of the 
argument on language and its ethical significance from Heidegger, Buber and 
Levinas. Ward already provides a detailed discussion of this theme; we, therefore, 
will summarize his analyses first, and then develop our own discussion concerning 
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the theme of the Other, language, and ethical significance between Heidegger and 
Levinas. 
 
According to Ward, Buber‘s, as well as Barth‘s, emphasis on dialogue-with-
difference influenced Levinas.   And Ward holds that both Heidegger and Buber 
would agree that ‗there is otherness because there is dialogue.‘162   We will argue, 
however, that Levinas would consider conversely that there is dialogue because there 
is otherness.  As for the analysis about genuine dialogue, Buber and Heidegger share 
similar viewpoints.  Firstly, ‗genuine dialogue is an ontological sphere which is 
constituted by the authenticity of being‘;163 Second, in genuine dialogue and in ‗its 
basic order […] nothing can be determined, the course is of the spirit, and some 
discover what they have to say only when they catch the call of the spirit.‘164  On the 
other side of same coin, their differences are evident.   The first lies in the fact that 
Buber still belongs to the Greek ontological tradition while Heidegger intends to 
push beyond it.
165
  Even though both Heidegger and Buber start their thoughts from 
facticity (Faktizität), Heidegger‘s concern is to retrieve the forgetting of ontological 
difference; Buber‘s concern is to prove the fundamental I-Thou relation in a social, 
anthropological and philosophical sense.
166
  From this we can conclude, according to 
Ward, that for ‗both of them dialogue is the location for the ontological, but what 
each understands by the nature of the ontological differs radically‘.167  It is precisely 
these fundamentally different concerns which affect their viewpoints on ethical 
consideration and its relation to dialogue.  
 
Buber stresses the significance of the ‗between‘ in a spoken dialogue because 
it indicates a site between the I and Thou.
168
  The space of this site is open for the 
‗understanding between human beings and for the ontological unity of the human 
and the divine Thou.‘169  Thus, Buber, like the other dialogical philosophers, stresses 
the movement of the spirit from the divine Thou to the human Thou, rather than 
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concentrating on the unity between two dimensions of the ontological difference in 
Heidegger, even though both of them intend to move beyond intentionality.   Their 
attention to language is an essential approach in the form of speaking and hearing to 
receive and respond between the human Thou and divine Thou as well as the beings 
and Being.
170
  In Ward‘s opinion, the obvious distinction between them is the fact 
that Heidegger works on ‗the end of metaphysics‘ while Buber works as a 
philosophical anthropologist.
171
  
 
This distinction shows their different purposes when they analyze language. 
Buber holds that language in the I-Thou relationship is both transcendental and 
spiritual, and which has an evolutionary characteristic to develop itself in the 
personal-social construction.   Heidegger thinks that language in the beings-Being 
relationship is both backtracked and metaphysical, and which has a recalling 
characteristic to recall itself in the Dasein-world construction.   Buber‘s purpose is to 
improve a genuine and an effective way of dialogue in the I-Thou relationship.   
Buber‘s way of dialogue exists reciprocally between the I and the Thou which is 
similar to Barth‘s articulation on word of man and Word of God because when the 
Thou addresses the I, it is like a revelation from the Thou to reveal a monologue 
towards the I in the dialogue.   Heidegger‘s way of dialogue does exist between the 
beings who live in this world, but it also indwells between Being and the human 
individual‘s understanding of its own being and that is a form of monologue.172  
 
 Buber‘s dialogue, therefore, spirals up in the understanding between the I and 
the Thou in a subjective but bilateral way. However, there is a danger that lies behind 
this spiral because there is no reliable guarantee for the direction of this spiral and 
dialogical development. Levinas criticizes this point from Buber from two aspects in 
Totality and Infinity:  
 
One may, however, ask if the thou-saying [tutoiement] does not place the 
other in a reciprocal relation, and if this reciprocity is primordial. On the 
other hand, the I-Thou relation in Buber retains a formal character: it can 
unite man to things as much as man to man.  The I-Thou formalism does 
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not determine any concrete structure. The I-Thou is an event 
(Geschehen), a shock, a comprehension, but does not enable us to account 
for (except as an aberration, a fall, or a sickness) a life other than 
friendship: economy, the search for happiness, the representational 
relation with things.  They remain, in a sort of disdainful spiritualism, 
unexplored and unexplained.
173
 
 
Levinas immediately states that he is not seeking to correct Buber‘s thought on these 
points but that he would like to provide different perspectives on these similar points 
with respect to the idea of the Infinite.  In Levinas‘s other work Otherwise than 
Being, he further points out his developed thought on ‗illeity‘ (from Latin, ille, ‗he‘) 
with the comparison to Buber‘s concept of ‗Thou‘, though Levinas comments that 
‗Buber has never brought out in a positive way the spiritual element in which the I-
Thou relationship is produced.‘174  From this train of thought, Buber‘s philosophy of 
dialogue would be lack of the idea of the Infinite but still stick to totality because for 
Buber, ‗the truth of the word in its highest form […is] indivisible unity.‘175  In other 
words, Buber‘s philosophy of dialogue brings Being and beings into one, if we use 
Heidegger‘s paradigm of ontological difference as a mode to analyze it.   Then when 
the dialogue happens in the I and the Thou, the element of time or history will be 
excluded because the I and the Thou are ‗an organic one‘ at the time when they 
proceed in dialogue.   Time or history is an external element rather than internal 
element because the I-Thou relation is one and will not be changed according to time 
but only will change because of their relationship itself.   This is also because 
Buber‘s ‗dialogicalism‘ accommodates the other to the same.176  Thus the critical 
question arises as to whether the dialogue in I-Thou relationship is dialogue, or the 
dialogue is just an inter-change of two monologues from the I and the Thou? 
According to this, Ward holds that Buber‘s method is not dialogical and cannot 
overcome the intentionality of the ‗I‘ with this method.177  By contrast, Heidegger‘s 
deliberations on language in the mode of ‗saying‘ also shares this problem because 
saying cannot be apart from the self-understanding in a dialogue according to his 
analyses of temporality and its relation to ontological difference as we already 
discussed. Heidegger‘s later thought on language continues this train of thought from 
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his analysis of poetry as a witness (das Gedicht bezeugt es), even though it is no 
longer as a manifestation (bezeigt es) as in his Being and Time.
178
  The feature of 
witness still emphasizes the synchrony aspect of language.   Heidegger, therefore, 
has not solved this problem thoroughly.    
 
There is, however, an important concept that runs through Heidegger‘s 
thought, and which should have more attention paid to it in any analysis of the 
relation between language, the Other and responsibility.   This concept is ‗oblivion‘ 
or ‗forgetting‘, or to put it more precisely: the elements that constitute memory.179  
Only when we know something that has been forgotten do we start to search through 
our memory.   Thus, when Heidegger discusses forgetting, he is at the same time 
exploring memory because in this pair of concepts, one cannot exist without the 
other.   Moreover, the reason why Heidegger takes language so seriously lies also in 
his discussion of the oblivion of Being because language is a key point in order to 
search the traces of the meaning of Being that are left for beings.
180
  Thus, it is not a 
psychological approach at all in Heidegger, but an interpretation of memory in a 
metaphysical and hermeneutical sense.   If we can say of Heidegger‘s early thought 
that dialogue, in the nature of language, happens between two beings about language, 
in his later thought, we can say that different relations to language in the process of 
thinking of being play a major role in his thought.   Memory connects the dialectic of 
the said and the saying.   Levinas understands and develops his thoughts of language 
from this, while Buber‘s presupposition of the same and integral characteristic of I-
Thou relationship restricts his thought from this perspective.   As Wards argues, this 
is because ‗he is caught between the methodological precedence of his ―I‖ discourse 
and the ontological precedence he wishes to accord the Thou.‘181  Buber‘s thoughts 
on dialogue cannot go too far compared with Heidegger‘s because of this 
unavoidable conflict.  Heidegger‘s phenomenological and hermeneutical approaches 
make it substantial that the trace of the dialectical relationship of the saying and the 
said would be fundamental for his analyses of language.  Both of the unsolved 
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problem from Buber and eloquent analyses from Heidegger provide, however, a 
necessary backdrop for Levinas to develop his own thoughts on the relation between 
language, the other and ethics.   Levinas identifies that the problem is of the 
sameness of the I-Thou relation in order to give a genuine place for the Other and 
continues Heidegger‘s tracks to find out the ‗discourse prior to discourse‘ in order to 
detect the genuine significance of language in our ethical relationship.   Thus, in next 
section, we will briefly discuss Levinas‘s concept of face and its relation to language 
with Heidegger‘s later discussion of language within the context of ‗face-to-face‘.   
A detailed discussion of Levinas‘s ethical significance of ‗face-to-face‘ in the 
analyses of language will be explored in the following chapter.   
 
§ 3.3.8  „Face and Language‟ in Heidegger and Levinas (Ethical Significance of „Face-to-Face‟) 
 
We are not going to compare the concept of face-to-face and its relation to language 
between Heidegger and Levinas in this section because, though both of them use this 
concept to point out the pre-structure of language, their presuppositions and purposes 
are not the same.   It is still meaningful to look at their examples, nonetheless, 
because from their different perspectives we can detect why the same concept and 
similar starting points will lead to different concerns and directions.   Then, we will 
argue for our own perspective by analysing the role of language in an ethical ‗face-
to-face‘ relationship as based on this discussion.   
 
When Heidegger discusses ‗face to face‘ in his work On the Way to 
Language, this concept is explained as the ‗neighbourhood‘.   This neighbourhood 
refers to the face-to-face that exists between poetry and thinking, that is to say, 
between two modes of saying, as well as when human experience is face to face with 
language.
182
 Heidegger argues that it is not only important to detect our relation to 
language, but it also necessary to find out how language keeps this relation as 
relation.   In other words, language in Heidegger would reveal the inner structure and 
situation of human being by undergoing an experience with language.    
 
With this in mind, Heidegger differentiates between ‗the being of language‘ 
and ‗the language of being‘.   Heidegger explains the former as ‗language is the 
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subject whose being is to be determined‘, 183  while the latter is as ‗we shall 
comprehend what language as soon as we enter into [it and when it] opens up before 
us.‘184  The being of language and the language of being should be two stages in one 
process.   The being of language is the being that exists prior to ‗the speaking‘ but 
entails ‗the speaking‘.   The language of being refers to the language that man is 
‗speaking‘, which represents all of the characteristics of this man as being.   
Heidegger separates this process into two stages, but the ethical significance of 
language exists precisely between these two stages.   Thus Heidegger‘s investigation 
of language has approached or implied the ethical significance in his thought, but he 
never points it out and always wants to keep it in an absolute neutrality, though he 
also thinks that responsibility is a good thing and important.
185
  Based on this, 
Heidegger‘s emphasis on face-to-face, either in the sense of the encounter between 
human being or in the sense of the neighbourhood of poetry and thinking as modes 
of saying, points out our existent situation of waiting for the encounter and the 
future.   In this way, for Heidegger, language, memory, and thought can be shown 
and made to appear integrally related, and, 
 
[Heidegger‘s three lectures have tried]: to make us face a possibility of 
undergoing an experience with language, such that our relation to 
language would in future become memorable, worthy of thought. […] Its 
[Language‘s] character belongs to the very character of the movement of 
the face-to-face encounter of the world‘s four regions [earth, sky, god, 
man]. […] Language is, as world-moving Saying, the relation of all 
relation.
186
 
 
The point that is criticized by Levinas and  others, however, is that even though 
Heidegger places an emphasis on the relation of saying and the nearness of the face-
to-face encounter, there is still no ethical concern in his thought.   Language is a 
genetic web that expresses thoughts.   Thus language as intellect, in Heidegger, is a 
totality of speaking: the being of language is in its totality of a ‗Saying‘.187  In this 
way, in order to explain the unity of the being of language, Heidegger draws on 
Humboldt‘s theory on language and worldview with regards to ‗the diversity of the 
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structure of human language‘ and ‗its influence on the spiritual development of 
mankind‘188 as we have discussed in above section.   
 
From our previous discussion, Heidegger concludes his theory of language 
as: 
 
The encountering saying of mortals is answering.   Every spoken word is 
already an answer: counter-saying, coming to the encounter, listening 
Saying. […] This way-making puts language (the essence of language) as 
language (Saying) into language (into the sounded world).
189
 
 
 
Heidegger understands that his theory of language could give an impression of or 
lead to a selfish solipsism.
190
  Thus he concedes that language is a monologue, even 
though it appears as a dialogue because the property of owning and appropriating 
language brings about this problem owing to Heidegger‘s separation of thinking and 
Being.  
 
This problem is irresolvable in Heidegger even though he points out that the 
approach of relating language, memory, and thought will show what is absent in the 
oblivion of Being turns out to be present in the unsaid, said, and the saying.   What 
Heidegger left for us is the way to detect the trace of this oblivion rather than to 
construct what has been forgotten, in other words, it is ‗the experience of the history 
of thinking is the experience of a lack‘.191  Thus, for Heidegger, the encountering of 
face-to-face is essential in his later thought in the sense of witnessing a 
transformation of language as an experience of language.  However, from our 
forgoing analysis, Heidegger is not interested in moral judgments from his early 
thought in Being and Time to his later thought On the Way to Language.   By 
distinguishing everyday language and philosophical language, Heidegger points out 
its relation to the distinction between inauthentic and authentic existence.   And a 
person who is in an inauthentic existence cannot make a value judgment.   This 
distinction influenced Rudolf Bultmann‘s theology, and other Christian thinkers too, 
and it is something which is criticized by Bonhoeffer.   Even though there is a term 
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‗care‘ (Sorge) that Heidegger uses in his thought to describe the Dasein‟s mode of 
being-in-the-world, it is a word used to describe the facticity of the existence of 
Dasein, which is value-neutral as well.   Thus we could conclude this part by saying 
that Heidegger in his later thought reveals the relationship between face-to-face and 
language, however, this relation is still neutral and not in an ethical mode.   This 
neutral being-with in Heidegger from his early to later thought is still the basis of 
Levinas‘s thought because it is the starting point for him to criticize that very ethical 
neutrality.   
 
Levinas‘s emphasis on the priority and exteriority of the Other‘s relation to 
language is, therefore, an ethical orientation that would clarify Heidegger‘s mystical 
significance of language.  It would also point to the inherent ‗metaphysical‘, in 
Levinas‘s sense, priority of the ethical face to face encounter as preceding 
‗ontology‘, in Heidegger‘s sense, for,  in Caputo‘s words, 
 
The ethical is there from the start and does not require either ontological 
preparation (the Heidegger of Being and Time) or a deontological 
foundation (value theory, criticized by Heidegger). The ethical does not 
wait and does not need to have a space prepared for it.
192
 
 
By criticizing, therefore, the priority of Being, knowledge, and the subject‘s 
understanding of Being that Heidegger stresses, both Bonhoeffer (who develops the 
priority of Christ, the necessity of non-religious interpretation of Christianity, and the 
significance of responsible life) and Levinas (who develops the priority of the Other, 
the necessity to explore the link of language and the subject‘s responsibility to, 
before and in front of the other) calls radically into question Heidegger‘s concept of 
understanding and the understanding of the other‘s being derived from his attitude of 
neutrality.  
 
This problem, then, lies in the analysis of the relationship between ethics and 
language via the Other.   When we consider language within the context of an ethical 
relationship, for instance, like responsible relationship, language is no longer an 
instrument for a human being to understand each other.   Rather, it is a method that 
draws a human being face to face and reveals not only the present relationship of the 
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interlocutors but also their past and future relationship in history.   Because the Other 
is not only a phenomenal face in a positive sense and an appearance of the Dasein in 
a negative sense, yet it is always more than that: ‗the Other commands from on high 
in a way that is beyond Being as phenomenality.‘ 193   Thus, on the one hand, 
language is both the nature and mediator to connect the Other and the 
commandments in the form of responsibility; on the other hand, language and 
responsibility cannot be manifested completely only by themselves because they 
interpenetrate and inter-identify each other.  
 
Responsibility only can be accomplished in the consideration of the other by 
the means of language within the context of both Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s 
thought. It is evident that their similar theological concern is the backdrop of their 
ethical concern. However, ‗Faith is of a different order from Being, for 
Heidegger‘,194 and ‗Heidegger‘s ontology places itself ―beyond good and evil‖.195 
For both Bonhoeffer and Levinas, the critique from theology and goodness towards 
ontology and neutrality is ineluctable. It is the theological and ethical concerns which 
differentiate Heidegger‘s thought from Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s.   Bonhoeffer 
intends to develop a universalist and Christological language to seek the genuine 
faith in a coming-of-age era while Levinas intends to develop a personalist and 
ethical language to seek the genuine co-existence with the Other.    
 
Indeed, ‗the world is not a thing that I understand by thinking about it 
because the world is not something separate from myself at all.‘196  Heidegger‘s 
problem is essentially derived from his ontological difference, even though in his 
very thought of being-with-others in this world he was aware of the limitation of 
Dasein. The separation of beings and Being leads him to epistemologically or 
methodologically ponder about this world but metaphysically outside from this 
world.   Therefore, for both Bonhoeffer and Levinas, the philosophical questions 
cannot only focus on the ‗what‘ and the ‗how‘ question, but also the ‗who‘ question, 
though Heidegger cannot provide a satisfactory answer he helps to sharpen the 
question.   
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Responsibility as an ethical concept would easily drop into a relativistic gap 
because of the various definitions of responsible behaviour.   However, from both 
Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s direct and indirect investigation and critique of 
Heidegger‘s thought, we not only confirm the priority of ethical concern rather the 
ontological concern of human being, but also are convinced of the necessity of 
another kind of responsibility: to take responsibility for whom we are responding to.   
Though Heidegger also calls for the responsibility about the true vocation of Dasein 
in his speech to the German university, and also emphasizes the role of language via 
listening and calling, this responsibility is responsible to the essence of Being, a 
power that outmatches the integrity of all human being, rather than to the dignity of 
every human.   Bonhoeffer is aware of this problem in his Christological thought but 
unfortunately he has no chance to complete his idea.   Levinas detects this problem 
and endeavours to clarify this responsibility by stressing the claim that the call of the 
other has on me, that is, the call of conscience that emanates from the other.  
 
For Levinas, ‗―responsibility-before-freedom‖ does refer to an authentic 
awareness of being made responsible‘. 197   This awareness does not fill in 
Heidegger‘s gap of the ontological difference but opens up a horizon of responsible 
experience along with the other and before the other and in front of the other.   A 
horizon to detect the presence through an absence because ‗the relationship with the 
Other (L‘Autrui) is the absence of the other (l‟autre).‘198  Thus, this paradigm of 
presence-absence links Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s ethical and theological concerns 
together. Bonhoeffer‘s concern is that when the world becomes mature and when 
God no longer plays the traditional role as before, what, then, is the position and faith 
of a human being? Levinas would agree with Bonhoeffer‘s idea in his later life as a 
theology of responsibility and independence: before God and with God, we live a 
responsible life without God.   This is also the resonance of Barth‘s thought of 
kenosis but Levinas draws Barth‘s consideration on God‘s incarnation down to the 
concern about human being as well as the freedom and responsibility of creature 
rather than the absolute Other, God. Therefore, in the following chapter, we will 
concentrate on Levinas‘s elaboration of response via the contrast between finity and 
infinity in order to illustrate our theme of responsibility, Otherness, and language.  
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CHAPTER IV  
 
THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE 
MANIFESTATION OF THE OTHER IN LANGUAGE 
   
In the previous chapter, we noted that both Bonhoeffer and Levinas faced the same 
historical realities that called upon them to ponder similar concerns, especially 
regarding the ‗other‘ and the issue of man‘s responsibility to the ‗other‘.  In that 
chapter, we also noted that, though undertaken separately, it was of crucial 
importance that both of these thinkers provide arguments that refute Heidegger‘s 
narrow focus on the responsibility that one has for one‘s own self and his position in 
philosophy centring on the ‗mineness‘ of Being to the exclusion of the ‗other‘ for 
whom one is also answerable.  Bonhoeffer never finished his critique, but in this 
chapter, we shall see that Levinas continues Bonhoeffer‘s critique by rasing again 
Bonhoeffer‘s question ‗What is man?‘, but from another approach, from the point of 
view of ‗Who is the Other?‘  What is significant about Levinas‘s approach is that he 
defends the view that the manifestation of the other occurs in language.  
 
This chapter is divided into two main sections.  The first section focuses on 
Levinas‘s reflections on the relationship between the Other and the exteriority of the 
‗face‘.  This section addresses the problem of ‗how the Other becomes the Other‘ by 
examining the concept of ‗separation‘ in Levinas‘s thought, whilst also relating the 
ethical significance of ‗face‘ to his reflections on the ‗incarnate subject‘.  The second 
section concentrates on the relationship between ‗face‘ and language.  For Levinas, 
the ‗face‘ is the beginning of language.   Thus it will be of importance to distinguish 
Levinas‘s account of language from both Heidegger‘s view that ‗language is the 
house of Being‘ and causal and instrumental views of language.  Like words, the 
encounter of the face is experienced in and through time.  Thus, in this section, we 
intend also to explore the ethical significance of language within the context of 
diachronical time.  This will lead our discussion to Levinas‘s concepts of ‗the 
Saying‘ and ‗the Said‘ and how this pair of concepts is entailed by proximity and 
substitution in a responsible relationship.  We will conclude that although man‘s 
response is finite, the responsible significance of this response is infinite.  It is the 
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response to the Other via language that manifests the significance of responsibility. 
Responsibility in this new sense provides a possible approach and basis for 
explaining Bonhoeffer‘s idea of non-religious interpretation of Christianity and his 
exploration about the structure of responsible life. 
 
 
SECTION ONE 
THE OTHER AND THE FACE 
 
In chapter three, we have specifically discussed Levinas‘s evaluation of Heidegger‘s 
ontological difference‘ and the priority of the individual human being (in Dasein) in 
raising anew the question of the meaning of Being.  In his critique, Levinas holds 
that Heidegger fails to recognize the original plurality of human beings (in Dasein) 
but only recognizes the manifestation of one‘s own existential possibilities as a being 
for one‘s own death (in Dasein).   Levinas, nevertheless, admits that Heidegger 
pushes Husserl‘s transcendental method of enquiry and rigorous phenomenology 
forward to the real life-world rather than only in an ideal world, but not far enough.   
We shall see, therefore, that Levinas‘s critique is not only about whether there is 
ethical concern in Husserl and Heidegger‘s discussion, but also is about the ethical 
requirement in the phenomenological approach itself.   In other words, the question 
turns to how the phenomenological approach can be effective in the life-world (of an 
ethically responsible human being) and not only in the ideal world of meaning 
(repeated and repeatable in and through eidetic-seeing).   
 
§ 4.1.1 From Phenomenological Ontology to Ethics 
 
Levinas‘s analysis begins from Husserl‘s transcendental reduction.   Husserl‘s 
transcendental reduction is closely related to the notion of intentionality, which is 
borrowed from Brentano.   Intentionality indicates the structure of consciousness, 
that is to say, intentional consciousness, for Husserl, means that consciousness is 
always a consciousness of something.   Thus the transcendental reduction as the 
essence of Husserl‘s transcendental phenomenology shows the central role of 
consciousness in his understanding and analysis of intentionality.   In this 
presupposition, the meaning of things is derived from or constituted by 
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consciousness. In other words, the transcendental reduction and constitutive meaning 
are two sides of the one coin in Husserl‘s phenomenological approach. The former 
‗reduces‘ the natural attitude from our everyday life in the world into an inter-
subjective relationship between transcendental egos; the latter ‗constitutes‘ the 
meaning via this reduction in consciousness and projects this consciousness back to 
the everyday life world.   From this, Husserl‘s eidetic reduction has been established. 
For Levinas, the eidetic reduction not only reveals the way we experience our 
everyday life in the world but also distinguishes our experiences themselves from our 
understanding of our experience.   Thus, the eidetic analysis can look at what we do 
and what we are by this distinction, from which we can see the ethical implication in 
Husserl‘s transcendental phenomenology.   This is also the reason why Levinas still 
keeps phenomenology as his major approach to explore ethics as first philosophy.   
 
Nevertheless, from Levinas‘s early work Existence and Existents, he 
criticizes the role of consciousness in this phenomenological approach.   The 
problem of consciousness lies in the depersonalization involved the process of 
reduction when the subject intends to objectivize the other subjects and things in this 
process (as both things and other fellow human beings are taken, initially, as objects 
given to one‘s own actual outer perceptual-sense experience).   For Levinas, 
consciousness is not the only origin of knowing one‘s everyday life in this world but 
it is the obligation to act before the other because ‗consciousness always arrives after 
the fact of the obligation‘. 1   In Time and the Other, Levinas deals with the 
transcendence of the Other within a diachronical relationship rather than in the 
synchronical one such as Heidegger articulates it in Being and Time.   This approach 
not only refers to the understanding of one‘s experience of time, but also opens up a 
new perspective towards the time that is experienced both by myself and the Other 
diachronically.   This means that the experience of time in a subject‘s duration is just 
one aspect of the understanding of time; in order to approach the Other in a mutual 
relationship, we need to count in the Other‘s experience of time and how these two 
aspects of time interweave when they encounter.   From this, we will see that 
intentionality in the traditional Husserlain thematization way is not able to 
completely analyse the very relationship of the subject with the other because this 
                                                 
1
 Jeffrey Bloechl, ‗Ethics as First Philosophy and Religion‘, in The Face of the Other and the Trace of 
God, ed. by Jeffrey Bloechi (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), p. 132. 
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two-dimensional time cannot be reduced and then constituted in the same way by the 
consciousness of two subjects.
2
  Therefore, Levinas‘s unique way of discussing time 
breaks through the characteristic of sameness in the analysis of consciousness, which 
is an important presupposition for us to fully appreciate his articulation of ethics and 
religion in the consideration of language and the Other. 
 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas further breaks with consciousness analysis 
by emphasizing the sensuous elements of sensibility, like pain, suffering, pleasure, 
enjoyment, etc., in order to illustrate the importance of inhabitation or ‗being at 
home‘ (chez moi) and cohabitation.  This cohabitation is an invisible attribute of 
relationship that is achieved via ‗separation‘ that exists between genuine 
subjectivities but which is connected by language at the same time.   Only thus can 
we understand the role of alterity in an ethical relationship in dichronical time and 
through dialogue.   The very approach to and basic question ‗What is it?‘ indicates 
already an answer that is constituted by intentional consciousness in an objective 
thinking system.   This way of thinking, according to Levinas, occupies Western 
philosophy and culminates in the philosophy of Hegel.
3
  In Otherwise than Being, 
Levinas stresses that the ‗what‘ question comes after the who question because ‗the 
―what?‖ is already wholly enveloped with being, has eyes only for being, and already 
sinks into being.‘4   Thus in order to answer the ‗what?‘ question, we need to be sure 
of ‗who‘ raises this question in the first place.   Heidegger attempts to solve this 
problem by understanding beings qua beings and let beings independently be.   It is 
only in the ‗understanding of Being‘ (Seinsverständis) that is deposited in Dasein  
that any questioning of the meaning of Being can be sought.
5
 
                                                 
2
 For further discussion, see Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Philippe 
Nemo, trans. by Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1997), pp. 57–61. 
(Henceforth abbreviated as EI). See, also, Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. by Richard 
A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), p. 39. (Henceforth abbreviated as TO.) 
3
 See, EI, p. 75. 
4
 OB, p. 23.  
5
 ‗Entities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in 
which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. But Being ―is‖ only 
in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being 
belongs. Hence Being can be something unconceptualized, but it never completely fails to be 
understood.‘ Being and Time, p. 228:183: ‗Seiendes ist unabhängig von Erfahrung, Kenntnis und 
Erfassen, wodurch es erschlossen, entdeckt und bestimmt wird. Sein aber ―ist‖ nur im Verstehen des 
Seienden, zu dessen Sein so etwas wie Seinsverständnis gehört. Sein kann daher unbegriffen sein, 
aber es ist nie völlig unverstanden.‘ According to Heidegger, then, because ‗[The meaning of] Being 
can be something unconceptualised (unbegriffen), but it is never completely incomprehensible (es ist 
nie völlig unverstanden)‘, then we can set aside and not return to the very existence of things that are 
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In this manner, Heidegger excludes traditional (realist) metaphysical 
speculation from his conception of a phenomenological ontology (or ‗fundamental 
ontology‘) that finds its roots, not in the consciousness of the human being 
(transcendentally reduced a la Husserl) but, nonetheless, in the actual awareness of 
an individual‘s being a being-in-the-world.    And since Miteinandersein (being-
with-the-other-person) is acknowledged by Heidegger as a feature of one‘s own 
being-in-the-world, then Heidegger believes that his start-point evades any Cartesian 
or solipsistic isolatable consciousness.   As we have discussed in chapter three, 
Heidegger has deliberately discussed the ontological relation of Miteinandersein 
(being-with-the-other-person) via his examination of understanding.    
 
Heidegger‘s concept of understanding is both a turning point and starting 
point for Levinas.   It turns from the traditional understanding of language and goes 
beyond the features of subjectivity in the background of phenomenological ontology.   
Levinas intends to explore the being‘s relation with the other which cannot be 
reduced to understanding because ‗in understanding this being, I simultaneously tell 
him my understanding. […] my understanding of a being as such is already the 
expression I offer him or her of that understanding.‘6  When I talk to someone, even 
about that being‘s understanding of something, I recognise that my understanding is 
not reducible to that‘s being‘s understanding of their own existence.   The other‘s 
existence is more than either my understanding or their own self-understanding 
revealed in dialogue.   In other words, for Levinas, my relationship with the Other 
cannot be only explained by ontological understanding in the approach of ‗as‘ in 
Heidegger‘s thinking because this ‗as‘ reveals the meaning of the object but not the 
object itself.
7
   Consciousness, in this process, bears this meaning and confers it to 
corresponding understanding.   This is exactly what Levinas criticizes as a totalistic 
understanding of the ‗what‘ question and such a totalistic conception of 
understanding cannot be applied to any analysis of the meaning of our shared human 
                                                                                                                                          
outside of my understanding of their being, and that includes the being of my own fellow man. The 
exteriority of the existence of ‗the other‘, then, is recognised by Heidegger, and central to his own 
position, but he does not address or think the other in his philosophy. This becomes the critical task  
of Levinas‘s advancement of phenomenology (as ‗metaphysics‘, in Levainas‘s sense of that term), but 
it is one that radically calls into question the priority of ‗ontology‘ in Heidegger‘s definition of 
phenomenology as first philosophy. 
6
 EN, p. 7.  
7
 Emmanuel Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Dodrecht: Kluwer, 
1993), p. 110.  (Henceforth abbreviated as CPP.) 
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existence without serious determinant to the understanding the existence of others.    
This is why the very existence of others, or ‗metaphysics‘ (in Levinas‘s sense, of 
‗ethics‘) precedes any ‗ontology‘ (understanding of being).    
 
Levinas puts forward the ‗who‘ question at the beginning of Otherwise than 
Being: 
 
on all sides the privilege of the question ‗what?‘, or the ontological nature 
of the problem is affirmed […] if one starts with the notion of the truth, 
can one place the welcoming of the manifestation of being outside of the 
being that manifest itself? Can he that looks place himself outside of the 
Absolute, and the look withdraw from the event of being, by hollowing 
out the fold of inwardness, in which knowledge is deposited, accumulates 
and its formulated? […] That is in fact our problem: what does ‗who?‘ 
mean? [because] truth can consist only in the exposition of being to itself, 
in self-consciousness.
8
 
 
From this, we can argue that Heidegger illustrates the relationship of ontological 
difference but Levinas explores the ethical separation from the manifestation of 
beings by criticizing the totalistic characteristic of the relationship between Being 
and beings, which defines the distinction between the interiority and exteriority of a 
subjectivity as well as the finitude and infinitude in a responsible relationship.    Thus 
we can understand why Levinas must think through Heidegger‘s identifiction of 
‗mineness‘ and ‗Being‘ to the Other as exemplified in the exteriority of the  ‗face‘ 
that can never, in principle, be reduced to the interiority of self-consciousness 
(Husserl) or of Dasein facing itself in anticipation of its own death (als Vorlaufen 
zum Tode). 
 
§ 4.1.2  The Other and the „Face‟ 
 
The notion of ‗face‘ is a very important concept in Levinas‘s thought, but it is also a 
very intricate concept that is articulated by Levinas in relation to many other main 
concepts in his later works.   Throughout his deliberations, however, Levinas 
considers face not in a metaphorical way but in an ethical and transcendental way.   
What the ‗face‘ expresses is not about a specific person, but about the relationship 
with this person.   Therefore, the phrase, ‗the face of the Other‘, indicates not the 
                                                 
8
 OB, p. 27. 
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perception, description, or interpretation of the expression of the face of a person, but 
the condition for the experience of this face to appear.   In other words, the face is an 
ethical sign that emphasizes the immaterial and non-objectified attribute of human 
being.
9
  In this regard, Levinas‘s concept of ‗face‘ is functionally similar to 
Heidegger‘s notion of ‗Being‘ because both these two terms deal with the first 
signification (primum intelligibile) of human relationship in an indirect way.
10
  Their 
motivations behind the function, however, are not the same.   Heidegger‘s 
philosophy lacks a genuine ethical concern and the concept of Being is neutral and 
anonymous. 
 
§ 4.1.3  The Other and Exteriority (of the Face) 
 
In order to break through this neutrality and anonymity, Levinas stresses the 
characteristics of the relationship with the Other in the ways of exteriority and 
separation as the condition in his analysis of ‗face‘.   The face of the Other, for 
Levinas, is a ‗mask‘ that covers one‘s interiority on the one hand, and reveals one‘s 
exteriority on the other hand.   Thus, ‗face‘ within this presupposition is both a 
limitation and a possibility of establishing a relationship with the Other.   ‗Face‘, as a 
condition of experiencing the Other, does not mean, however, to fulfil the 
understanding towards the Other via ‗face‘, but to deepen the contact with the 
otherness of that Other in and through a diachronical relationship.   The face is 
visible, but the ethical and transcendental significance behind the face is invisible 
and inherent in the Other.   This invisible face, nevertheless, does not denote the 
absence of this significance; rather, it implies the determinative connections of the 
face encounter but which are easily neglected by people.   Thus, we will begin our 
discussion from the traditional interpretations of the Other which are mostly close to 
both the concerns of our topic and the methods that we intend to explore.   
 
§ 4.1.4  The Traditional Interpretations of the Other 
 
The traditional interpretations of the Other are discussed in two senses: Firstly, it is 
in the sense of opening a horizon by means of the formalization of our experience of 
                                                 
9
 See, GDT, p. 196. Levinas discusses the signification of signs of the face, and especially notes that 
when ‗the moment the other becomes material, he loses his face‘. 
10
 See related discussion about this point in De Boer, p. 28. 
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the Other.   Secondly, it is in the sense of constituting an idea by means of the 
absolutization of the traits of the Other.   Both approaches attempt to detect the truth 
of the ‗understanding‘ of the Other from the perspective of intentional consciousness 
rather than from the relationship of alterity with the Other.
11
  This traditional 
interpretation of the Other is derived from the characteristic of the reduction of 
Western ontology.   Within this background, to know the other is to know this other 
from me or within me.   Thus, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas states that 
‗Philosophy [in this sense] is an egology‘.12  Husserl and Heidegger, who influence 
Levinas, also repeat and continue this tradition.   Notwithstanding their differences 
and focus on intentional consciousness and Dasein, both maintain that in the case of 
understanding the other from the domination of the I in the relationship with the 
Other, the I has the free will and the capacity of reason to keep one‘s own identity 
from within as an egoism.   In Heidegger‘s case, he emphasizes the reduction of the 
Other to the same as the Being, for, although the ‗understanding of Being‘ extends 
equally and inclusively to myself, the world, and my fellow human being,  it is the 
characteristic of mineness in understanding the Being that determines its meaning 
(for Heidegger).    For this reason, Levinas holds that ‗(O)ntology as first philosophy 
is a philosophy of power‘.13  In this, freedom and reason are then subject to this 
power.  The result of this would be that freedom belongs to Being but not by man; in 
other words, man is controlled by the false impression of freedom in obedience to 
Being.
14
 
 
This concern about the characteristics of sameness and totality in ontology 
from Levinas cannot be explained completely without considering the historical 
background and his own personal experience, especially the experience of war.  If 
ontology shows the identity of sameness and the relation between things is a 
spontaneous co-existence in the world, then war is the event that breaks the identity 
of this sameness and relation.  This is a special ‗time‘ for man to rethink the 
objectivity of ontology and the intersubjectivity between two, or more than two 
                                                 
11
 See, Introduction to OB, p. xxxii. 
12
 TI, p. 43. 
13
 Ibid., p. 45. 
14
 See, TI, p. 45.  There is a sense in Heidegger‘s ‗response‘ (Antwort) to the ‗question of the meaning 
of Being‘ that we cannot but be puppets responding to the historical-epochal sendings of that meaning 
and understanding of Being.  This is why Levinas, correctly, believes that it is a false impression of 
freedom in obedience to the meaning of Being. 
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parties in this War.   What is left after the War is neither the triumph or the losing nor 
the meaning of these results as historical concepts in the way of reduction from 
history.   The Other is the irreducible one that is able to escape from the sameness or 
mineness of ontology into the alterity of ethics.   
 
Memory, in Levinas, is a representation of reduction but it can only be 
understood in relation to one‘s conception of time.   Heidegger‘s emphasis on 
forgetting ‗the ontological difference‘, for instance, stresses the importance of re-
achieving a kind of ontological memory, or ontology-based memory.   The 
traditional way of interpretation of the Other is based on the unity of the ‗truth‘ of the 
Other by means of recalling the distance between the past and the presence about this 
Other.   It is a process that includes both memory and projection, which unites the 
role of consciousness in memorizing the Other and the role of the essence in 
projecting the Other.
15
  The outcome of this unity is that the particularity is classified 
into the wholeness of an image, as Being in Heidegger, and the subjectivity is 
classified into the reflective understanding of the objectivity.   The Other, in such a 
configuration, is always held in the constitution of my consciousness and already 
affirmed in my understanding of the representation of the Other in my memory.   The 
I has the freedom to understand the Other who is deprived of the freedom in the 
process of being understood.   Yet the very existence of the Other is what calls into 
question my ability to understand the Other from the freedom of my personal point 
of view.    If the limitation of the constitution cannot be avoided, it needs to be 
recognized as a genuine condition and transcended.   We will argue that this is the 
reason why Levinas gives priority to passivity (before the Other) rather than 
positivity in his consideration of ethics because he acknowledges the problem of the 
traditional constitutive way of thinking.   This point also relates to Levinas‘s 
distinction between totality and infinity: both of these concepts must be thought 
together.   In this distinction, totality refers to the theoretical constitution of the 
relationships and infinity refers to the moral conditions for the relationships.
16
  
 
One of the conditions for revealing the relationship with the other is time, 
which we have already discussed in both chapter two on Bonhoeffer‘s concepts of 
                                                 
15
 See related discussion by Levinas in, OB, p. 29. 
16
 See Levinas‘s discussion on this distinction in, TI, p. 83. 
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the pen-ultimate and the ultimate and in chapter three on Heidegger‘s synchronical 
time and Levinas‘s diachronical time.   In the traditional interpretation of time, time 
is regarded as a physical measuring system used to describe objectively sequential 
events as well as to explain the causation of people‘s actions.   When we need to 
discuss time within the context of ethics, and in particular our responsibility for the 
other, however, we cannot only focus on specific and disconnected points of time but 
on the relationships between different streams of flowing time.   Thus, the discussion 
of the Other in the traditional interpretation is in a static and one-sided way which 
lies at the basis of totality.   In Levinas‘s view, the investigation of the role of time in 
this discussion should go beyond the still time and its relation to beings and focus on 
how the ethical relationship with the other is manifested in the sense of infinity.   
 
Therefore, the elements that are inherent in the infinity would break through 
the totality.   For Levinas, the most essential element that can condition the totality 
lies in the face of the Other as the gleam of exteriority and a defense of subjectivity 
at the same time.
17
  Infinity is not a concept that can be restrained by the context of 
time, but reveals itself in the subject who lives in time as a mode of being.   Then a 
question would be raised about the method that can be used in approaching the 
infinity, which is an important issue for both philosophy and theology because this is 
a question that concerns human nature in general.   In Levinas, the existence of the 
Other, especially the face of the Other is an essential approach to affirm my own 
identity.   Undoubtedly, this is how Levinas puts his method or style of passivity into 
effect.   This passivity, however, relates to the recognition of the existence of an 
independent value.
18
  This independent value cannot be reduced into my 
consciousness and understanding.   In this sense, to experience the Other is to 
experience the Infinity that goes beyond my being (être, literally and verbally, my ‗to 
be‘) and my power.19  The method that Levinas applied within this presupposition is 
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 See, TI, p. 24. 
18
 The existence of an independent value is discussed by Brown in Continental Philosophy and 
Modern Theology: An Engagement, pp. 85–86. 
19
 Levinas‘s ethical thinking in this sense is closely related to his religious background. See Is It 
Righteous To Be? Interview with Emmanuel Levinas, edited by Jill Robbins, (Stanford California: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 18. ‗the face is the site of the Word of God, that the Word of God 
is the very obligation or commandment that the face addresses to me. That the relation to God never 
accomplishes itself in the absence of the relation to man is a familiar enough emphasis within 
Levinas‘s hermeneutic of Judaism.‘ We will discuss the application of the interpretation from 
Levinas‘s ethical thinking on the problem of religious diversity in chapter five.  
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the ‗exploration of the pre-objective areas of human experience and in the implicit 
understanding of being.‘ 20   From this, we can see Levinas‘s method is clearly 
different from the traditional interpretation on human relationship.   In other words, 
this method is derived from the Other which has been already situated in a bond to 
me in a ‗pre-original‘ condition, but the traditional interpretation roots in my 
understanding towards the Other after we encounter, know, undertake, or commit 
with each other.  As Ward holds, Levinas is concerned with the ‗otherwise 
(autrement) than Being‘, or a kind of non-being which is prior to Being, and which is 
presented as an absence rather than a presence.
21
  The position of the Other is an 
absence of the I, or, in other words, there is always an Other who is with me but also 
beyond my existence, even though this Other is not present but it does exist in a 
specific time in history.   The significance of the Other lies in the experiences of the 
otherness of other people, or of the Goodness of different good things, or of the death 
of a person, etc.   There are some common characteristics of these contents of the 
Other that are relational, invisible, a priori, and asymmetric, and that Levinas invites 
us to think.   
 
From these characteristics of thinking about the Other, we have found that the 
methods that Levinas applies are indeed ‗implicit‘ and ‗uncertain‘ because they are 
used to reveal transcendental ethics.   Correspondingly, the methods that are applied 
in the traditional interpretation of the Other are ‗explicit‘ and ‗certain‘ because they 
are used to affirm the ontological existence of the Other.   Levinas brings forward the 
notion of ‗trace‘ to clarify his approach, and to distinguish it (radically) from the 
perspective of ontology.   To use De Boer‘s words, ‗(S)omething has happened, the 
invisible has passed by and left a trace.   This trace is a summon of the Other, which 
invests me with my responsibility, my non-transferable unicity.‘ 22  Thus, when 
something happened, it did not just happen purely and simply (i.e., directly) because 
it was caused by endless and even non-causal events.  This trace, then, is not in the 
categories of the traditional interpretation of the Other but lies in the traces of what 
we have done and said.   Furthermore, the effect of what we have done and said is 
beyond our intentions and consciousness.   This is also one of the reasons why 
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 De Boer, p. 26. 
21
 See Ward, p. 109. 
22
 De Boer, p. 65. 
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Levinas states that to consider an ethical relationship is to act in an immemorial 
sense, since it cannot be found in a (factual-psychological) memory that is based on 
consciousness.    
 
When we face the Other, the face of the Other is the first impression for me, 
which cannot be understood from my memory.   Levinas use samples like, the poor, 
the stranger, the widow, and the orphan to illustrate this feature.   Each of these 
Others have a past but it is one that cannot be understood or recollected by me, yet it 
can be traced from their faces.
23
  This approach ‗profoundly disturbs the self-
sufficiency of the ego, but does not destroy the ego; in fact, it deepens interiority.‘24 
Far from rejecting the significance of subjectivity the encounter with the Other (that 
is to say, ‗the poor‘, ‗the widow‘, ‗the leper‘, in sum, he and she who have been 
othered in society) unlocks a deeper subjectivity for that subject.   Therefore, the 
discussion of how to keep my ego and yet, at the same time, the Other‘s ego leads to 
the question about how the Other becomes the Other, which is equivalent to the 
question of ‗who is the Other‘.25  
 
Levinas proposes a concept ‗separation‘ to explore this question within the 
context of his definition of infinity because such infinity indicates the transcendental 
relationship with the Same and the Other.
26
  Only in the sense of infinity can the 
discussion of the ethical significance of ‗separation‘ be possible.   Without the 
linkage between separation and ‗infinity‘, this ‗separation‘ is still in my 
understanding and projection towards the Other.   
 
§ 4.1.5   Separation: How the Other Becomes the Other 
 
As discussed above, the thoughts about the traditional interpretation of the Other in 
the history of Western philosophy emanate from the within rather than from that 
which is outside of the subjectivity of the subject.   Levinas states in his Difficult 
Freedom: ‗If ―know thyself‖ has become the fundamental precept of all Western 
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 See related discussion, ibid., p. 48. 
24
 Ibid., p. 49. 
25
 We have to be cautious, therefore, not to confuse this question with ‗what is the Other?‘ 
26
 See De Boer‘s discussion: ‗The relation to the Infinite is a model for the ―transcendental‖ relation 
between the Same and the Other.‘(ibid., p. 14). 
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philosophy, this is because ultimately the West discovers the universe within 
itself.‘27  By contradistinction, Levinas‘s notion of ‗face‘ plays important role in 
clarifying the question of ‗how the Other becomes the Other‘ from the without.   
 
In the traditional sense, the Other is always, in a significant sense, found in 
one‘s experience and in one‘s understanding of the Other.   Levinas‘s approach by 
analysing the vision of ‗face‘ intends to move out from this experience and 
understanding of oneself.   I am the concern of the Other via his or her face, just like 
the Other is my concern via my face.   This process cannot be explained only in (my) 
experience but in the event of ‗contact‘ because this encounter ‗always presupposes 
an interlocutor‘:  
 
one always identifies that other person on the basis of a rich environment 
and a deep personal history, but these things comprise a sphere of 
meanings and dispositions which, still, the other approaches from the 
outside.
28
 
 
In  Entre Nous, Levinas clearly states that the problem of the interpretation of the 
Other from the within does not lie from consciousness itself, but lies in the fact that 
there is no ‗exteriority‘ in consciousness.29  What does exteriority mean in Levinas? 
If we put it in one sentence, then it means that one is in a relationship where the 
Other is prior in this relationship; and this priority leads to a particularity of thinking, 
which is opposite to the totality of Being (and to one‘s natural totalizing of the 
‗understanding of Being‘).   That is to say, in the relation to the prior Other, one can 
situate oneself not from the category of the whole as Being, but from being oneself in 
all of that being‘s particularity.   
 
The above position sounds quite similar to the existential interpretation about 
human being, which also deals with the philosophical thought on the existential 
situation of the individual person as well as his emotions, actions, responsibilities, 
and thoughts, especially when it emphasizes the slogan ‗existence precedes essence‘. 
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 DF, p. 10.  
28
 Jeffrey Bloechl, Liturgy of the Neighbor: Emmanuel Levinas and The Religion of Responsibility 
(Duquesne University Press, 2000), p. 63. 
29
 See, EN, p. 13. ‗The living being per se, then, is not without consciousness, but has a consciousness 
without problems, that is, without exteriority.‘ 
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The idea of this slogan stresses the difference between facticity and transcendence, 
as well as the sameness and alienation.    We can see,  nevertheless, that the 
existential approaches originate from the constitution of a self-giving meaning and of 
one‘s ownmost self-understanding, rather than from the existence of  the Other of 
that Other‘s interiority of their constitution, which is the exteriority of the Otherness 
of the Other.   In this sense, Levinas regards such existential interpretation as also a 
philosophy of totality because the I absorb the Other into the I‘s system of 
understanding.
30
 
 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas presents the concept of ‗radical separation‘. 
This ‗radical separation‘ lies between the same and the other, precisely because it is, 
 
impossible to place oneself outside of the correlation between the same 
and the other so as to record the correspondence or the non-
correspondence of this going with this return. Otherwise the same and the 
other would be reunited under one gaze, and the absolute distance that 
separates them filled in.
31
 
 
The reason why Levinas proposes this concept is to stress the primal identity or the 
genuine self-identification of the I and the Other.   This separation paves the way for 
the self-identification that also identifies the subjectivity (but it is a subjectivity 
where the other takes the me (le moi) in me (moi) as hotstage (l‟otage).32  Levinas, 
later in the same book, clarifies that ‗separation in the strictest sense is solitude, and 
enjoyment – happiness or unhappiness – is isolation itself‘33, which is an ultimate 
structure.   This structure can break up totality and leads to the completion of radical 
separation.   For Levinas, this ultimate structure is transcendence because it reveals a 
projected distance between the reality of the I and the Other.   In other words, to 
break up totality is at the same time to destroy this projected distance because 
without this destroying then the Other and the I are still in the identification of the 
sameness but not in an alienated relationship with the Other.
34
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This process of establishment and demolishment of a relationship is a 
description and a path which leads to a social superstructure.
35
  Radical separation 
shows both the passivity of responsibility and the positivity of (limited) freedom in a 
social relationship.   The reason is that in this radical separation, the I as a subject 
who fills the room to step in to dominate, in the meanwhile creates room to step 
forward to liberate.
36
  The former refers to the type of responsibility that is taken on 
one‘s own initiative, according to the social customs, laws or even conscience, and 
so on; the latter refers to the type of responsibility that is achieved from the freedom 
that is reconciled by the I and the Other.   The second one is what Levinas means by 
ethical responsibility.   
 
If this ‗radical separation‘ in the relationship with the Other is a process of 
establishment and demolition, then when people deliberate or reflect on this process, 
they, at the same time, find out the ‗disproportion between the Other and the self‘, 
which is ‗precisely moral consciousness‘.37   Levinas continues to clarify this by 
noting that, 
 
Moral consciousness is not an experience of values, but an access to 
external being; external being is, par excellence, the Other. Moral 
consciousness is thus not a modality of psychological consciousness, but 
its condition.
38
 
 
This interpretation of moral consciousness provides an answer for Bonhoeffer‘s 
critical viewpoint on human‘s conscience as moral consciousness. Human‘s 
conscience is not the ultimate criteria of ethical issues, but its condition.   It is a 
condition that is derived from myself but at the same time is concerned with the 
Other.   When we deliberate ethical issues, our conscience deals with not only our 
own selves, but also all others in their absence from my self.   This deliberation 
shows the radical separation in fact is a transcendental connection between the I and 
the Other.   
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There are two concepts that Levinas discusses in Totality and Infinity: desire 
and need.   We can use these two concepts to illustrate further the significance of 
‗radical separation‘.   Desire, in Levinas, ‗measures the infinity of the infinite, for it 
is a measure through the very impossibility of measure.‘39   It is ‗positively attracted 
by something other not yet possessed or needed‘; correspondingly, need refers to ‗a 
negation or lack in the subject that seeks to fill in.‘40  Thus, Levinas remarks, 
 
To conceive separation as a fall or privation or provisional rupture of the 
totality is to know no other separation than that evinced by need. Need 
indicates void and lack in the needy one, its dependence on the exterior, 
the insufficiency of the needy being precisely in that it does not entirely 
possess its being and consequently is not strictly speaking separate.
41
 
 
‗Need is primary movement of the same‘, states Levinas.42  Need is also, however, 
the basis for desire because the ‗need‘ comes from the inner requirement and only 
satisfies this demand inside the subject.   The desire is the surplus of the ‗need‘ that 
extends towards to the external and reaches the need of the others via the Other‘s 
face.   Thus, the infinity that desire measures can be measured from the ‗face‘ for 
Levinas.   In other words, ‗Levinas admits that the Other is infinitely and absolutely 
other not in the sense of purely other.   The Other is alter ego but is not only this, is 
always more than this.‘43  Thus the traditional interpretation of the Other, and the 
reasons why Levinas argues against this approach, are connected to his concept of 
‗separation‘ and its significance in any deliberation on the ethical significance of the 
face of the Other and the face-to-face encounter. 
 
§ 4.1.6   From Separation to Incarnation: Exteriority and Incarnate Subject 
 
Levinas‘s exploration about the exteriority and the incarnate subject follows closely 
on from the discussion of the concept of ‗separation‘.   In the previous section, we 
dealt with the role of the Other in this ‗radical separation‘.   In this section, we will 
work out the position of the subject in this separate relationship.   The Other, as we 
have argued, it is not a pre-given material object by the I, the other is not the 
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empirical other that is given to me, like any other object, by means of outer 
perceptual-sense experience but is an incarnate subject that is exterior to the I and 
vice versa.   Thus, only if we keep this point in our mind can we discuss the genuine 
ethical significance of the face. 
  
The term ‗incarnation‘ for Levinas is neither a Christian concept that refers to 
‗God the Son‘, or to the Logos that becomes flesh; nor even a religious term in a 
particular religious system.   Rather, it is close to, though not the same as, its literal 
meaning, that is to say, it is something embodied in flesh, or which takes on flesh, or 
which is the process of materialization of a specific entity, god or force whose 
original nature is immaterial.   
 
In Levinas, the beginning of the incarnation is derived from ‗the sensible 
experience of the body‘.44  Thus, for Levinas, it is different from the process of 
materialization in a literal sense.   Rather, it is a process of ‗subjectification‘ and this 
subjectification would be accomplished by sensibility, namely, in ‗an exposure to 
others, a vulnerability and a responsibility in the proximity of the others.‘45  Thus, 
the incarnation is not an event that happens in a specific time because it is impossible 
to know the other person in this particular moment, while it is a living and dialogical 
action that is accomplished by both subjectivities: the I and the Other in the duration 
of time.   In other words, it is not possible for this process to be completed in one‘s 
consciousness alone, and it is only possible by a surplus of action from 
consciousness to infinity.   This is an indispensable step in arguing for the 
significance of the ‗face‘ that Levinas presents in Totality and Infinity. 
 
The incarnation of consciousness is therefore comprehensible only if, 
over and beyond adequation, the over-flowing of the idea by its ideatum, 
that is, the idea of infinity, moves consciousness.
46
 
 
This ‗incarnate thought‘ corresponds to the separable-separated relationship 
(between a human being and another or between a You and a Me) because it is a 
‗thinking‘ that thinks more than it can think in oneself, it thinks the other; but it is a 
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thinking  or a living from the Other, which goes beyond the ‗need‘ towards the 
‗desire‘. 
 
This ‗transcendental leap‘ of incarnation is related to the diachronical 
interpretation of separation.   In traditional Cartesian interpretation, there is also a 
separation between thinking and being, which refers to the separation between the 
cogito and the body.
47
  This static and self-confirmed separation, however, blocks the 
possibility of reaching the other subject as an integrity of the other‘s cogito and 
body.   Levinas, therefore, states that the trace of separation seeks the inwardness of 
the subject as a unique subjectivity and, at the same time, reaches the other in the 
form of responsibility.
48
  This trace of separation prevents one‘s consciousness and 
one‘s subjective freedom to violate the ego of the Other.   Thus, this separation is a 
necessary step to establish a concrete but not a representative relationship between 
the I and the Other, as well as with the world.   Levinas describes this situation as 
‗chez soi‘ (at home) in which one maintains oneself (se tenir).49  This situation of 
‗chez soi‘ is not a physical or spatial concept but a mental and ethical concept that 
indicates the non-indifferent relationship between the I and the Other.   In other 
words, the ‗radical separation‘ also means that the situation of my existence as ‗chez 
soi‘ indicates the absence of the Other, and vice versa, which is a preparation for the 
hospitality and responsibility towards the incarnate subject as the Other. 
 
It will be useful, at this point, therefore, to compare  Buber‘s ‗I-Thou‘ 
paradigm and Levinas‘s ‗I-Other‘ paradigm in relation to Levinas‘s discussion and 
distinction on separation and incarnation and the incarnate subject. 
 
§ 4.1.7  Incarnate Subject: Buber Contrast Levinas 
 
Buber‘s I-Thou thinking breaks through the traditional interpretation and 
thematization of the Other.   In I and Thou, Buber states ‗Through the Thou a man 
                                                 
47
 See, OB, p. 79. 
48
 See, Ibid. 
49
 TI, p. 37. Original notes from the translator on explaining the meaning of ‗maintain oneself‘: ‗Se 
tenir‘ involves the notion of containing oneself; it is the idea of an active identity with oneself. It also 
involves the notion of holding oneself up, of standing, of having a stance – which is at the same time a 
position and an attitude, a posture and an intention.‘ 
 159 
becomes I‘.50  This ‗becoming‘ is realized when the I and Thou freely encounter each 
other without focusing on the consideration of any causality.   Buber stresses two 
aspects that are rather similar to Levinas‘s argumentation on the I-Other relationship, 
the face and passivity, for, as Levinas writes, 
 
He who forgets all that is caused and makes decision out of the depths, 
who rids himself of property and raiment and naked approaches the Face, 
is a free man, and destiny confronts him as the counterpart of his 
freedom.
51
 
 
The approach to the face is a way of waiting but not seeking or finding without 
seeking.
52
  Buber ascribes this motivation to God, who gives to people the meaning 
of their lives.   God is the ‗God who becomes‘ and what a human being can do is to 
wait for this coming of the God as the face of the Thou. 
 
Friedman remarks that, for Buber, when people know each other in a 
relationship, and when they approach each other face to face, they will freely decide 
because this is a process that has happened in two alternatives, side by side, between 
the I and the Thou.
53
  In this situation, the realization of genuine relationship begins 
in me from the Other because we need to respond to the Other‘s words.   The 
dialogical relationship within a wholeness between the I and the Thou is the most 
distinctive characteristic of Buber‘s thought, which was absorbed by Levinas who 
moves this dialogical relationship up to a responsible relationship.   In Levinas, the I 
is being responsible for the decision that made by the Other which is out of our 
control and thus absolutely transcendental.   As Friedman argues, the interpretation 
of the distinction between individualism and collectivism from Buber‘s thought does 
not reveal the genuine person, not to speak of the process of the incarnation of the 
subject.   We argue that, as we have discussed in chapter three, even though Buber 
raises the ‗Thou‘ from the general ‗It‘ and points out a dialogical approach to explore 
human relationship, his discussion has not solved the problem of how man can 
genuinely meet and accept himself as well as the Other from this dialogical approach 
out of the wholeness.   
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To accept oneself is a relevant and an important presupposition in 
Bonhoeffer‘s discussion: the ‗coming-of-age‘.   In some cases, people would regard 
the ‗coming-of-age‘ as maturity, but in the case of the consideration of the incarnate 
subject, it is linked to the former but not to the latter.   The reason lies in that 
maturity indicates fullness of growth and readiness for normal functioning, while 
coming-of-age undergoes the changes that result from the passage of time.   
‗Coming-of-age‘ emphasizes the negative and destructive changes that accompany 
growing mature.   Therefore, the choice of ‗coming-of-age‘ in Bonhoeffer also 
indicates the thinking of the incarnation of the subject in the structure of responsible 
life: how people take their responsibility before God.    
 
In these specific situations, for Buber, the Other is to be seen or to be made 
present by experience and dialogue, rather than through identification or empathy.   
Thus, the characteristics of ‗wholeness‘, ‗decision‘, ‗presentness‘, and ‗uniqueness‘ 
are Buber‘s foundation for his definition of ethics. 54    This is why Buber 
distinguishes his thinking on ethical relationships from ‗moral autonomy‘, and tends 
to ‗moral heteronomy‘, which implies ‗freedom for‘ rather than ‗freedom from‘.55 
For Buber, then, this thought of ‗freedom to respond‘ includes both the free response 
to the external address of the Other and the free response from the internal voice of 
one‘s own.   Buber‘s emphasis, therefore, lies on the dialogue that occurs between 
man and man from these two aspects.
56
  
 
We can see, nevertheless, that the problem of the Other leads to the problem 
of  exteriority, which, in turn, brings forward the problem of separation that is 
embodied in the discussion of incarnate subject.   Buber‘s thoughts on language in 
dialogue, ‗moving between self and other‘, presents the other and presents the same, 
hence the wholly other is also ‗the wholly same‘.57   Although Buber holds that 
                                                 
54
 See, Friedman‘s discussion in his Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 198. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 We can find both similarities and divergences between Buber and Levinas on the discussion of 
incarnate subject. De Boer summarizes Levinas‘s critique on Buber from three points. The first point 
is Buber‘s spiritualism; the second one is Buber‘s dialogical thought of formalism; the last is about the 
problem of alienation and self-realization. Our discussion above corresponds to the second and the 
third points. De Boer holds that Buber‘s I-Thou relation, which depends on mutually ontological and 
constitutive dialogue, lacks the ethical dimension that Levinas recognises. See, De Boer, pp. 30–31. 
57
 Buber, I and Thou, p. 79. 
 161 
‗genuine responsibility exists only where there is real responding‘,58 how this real 
responding comes to be realizable and how the subject becomes incarnate in this 
responding in ‗the wholly same‘ is left unaddressed.   Is responsibility still 
implicated in the I-Thou relationship when the Thou had existed before but is absent, 
at present?  If it is only through ―seeing the other‖ can this relationship become fully 
real?
59
 Buber appeals to the Eternal Thou to solve the problem of preventing people 
to lead the other people from a ‗Thou‘ to an ‗It‘ by encountering and responding to 
this ‗Thou‘.   In this way, Buber successfully brings ethical thinking, like 
responsibility, beyond an abstract and universal moral law or ethical principle. He 
still, however, has not completely solved those questions which we asked. Levinas‘s 
articulation on the ethical significance of the face provides a possible answer to these 
problems of incarnate subject and genuine response, which further deepens our 
discussion on responsibility. 
 
§ 4.1.8  Ethical Significance of the Face 
 
In Levinas‘s Is It Righteous to Be?, he writes, 
 
The face is not at all what has been seen.
60
 […] The face is not the order 
of the seen, it is not an object, but it is he whose appearing preserves an 
exteriority which is also an appeal or an imperative given to your 
responsibility: to encounter a face is straightaway to hear a demand and 
an order.
61
 
 
For Levinas, then, the face, firstly, marks the separation between oneself and the 
Other and commands both the finity and the infinity in the relationship with this 
Other.   Secondly, when the faces encounter, this manifests a pre-linguistic or pre-
conceptual demand of relationship, or a claim that the other has on me that is entailed 
in ethical significance.   Thirdly, this pre-linguistic ethical significance constructs 
genuine communication as dialogue.
62
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In Levinas‘s Ethics and Infinity, Levinas raises the question whether 
‗phenomenology of the face‘ is possible since phenomenology describes what 
appears.
63
  Phenomenology is a method of philosophy but when we ponder the 
possibility and the limitation of this method, this thinking is also a type of 
philosophy.   Phenomenology, as a method, can shed light on the objects that can be 
constituted by consciousness, yet when we need to discuss the event of being and the 
ethical significance of this event, this method is beyond the function of the 
constitution.  As for the case of ‗face‘, the most intriguing issue is the opaque 
characteristic of the face.  People can observe and tell what the others‘ faces look 
like, even what types of ethnic group they are, or how old these people would be by 
guessing from the appearance of their faces, and so forth.  When we see the other‘s 
face, however, there are something much more important which might never be seen 
through than that of all we can see.    In what sense, then, can Levinas argue that 
there is ethical significance in the face of the Other? 
 
Levinas deliberates the ethical significance of the face in his different works.   
In Ethics and Infinity, he writes, 
 
The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence. At 
the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill. […] The first word of 
the face is the ‗Thou shalt not kill.‘ It is an order.64  
 
In his essay ‗Ethics as First Philosophy‘, he unravels the implications that this call 
has on ‗me‘, remarking, 
 
In its expression, in its morality, the face before me summons me, calls 
for me, begs for me, […] and in doing so recalls my responsibility, and 
calls me into question.
65
 
 
Again, in his essay ‗Meaning and Sense‘, he points to the ineluctability of the face, 
for, 
 
[A] face imposes itself upon me without my being able to be deaf to its 
call […] without my being able to suspend my responsibility for its 
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distress. Consciousness loses its first place […] Consciousness is called 
into question by the face […].66 [The face of the other person] proceeds 
from the absolutely Absent, [but its relationship] does not indicate, does 
not reveal, this Absent; and yet the Absent has a meaning in the face.
67
 
 
For Levinas, then, as Jeffrey Bloechl aptly sums up and concludes,, ‗(T)he face of 
the other awakens me to a responsibility that is unlimited, unqualified, or simply 
infinite.   This is why Levinas‘s account of ethical transcendence cannot be 
assimilated with his account of Jewish religious transcendence.‘68  Thus, this infinite 
is embodied in the meaning-content of the process of the incarnate subject via the 
‗epiphany‘ of the face.   The face of the Other is something that I cannot own and 
something that I cannot even understand completely.   From this, the face is the 
condition of thought, which is the beginning of moral consciousness.   It is necessary 
to emphasize the point, then, that face is the origin of moral consciousness rather 
than a moral law.   The moral law indicates a premise or principle about right and 
wrong and how things ‗ought‘ to be done according to this law.   However, in 
Levinas, what we have to deal with is not the truth but the appearance of the truth, 
though he doubts whether they are the same.
69
  If ‗truth is a progression‘ and ‗the 
manifestation of being‘ is the ‗primary event‘, then it is similar to Buber‘s opinion 
that ‗the primacy of the primary is the presence of the present‘. 70   Then, the 
signification of this process of signifying only is significant for the one who is 
incarnating in a diachronic development with a face as moral consciousness.   
Without this ‗who‘, the subjectivity cannot be constructed from the wholeness or the 
sameness. 
 
The moral consciousness of the face of the Other is prior to the understanding 
and constitution of it.   In other words, the importance of this moral consciousness is 
not to give us an answer about how to understand and constitute the faces when they 
encounter each other but to raise questions for us about the relationship between the 
subjectivities behind the faces.   If we consider this, then Levinas‘s concept of 
‗proximity‘ is prior to the moral consciousness, which entails the responsibility that 
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is born from moral consciousness as the infinite possibility in relationship.   Levinas 
regards this infinity of responsibility from face as the primordial expression, which is 
the first word: ‗you shall not commit murder‘, and the epiphany of the face shows the 
ethical resistance in the finitude of relationship. 
71
 
 
The limitation of phenomenology, as we mentioned above, lies in the fact that 
it shows the surplus of the infinity of the face of the Other.   This surplus or claim 
that the face of the Other, nonetheless, is directed towards ‗me‘, it makes its claim on 
‗me‘.   In the case of the discussion of the face, it is not a purely negative or passive 
reception but a positive or active acceptance.   This acceptance indicates a response 
that responds to the trace that the face leaves behind both in the forms of silence and 
address.   This response also indicates that ‗sentient being takes the place of the other 
without usurping that place‘.72  This is why Levinas, then, sets the face of the Other 
in a prior place, which is at the same time a humble way to reveal the concrete form 
of the Idea of the Good.
73
  Compared to Levinas‘s emphasis of what the face reveals 
in his early thought, he stresses the way the infinite responsible significance of one‘s 
own subjectivity towards the Other is both unlocked and revealed from the infinity of 
the face in his later thought.   This is why De Boer is correct to define and succinctly 
characterize this thought as a ‗philosophical anthropology of subjectivity‘.74 
 
The change from the ethical significance of the face to the responsible 
significance from the face results in Levinas‘s ability to surmount the traditionally 
hermeneutical fusion of horizons between the Same and the Other.
75
  The Other, who 
we either are willing to or have to face, is a person that calls me or orders me to face 
and to respond to his or her demand.   In this situation we are awakened to face this 
new relationship, rather than ‗know‘ and ‗understand‘ the relationship after we face 
it.   This ‗facing‘ the face allows Levinas to distinguish between two types of 
responsibility.   The first type refers to the self-consciousness of responsibility that is 
from the subjectivity of the self towards the objectivity of the Other, which 
fundamentally exists in the relationship with the Other; the second type refers to the 
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moral consciousness from responsibility that is from the face of the Other towards 
the subjectivity of my self, which is primarily to be inspired and fulfilled by the 
encounter to the Other.
76
 
 
So far, we have laid stress on the exploration of the ethical significance of the 
Face as a responsible response towards the face of the Other.   In the following 
section, we are going to discuss how this face can be responsibly related to language 
and how language indicates responsibility.   
 
 
SECTION TWO 
THE FACE AND LANGUAGE 
 
Although Levinas holds that language, in the form of dialogue, plays a central role in 
ethical thinking, he insists that the most essential thing in this thinking is not the 
dialogue itself but the condition of language itself.   When the other person 
approaches me, this person has been constituted into my consciousness at the same 
time.   This process involves both an overlapping and an outstretched retention 
between the difference of the identity of other person itself and my constitutive 
perception about this person.   This is a traditionally phenomenological way to 
interpret how a person understands the other person.   If we think about this process 
from Levinas‘s perspective, however, this traditional manner of defining (doing) 
phenomenology has to stop at this stage precisely because of the boundary between 
the self and the Other.   The existence of the Other cannot be constituted via my acts 
of outer-perceptual sense experiences.   Yet Husserl must maintain the constitution 
of the knowability of the existence of the other in my experiences because, for 
Husserl,  
 
nothing can exist if it is not dependent for its existence on the 
transcendental self.   This implies that the essences emerging as residues 
at the end of phenomenological and transcendental reduction as well as 
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bodies and other minds are existentially dependent upon the 
transcendental ego.
77
 
 
What Levinas intends to stress is the question how the transcendental Other can be 
approached not merely from the comprehension of this transcendental ego, but from 
the expression of the Other.   Levinas states that ‗Speaking implies a possibility of 
breaking off and beginning‘. 78   This is a beginning of the face-to-face relation 
because this speaking is speaking to an exterior subject who is independent from 
‗me‘, but one who is also, at the same time, a subject that ‗I‘ need to depend on in 
order to establish genuine communication.   Based on this presupposition, we need to 
rethink the question Levinas raises in Totality and Infinity: ‗Is not the presence of the 
Other already language and transcendence?‘79 Even though he already provides a 
very direct answer later in the same work: ‗It is the face; its revelation is speech.‘80 
But what is the meaning of his point that ‗face‘s revelation is speech‘ within the 
context of this question and answer?  To address this question we have to begin with 
what Levinas means by the Silence of the Face and its role in the ‗ethical order‘ of 
speaking, before it is constituted in  the order of daily use and theory.   Then, we can 
address two transitions both from ethics to dialogue and from dialogue to ethics, 
which show Levinas‘s structural explanation of language.   Based on this point, we 
will argue that ‗face‘ is the expression of language.   After this, we will further 
articulate the ethical significance of language with regard to the element of time, and 
also will specifically discuss the role of responsibility in two forms of speaking ‗the 
Saying‘ and ‗the Said‘.   In the last part of this section, we will discuss Levinas‘s two 
important concepts ‗proximity‘ and ‗substitution‘ in responsible relationship.    
 
§ 4.2.1 The Silence of Face and the Silence of Language 
 
The ‗face‘ is untouchable; it can be seen but cannot be seen through.   In this sense, 
‗face‘ is not an object that can be comprehended in a traditional way of 
understanding and interpretation.   In this sense, the ‗face‘ is also silent but its silence 
is not an absence of sound or the echo of a sound, rather the ‗silence‘ of the face 
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calls forth a response and hence is found in language.   In this regard, ‗language‘, as 
Levinas argues, ‗is perhaps to be defined as the very power to break the continuity of 
being or of history‘.81  The words are to be said in a form of language firstly to break 
the silence, and are opaque.   In Levinas‘s words ‗Speech cuts across vision.‘82  We 
argue that this does not mean that speech replaces the vision of the Other but speech 
is the expression of the command from the face of the Other.   This expression 
indicates two diachronical and parallel moments.   The first refers to the moment 
when the words are being said by the Other, which delivers not only the meaning of 
those words but the way that the Other organizes this words and the ethical 
significance of them in a responsible way.   The second refers to the moment when 
the ‗I‘ listens to these words, and who not only understands the meaning of these 
words but also the way that the I interprets these words and the ethical significance 
of them in a responsible way.   Both these two moments are embodied responsibility, 
which is a two-way transcendental ‗revelation‘ of language.   This is the meaning of 
the pre-linguistic, or of ‗silence‘ in Levinas‘s words.   Here is where Levinas 
discovers the phenomenological origin of ethics, for, here ‗the expression of the face 
calls the subject into the relationship determined by responsibility, so that the 
relationship is itself the very institution of ethics.‘83 
 
§ 4.2.2  The Face is the Beginning of Language: Levinas's Structural Explanation of Language 
 
The general or basic function of language is to express and understand information 
and ideas via various linguistic systems.   In a practical, or operational sense, there is 
no difference between the positions of all the interlocutors who are using language in 
a conversation.   This practical presupposition, however, is, in fact, also an ideal 
situation because we are talking with one or some ‗specific‘ persons, but not to a 
person or a group of persons who are just a duplication of one another and have the 
same faces.   
 
In our discussion, as Levinas argues throughout his works, the role of the 
Other in the analysis of language is essential because we have something to say, for 
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the Other.
84
  If, as we have discussed, the face is the first word, the first boundary as 
well as the first possibility to approach the Other, then, ‗Levinas‘s explanation [of 
the relation between face and language] is structural rather than causal‘.85  
 
In Entre Nous, Levinas states that ‗The interlocutor does not always face me. 
Pure language emerges from a relation in which the other person plays the role of a 
third party.‘86  This statement indicates at least three facts that are easily ignored: 
first, language is not only the words that are being spoken, it also reveals the person 
who is organizing these words; second, language is not only being organized by a 
‗specific‘ person, it also records the ‗trace‘ of this person, when he or she is not 
present; third, there would be a third person or party who receives and examines 
these ‗traces‘ left by the former interlocutors. 
 
Therefore, the analysis of language, with regards to the ‗face‘, is not in the 
sense as ethnology, psychoanalysis, sociology, or even linguistics; it is, rather, a new 
approach that can explore the originality of the expression of the ethical significance 
of the ‗Face‘ without the necessity of the presence of the ‗face‘ itself and without 
attaching the value that is not owned by the face of this subject.   In the meanwhile, 
language, as verbal sign, reveals the subject as a signifier who delivers genuine 
information and ideas to the Other as a sign receiver and examiner to receive the 
meaning of this sign and interpret it, though it is not possible to interpret 
completely.
87
  
 
As regards to the role of examiner, there are various approaches to examine 
the expression from the ‗face‘. In the Kantian sense, this examiner deals with an 
incomplete interpretation with this receiver‘s reason ‗completely‘.   In the 
Heideggerian sense, this examiner deals with an incomplete interpretation from the 
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views of Being, which also provides complete hermeneutical significance for beings. 
In the Hegelian sense, as well as in the Cartesian sense, this examiner combines 
absolute spirit with infinite consciousness to limit or encompass all relations.
88
 
 
All of the above approaches to the examination of the expression of the face, 
for Levinas, would be a totalitarian or an absolute form of conversation that unfolds 
from within both a limitation and a possibility of man‘s constitution by his 
consciousness and spirit.   By distinction, Levinas maintains, ‗(A)bsolute experience 
is not disclosure; to disclose, on the basis of a subjective horizon, is already to miss 
the noumenon.‘89   What Levinas stresses is the role of face that can orient our 
attention outside of our intentional consciousness in order to find out the original 
relation with exterior being.   Nevertheless, the orientation of the ‗face‘ as a 
‗revelation‘ will not force the other to accept it but shed lights upon it.  
 
In contrast, Levinas explains how the vision functions in a relation with 
‗things‘ in Totality and Infinity, 
 
As Plato noted, besides the eye and the thing, vision presupposes the 
light. The eye does not see the light, but the object in the light. Vision is 
therefore a relation with a ‗something‘ established with a relation with 
what is not a ‗something‘. […] The light makes the thing appear by 
driving out the shadows; it empties spaces.
90
 
 
From Levinas‘s analysis of vision, vision itself is ‗not a transcendence but a 
signification by the relation that makes it possible.‘91  When we see something, we 
are already in the relationship with this something at a distance.   Even though the 
light ‗empties‘ this distance and reminds the people whose vision is on the horizon of 
this vision,
92
 one still cannot truly see through this horizon.   Apart from this 
difficulty, however, there are other essential problems as we have mentioned above: 
is there still any ethical significance when the object of our seeing is no longer 
present? What is it to have an ethical significance when the object is absent? Would 
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this absent one play the role of a ‗third party‘ in our ethical considerations? We will 
argue that Levinas‘s structural explanation of language intends to resolve these 
problems. 
 
Levinas‘s proposal about the structural explanation of language from the ‗face‘ 
that we are considering provides a new perspective to rethink these questions.   This 
structural explanation is not a description of what we see, or the structure of our 
seeing, but the openness of this structure, or the development of this structure from 
the origin.   In other words, it refers to how the ethical significance of the face can be 
transformed into a new expressive form of language.   Levinas presents it in this 
way: 
 
the idea of infinity in consciousness is an overflowing of a consciousness 
whose incarnation offers new powers to a soul no longer paralytic – 
powers of welcome, of gift, of full hands, of hospitality. […] The word is 
a window; if it forms a screen, it must be rejected.
93
 
 
It is clear that, for Levinas, the structural explanation of language is both a 
transcendental and an intellectual one which clarifies the ethical correlation between 
language and ‗face‘.   This explanation is the beginning of a journey of exploring the 
development of the use of language, but not the destination of this journey, which is 
to describe the genuine ethical attitudes and explore the true responsibility when we 
face (ethical) exigencies.   Levinas asks the question ‗what is to have a meaning‘ and 
provides the answer as ‗meaning is the face of the Other‘.94  
 
Levinas‘s question and answer is not a tautological language game about the 
concept of the Other.   He further stresses the priority of the analysis of the 
‗meaning‘ in the relationship between language and face.   In the daily and practical 
sense, language plays a very important role in communication between people.   
There is, however, a primary signification of language prior to the instrumental use 
of language.   For Levinas, this primary signification depends on the primordial face-
to-face relationship.   Therefore, we have shown that this structural explanation of 
language in Levinas focuses on the role of ‗priority‘ in the tension between man‘s 
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dual attributes: the finite and the infinite.   This priority is embodied in language as a 
‗gesture of behaviour‘.95 This ‗gesture of behaviour‘ for Levinas indicates what is 
essential in language: ‗the coinciding of the revealer and the revealed in the face […] 
gestures and acts produced can become, like words, a revelation‘.96 
 
If this revelation is derived from the gestures and acts which indicate what is 
essential in language, then we can argue that the tension of man‘s finite and infinite 
dimensions is precisely embodied in this revelation from the face of the Other. 
Furthermore, combined with Levinas‘s idea of ‗language as the presence of the 
face‘,97 we can conclude that the priority of the face of the Other in the structural 
explanation of language points to a possible solution for solving the tension of man‘s 
finite and infinite dimension by revealing language as justice.   
 
This structural explanation of language indicates two situations when we 
consider Levinas‘s discussion of third party (illeity) as the Otherness of the other, in 
terms of both the presence and the absence of the face.   ‗Face‘ itself is not only a 
part of the body of a person, but also an indication of this person as a whole.   When 
the face of a person is absent physically, then, the trace of the face in the form of 
language is still present.   This is why Levinas again emphasizes in his Difficult 
Freedom that ‗the expression of the face is language‘.98 
 
§ 4.2.3  Face as an Ethical Expression of Language 
 
In the previous section, we have clarified the meaning of the structural explanation of 
language and the role of ‗face‘ in this structural explanation.   This clarification is a 
necessary step for us to set out the perspective for our consideration of language and 
is an important preparation in order to locate the concept of face with regard to this 
consideration.    
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In a previous section (§ 4.1.5), we discussed separation as the way of letting the other 
become the other via the face as exteriority.   Based on this, desire measures infinity 
as the face of the Other.   In the preceding section (§ 4.2.2), we noted that language 
cannot ‗touch‘ the physical face but can ‗reach‘ the infinity of the face of the Other 
because, in Levinas, the ‗face to face‘ approach in conversation is justice.99  In what 
follows, then, we are going to explore in detail the ways in which face can be an 
ethical expression of language. 
 
For Levinas, language is not a tool to express or repeat thought (or ideal 
meanings, as in Husserl), but bears witness in the form of a verbal system.
100
 And it 
is this attribute of bearing witness which requires the structural explanation of 
language, rather than the descriptive language of phenomenology and existential 
ontology, that Levinas wishes to draw our attention to.   In Levinas‘s words,  
 
The discourse is therefore not the unfolding of a prefabricated internal 
logic, but the constitution of truth in a struggle between thinkers, with all 
the risks of freedom. The relationship of language implies transcendence, 
radical separation, the strangeness of the interlocutors, the revelation of 
the other to me.
101
 
 
There is a dynamic formalization of language when discourse happens in a face-to-
face situation between interlocutors, rather than a generalization or conceptualization 
of language as the condition forced upon the other interlocutor.  This dynamic 
formalization of language is ‗a manifesting of the signifier, the issuer of the sign‘102 
because it draws in ‗the face that looks at me [which] introduces the primary 
frankness of revelation.  In function of the word the world is oriented, that is, takes 
on signification‘.103 
 
This formalization does not refer to the process of our thinking in a linguistic 
formula.  Rather, it emphasizes the ethical order of each linguistic symbol in this 
formula when we are thinking.   In other words, even though we have confirmed that 
Levinas intends to use phenomenological approach to explore the ethical significance 
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of the face, he also needs to reconsider the basic suppositions of phenomenological 
linguistic philosophy altogether.
104
 
 
De Boer stresses that ‗Levinas‘s philosophy of language reveals a depth-
dimension of language‘.105  This depth-dimension of language refers to the first or 
primordial signification in all genuine communication, which indicates the reason 
why Levinas defines it as ‗First Philosophy‘. The ‗first‘ does not only refer to the 
‗first place‘ of the importance of ethics in intellectual thinking, but also points out 
the ‗first word‘ and ‗first event‘ of human beings. For Levinas, the ‗first word‘ is 
obligation or responsibility and the ‗first event‘ is the face-to-face encounter. We can 
use Levinas‘s articulation of speaking and hearing to clarify this ‗first word‘ and 
‗first event‘. He writes, 
 
Speaking and hearing become one rather than succeed one another. 
Speaking therefore institutes the moral relationship of equality and 
consequently recognizes justice. […] What one says, the content 
communicated, is possible only thanks to this face-to-face relationship in 
which the Other counts as an interlocutor prior even to be being known.
106
 
 
The first event is the word that is being spoken to the other people when he is also 
hearing this word, which is a face-to-face relationship that entails a genuine 
communication. In other words, the face as the pre-linguistically ethical order 
indicated in the first event already conditions the conversation with the other before 
we speak the first word. 
 
The face, then, is better understood as an ethical order that conditions the 
ethical expression of language. It is also, therefore, a perspective that contrasts the 
traditional phenomenological approach because within this presupposition, ‗language 
is not enacted within consciousness; it comes to me from the Other and reverberates 
in consciousness by putting it in question.‘107 Language, in this sense, does not focus 
on the constitutive and instrumental features but on the level of its ‗incarnate‘ 
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essence: the incarnation from ethical relationship to the ethical significance of 
language. 
 
§ 4.2.4 Ethical Significance of Language (The Said and The Saying, History/ Time) 
 
‗Face‘, considered as an ethical expression of language, recalls the importance of the 
‗who‘ question and points out the inadequacy of the ‗what‘ question.   The ‗what‘ 
question corresponds to Descartes‘ paradigm of the ‗subject-object‘, to Kant‘s 
paradigm of ‗phenomena-noumena‘, to Husserl‘s paradigm of ‗noesis-noema‘, as 
well as to Heidegger‘s paradigm of ‗beings-Being‘.   Although the emphases and the 
approaches of all these paradigms are not the same, there is still a common 
characteristic of them: the relation between those two poles is supposed in a 
coexisting situation.   Husserl and Heidegger take the element of time into 
consideration when they reflect upon this relation, especially in human relationships, 
which is the most striking difference with Descartes‘ and Kant‘s approaches.108  
 
Though Kant discusses the nature of time in the ―Transcendental Aesthetic‖ 
of his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), his basic purpose, nevertheless, is to illustrate 
the relationship between time and human experience, especially in the form of the 
inner sense that constitutes the object via its appearance, as well as with his 
discussion of space.   Kant‘s discussion on time, either in the way of ‗empirical 
reality‘ or ‗transcendental ideality‘, therefore, focuses indeed on the a priori 
structure of time.   His consideration of time, however, is in the form of 
representation of time in our consciousness and it is difficult to detect an ethical 
concern in his discussion with regards to this a priori structure of time.   Levinas 
notes that, ‗(T)he flow of time in which, according to the Kantian schema, the world 
is constituted [is] without origin.‘109 
 
Husserl‘s discussion on time, especially time consciousness, is related to his 
consideration of inter-subjectivity.   He deliberates this topic in his On the 
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Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1928).
110
  He puts forwards 
three concepts to identify different aspects of time: retention, which is an immediate 
memory; original impression, which is the awareness of perception; protention, 
which is an immediate anticipation.  For Husserl, this is the structure of the 
consciousness of internal time and when these three aspects are constantly 
constituted as past, present, and future, the experience of time would be conscious of 
and play important role in the relationship of inter-subjectivity.  Husserl‘s analysis of 
time, however, has not been applied in detail to his articulation of empathy, inter-
subjectivity and life-world.  Thus, the ethical significance in Husserl‘s consideration 
of time is insufficient, though it indeed paves an important way for Levinas‘s 
deliberation on this topic. 
 
Heidegger‘s discussion on time has been discussed in chapter three, which is 
related to his consideration of Dasein.  As mentioned previously, Heidegger 
articulates time in ontic mode and in an ontological mode of temporality.
111
 The 
‗Mineness‘ is a distinctive feature of Dasein, which is determined by death. Death 
defines our facticity as an ‗a priori past‘ which decides our original structure of time 
in the form of past, present and future within the context of Being.  The examination 
on time in Heidegger, however, is derived from the self-centred sameness of each 
individual Dasein and lacks any reference to socio-ethical concerns.  Thus, at best, 
Heidegger‘s phenomenological ontology can only lead to the utilitarian present in 
synchrony.  The present speaking or the mode of ‗saying‘ of the ‗I am a being-for-
my-own-death‘ is related to the self-understanding of Dasein in a ‗dialogue‘ with 
itself, and thus is really a ‗monologue‘ which ignores the diachronically other-
oriented ‗saying‘ in an ethical relationship. 
 
                                                 
110
 Though published later in 1928, and edited by Heidegger (with the major help of Edith Stein), 
these reflections date back to Husserl‘s earlier lecture-course in 1905 on immanent time-
consciousness. For Husserl, the abilty to reflect upon one‘s own experiences presupposes a time 
dimension to one‘s own consciousness in terms of being extended into the future and into the past, in 
the present. His ideas are similar to Augustine‘s but Husserl subscribes to the Brentanean-Lockean-
Humean view that acess to consciousness is particular direct and certain compared to any thing else. 
Thus Augustine‘s reflections on the temporality of the self in relation to the eternity of the mode of 
being of God (as the Asbsolutely other) does not feature in Husserl‘s elaboration of and version of 
post-Kantinan transcendental phenomenology. 
111
 See, Chapter III of this study. 
 176 
We have briefly reviewed and discussed the problem of time from three 
important perspectives, which illustrate the necessity to re-think the concept of time 
both in ethical relationship and in the form of language that entails this relationship. 
In an ethical relationship, especially a responsible one, ‗our relation and my 
responsibility depend on your becoming present to me as yourself, and in a way I can 
understand.‘112  Bloechl‘s description stresses the role of language in the ethical 
relationship as a response to another person in the forms of ‗the Saying‘ [le Dire] and 
‗the Said‘ [le Dit] in Levinas.   Saying refers to the foundational form of speech, 
discourse and communication, and which is not the act of speaking itself but ‗the 
encounter of two utterly unique persons‘. 113   The Said refers to the everyday 
language, which is preceded by ‗the Saying‘.114  In other words, the Said is the 
record and testimony of the Saying. For Bloechl, ‗the Saying animates that 
established order, or Said‘ and ‗Saying, then requires the Said, even if the Said can 
never satisfy or contain it.‘115  Thus another perspective to explain the ethical order 
of language, one that is not understood in terms of a synchrony but rooted in the 
concrete forms of diachrony that is operative in  the distinction of ‗Saying‘ and 
‗Saying‘ is needed and specifically put forward in Levinas‘s Otherwise than Being.  
 
§ 4.2.5 Ethical Significance of Time in Language 
 
In contrast to the stress of the past in the traditional views of time, Levinas 
emphasizes our anticipation of the future because ‗the ―relationship with the other‖ is 
the ―relationship with the future‖‘.116  The reason why he is concerned with the 
future, rather than with the past, is because of people‘s inner desire and requirement 
of the responsible relationship.   Levinas adopts Rosenzweig‘s view of time rather 
than Kant‘s, Husserl‘s and Heidegger‘s.  According to Rosenzweig, in Michael 
Morgan‘s interpretation: 
 
our experience of the past refers to ‗the religious consciousness of 
creation‘; our experience of the present refers to our ‗listening to and 
receiving revelation‘; our experience of the future refers to our ‗hope of 
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redemption‘. These three religious ideas become ‗conditions of 
temporality itself‘.117 
 
We agree with Morgan‘s argument that Levinas‘s contribution to the discussion of 
time lies in the fact that he goes beyond Heidegger‘s ‗immanent centres of meaning‘ 
and attempts to reach ‗the transcendence of the immanence‘.118  This consideration 
cannot be carried out completely without also involving a discussion of diachronical 
time. 
 
To live in the present refers to an integral attitude that diachronically 
connects both the past and the future in the subject who is aware of this connection. 
In Husserl‘s phenomenology of immanent or internal time consciousness, the past 
can be rememberable and even recoverable in the retention.   In Husserl‘s case, the 
subject is also conscious of the connection between the past and the present but the 
explanation of this past is represented and constituted by the subject.   A question 
concerning the concept of time that Levinas analyzes in Otherwise than Being is how 
the past finds its proper position in the present.   In other words, this inquiry is about 
how to balance the consideration of the past and the present.   For Levinas, the past 
directly and indirectly affects the present but the past indeed passes, the past that 
renders itself in the present is not the past itself.   To justify the position of the past in 
the present is a difficult but necessary responsibility.   
 
This is a preparatory step for the following discussion on ‗alterity‘ and 
‗proximity‘, both of which will be discussed with regards to time in the articulation 
of its ethical significance in language.   The original meaning of ‗alterity‘ is the state 
of being other or different, i.e., otherness.  The past is my past and when I recall this 
past, it is not the past itself but a trace of past in my memory or the ‗otherness‘ of the 
past.   The past itself is immemorial but we have to encounter the otherness of the 
past, face the Other with the past, and respond to the past of the Other.   This 
immemorial past escapes from retention but only can be found in the trace of the face 
of the Other.   Proximity, for Levinas, then, is the ground of interpersonal contact, 
which is also the ability to give an immediate response.   This immediacy does not 
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refers to how close the spatial, or the mental distance between two persons is, but 
stresses how one person can essentially approach the other as the other feels himself 
or herself but, at the same time, keeps the difference between these two people in the 
diachronical time.   Levinas writes, ‗proximity is a disturbance of the rememberable 
time,‘ and so, it is also a pre-original reason that is prior to the self-consciousness of 
one‘s identity.119 
 
Levinas‘s aim, therefore, is not to analyze time in human experience and 
consciousness as Husserl did but to explore how to treat or evaluate justly all 
aspectes related to time.   This justice requires an in-depth responsible consideration 
towards oneself and one‘s relationship with the others, both in an individual and in a 
social sense.   Levinas writes: 
 
The past of the other is, in a sense, the history of humanity in which I 
have never participated, in which I have never been present, is my past.   
As for the future [..., it] is the time of pro-phecy, which is also an 
imperative, a moral order, herald of an inspiration. [...] a future that is not 
a simple to-come [a-venir].
120
 
 
Levinas explains the essence of the diachrony of time and its internal relationship 
within a moral order: we always already have been responsible but not coming to be 
responsible.
121
  In other words, to be responsible is an a priori condition of human 
existence rather than an a posteriori consitution of human being. 
 
Therefore, for Levinas, the genuine retaining is not of one‘s memories or 
reminiscences, but the moment when the memory is brought into the present and 
altered by our difference to the other within our identity.
122
 In other words, in the 
proximity of contact and following the detection of alterity, we will be conscious of 
the tension of one‘s freedom and responsibility when we need to respond to the 
Other. Without considering the proximity of the Other, my consciousness of time, 
which constrains my memory, would reduce my relationship with the Other, or the 
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encounter with the Other, into a projection of my apperception.  In this case, there 
would not be a signified response but a self-rightous reaction to the Other. 
 
In order to clarify the structure of the ethical significance of time and to stress 
its diachronical structure, Levinas in Otherwise than Being explains the relationship 
between time and language, and their roles in  ethical events. For Levinas, 
 
The verb understood as a noun designating an event, when applied to the 
temporalization of time, would make it resound as an event, whereas 
every event already presupposes time.
123
 
 
The verb, in contrast to the nature and characteristic of the noun, shows the flowing 
of time and the content within this flowing.  When the event is finished and is 
recorded with words, this event become a noun, a historical noun, which is kept in 
the retention of man‘s consciousness.  
 
From this perspective, we can say that being, especially human being, should 
in fact be a ‗verb‘ rather than a ‗noun‘ because human being is always coming to 
be.
124
  Language, at the first level, is the description of this forming and ‗making 
being understood‘, however, in the second level, is ‗the verbalness of a verb‘ which 
‗makes its essence vibrate‘.125  The meaning of the verb is not given when the action 
of this verbalness becomes the past but is given along with this action.  If we apply 
this idea into language, then the meaning of our speaking lies in the ‗Saying‘ and the 
‗Said‘ is prior to, but also consists of, the ‗Saying‘.   A verb designates a ‗nomen 
actionis‘, and the name of the action that Levinas is idntifiying is a ‗saying‘. 
 
In sum, therefore, when we speak to a person, we are in a face-to-face 
relationship that requires the consideration of the role of time in our speaking 
because in the course of the ‗verb-noun‘ formation, the ethical order of language is 
founded.  
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§ 4.2.6   Responsibility in the Saying and the Said 
 
In this part, we will move on to the discussion of two forms of language namely, ‗the 
Saying‘ and ‗the Said‘, which indicate the ethical significance of time in language. 
 
For Levinas, language operates in the form of ‗saying‘ and ‗said‘: ‗the saying 
bore this said, but goes further, was absorbed and died in the said, [which] was 
inscribed.‘126  The words here that Levinas uses are dense and opaque and need to be 
explained.   The said, in Levinas, is not equal to ‗a sign of a meaning, nor even only 
an expression of a meaning‘.127  It contains more than that. Also, Levinas argues, 
‗The birthplace of ontology is in the said.‘128  All ‗talk of being‘ (ontology) takes its 
cue from the said.  Thus the said synthesizes the past as time or history, as well as the 
self as the past subjectivity, and also the language as a reconstitution that is prior to 
consciousness and also constitutes consciousness. 
 
Thus, we argue that the said-saying paradigm can be regarded as a diachronical 
synthesis of the process of the verbalness of the verb, which absorbs the saying into 
itself on the one hand, but has gone beyond the saying, on the other hand, when this 
said is faced and anticipated towards the future.   In other words, there is not an 
essence, even in the temporalized moment as Heidegger states, in this process except 
the ‗alter change‘ in continuous time.   If the said is the birthplace of ontology, then 
the saying is the birthplace of ethics and responsible relationship.   Levinas writes,  
 
The responsibility for another is precisely a saying prior to anything said. 
[…] the saying is both an affirmation and a retraction of the said. […] To 
enter into being and truth is to enter into the said; being is inseparable 
from its meaning! It is spoken. It is in the logos. But the reduction is 
reduction of the said to the saying beyond the logos, beyond being and 
non-being, beyond essence, beyond true and non-true. It is the reduction 
to signification, to the one-for-the-other involved in responsibility (or 
more exactly in substitution), to the locus or non-lieu, locus and non-lieu, 
the utopia, of the human.
129
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This long quotation shows both the difference and the relationship between ‗saying‘ 
and ‗said‘ in the ontological sense and in the ethical, or responsible sense.   When I 
am speaking to the other, I am already separating myself from this other; but, at the 
same time, I am intending to approach this other in order to establish a platform for 
communication.   The saying signifies the said as the way that the subject organizes 
one‘s language to the other.   Thus, when we are speaking in the face-to-face 
relationship, the signification from the saying-said correlation shows the proximity 
between interlocutors.   Levinas stresses, 
 
Proximity is quite distinct from every other relationship, and has to be 
conceived as a responsibility for the other; it might be called humanity, or 
subjectivity, or self.
130
 
 
Levinas intends to distinguish his thoughts of subjectivity from Husserl‘s subject-
object structure for the reason that Husserl sets out the role of language in the form 
of a thematization within the context of noesis-noema paradigm.   Levinas raises the 
concept of ‗trace‘ as the human face to argue against the subject-object systematic 
structure.   
 
The concept of ‗trace‘ contains two meanings: the first is the trace of human 
face as we have discussed at the beginning of this chapter; another is the trace of 
language, which is closely related to the first one as well.   In other words, the trace 
of language realizes the trace of human face by an other-oriented self-expression.   
To detect the trace of human face is ‗to catch sight of an extreme passivity‘in the 
relationship with the Other;
131
  to track down the trace of language is to listen to the 
saying as ‗the extreme passivity of the exposure to another‘.132  In this case, silence 
is also a response, but a response in a waiting situation. From this, Levinas‘s 
articulation of language goes beyond the philosophy of dialogue, or it should be 
called ‗dialogue-before-the-dialogue‘.133  The ethical significance of this linguistic 
structure, or the ethical order of language, refers to ‗the exploitation of language – 
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‗responsibility-before-freedom‘.134  In Totality and Infinity, Levinas already explains 
this structure clearly. 
 
This bond between expression and responsibility, this ethical condition or 
essence of language, this function of language prior to all disclosure of 
being and its cold splendour, permits us to extract language from 
subjection to a preexistent thought, where it would have but the servile 
function of translating that preexistent thought on the outside, or of 
universalizing its interior movements.
135
 
 
From this, language is not the beginning of our expression, but the struggle with the 
thinking that lies before we express, which also would be composed of comparison 
and judgment.   Levinas deepens the discussion by arguing that the ethical order not 
only would be considered in the situation of I and You but also when the evaluation 
of the third party (what he terms, ‗Illeité from the Latin, ille, meaning, ‗he‘) comes 
into the process of comparison and judgment.   This consideration is no longer in the 
semantic sense of how language practically works but in the moral sense of how 
people ethically judge.
136
 
 
In order to judge ethically, saying plays an important role in the course of my 
approach to the other.   In other words, saying is ‗the proximity of one to the other, 
the commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the very signifyingness of 
signification.‘ 137   When the proximity is realized in this context of pre-original 
language, substitution is another aspect to carry out the saying-said paradigm in 
responsible relationship.   Substitution within the context of saying-said paradigm 
does not refer to the replacement of the other person or thing, but the passivity of 
alterity.   When I am speaking to the other person, the words I am using are the 
manifestation of my ethical concern for this person, if we are in a responsible 
relationship.   The saying is manifesting the said and the said is delivering silently in 
the saying when we approach the other and stand in the place of this other 
substitutionally.   We argue that this is also a ‗for-structure‘ like Bonhoeffer‘s ‗pro-
me‘ structure.   Levinas elaborates in God, Death, and Time, 
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What we are seeking here is a signification that is prior to, and 
independent of, every content and every communication of contents, and 
that can be fixed by the term ‗Saying‘ as a ‗Saying to another, as the one-
for-the-other. The ‗for‘ is what we must consider; it has a meaning 
different from what it would have at the thematizable level of ontology.
138
 
 
This ‗for structure‘ answers the ‗who question‘ which we asked at the beginning of 
this chapter.   When we speak, we speak to the other but, at the same time, speak 
‗for‘ this specific person.   The ‗for‘ is bearing witness to my openness towards the 
openness of the other in the saying.   Heidegger also argues that man‘s response is to 
the other being in the Ereignis (an event).   Heidegger, however, stresses the 
passivity of man‘s response in his or her own finitude, while Levinas emphasizes the 
passivity of man‘s response in the infinite towards the other.   Thus, in Levinas‘s 
thought, the saying shows double-levels of passivity: the passivity for the other and 
the passivity for the infinite.   Levinas repeats, ‗this passivity of passivity, this 
dedication to the other, is a sincerity, and this sincerity is Saying.‘139  Thus, the 
passivity of the ‗for structure‘ prevents the violence of occupying someone else‘s 
place but, at the same time, keeps the openness of responsibility in the origin of 
language as ethics. In Levinas‘s words, ‗the overemphasis of openness is 
responsibility for the other to the point of substitution, where the for-the-other proper 
to disclosure, to monstration to the other, turns into the for-the-other proper to 
responsibility.‘140 
 
From this, we argue that the significance of responsibility in the saying-said 
paradigm is not to provide a standard or principle of the concept of responsibility, or 
a hermeneutics of responsibility, but to find out ‗who is a responsible person‘, 
especially in the saying of this person.   It is not to know and understand firstly ‗what 
responsibility is‘, and then to be a responsible person, but to be a responsible person, 
then genuine responsibility would be found and understood by oneself and other 
people.   Responsibility, therefore, is not situational and relativistic even though the 
manifestations of responsibility are always changing.   Thus, in Levinas, the subject 
of saying who shows the pre-linguistic system as the order of morality is the sign of 
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responsibility within the context of the changing plots or settings but not the one who 
establishes this sign according to different situations and environments.    
 
Thus, the saying-said paradigm is an openness or exposure that constitutes the 
infinite of the subjectivity in the ‗for structure‘, and the subjectivity finds its ethical 
expression in the saying-said paradigm in responsibility.   As one commentatoar puts 
it, ‗the diachrony of personhood repeated itself in the diachrony of language‘, which 
is the structure of both ethics and linguistics.
141
  Ward also clearly concludes the 
relationship between this paradigm and responsibility from Levinas‘s Otherwise than 
Being, remarking, 
 
According to Levinas, a Saying [le Dire] prior to any said; a signification 
in the responsibility one-for-another that is prior to the signifier/signified 
schema of discourse; a Saying prior to transcendental subjectivity and 
therefore outside representation and ontology.
142
 
 
Thus it is not to only understand what is said, but to understand the speaker who is 
saying as a subjectivity and also the trace of the infinity from this saying.   This is the 
reason why we repeat that language in the forms of ‗the said‘ and ‗the saying‘ as the 
trace of the infinity is the condition for the in-depth dimension of ethics by 
participating in the difference.   This participation, at present, shows the ‗trace‘ of 
saying in the said and out of this participation, the responsibility is justified.   
 
§ 4.2.7  Proximity and Substitution in Responsible Discourse/ Relationship 
 
The carrying out of the saying-said paradigm implies two necessary aspects as we 
already mentioned above: proximity and substitution.   We can move on to discuss 
how these two aspects achieve responsibility in a deeper sense. 
 
Proximity is the beginning of the alterity after the separation is realized by 
the approach of the face of the Other as we analyzed in the first section of this 
chapter.
143
  Alterity would be achieved by the effectuation of proximity and 
substitution in the relationship with the other.  Speaking in the form of 
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communication needs proximity but it is not a mode of communication, not even part 
of it but the condition of it in order to keep the ‗absolute singularity‘ of the 
interlocutors in this communication.  This ‗absolute singularity‘ is the result of the 
radical separation, which leads to a situation of ‗absence‘ as proximity. Levinas 
holds that ‗caress is the unity of approach and proximity.  In it proximity is always 
also an absence. […] Proximity is not a simple coexistence and rest.‘144  We will 
argue that this absence is precisely the presence of infinity in the relationship with 
the Other because the presence of infinity is in the diachronical future which is to be 
concretized by the ethical relationship of ‗absolute singularity‘. 
 
In Levinas‘s words, ‗the proximity of the other is signifying of the face‘.145 
That is to say, the invisible morality is revealed via the proximity of facing with the 
Other.  When we approach the face of the Other, the presence of the face is the 
presence of infinity, which is absent from my existing or my preceding 
consciousness and reason as passivity.  We find corresponding statements in 
Levinas‘s Otherwise than Being, where he points out, 
 
It is perhaps here [negative quantity as passivity], in this reference to a 
depth of anarchical passivity, that the thought that names creation differs 
from ontological thought. […] It is not here a question of justifying the 
theological context of ontological thought. […] for the word creation 
designates a signification older than the context woven about this 
name.
146
 
 
Here, Levinas stresses the concept of ‗creation‘ in three meanings.  Firstly, the 
concept of creation indicates the negative quantity as passivity of the origin of 
human relationship; secondly, it also refers to the passive feature of proximity in the 
human relationship; thirdly, the signification of the creation points to the pre-original 
foundation of language and human being‘s understanding about this pre-linguistic 
ethical significance in human relationship as well as in all kinds of human written 
works, which is an important condition for human understanding and interpretation. 
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Corresponding to and following from proximity, substitution is another 
important aspect in order to explore responsibility.  The basic meaning of 
substitution is to replace someone or something with another person or thing.  In 
Levinas, however, it does not refer to the appropriateness of the replacement between 
persons or things, but to whether one person is aware of and then acts in respect of 
the other people‘s integrated existence and his or her need according to this 
awareness, or not.  Thus, if proximity stresses the necessary closeness in a 
relationship, then substitution emphasizes the openness in this closeness. 
 
For Levinas, substitution is derived from the sensibility of the subject‘s 
subjectivity.
147
 Substitution in the saying requires the presupposition of responsibility 
because it needs justification of the order of the said, which is entailed in the order of 
ethical signification.  In the history of Western philosophy, there are many 
approaches to dealing with ethical significance of human relationships, such as, for 
instance, Hegel, who reduces human relationships into the subject and object of 
thought or absolute essence in his Phenomenology of Mind.  Heidegger‘s analysis of 
Dasein implies the problem of substitution by bringing about the projection and 
objectification of other people as another Dasein who shares the same Da (there) in 
the world.  The process of projection and objectification concentrates on the 
sameness and integrates this sameness into mineness. Thus, in Heidegger‘s case, he 
reduces every being into the essence of Being. 
 
In contrast, Levinas uses substitution rather than reduction in order to avoid the 
reduction as a violence to a relationship.  He states,  
 
Irreducible to being‘s essence is the substitution in responsibility, 
signification or the one-for-another, or the defecting of the ego beyond 
every defeat, going countercurrent to a conatus, or goodness.
148
 
 
Therefore, we could conclude that substitution indicates the fact that to live is not to 
live as an existent or a being (concerned about one‘s own manner of being) but to 
live in the ethical significance of this other existent or being.  Only by means of this 
signification, which is entailed in substitution, can responsibility be achieved by 
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putting oneself in the place of another.  From this, ‗speech and its logical work 
would then unfold not in knowledge of the interlocutor, but in his proximity […] 
proximity is by itself a signification.‘149 In other words, proximity and substitution 
pave the way for the order of ethical significance in the formulation of language. 
 
Proximity and substitution in Levinas can be regarded as a primal humanity, 
or in De Boer‘s words, an ‗original ethical situation of human beings, of the 
condition humaine‘,150 and thus reveals the most foundational human relationship, 
which is prior to consciousness, understanding and knowledge.  This is the origin of 
the relationship that is also prior to the identification of the difference of individual 
and collective as well as of singularity and universality.  The proximity and 
substitution bring about the ethical ‗we‘ in face-to-face relationship, which ensure 
from the responsibility of the Other and for the Other.  In other words, ‗in the 
proximity of the face, the subservience of obedience precedes the hearing of the 
order‘.151 And substitution can be regarded as the ethical dynamism of a humane 
society,
152
 which refers to someone who makes the fate of the Other his own.
153
  
 
 
From this analysis of proximity and substitution, we can see that 
responsibility as an ethical signification in human relationship and in human pre-
linguistic construction is ‗an obedience to the absolute order‘.154 There are, of course, 
diverse manifestations of this absolute order especially in ethical, religious, and 
political issues, and so forth, but the one that Levinas identifies is this pre-original 
and inspired order that both determines and yet distinguishes itself from the 
constituted order of ethical, religious, and political norms or principles.  In Levinas‘s 
words, ‗responsibility for the other man is ordered […which] is a commandment 
ordering responsibility for the other.‘155 
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The human being is responsible for not only following the Good but also for 
gross inhumanity to each other.  Man‘s inhumanity to man is a fact of life, and if 
ignored by any philosophy that proposes to examine the meaning of human 
existence, such as Heidegger professes in his early philosophy, has seriously 
implications for the ethical status of such philosophy.   Suffering is not avoided by 
Levinas.  Levinas, in fact, intensively articulates the concept of ‗suffering‘ in his 
essay ‗useless suffering‘.156 It is of importance, then, to examine the relationship of 
suffering not only to proximity and substitution but also to responsibility. 
 
Suffering, in a general sense, refers to ‗a datum in consciousness‘ and ‗a 
certain psychological content‘, which is similar to ‗the lived experience of color, 
sound, contact, or any other sensation‘. 157   In Levinas, however, suffering is 
precisely passivity that is ‗more profoundly passive than the receptivity of our sense, 
which is already active reception, immediately becoming perception‘.158  In other 
words, suffering as a passivity is no longer a painful experience but a lasting ordeal 
which goes beyond the self-consciousness of pain.  Thus, what Levinas emphasizes 
in the suffering of the suffering of the other is that, 
 
the suffering for the useless suffering of the other, the just suffering in me 
for the unjustifiable suffering of the other, opens suffering to the ethical 
perspective of inter-human.
159
 
 
Based on this, Levinas points out a ‗radical difference‘ between ‗the suffering in the 
other‘ and ‗suffering in me‘.160 The suffering in me can be explained or interpreted 
and understood in my consciousness with my past experience.  With ‗the suffering in 
the other‘, however, can I have anything to do? Can I understand the suffering of the 
Other? What can I do with this suffering outside of my experience?  
 
To try to answer these questions about ‗suffering‘ in Levinas is not to be 
limited to religious and philosophical discussions for they arise from the 
consideration of the primal existential situation of human being.  The meaning of 
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‗uselessness‘ stresses the finite nature of human being in the order of ethical 
significance.  I cannot really place myself in the other‘s position to experience his or 
her suffering.  Nor can I judge of others as I should, if I were in his or her place.  I 
myself, as a subject that is alien to the Other, cannot justify the Other‘s pain, and 
vice versa.  Levinas even states that ‗the justification of the neighbour‘s pain is 
certainly the source of all immorality.‘161 To explore the suffering of the suffering, 
however, is not only necessary but also ‗the most profound adventure of 
subjectivity‘.162 Indeed, the suffering of the Other is the pain of the Other that I 
cannot share, while I can share the meaningfulness of this suffering of the Other.  In 
other words, I can take responsibility for the suffering for the Other.  In Entre Nous, 
Levinas explains the particular perspective from which he attempted to examine the 
concept of suffering.  He writes, 
 
It is in the inter-human perspective of my responsibility for the other, 
without concern for reciprocity, in my call for his or her disinterested 
help, in the asymmetry of the relation of one to the other, that I have tried 
to analyze the phenomenon of useless suffering.
163
 
 
Thus, when the subjectivity of a subject transcendentally searches the meaning of 
this useless suffering, this subject is already in the process of proximity and 
substitution.  To suffer for the others is an in-depth level of proximity and 
substitution that is embedded in the responsible relationship.   
 
This in-depth proximity and substitution in suffering for the other also 
indicates the paradoxical in our human relationship: the ability of the finite human 
being to come close to each other in the presence of the gulf of the infinite 
characteristic of the separation and ethical responsibility between each other.   In De 
Boer‘s words,  
 
Suffering —  not as the magical or mythical expiation of evil, but as the 
ultimate experience of responsibility —  is a passion that is more passive 
than things (to which this category is usually applied).
164
 
 
                                                 
161
 Ibid., p.98. 
162
 Ibid. 
163
 EN, p.100. 
164
 De Boer, p. 37. 
 190 
This ‗ultimate experience of responsibility‘ reveals that the subject always has limits 
in human relationship but, at the same time, it reveals that this responsibility always 
requires human being to transcend what it limits.   
 
From the previous analysis, we can conclude that when the ‗I‘ responds to the 
other, the ego of the I has been formed in the course of proximity and substitution.  
Furthermore, the Otherness of the other has also been located in a responsible 
relationship with me, which is prior to this other‘s presence in this relationship.  The 
approach to the Other is no longer constituted in the sense of Husserlian 
phenomenology but substituted in the sense of Levinasian ethics.  Proximity and 
substitution is the condition of the formulation of relationships and the manifestation 
of language in the forms of ‗saying‘ and ‗said‘.  This condition is manifested in the 
trace as the face of the Other, which also resolves the tension between particularity 
and universalism between the interlocutors who are in the order of ethical 
significance. 
 
§ 4.2.8   Conclusion: Infinite Responsible Significance of Finite Response 
 
Looking back over this chapter, we have deliberated how the I approaches and 
accepts the other from the perspectives of time, subjectivity, and language, which 
illustrate the structure of the response and responsibility for the Other.  We noted that 
there are three aspects to this structure.  Firstly, this structure guarantees the 
preceding essence of responsibility rather than responsibility in the relative and 
situational sense.  Secondly, this structure is concealed in the finitude of subjectivity 
but it would be awakened by the encounter with the face of the Other, which is the 
genuine event of transcendence in life.  Thirdly, Levinas‘s concept of the ‗third 
party‘ keeps the openness of this structure because it not only emphasizes the 
multiplication of the Other but also accentuates the response of the I among these 
Others.  It is this which brings forward the core of the Otherness of the other in the 
order of infinite responsible significance.  Between ‗I‘ and ‗Thou‘ there is ‗He‘ to 
whom and for whom and before whom the ‗I‘ and the ‗Thou‘ are responsible.  Thus 
the birth of ethical responsibility lies in the recognition of the ‗illeity‘ of the Other 
and the suffering of that other.  This is why Levinas stresses that it is only with and 
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in the appearance of ‗the third‘ (of ‗he‘, rather than of ‗me‘ and of ‗you‘) that the 
exigency of an ethical responsibility both manifests itself and demands to be heard. 
 
Levinas‘s ethical reflections have significant implications for how we 
understand the origins of philosophy in general and the rise of Husserlian and 
Heideggerean phenomenology in particular.  According to Levinas, when the third 
party interferes in the relationship between the I and the other and when we need to 
explain ‗the said‘ of the I and the Other to third people in the form of saying, then 
philosophy and hermeneutics come into being.  This is why Levinas, especially in his 
later works, argues that ‗the face of the Other is perhaps the very beginning of 
philosophy‘.165 
 
Levinas‘s concept of ‗first philosophy‘, then, emphasizes the order of ethical 
responsibility  in the first meeting with the first comer as well as the third party.  The 
reason for this lies in the fact that when the ‗I‘ faces the others both as the first comer 
and as the third party, that ‗I‘ needs to approach them proximately and judge these 
relationships substitutably.  Both this approach and judgment require justice, 
however, to take precedence between the first comer and the third party.  This is an 
‗incomparable comparison‘ because everyone is unique but everyone lives in the 
same world.
166
 In Levinas‘s words, it is an ‗asymmetry of inter-subjectivity‘, which 
lies in the order of justice in my responsibility.
167
 
 
The order of justice as ethical significance needs and demands ‗language‘ to 
deliver its meaning from a pre-linguistic relationship with the Other.  Responsibility 
is a bond to connect the words that would be used by the subject, and also to link the 
present subject and the past subject in the form of ‗the saying‘ and ‗the said‘, as well 
as to transcend one‘s own feeling of suffering towards the suffering of the Other as 
the suffering of suffering.  Thus, responsibility is a surplus or an excess (excédence) 
over the finite of the subject in the infinite ethical significance from the event of 
encountering with the Other via the act of response. 
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From this, as Levinas states, ‗when [ethics is] proposed as a modality of 
transcendence, [it] can be thought on the basis of the secularization of the sacred.‘168 
We can interpret this statement with regard to the proposal of Bonhoeffer‘s ‗non-
religious interpretation of Christianity‘ on how people live without God, but still 
need to respond to the divine in a secularized and coming-of-age world.   Levinas 
shares similar concerns to Bonhoeffer.  Levinas writes in Difficult Freedom, ‗The 
path leads to the one God must be walked in part without God.‘169 A poetic metaphor 
can be used to explain this: God hides His face in order to awaken human being‘s 
maturity from all the dis-ordered things that happen in the world via inter-human 
relationships.   
 
The meaning of this hiding of the face of God indicates that the role of God 
has been changed in the process of secularization.  The traditional sense of God is 
absent but the very original desire towards transcendence or ultimate reality is 
always there.  The ethical significance of responsibility, in Levinas‘s sense, lies in 
the ways that the words used by the interlocutors can reveal this transcendence when 
human being encounters the face of the Other and communicates with this Other.   
 
In Bonhoeffer‘s terminology, a non-religious interpretation of religion that 
prioritizes the ethical is still not only possible but necessary.  In both cases, words 
used ensure the possibility that man would have the sincere confidence to admit his 
or her own weakness by removing the mask from one‘s face in the face-to-face 
relationship.  Only when the person recognizes his own finitude can that person 
demand the genuine infinite, either as God or as ultimate reality, as well as the 
genuine ethical relationship with the Other.  In this sense, ethics is indeed an optics 
of the Divine, but it indicates the way or the ‗how‘ the infinite responsible 
significance is embedded in the finite response.
170
 Not only, therefore, is there an 
inherent ethical significance to this responsibility advocated by Levinas and 
Bonhoeffer, there is also an endemic ethical structure to this responsibility.  To the 
ethical structure of this responsibility, we now turn.  
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CHAPTER V  
 
THE ETHICAL STRUCTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY  
 
Central to Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s thought is the recognition of the depth-
dimension that ‗the Other‘ and ‗language‘ occupies in the ethical structure of 
responsibility.   This final chapter of our study, therefore, examines the role and the 
inter-play of ‗the Other‘ and ‗language‘ in the ethical structure of responsibility.  We 
begin by outlining first, however, another possible approach to and method of 
analysing the ethical significance of responsibility in the phenomenology of 
sociology elaborated in the work of Alfred Schutz (1899–1959). 1  Unlike 
Bonhoeffer‘s focus on the Church as responsible community and Levinas‘s 
identification of ‗the Other‘ as pivotal to his conception of ethics as ‗first 
philosophy‘, Schutz concentrates on the primacy of the ‗we‘ in his analysis of the 
human being.   In this regard, the specific role of ‗the Other‘ and of ‗language‘ is not 
central to Schutz‘s account, even though he recognises the significance of the other 
in social interaction and social responsibility.   In the first section of this chapter, 
therefore, we have to address the question: is a phenomenology of sociology 
sufficient for exploring the ethical structure in responsibility? We will see that, 
though this approach has its merit, recognition of the interplay of ‗the Other‘ and 
‗language‘ in ethico-religious experience is indispensable in the ethical analyses of 
responsibility.    In section two, therefore, we will analyse ‗religion‘ in the ethical 
structure of responsibility, taking into account Bonhoeffer‘s reflection on the 
relationship between religion and faith, as well as his ‗non-religious interpretation of 
Christianity‘.   This aspect is also highly relevant for locating the ethical significance 
of responsibility in the entire issue of the re-consideration of religion that occupies 
the minds of many twentieth century philosophers, including Levinas and 
Bonhoeffer (section three).   Reflection on the ethico-religious dimension of 
responsibility, however, is not of course exclusive to western religions; all religions 
and all ethical theories acknowledge responsibility as a fundamental and universal 
value.   In the concluding section of this chapter, therefore, we will analyse the 
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concept of ‗responsibility‘ by comparing the ethical structure of responsibility as a 
whole from the Western perspective (based on the thinkers we have considered in 
this thesis so far) to a Chinese perspective on responsibility, based on writers of the 
Confucian tradition, especially from Neo-Confucianism.    In this way, we will be 
able to show similarities and differences between Western and Chinese perspectives 
on responsibility.   This, in turn, will illuminate further different understandings to 
both how and what it is to treat each other responsibly.  Although the universal 
dimension of ‗responsibility‘ and various approaches to and forms of its 
manifestation in cultures and religions can never be the same, precisely because of its 
historical and cultural conditioning, this analysis both confirms and reveals the 
plurality that is constitutive of the kind of universality characteristic of ethical 
responsibility in both Western and Chinese cultures. 
  
 
SECTION ONE 
IS PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOCIOLOGY SUFFICIENT FOR THE EXPLORATION  
OF THE ETHICAL STRUCTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY? 
 
In chapter two, we noted that Bonhoeffer, in his early works (both in Sanctorum 
Communio and Act and Being) attempts not only to uncover sociological and ethical 
evidence for what is supposed to be true faith but also to determine the role which 
this faith plays in the form of ‗being-in-relationship‘ in the Church as a responsible 
community.  We also noted, however, that part of this position that Bonhoeffer 
adopts is based upon his rejection of the methods of the tradition of idealist 
epistemology that separates the wholeness of knowing and being.  Schutz, likewise, 
in his The Phenomenology of the Social World, rejects idealist epistemologies and 
elaborates a phenomenology, based on Weber‘s social theory, which considers 
similar inquiries to both Bonhoeffer and Levinas, but deals these topics from within a 
different approach, namely, from a phenomenology of sociology.
 2
   It is of relevance 
to our study, then, to ascertain  whether Schutz‘s phenomenology of sociology can 
provide a possible answer to Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s inquiries and their analyses 
                                                 
2
 Schutz was an Austrian social scientist. He integrates sociological and phenomenological traditions 
into a method of social phenomenology to explore human relationship. Many, in particular, Max 
Weber, Henri Bergson, William James, as well as Edmund Husserl, influenced his thought. 
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of the phenomena of social relationships and the significance of the existence of 
Levinas‗the Other‘ in human relationships.  Is phenomenology of sociology 
sufficient for the exploration of the ethical structure of responsibility? This is the 
question that this opening section of our chapter addresses. 
 
§ 5.1.1  Schutz‟s Sociological Reflections on the Phenomenon of the „We‟ 
 
Schutz‘s work in sociology is renowned for the attempt to emphasise the experiences 
of the ‗we‘ in social relations, experiences that did not feature centrally in Husserl‘s 
transcendental-idealist view of human consciousness.   From the outset, then, Schutz 
turns to the social theory of Weber and adopts Weber‘s approach of ‗ideal types‘ to 
classify different types of social relationships and the way  in which social beings 
typically act in these relationship towards the past, present and future, a focus he 
inherited from Bergson.   Schutz, however, points out that one of the main problems 
with Weber‘s ‗interpretive sociology‘ is that it cannot provide sufficient evidence 
regarding ‗the essential characteristics of understanding (Verstehen), of subjective 
meaning (gemeinter Sinn), or of action (Handeln)‘. 3   In other words, Schutz 
creatively applies and modifies Weber‘s term and method of ‗ideal type‘ to 
‗penetrate to the subjective meaning of individuals‘ in order to explore in what sense 
these ideal types can be ‗type-transcendent‘.4  In this regard, Schutz develops his 
thinking by applying the method of phenomenology that he inherited from Husserl to 
the concept of ‗ideal-type‘ as a basis for a critique on the limitation of Weber‘s 
interpretive sociology.   
 
In order to develop this approach, Schutz  brings forward an important pair of 
concepts:  the ‗in-order-to motive‘ (Um-zu-Motiv) and the ‗because-motive‘ (Weil-
Motiv).
5
  The former refers to the reason why the subject chooses to act prior to the 
whole action, while the latter refers to the explanation for the kind of action that 
unfolded in the past event.   This duality enables Schutz to address the problem of 
‗the genuine understanding of the other person and the abstract conceptualization of 
                                                 
3
 See related discussion from the ‗Introduction‘ of Schutz‘s, The Phenomenology of the Social World, 
pp. xxi–xxii.  
4
 Ibid., p. xxii. 
5
 See related discussion, ibid., pp. xxiv, 86, 90, 96, 169, 171, 174–175. 
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his actions or thoughts as being of such and such a type‘.6  Focusing on the ‗in-order-
to motive‘ is different from focusing on the ‗because motive‘.   The former takes into 
consideration the experiences of the actor as a subject.   The later can take into 
consideration the many things that are connected to the ‗type‘ of action done.   For 
Schutz, then, this distinction is set to deal with the transcendental problem of inter-
subjectivity.   
 
Schuts‘z distinction, nevertheless, raises two questions.   The first question 
relates to whether this distinction overcomes the problem of the limitation of 
interpretive sociology in reaching a genuine understanding of the other.    The second 
question concerns whether this solution is sufficient for ‗letting the other be the 
other‘ in the social relationship, or not.  
 
Regarding the first question, Schutz‘s approach to and crucial focus on the 
priority of synchronized consciousness in social interaction is, in many respects, is 
quite similar to Heidegger‘s position.   In this sense, Schutz agrees with Heidegger 
that the interpersonal relationship is reciprocal, but in a limited mutual way.   Even 
though Schutz proposed another approach to Heidegger‘s to interpret the other‘s 
subjective experience, which is to wait the event that is attended by ‗the Other‘ 
whereupon ‗the me‘ recedes into the past, and then evaluate the subjective 
experience of the Other, this does not lead to a genuine understanding of the other in 
such a relationship.
7
  This  is, nonetheless, on Schutz‘s part, a genuine attempt to 
examine, in  a most objective way, the subjective experience of the other,
 
 even if it 
is still formulated from within the limited scope of ‗ideal type‘ and the room for to 
‗let the other be the other‘ is extremely narrow.8  Though the  distinction between the 
‗in-order-to motive‘ and ‗because-motive‘, then, does indeed provide an efficient 
perspective on clarifying the motivation of human actions in human relationships, 
whether it is sufficient to provide a starting-point for any discussion of the in-depth 
                                                 
6
 Schutz, p. xxv. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 See Schutz analyses of objective and subjective meaning for sociology (ibid., pp. 37–38). He 
believes that it is necessary to find out the objective meaning ,which would be equivalent to a kind of 
ideal-type, in order to constitute the meaning-content that can be shared by each subject who is in 
different specific relationships. It is, however, necessary to point out that, though the objective 
meaning as an ideal type has an anonymous character, Schutz clearly realizes that subjective meaning 
is never anonymous. This paradoxical situation has not completely been resolved in Schutz‘s thought; 
it is, therefore, still open for discussion. 
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ethical significance of responsible relationship is a different point, and an entirely 
debatable point at that. 
 
Schutz, nevertheless, draws attention to the significance of memory in human 
relationship, utilizing Husserl‘s analyses of protention and retention.   These three 
elements of protention, retention, and retention of retention, are closely related to 
Schutz‘s distinction and analysis of ‗in-order-to motive‘ and ‗because motive‘.   
Thus Schutz‘s approach can be traced back to Husserl‘s analyses on memory, 
expectation and recollection in his 1905 lecture course on The Phenomenology of 
Inner Time-Consciousness (published in 1928).    Here, Husserl remarks, 
 
Every Act of memory contains intentions of expectation whose 
fulfillment leads to the present [...].  The recollective process not only 
renews these protentions in a manner appropriate to memory. These 
protentions were not only present as intercepting, they have also 
intercepted, they have been fulfilled, and we are aware of them in 
recollection. Fulfillment in recollective consciousness is refulfillment 
(precisely in the modification of the positing of memory), and if the 
primordial protention of the perception of the event was undetermined, 
and the question of being-other or not-being was left open, then in the 
recollection we have a pre-directed expectation which does not leave all 
that open. It is then in the form of an incomplete recollection whose 
structure is other than that of the undetermined primordial protention. 
And yet this is also included in the recollection.
9
 
 
This immanent time structure that enables a human being to reflect upon one‘s own 
experiences, however, is focused on and tied to just that — the ability of my 
consciousness to reflect upon its own contents in time.  The existence of the other 
and the significance of the existence of the other in my memory of such experiences 
is, therefore, evaded by Husserl.   
 
 This, then, is why Schutz‘s development of Husserl‘s reflections on the 
immanent time-structure of one‘s actual consciousness in social consciousness 
follows in the same trend as Heidegger‘s, especially on the examination of the role of 
projection in the discussion of act.   We cannot carry out all the details about this 
similarity in this thesis, but it is important to point out that the distinction of 
                                                 
9
 See, Edmund Husserl, The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology, ed. 
by Don Welton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 199. 
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reflective and non-reflective experience that Schutz derived from Husserl and 
Schutz‘s analyses of projection in the act and time pre-determines and constrains 
Schutz‘s discussion of human relationship in the sense of phenomenology of 
sociology.   This type of discussion is still ego-oriented in the process of 
transformation towards to the Other, even though Schutz is fully aware of the 
complicated ‗transformation from multiplicity to unity‘ in the process of 
understanding the Other and interpreting the act of the Other.
10
  The unity that 
Schutz can only find, however, is the unity of meaning in my experiences, via the 
development from the intentional act, which is based on the meaning-context of my 
experience.   This unity, then, is both real and ideal in the sense of ideal objectivity. 
This ideal objectivity, for Schutz, is an important presupposition for judgment in the 
action between human relationships because based on this, people can carry out their 
self-interpretation of that lived experience to achieve the intended meaning and 
renew it in the next new lived experience in the future.
11
  As Schutz points out, 
therefore, Weber ‗fails to discuss either the nature of the meaning-context or its 
dependence on the meaning of a particular concrete actor‘ because in the context of 
Weber‘s sociological theory, the actor‘s subjective feeling and the observer‘s 
objective perspective are incommensurable.
12
 
 
In order to solve this problem of other person in the meaning context or 
structure, Schutz seeks to apply the ‗in-order-to motive‘ and the ‗because motive‘, as 
we have already explained above, to locate our perspective of horizons.   This is not 
the quite the same issue that Husserl raises regarding ‗the constitution of the Thou 
within the subjectivity of private experience‘ in pure phenomenological sense but  
the issue of how to solve the tension, from both a sociological and a pragmatic point 
of view, between the meaning that I give to the other‘s experience and the meaning 
that the others give to them.   Therefore, the issue for Schutz now changes from 
Weber‘s ‗actor-observer‘ problem, and to the ‗I-Other‘ problem in the meaning-
context of human lived experiences.   
 
                                                 
10
 Schutz, p. 69. 
11
 Ibid., pp. 77–78. 
12
 Ibid., pp. 86–90. 
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In dealing with the ‗I-other‘ problem, Schutz stresses in particular the error of 
the empathy theory, which also applies projection to understand the other person‘s 
experience.    ‗(T)he projective theory of empathy,‘ Schutz critically remarks, ‗jumps 
from the mere fact of empathy to the belief in other minds by an act of blind faith.‘13 
By criticizing the limitation of both the significance and the role of empathy in a 
transcendental-phenomenologically reduced account of the self and the other, 
without a structural parallelism between the I and the Other, Schutz continues to 
stress the general thesis of the alter ego in the ‗expressive act‘ (Ausdruckshandlung) 
rather than in the ‗expressive movement‘ (Ausdrucksbewegung).   The former refers 
to what it is that a person is doing and the latter refers to the process of an observer 
who draws meaning from one‘s observation of the person as actor.   Schutz holds 
that the initial ‗expressive acts are always genuine communicative acts 
(Kundgabehandlungen) which have as a goal their own interpretation‘.14 
 
From this, we can detect that for Schutz both the motivation and its 
expression are of importance in any sociological exploration of meaning in human 
relationships, in particular the location of the words as well as the development of a 
word that the interlocutors use in their own meaning context.   The reason behind 
this, of course, is that ‗discourse is itself a kind of meaning-context‘.15  Although 
Schutz himself admits the limitation of analyzing objective meaning in conversation 
or communication (because it is merely the ordering of one‘s past experience and 
future projection in a total context of meaning), the discussion of subjective and 
objective meaning is ‗the open door to every theology and metaphysics.‘ 16  
Therefore, it is still an open topic for us to explore and to explore further in relation 
to  another distinction he draws between ‗Other-orientation‘ and ‗affecting-the-
Other‘. 17  Only the former will bring in genuine communication in social 
                                                 
13
 Schutz, p. 115. 
14
 Ibid., p. 117. This is similar to Dilthey‘s view, which influenced Schutz, on the way in which the 
understanding and meaning of an experience is raised and completed (rather than cancelled) in its 
meaning through articulation in written expression (e.g., in a play, a poem, a prayer, a treatise etc.).  
By taking the experience of language (e.g. reading a poem and trying to understand what is deposited 
in the poem), rather than the experience of perception, Dilthey develops an alternative 
‗phenomenological‘ approach to Husserl. It is one, nonetheless, that was highly influential on others 
who also departed from Husserl‘s stress on perception in phenomenology (e.g. Heidegger, Levinas, 
Derrida). 
15
 Ibid., pp. 125–127, my emphasis. 
16
 Ibid., p. 135. 
17
 Ibid., p. 148. 
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relationship.
18
  This orientation relationship (Einstellungsbeziehung) is quite similar 
to Levinas‘s concern about the I-Other relationship.  
 
Interestingly, both Schutz and Levinas stress the significance of the face-to-
face relationship in human interaction.
19
  Schutz‘s thought of the face-to-face 
relationship is of a living social relationship indicating ‗an actual simultaneity with 
each other of two separate streams of consciousness‘, 20  and which assumes an 
attitude of ‗Thou-orientation‘.  Levinas‘s face-to-face relationship is also a social 
relationship, as well as an individual relationship between the ego and self, but the 
Other has priority in that relationship.   The difference, then, between Schutz and 
Levinas lies in that Schutz‘s Other-orientation includes the ‗they-orientation‘ and 
‗we-orientation‘, while the ‗Thou-orientation‘ is a formal concept or ‗ideal limit‘ in 
Husserl‘s sense of that term.21  In contrast, Levinas does not use the term ‗Thou‘ but 
stresses the priority of ‗the Other‘ in the ethical consideration of human relationship. 
This difference implies that Schutz, similarly to Heidegger, admits the existence of 
the Other (Dasein in Heidegger) and the significance of the relationship with the 
Other ideally and objectively, but the ‗care‘ towards the Other or the mind of the 
Other is neglected.
22
  On the other hand, Schutz emphasizes the characteristic feature 
of sympathy in the face-to-face relationship, or, more accurately stated for Schutz, in 
the ‗pure we-relationship‘ because only in this simultaneous ‗we‘ which experiences 
itself in synchronical time that the ‗we‘ can ‗live in each other‘s subjective contexts 
of meaning.‘23  The second aspect is likewise very similar to Heidegger‘s approach 
that the ‗we‘ can be approximately regarded in its Being (mitdasein).   The problem 
with both Heidegger‘s and Schutz‘s account of the face-to-face relationship, 
however, lies in the fact that this relationship is subjected to the reciprocal We-
relationship whereupon the uniqueness of the two faces is eliminated.   This is 
exactly what Levinas argues against, for, even though Schutz‘s approach can reduce 
the subjective involvement of the I in the understanding of the Other in the face-to-
face relationship, in pursuit of the objectivity of the understanding the Other, the 
Other becomes an object of my thought rather the Other itself.   Thus ‗I‘ can be 
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 Ibid., p. 150. 
19
 Ibid., pp. 157–164. 
20
 Ibid., p. 163. 
21
 Ibid., p. 164. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid., p. 166. 
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‗with‘ (mit) another human being in a social relationship but not with that other being 
in terms of a responsibility before and to that other.    And it is the latter relating that, 
for Levinas, characterizes the essential feature of human inter-personal 
responsibility. 
 
From a sociological point of view, nevertheless, Schutz‘s articulation of the 
face-to-face relationship focuses on a higher level of awareness of ‗my‘ 
understanding concerning ‗the Other‘ in the social ‗We-experience‘ with a reciprocal 
motivation.   He is clearly aware of the unavoidable separation between the observer 
and actor in an objective perspective.   And he is also quite clear about the danger 
when the observer applies the inappropriate ‗ideal-type‘ to understand the actor‘s 
action, if this observer never has the chance to be in a genuine ‗we-relationship‘ with 
the particular actor.
24
  In addition, Schutz shares the critical comments of Levinas on 
the role of memories because ‗memories are not in the full sense experiences of my 
world of predecessors, for in each memory the sense of the simultaneity of the 
experiences of the partners in the We- or They-relationship is preserved.‘25 This 
point supports Levinas‘s emphasis on the significance of the immemorial past 
because it is not sufficient to establish an ethical relationship which bases on one‘s 
actual memory.   The significance of this immemorial past, nevertheless, shows the 
passive dimension to Levinas‘s conception of ethics but it is a dimension that is 
overlooked by Shutz (as much as it had been by Heidegger earlier). 
 
In sum, Schutz‘s phenomenology of sociology provides an objectively based, 
social perspective to explore human relationship and its meaning-context.   Schutz‘s 
purpose is to arrive at scientific knowledge for social human relationship.   This goal 
sets up his theory in an objectively-oriented manner because, 
 
All scientific knowledge of the social world is indirect. It is knowledge of 
the world of contemporaries and the world of predecessors, never of the 
world of immediate social reality. Accordingly, the social sciences can 
understand man in his everyday social life not as a living individual 
person with a unique consciousness, but only as a personal ideal type 
without duration or spontaneity.
26
 
                                                 
24
 See Schutz‘s particular discussion on this, esp., pp.205–208. 
25
 Ibid., p. 205. 
26
 Ibid., p. 241. 
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The merit of Schutz‘s theory, then, is that his thinking provides an objective frame of 
reference for various disciplines to explore the subjective and objective meaning in 
social human relationship.   In other words, it is valuable for our consideration on 
themes, such as, for instance, the ideal-type of the Church, the objective meaning of 
religion in various religious groups, and the various ways of the sharing of the 
subjective experiences in genuine faith, which correspond to Bonhoeffer‘s inquiries. 
It is also helpful in comparing several concepts that share Schutz‘s and Levinas‘s 
similar concerns, even though they are used in different sense of definitions and 
approaches.   From these comparisons, nevertheless, we can see that Levinas‘s 
approach is not sociological or scientific.   Schutz integrates Weber‘s sociological 
theory and Husserl‘s phenomenological approach to bring forward the idea of 
transcendental alter ego for the purposes of going beyond the boundaries of the 
subject matter of social science.   To be fair, if there is any so-called ‗demerit‘ of 
Schutz‘s method of the constitution of the Thou via the transcendental ego between 
the sociological persons, it does not lie in his theory itself but in the non-priority of 
the ethical concern even though Schutz himself already recognised (but did not 
resolve) such problems in his analyses.  
 
In the following section, we will examine Schutz‘s classification of the ideal 
type for the social human relationship, with particular reference to the role of the 
Other in the ethical structure of responsibility, and stress the different proportion of 
ethical concern in these types of relationships. 
 
§ 5.1.2  The Role of the Other in the Ethical Structure of Responsibility 
 
The priority of the Other in the ethical structure of responsibility is not only a matter 
of purely philosophical concern but also, as Levinas remarks, a response to the ‗most 
revolutionary fact of our twentieth-century consciousness‘.27  All the events that did 
happen in this era and all the people who suffered from these events remind those 
                                                 
27
 EN, p. 97. Levinas remarks, ‗(T)his is the century that in thirty years has known two world wars, 
the totalitarianisms of right and left, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiorshima, the Gulag, and the genocides 
of Auschwitz and Cambodia. This is the century that is drawing to a close in the obsessive fear of the 
return of everything these barbaric names stood for: suffering and evil inflicted deliberately, but in a 
manner no reason set limits to, in the exasperation of a reason become political and detached from all 
ethics.‘ (Ibid.). 
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people who did not experience them to re-think how we have responded to ‗the 
Other‘ in the way of answering before the Other, for the Other and in the place of the 
Other who may be a stranger.  This answerability or response, however, is not 
limited only to the twentieth century but extends to  the unfolding history of 
philosophy itself down through the ages, and, indeed, to the unfolding history of 
humanity.  As noted above in our discussion on the ideal types of human 
relationship, intentional description can be applied to explore the apprehension and 
action of the other person.  Thus, in the next section, we will apply the classification 
of ideal types to explore the ethical relationship of responsibility and obligation. 
 
§ 5.1.3. The I-They and I-We Relationship 
 
In the first case, we will define and compare human relationship in the form of ‗I-
They‘ and ‗I-We‘ relationship in order to analyze the role of responsibility and the 
role of language in these two types. 
 
In the ‗I-They‘ relationship, the proportion of responsibility is comparatively 
lower than the other types of relationship.  The reason for this is that the ‗they‘ 
implies a gap, or a distance between the I and the rest of the others that establishes 
both difference and indifference.   The feature of the language that is used in the I-
They relationship, therefore, is characteristically tentative.  
 
By contrast, in the I-We relationship, the I is a constituent part of the We. 
Though the I is identified by recourse to various backgrounds and is, therefore, 
disengaged from a totality, the ‗we‘, nevertheless, implies both similar characteristics 
of every individual and the unified aspects of these characteristics. Thus the 
characteristic feature of language that is used in the I-We relationship indicates 
commonly owned interests and values.  Such language, therefore, is not only 
tentative, though it could be instrumental, but it also could be personal. 
 
I-They relationship can be regarded as the pre-I-We relationship because 
when they gradually recognize each other, the I-They relationship will change into 
the I-We relationship, and the isolation between the I and the They will be settled.   
In the second situation, the well-established I-They relationship seems like the I-
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Other relationship.   In our ethical concern, however, the I-Other relationship 
indicates the uniqueness of the individual while the I-They relationship stresses the 
difference between the I and the other people as a group.   In other words, the 
difference and isolation between the I and the ‗they‘ is essential but neither the I 
itself nor the ‗they‘ themselves are of importance in this meaning-context. 
 
The difference, therefore, between the I-They and I-We relationship is the 
quality of the relation rather than the origin of it.   Only in the I-We relationship is it 
possible to have genuine discourse or communication with each other.   For our 
ethical concern, nevertheless, the We should not be a plural form of the ‗I‘, otherwise 
the We is equivalent to Heidegger‘s Being, then there is no genuine difference 
between the I and the other I in the We.   The separation of each individual should be 
the foundation of the genuine plurality necessary for ethical concern.   This radical 
separation, then, is a primordial situation for the very formation of plurality is what 
establishes the ethical order of human relationship.   Only under the situation of the 
genuine plurality, therefore, can the ethical encounter and response be possible. 
Compared to the I-They relationship, the proportion of responsibility in the I-We 
relationship is higher.   Because of the uncertain situation of the I in the We, 
nonetheless, the realization of responsibility and the expression of language in this 
situation cannot be completely guaranteed, pre-determined, foreclosed and 
thoroughly analysed. 
 
§ 5.1.4 The I-Thou and I-God Relationship 
 
In the second case, we will define and compare human relationship in the form of ‗I-
Thou‘ and ‗I-God‘ relationship in order to analyse the role of responsibility and the 
role of language in these two types. 
 
Firstly, we are examining the ‗I-Thou‘ relationship in a general sense here.   
In the ‗I-Thou‘ relationship, the other person in the We-relationship has already 
separated from the We-group, and has become a genuine individual.   This individual 
can be conscious of himself as a subject who can experience and think freely.   In 
other words, this Thou has its own subjectivity and has the freedom to share its 
subjectivity with the other subject in a social and multiple relationship.   At the same 
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time, the I is also a Thou for the other person in this relationship.   Thus, in this 
situation, the relationship between the I and the Thou is reciprocally established.   In 
other words, the existence of the Thou is for me, and vice versa.   This is a mutually 
ideal relationship, as well as an actually empirical relationship.   There is, however, 
no fixed structure of the I-Thou relationship precisely because this relationship itself 
is a dynamic event, rather than static restraint.   Correspondingly, the role of 
responsibility can be examined in the ideal and metaphysical level in this situation. 
The role of language can also be discussed in the primordial and pre-linguistic sense, 
rather than in the practical and instrumental sense. 
 
Secondly, the I-God relationship can be regarded as a special type of I-Thou 
relationship.   The reason for this is that the I-God relationship can only be set up 
when the revelation, as a special event, occurs between the I and the Thou.   The 
divine element unifies human experience in a transcendent sense, or people explain 
the significance of their experiences with a specific transcendent perspective.   The I-
God relationship, nevertheless, is not completely the same as I-Thou relationship 
because if we define I-Thou relationship as two-dimension between two 
subjectivities, then the I-God relationship would be multi-dimension in the sense of 
sociality.   From our discussion of previous chapters, God as a wholly Other for man 
in Barth‘s thought‘s brings forward a Kenotic Christology, which indicates the 
increasing importance of human interpretation on divine element in I-God 
relationship.   The method of analogy is essential for this interpretation.   Bonhoeffer 
critically develops this approach in his exploration on the Church in a socio-
theological-oriented sense.   In other words, the focal point of the I-God relationship, 
under the consideration of non-religious interpretation of Christianity, turns from the 
examination of the nature and existence of God, and to the transformation of God, 
especially to the exemplary role of Jesus, for Bonhoeffer, in human social 
relationship.   Bonhoeffer‘s inquiry about the language used in interpreting Bible 
should be kept in mind, therefore, because this inquiry, on the one hand, desires to 
keep the original and genuine faith in the world of coming-of-age when the forms of 
religions have been changed; on the other hand, the understanding and attitude of 
people towards religion has also been changed.   This is why Bonhoeffer‘s inquiry is 
open, and in chapter four we have attempted to apply Levinas‘s theory to provide a 
possible answer with the analyses of ‗the Other‘ and language to this inquiry.   In 
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other words, our argument is that the feature of the infinite in the ethical relationship 
would be a fundamental presupposition for understanding various I-God 
relationships nowadays.   This especially necessitates, then,  the examination of 
various forms of language that are used in these relationships in conjunction with the 
attitude of putting the priority of the Other forms of I-God relationship in order to 
genuinely understand them.    
 
In support of this line of argument, Levinas, in Totality and Infinity, brings 
forward a unique ‗atheistic‘ point of view about I-God relation.   
 
The atheism of the metaphysician means, positively, that our relation with 
the Metaphysical is an ethical behavior and not theology, not a 
thematization, be it a knowledge by analogy, of the attributes of God. God 
rises to his supreme and ultimate presence as correlative to the justice 
rendered unto men. The direct comprehension of God is impossible for a 
look directed upon him, not because our intelligence is limited, but 
because the relation with infinity respects the total Transcendence of the 
other without being bewitched by it, and because our possibility of 
welcoming him in man goes further than the comprehension that 
thematizes and encompasses its object. […] A God invisible means not 
only a God unimaginable, but a God accessible in justice. Ethics is the 
spiritual optics.
28
 
 
In light of this, Levinas identifies and stresses the inseparable connection between 
divine God-man relationship and ethical man-man relationship.   This so-called 
‗atheistic‘ viewpoint is to trace back to the origin of the religion before it was 
artificially defined as ‗theistic‘.   That is to say, it is the original manifestation of the 
divinity of God in a responsible human relationship with regard to everyone‘s 
personal uniqueness, and the chosenness of one‘s faith in the genuine form of 
communication, that sustains the nature of religion or the presence of the divine. 
Only when we know and act according to the nature of religion can the inter-
religious understanding be possible, which is, as we have argued, also the essence of 
Bonhoeffer‘s non-religious interpretation of Christianity and Biblical words. 
 
Therefore, in this context, God is an invisible force of the Other and only by 
means of his ‗voice‘, either in the form of biblical words or in the form of preaching 
                                                 
28
 TI, p. 78.  
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or so forth, can man carry out the infinite movement of the Good as the form of 
ethical imperative that is inherent in God‘s voice.   This raises two questions, then.   
‗Is God the human other?‘ and ‗How are we to understand such a reformulation of 
the face-to-face in religious language?‘29  
 
These two questions are questions that are often asked regarding the 
relationship of the human to each other and the radical otherness of the divine. 
Indeed, ethical action is not all of religious experience, but it is the essential part of 
it.   Therefore, the essence of Bonhoeffer‘s idea of non-religious interpretation would 
be an ethico-divine interpretation.   The idea of ‗trace‘ from Levinas can be regarded 
as the ethical force in the I-God relationship.   And this ‗trace‘ can be manifested 
when people encounter each other face to face.   Michael Morgan provides a very 
clear explanation and summary about the role of God in human relationship, when he 
remarks, 
 
First, that God as illeity is present in the face, but that the third party has a 
different relation to the face of the other. In society, God is related to the 
other but not as a third party; God is the other‘s ethical force. The third 
party is other to my other; there is a third, a fourth, and more; […] God as 
illeity is other, but not as an other. […] Second, God is what calls to me 
from the face, whereas the third party compels me to stand back and to 
judge and assess how I am to execute my responsibility to all others. […] 
Finally, God is the author of responsibility and a kind of identity through 
substitution for the other; […] [If] God is involved in my being ‗a 
member of society‘, [then] this involvement is a betrayal of and also the 
establishment of a new relationship with God as illeity.
30
 
 
From this it follows that the Good in the trace of God as an ethical force only can be 
detected in concrete human relationship.   In Morgan‘s words: ‗God is ―neither an 
object nor an interlocutor‖ but an ―absolute remoteness,‖ which ―turns into my 
responsibility.‖ God is not the other but ―other than the other‖ and ―prior to the 
ethical bond with the other.‖‘ 31  This idea directly corresponds to Levinas‘s 
articulation of substitution and responsibility.  
 
                                                 
29
 See Morgan‘s questions in his, Discovering Levinas, p. 180. 
30
 Morgan, p. 192. 
31
 Ibid., p. 200. 
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In this way, the ethical sensibility is fundamental to religious sensibility 
because it is inherent in the responsible relation to the other person when the ‗trace‘ 
of God functions in the face-to-face relationship.   In the meanwhile, this ethical 
sensibility is also essential to help people to understand the theological language 
used in religious life with an ethical perspective.   In next section, we will further 
discuss this point. 
 
§ 5.1.5   Responsible Relationship: Face-to-Face 
 
In the last case, we will define and analyze human relationship in the form of ‗face-
to-face‘ in order to explore how the role of responsibility and the role of language 
integrate in this form together as an ultimately ethical structure. 
 
The most distinct difference between the face-to-face relationship and the 
previous relationships outlined is that the nature of this relationship is neither a type, 
as the I-We and I-They relationship, nor an event, as the I-Thou and I-God 
relationship. The face-to-face relationship is both a prerequisite and a condition for 
previous relationships, or it is a necessary presupposition to make the rest of 
relationships possible. In other words, the face to face relationship is a necessary pre-
condition of the other relations discussed above. 
 
Face to face is a primordial relationship that reveals how the I and the world, 
as well as the I and the other person relate to each other ethically.  When the I meets 
the face of the other, for the first time, this face-to-face situation is both the origin 
and the condition of this encounter.   It means that this encounter is the first event 
that happens between two subjects, but it is also the condition for its later stages that 
may be developed into the other relationships and that we have discussed above.   
The second obvious characteristic of face-to-face relationship is that it shows the 
difference between the same and the other but this difference cannot be, at the same 
time, be generalized into a totality.   It means that in the face-to-face situation, the 
position of the I and the other cannot be reducible to, or reduced as mutually 
cognitive objects and co-existences in synchrony.   This ‗we‘, rather, are separated 
but this ‗we‘ maintains its separateness in a plural society in time but in a 
diachronical sense of time.    
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This separation is primordial because only when the I faces the other can the I 
locate the boundary between my self and the Other.   This boundary, nevertheless, is 
not jointly set up by the I and the Other, but is revealed in a ‗for me‘ (pour moi) 
structure, in Levinas‘s word, or a ‗pro me‘ structure, in Bonhoeffer‘s word. This ‗for 
me‘, or ‗pro me‘ indicates a primordial subjectivity with regard to a genuine 
Otherness.   The main point here is not the ‗mineness‘ of the subjectivity but the 
„alterity‟ of this ‗mineness‘ concerning the Other.   In other words, the Other is 
endowed with the priority in a face-to-face relationship, even if the subjectivity of 
the I and the capability to apply the ‗alterity‘ towards the Other is initial and 
essential.    It is with this fact of experience, with this fact that the face of the other 
claims, first and foremost, an ethical responsibility from me towards that particular 
other that is the origin of ‗ethics‘ for Levinas.   
 
When we examine the face-to-face relationship itself, this relationship 
automatically indicates the existence of the ethical order in a society because this 
order is an essential condition of showing its social essence.   Namely, the face-to-
face relationship as a condition clarifies different layers of relationship.   This 
clarification shows the fundamental role of face-to-face relationship as the bond or 
obligation in ethical relationships in that not all human relationships are ethical 
relationships.   
 
We define this fundamental face-to-face relationship as responsible 
relationship because of its immanently singular and finite aspects, as well as its 
transcendently multiple and infinite aspects.   Responsibility, which is different from 
what we have discussed in the first chapter from agential theory, social theory and 
dialogical theory, is re-defined, according to Bonhoeffer‘s discussion, on ‗the 
responsible life‘ and through Levinas‘s articulation on the paradoxical tension 
between response and responsibility.   It is precisely the limitation of human being‘s 
response to the divine other and to the other person when they are in the face-to-face 
situation that leads to the reconsideration of one‘s responsibility in a broader context 
or horizon.   Therefore, responsibility cannot be regarded as a conventional custom 
in daily life, neither as a kind of basic law in any legal system, nor even as moral law 
followed by personal conscience anymore in this context.   Responsibility, in the 
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face-to-face situation, is to locate one‘s genuine subjectivity that already bore all 
types of situation we mentioned above in order to justly make every ethical decision. 
These ethical decisions are difficult to make correctly, just like responsibility is 
difficult to bear properly.   The face of the Other reveals itself but, at the same time, 
conceals itself.   Correspondingly, in the face-to-face situation, we enjoy our freedom 
but, at the same time, bear our responsibility.   This dividing line is never clear but it 
always requires us to draw.  
 
As we indicated towards the end of the last section of this part, ‗trace‘ would 
be an essential clue to explore the role of responsibility in one‘s subjectivity and its 
relation to the other‘s.   We will further argue, in the following section, that the role 
of language is one of the most indispensable elements of the ‗trace‘, which also 
includes the pre-linguistic stages because it is entailed in the formulation of language 
itself.   
 
 
SECTION TWO 
THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN THE ETHICAL STRUCTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Many thinkers frequently raise two questions in relation to the viability of ethical 
language considered: ‗After the Holocaust, is ethical language still possible, still 
valid?‘ and ‗Can we speak of morality after the failure of morality?‘32 
 
These two questions are difficult questions to answer with just a ‗yes‘ or a 
‗no‘, but they have to be addressed not because we are still speaking of, or trying to 
speak of morality and ethics here but because morality and ethics require us to do so. 
In other words, it is a responsibility that we bear that urges us to find an answer to 
these questions for ourselves.   We may well not have the ability to search for the 
origin of these questions in the past, but we still have the chance to find out how 
these questions come into being and why they are so difficult to answer at the present 
and in the future.    Bonhoeffer and Levinas cannot escape from these questions 
                                                 
32
 Emmanuel Levinas, ‗The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas‘, trans. by 
Andrew Benjamin and Tamra Wright, in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, eds. by 
Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 176. 
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either, not because they had experienced the content of these questions but because 
of their ethical concern for future generations that urges them to speak out. They are, 
however, neither the first ones, nor the last ones to speak of ethical language. 
Condillac,
33
 Husserl, Rosensweig and Barth, and many more before them, and 
Derrida, Lacan and Kristeva, and many more after them, all provide various 
perspectives from which we can explore this problem.
34
  Even though the approaches 
that they have applied are different, there is a common concern in all of their 
thinking: to seek the very essence of human language itself and the formulation of 
this language via the speakers themselves which is prior to the analyses of an existent 
or particular language.   Only through this way can the ethical significance of 
language be revealed from language.   
 
Thus, generally speaking, we stress that it is the speakers themselves, who 
speak and communicate with the Other, that play the important role in the face-to-
face situation as a responsible relationship precisely because only therein do the 
speakers become the signifiers of the signification of the signs of their dialogue.   
The reason we emphasize the role of the signifier rather than the sign is that the 
formation of a sign itself is developmental; that is to say, the same sign used by one 
signifier changes, and there are different interpretation of the same sign from 
different signifiers.   It is practically significant to analyze the sign in a particular 
language.   However, when we need to explore the essentially ethical significance of 
human relationship, this is not sufficient. We, then, will focus on the ethical 
constitution of language.   In order to clarify this ethical constitution of language, we 
can illustrate the difference using two basic contrasting examples.   The first one is 
the difference between the use of language when a person is in soliloquy and when a 
person talks to his or her family members.   The second one is the difference between 
the use of language when a person talks to his or her family members and to his or 
her boss.   In these two cases, it is the ethical relationship that would determine the 
languages which would be used to communicate with the other person in a social 
network.   These two situations are very common in our daily life, and so, they are 
                                                 
33
 Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715–1780), French philosopher and epistemologist. He holds that 
language bears the sensory and emotional elements. The structure of language thus reveals the 
structure of mind and thought. His theory, therefore, has been regarded as a kind of ‗sensationalism‘ 
that emphasizes the role of sense in human language. 
34
 See, Ward, p. 4 and p. 148. 
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easy to understand, but they are not the most fundamental or original cases.   The 
original ones are far more complicated, such as, for instance, Levinas concept ‗the 
third‘.   That is to say, the language used between you and I would be different from 
the situation that when the third person turns up.   Society only comes into being, 
however, when the third person is involved in the I-Thou relationship.   Therefore, 
all these differences lie in the response to the interlocutor.   All elements in this 
response have to be taken into account when we examine the integrated responsible 
relationship with regard to the role of the Other.    
 
In the following sections, we will examine three aspects about language.  The 
first aspect is about the role time in language, which is derived from Bonhoeffer‘s 
ideas of pen-ultimate and ultimate, in his consideration of responsible life, as well as 
from Levinas‘s ideas of diachronic saying and said.   The second one is about the 
role of memory in language and its relation to responsibility.   The last is about the 
role of response and responsibility as a whole. 
 
§ 5.2.1   Language in History and Time 
 
The ethical significance of language is closely related to ‗time‘, especially when time 
is presented as ‗history‘ in the development of human society.  Time also occupies 
an essential element in the role of language in ethical relationship because language 
itself is both individual expression and social phenomena.  When we use language to 
describe and communicate, it forms an integral part of the process that establishes 
social human relationship.  Some types of words that constituted language are 
recorded and remembered, while the other types maybe forgotten and disappear. 
With regards to the ethical aspect of language, however, even the vanished language 
still leaves a trace for the presence of languages that are in current use.  In this 
respect, it is similar to the unconsciously collective memory of language that keeps 
the cultural elements in the way of dialogue rather than conscious memory that stores 
the functional or instrumental elements in the sense of linguistics. 
 
As we have discussed in chapter three and chapter four, the difference 
between Heidegger‘s synchronical way and Levinas‘s diachronical way of language 
has been stressed and we argued that the latter give prominence to the priority of the 
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uniqueness of the subjectivity between the Other and the I. Nevertheless, 
synchronical time is still a basic form of time in ethical consideration of language, 
even though it just shows one aspect of ‗duration‘ in the development of language.   
In other words, when we speak to the other, we face the other interlocutor ‗here and 
now‘.   The ethical significance of this face-to-face relationship comes into being 
along with the dialogue.   This is a synchronical aspect of the dialogue.    When, 
however, the ‗I‘ tries to make decisions or judgments in relation to my ‗exposure‘ to 
the other as an interlocutor, the expression of language in this dialogue is ethical.   It 
is time, then, that gives significance to this expression of language, when the speaker 
is conscious of the tension between his or her own freedom and responsibility 
towards the other.   Thus far, the relationship between language and time is in the 
scope of consciousness, in a phenomenological sense.   In this regard, people can 
provide ethical interpretation for their action or behaviour with their conscious 
memory.   
 
When both of us, however, are in this ‗duration‘ — the other person and I, at 
the same time — we are also in a diachronical situation.   Without this diachronical 
aspect, there is no way to explore ethical responsibility because of the double-
attribute of time.   General speaking, time is both objective and subjective.   The 
objective time means physical time that can be measured by physical process 
(seasons), or by instruments, like clocks and sundials, or by the radioactive decay of 
elements.   Objective time is public because everyone on this earth can use it as a 
frame of reference.   Thus, the characteristic of synchrony or simultaneity of 
objective time is noteworthy.   The subjective time is more complicated than the 
objective one.   Subjective time, sometimes is equivalent to psychological time, 
especially when people are conscious of the passing of time, even though the 
duration of the psychological experience of time is not equal in every unit of time.   
For instance, when one is in pain, even if only for a very short time, it is experienced 
as a very long time, whereas one can be hours happy doing something but it is 
experienced as a very short time.   Our discussion, then, needs to centre on the nature 
of subjective time that would be experienced by different subjectivities.   
 
The I, in the sense of subjective time, is both the origin and the end of time 
because this I could have freedom to decide how to interpret all the events happened, 
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or is happening, or will happen in his or her life.   From this point of view, time has 
an interpretive power for each ego.    When we consider an ethical relationship, 
however, we need to explore how two or more subjective times meet and weave with 
each other.   Here, Levinas‘s concepts of proximity and substitution provide 
solutions to explore the ethical significance in the explanation of language in time 
and history.   Indeed, one person cannot completely know and understand the 
subjective experience of others.   The way of using language, according to different 
identities of interlocutors, shows the ethical consideration towards the other.   In 
other words, the I is conscious of the boundary of one‘s freedom and responsibility 
in this relationship.   The refrainment in the form of language, which is decided 
precisely by this boundary, indicates the priority of my responsibility compared to 
my freedom.   In Susan Wolf‘s word, ‗we have the ―ability to step back from 
ourselves and decide whether we are the selves we want to be.‖‘35  Furthermore, as 
William Schweiker holds, 
 
We understand ourselves, we have our moral identities, as historical 
agents in relation to others and the world. Persons exist as selves in a 
moral space of relations through time. Thus, it is ordinarily believed that a 
person is and ought to be responsible for the consequences of his or her 
action.  Assuming responsibility […] has a retrospective and future 
oriented character to it. And it is also the case that a person is responsible 
in the present. Being responsible entails a commitment to self-constancy 
through time with respect to actions, intentions, and consequence of 
actions.
36
 
 
It thus follows that the issue of responsibility is also closely related to the question of 
personhood in different times and of this person‘s self-knowledge and self-identity in 
history.   In Levinas‘s words, ‗Time as question: an unbalanced relationship with the 
Infinite, with what cannot be comprehended.‘37  
 
To deal with time in the relationship to both the other person in the form of 
dialogue and to the divine Other in the form of interpreting the Scriptures, is in an 
infinite horizon.   The common ground of these two aspects is that this infinite 
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 Original quotation: Susan Wolf, ‗Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility‘, The Inner Citadel: 
Essays on Individual Autonomy, ed. by John Christman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
p.140;  re-quoted from Schweiker, p. 167.  
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horizon is subjective but also transcendental in various forms of the use of language.   
When the I knows the other person or the divine Other better, he or she will know 
himself or herself better in one‘s improvement of understanding along with the 
flowing of time or the development of history.   
 
If time, however, is an important factor in our consideration of ethical 
relationship to the Other, then what role does memory play in the integrated structure 
of responsibility with regard to language? The reason why this inquiry is raised is 
that memory is usually regarded as an ability to store, retain and recall information in 
the flowing of time.   Yet, in the meantime, the role of language has changed in 
different times and in different situations.   How do people think about the words that 
they spoke to the other person before? How do people select words to speak to 
different persons, when they are in conversation? Would the words that I had used 
before change my selection of words for the future? What influence will the other 
person‘s words have on the ethical relationship between him or her and me? In next 
section, we will attempt to answer these questions.   
 
§ 5.2.2 Language in Memory and Responsibility
38
 
 
In this section, we will not discuss memory in merely a psychological sense but in an 
ethical sense, though they are closely related.  
 
Several works have discussed the relationship between ethics and memory 
from various perspectives.
39
  Jeffrey Blustein‘s The Moral Demand of Memory, in 
particular, provides an ethical examination on memory.   In this work, Blustein 
systematically discusses main themes that are relevant to responsibility and memory.   
He begins from the analyses of memory as a subject of evaluative inquiry and 
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develops various points of view on taking responsibility for one‘s own past.   For 
Blustein, the aim to do justice to the past necessarily involves a clarification of the 
relationship between ethics, truth and collective memory.   In the last two chapters, 
he examines the responsibility of remembrance and the role of memory in bearing 
witness.   Indeed, memory plays an important role in psychological and bio-ethical 
consideration.   To research memory, however, is at the same time to pursue the 
reasons why we would remember something but forget other things, maybe 
consciously, maybe unconsciously.   Thus forgetting too, as Augustine notes in his 
famous discussion on memory in Book X of the Confessions, is a power (vis) of 
memory (memoria).    It is outside the limits of this study, nevertheless, to provide a 
detailed analyses of memory or  Blustein‘s work in this section, but we will make use 
of only those main points of view that he expresses that are most relevant to the 
understanding and evaluation of the topic of our enquiry.  
 
In his first chapter, Blustein remarks, 
 
When we study, discuss, analyze a reality, we analyze it as it appears in 
our mind, in our memory. We know reality only in the past tense. We do 
not know it as it is in the present, in the moment when it‘s happening, 
when it is. The present moment is unlike the memory of it. Remembering 
is not the negative of forgetting. Remembering is a form of forgetting.
40
 
 
He also notes in chapter three of his work, what memory is not and what it cannot 
do: 
 
Memory does not consist in subordinating the past to the needs of the 
present […] for he who looks to gather the materials of memory places 
himself at the service of the dead, and not the other way around.
41
 
 
Thus, at the beginning of the last chapter in his work, Blustein arrives at the 
conclusion for which he is striving to reach, namely, 
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Those who are alive receive a mandate from those who are silent forever. 
They can fulfill their duties only by trying to reconstruct precisely things 
as they were, and by wresting the past from fictions and legends.
42
 
 
From the above three quotations, there is one common ground to all of them.  To 
research memory ethically is not only to find out how memory itself functions from 
the view of psychology and even neuropsychology, which provides a substantially 
experimental foundation to explain memory, but also to find out how memory is to 
be ethically interpreted, reconstructed and communicated in one‘s mind or between 
people‘s minds.   The truth of the memory counts.   
 
We can, therefore, summarize three features for the ethical research on 
memory as follows.  Firstly, memory does not only lie in the past tense, but also in 
the present and future tense.  For example, William James rhetorically asks and 
answers three ‗big‘ questions about memory in order to lead the readers to think 
about them
43
: first, do emotional memories result from the retention of emotions as 
such? James gave a negative answer; secondly, can memory be improved? James 
answer was again negative; thirdly, is everything personally experienced capable of 
being remembered? James‘ answer is the same as the previous two.  Indeed, the ‗yes‘ 
or ‗no‘ answer is far from enough to clarify the psychological, social and ethical 
significance of these questions.   The negative answers, nevertheless, confirm the 
complicated nature of these questions, and the need of further research on them.  
This brings us back to the topic about the relation between these questions and our 
first feature of the ethical research on memory.  
 
James‘ three rhetorical questions can be re-interpreted and re-formulated to 
make the following three main points.   Firstly, the quantity of time is not necessary 
to determine the quality of time.   Secondly, the skills of memory may be improved 
consciously, but the ability of memory cannot be decided and changed consciously 
by people themselves.   Thirdly, personal memory cannot be completely remembered 
and controlled by the person who owns it.   In other words, even though memory 
plays a very important role in man‘s experience, the influence and significance of 
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what memory brings about would be out of the examination of memory itself.   From 
these three points, we argue that there is no direct causal relationship between time 
and memory, however the quantity and quality of time may be altered by memory 
consciously and unconsciously.   This is basic fact that paves the way for following 
two features on ethics and memory. 
 
The second one: ethical research into memory does not only focus on the 
private and subjective aspects of memory but also the shared and narrative aspects of 
memory.   As we have discussed in the first feature, even though the content of the 
memory is the same, the influence and the feeling of the owner about this memory 
will not be the same in different times.   Thus, when the I mentions a specific 
memory to other people, the order of my narrative about this memory may not be the 
same as the order of the actual content in this memory.   The main issue of 
responsibility lies in the identification of the content of one‘s memory and the 
narrative of it.   This issue is significant in the consideration of responsibility, in that,  
memory, in both the social and ethical sense, is a reflection or projection of history 
as well as the collective memory that are shared by the others.   Therefore, the ethical 
significance of memory cannot be accurately measured by strictly experimental 
method; it can be and will be reflected and clarified, however, only by way of the 
encounter of the other‘s memory in all shared ways, especially in the way of 
conversation or communication.   
 
The third one: memory does not only emphasize the memorable aspect of 
memory but also the forgettable aspect of memory.   In other words, we need to 
concern ourselves with the relationship between forget and forgive as well as the 
memorial and the immemorial.   As we have analyzed in the first feature, memory 
cannot be completely controlled by the owner, even though it is nearly the most 
private aspect that only can be controlled by its owner.   We argue that the 
memorable aspect of memory is the primary memory that is comprised of one‘s 
experience and can be retained in the level of one‘s consciousness.   The other aspect 
of memory is the secondary memory that sometimes we may already forget or try to 
forget.  Whether forgotten, or not, this deeply affects our ethical consideration, 
especially in conversation with oneself and the other.   Trauma is a distinct example 
for this feature.   In this case, the immemorial shows the boundary of memory itself, 
 219 
which, in turn, also leads people to the origin of the ethical significance between 
human relationships.    
 
This immemorial, then, corresponds to the call of infinite from the other 
people when ‗the I‘ responds to it.   The ‗I‘ cannot recall from its own (=my) 
memory, from its self-knowledge, or from any other reason that I need to respond but 
‗the I‘ responds to this precisely because it comes from the most original situation, 
the basic place of our humanity.  When ‗the I‘ responds to this call from an 
immemorial situation, it is not a call to fulfil a promise as the traditional views on 
responsibility, but a call to establish a new promise for the future conversation.   In 
this promise, we also get to know each other and set up the ethical way of linguistic 
expression because, in a responsible relationship, the interlocutors show their 
responsibility to the other people by means of the identity of one‘s words or 
knowledge and one‘s deeds or actions.   In William Schweiker‘s words, 
 
In uttering the sentence, who I am appears, as it were, as the link between 
a linguistic designator (‗I‘) and a particular deed (breaking a promise). 
This is important for our capacity for reflexive self-understanding and 
self-designation. Yet under the pressure of linguistic analysis it also 
threatens to reduce the self, the ‗I‘, simply to a function of language.  
Who I am is dependent upon the language I speak or which bespeaks 
me.
44
 
 
It thus follows that the form of the language that we use in the ethical or responsible 
relationship is in fact daily language, however, there is a transcendental attitude in 
this language when it is spoken as a responsible response to the call from the other 
people precisely because it would be understood beyond what it is said and saying. 
Therefore, the responsible language, both in a linguistic form and in a silent form 
(the face of the other as we discuss in chapter four), is a way to show the in-depth 
identity of one‘s subjectivity and responsibility to the Other in social relationship. 
Memory, which especially refers to a diachronical memory, is a trace, both in a 
memorial and immemorial way, for not only understanding the relationship with 
one‘s self and to the other, but also for making a promise to face the past and the 
future with the other in the present together. 
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§ 5.2.3  Responsibility as A Response to the Other 
 
Language, especially in the form of response, not only functions as expression of 
one‘s self but also as address towards different others.  Thus, language shows the 
subtle but essential differentiation of each ‗other‘. In other words, even though the 
words that the I uses to speak to the others are still those words, the words that can 
show each specific relationship and the words that can make this other person 
responsible are not the same. 
 
There are two essential characteristics about language as a responsible 
response.   Responsible response is transcendental and, at the same time, is also 
passive.   The characteristic of transcendence is related to the face of the Other when 
the I addresses to this interlocutor, and vice versa, as we have discussed in chapter 
four, especially from Levinas‘s point of view.   When the other addresses and 
questions me, the language that embeds in this process puts the other‘s self or myself 
into an in-depth subjective and responsible consideration.   This consideration itself 
is passive because the ethical encounter or event is both essentially and inter-
subjectively uncertain.   This uncertainty requires a dialogical and diachronical 
‗growth‘ or ‗evolution‘ of the ethical significance in using language.   
 
Thus, ‗the response to the Other‘ always takes place in an uncertain situation, 
the words selected to communicate with the other is uncertain, and the relationship 
that is to be established based on the dialogue is also uncertain.   All of these 
uncertainties, however, are undoubtedly in paradoxically and ethically tight relations.   
Thus, the response to the Other is a pursuit of certainty, which is not to be found in 
the proof of every word that we use in the communication, but in the way these 
uncertainties brings ‗us‘ into meaning.    It challenges ‗the I‘ to be responsible before 
the ‗Other‘, for the ‗Other‘ and to the ‗Other‘.   
 
This principle, Levinas argues, is fundamental for an ethical reflection about 
the significance of response in the question-answer form for both philosophy and 
theology.   If we apply this principle to Bonhoeffer‘s idea of non-religious 
interpretation, we can clearly find out that his inquiry is not to provide new 
principles of interpretation for Christianity or even religion, but to raise a dynamic 
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question for people to answer.   The question itself is about the changing forms of 
religion, the change of the usage of language, the change of the relationship with the 
Other, the change of the understanding and its significance of responsibility which 
connects all the aspects mention above.   We have found that Morgan provides a 
possible way to carry out this non-religious interpretation from Levinas‘s point of 
view for Bonhoeffer‘s inquiry.   He suggests, 
 
‗Sacrifice‘ is a religious term, and ‗substitution‘ is its secular paraphrase; 
it is a giving-over and an offering of the self for the other. Somehow – in 
a way he has not yet clarified – communication between persons depends 
upon my standing in for others, my being in the other‘s place.45 
 
The religious term, in this respect, therefore, is equivalent to and situationally 
replaceable by an ethical term.   Indeed, this replacement perhaps would change or 
reduce the divine element of the word ‗sacrifice‘ and the word ‗substitution‘ would 
be regarded as a reciprocal exchange in a relationship.   This, however, is different 
from Bultmann‘s existential interpretation of Christianity which is derived from 
Heidegger‘s existential thinking as Bonhoeffer criticizes.   The reason is that the 
language itself used in communication between the I and the others in an responsible 
context is transcendental.   This transcendental characteristic manifests its spirit in a 
response of man to the Other.   Thus, the essence of the responsibility as a response 
to the other lies in how the spirit of response between the I and the Other is to be 
revealed both from the language and from the ‗unsaying of the said‘, which is in 
order to re-awaken the primacy of saying.   
 
We are going to intensively analyze Bonhoeffer‘s idea of non-religious 
interpretation of Christianity with Levinas‘s ethical analysis of language in order to 
show that the role of language in our ethical structure of responsibility would be a 
possible answer for Bonhoeffer‘s inquiry, which is also the essence of Levinas‘s 
conception and understanding of ‗First Philosophy‘.    
 
Levinas states in Infinity and Totality: 
 
Language is consummated as a sequence, in speech and counter-speech. 
Here alone does the word that is formed in language meet its response. 
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Only here does the primary word go backwards and forwards in the same 
form, the word of address and the word of response live in one language, 
I and Thou take their stand out merely in relation, but also in the solid 
give-and-take of talk. […] The relation with man is the real simile of the 
relation with God; in it true address receives true response; except that in 
God‘s response everything, the universe, is made manifest as language.46 
 
 
Indeed, ‗ethics occurs […] in the demand for response‘47 and the term ‗religion‘ 
itself is etymologically an obligation or a bond in a relationship that also requests 
response.  Different from the sign system or structure that is constituted by the 
meanings attained from a mutual relation that transcends each individual interlocutor 
in a social sense, the language as a discourse about deeper human relationship is to 
share one‘s spiritual things to others by the form of an initial saying: a saying that is 
prior to consciousness and intentionality.   The ethical significance of language‘s 
priority implies that ‗I am not my origin unto myself; I do not have my origin in 
myself.‘48  
 
Religion, in its initial and etymological sense, however, is not only about 
various obligations and bonds between the I, the You, the We, and the relation to 
God but it is also about the order of these relationships after the ‗fall‘ (in Christian 
religion) or ‗ignorance‘ (in Buddhism).   Impartial love and eternal goodness is 
usually regarded as a transcendent ideal of religions.    At the same time, 
nevertheless, this also implicates that the essence of religion is the ‗return to unity‘ in 
order to achieve love and goodness.   This achievement lies in the relation to one‘s 
self and of one‘s response to the other in responsible relationship.    
 
We thus conclude that, for Levinas, the ethico-religious language, which is 
not the same as purely ethical language that has descriptive characteristics, stresses 
the transcendental and passive unity of divine and secular aspects in language 
concerning the ethically responsible relationship to the Other.    
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SECTION THREE 
RE-THINKING RESPONSIBILITY (I):  
RELIGION IN THE ETHICAL STRUCTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The ethical structure of responsibility is neither a principle nor rule to be followed; 
nor is it an idealized concept to be theoretically analysed.   It is, rather, a requirement 
for people to respond to in his or her subjectivity, which is prior to one‘s conscious 
intentionality.   If we have to find an analogical example to further clarify the ethical 
structure of responsibility, then mentality would be the case.   As Levinas states, 
‗Mentality is that orientation prior to the choice of knowledge [savoir], which is a 
modality of that orientation.‘49   Mentality plays an important role in man‘s action.  
Whereas mentality, then, is the dynamic process for pointing out an orientation, 
responsibility is the essential content of this process.   Thus, we will further discuss 
two important issues that relate to the ethico-religious language in the integrated 
structure of responsibility and find out that how this structure would be settled in 
one‘s mentality and in the mentality of a society.  The first issue, in this section, 
specifically continues to deal with ‗religion‘ in the ethical structure of responsibility.   
The second issue, which we will examine in section four, explores the Chinese 
perspective on the ethical structure of responsibility as the Other to the Western 
perspective and vice versa.   In this way, the significance of the mentality of the 
Other in relation to the significance of ethical responsibility to the Other will be 
brought into sharper relief. 
 
§ 5.3.1  Analysis of Religion in the Ethical Structure of Responsibility 
 
At the beginning, we have to limit the scope of our discussion of religion in this 
section because the term ‗religion‘ would cover a vast arrange of topics.   What our 
discussion will focus on is, , how ‗religion‘ changes, what is the ethical significance 
of this change nowadays and whether responsibility can be a possible foundation for 
people to explore this change, from the perspectives of ‗the Other‘ and ‗language‘.    
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§ 5.3.2 Re-consideration of Religion  
 
Under the influence of the social environment, people‘s religious experience and the 
interpretation of their religious experience change.   As Bonhoeffer arguably 
proposes, the era of our world is coming of age.   It is difficult to ascertain, 
nevertheless, whether the world is mature enough because it is continuously 
changing and the standard, if there is any, is still changing.    By advocating reason 
as the primary source for legitimacy and authority  the role of human being and our 
human self-understanding has become, however, more ‗mature‘ than the time before 
the Age of Enlightenment and more independent from the doctrines of religion and 
theology.   People begin to ‗think‘ about religion, rather than only believe in ultimate 
reality; and endeavour to ‗analyse‘ their religious experience, rather than only accept 
it as revelation.   Indeed, faith and reason has been consistently considered as two 
wings of human spirit and this relationship is traditionally regarded as the sources of 
justification for religious belief.    In the age of reason or the age of rationalism, 
nevertheless, the key point of these two wings tends to reason, rather than to faith, 
and it no longer just focuses on religious belief itself but the process of justification.   
The way in which, therefore, that the human being receives and interprets the 
religious message is quite different from before.   In such a context, the so-called 
maturity of the world means the extensive use of reason in every field of human life, 
even in the ethical and in the spiritual dimensions.   Religions become objects of 
research in various disciplines, and are explained in a different light and with 
different specific terms.  This also can be regarded as a process of ‗de-
mythologization‘, as Bultmann suggests, and as a necessary path towards a non-
religious interpretation of Christianity, as Bonhoeffer likewise argues.    Bonhoeffer, 
nevertheless, was equal critical of  this very approach because, in his estimation, 
such a project  of de-mythologization is not a thorough method for it overemphasizes 
the existential elements in the analyses, leaving, in its wake, the real danger of 
missing the essence of Christian faith (as we have analysed in chapter three). 
 
The ‗truth‘ of religion and ‗telling the truth‘, for Bonhoeffer, therefore, do 
count and, more importantly, are intimately connected socially.
 50
  As Steven Plant 
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points out,  referring to the challenging nature of intellectual honesty or ‗telling the 
truth‘  that arises from the tension between religion and living one‘s faith, 
 
In ‗What is meant by ―Telling the Truth‖‘? Bonhoeffer returns to how 
being good is worked out within social relationships — a theme at the 
heart of his thinking about the warrant for ethical discourse and his 
mandates theology. Within a social relationship, the position and role one 
has bears strongly on one‘s moral responsibility. [...] He understood that 
‗the more complex the actual situations of a man‘s life, the more 
responsible and the more difficult will be his task of ―telling the truth‖.‘ 51 
 
For Bonhoeffer, then, the term ‗responsibility‘, in the context of religion, means 
whether an individual bears the obligation to keep his or her intellectual honesty in 
relation to this reality in his or her thinking and whether the religion he or she claims 
to believe in is identified with his or  her truthful faith.  This problematic identity of 
my‘s religious belief, telling the truth, and institutional religion is directly based on 
Bonhoeffer‘s idea of a non-religious interpretation of Christianity because  the main 
issue facing a religious believer is precisely whether people know the religion 
correctly and acts out of that content, or put it into practice subsequently, in a 
modern time that is no longer the same as before.   As Ebeling holds, ‗(T)his rightly 
understood autonomy of the reason is so much a part of the reality of modern man 
that he is not even asked whether he is willing to make use of it, but only how in face 
he does make use of it.‘52  Therefore, the problem does not only lie merely in the 
content of faith and reason because there is a premise which is prior to these two 
wings: the responsible attitude on these two subjects. 
 
From this it follows that the solution to the tension between faith and reason 
or between one‘s religious experience and one‘s rational interpretation cannot be 
found only from a focuse on each of these two aspects, but explored from a third 
possibility: the condition that leads to or causes this tension.   In Bonhoeffer‘s own 
words, this premise is presupposed in his question ‗What do we really believe? I 
mean, believe in such a way as to stake our whole lives upon it?‘53, and ‗What does it 
mean to ―tell the truth?‖ when the answer one gives can cost another their life, just 
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for being an ―other‖‘? Levinas also raises similar questions about the useless 
suffering as the Holocaust, and that has overturned the thinking of traditional 
theodicy.   In order to answer the questions raised by both Bonhoeffer and Levinas, it 
is insufficient, therefore, either to trace back to the history of philosophy from a 
rational interpretation for an answer to this question or to seek the answer from the 
interpretation of a theodicy that posits an ultimate reality which is the greatest being 
of all beings, making such suffering meaningful, as there is a bigger picture or a 
longer chain of causation that the human being is not able to see or able to chase.   
What Bonhoeffer and Levinas propose, it that the human being rather seek out to 
find the answer from religious, philosophical and ethical perspective as a moral faith 
and also act out of this answer, which is an integrity of act and being.   This moral 
faith is described by Levinas in Entre Nous as this,  
 
One has every right to wonder whether the devotion that animates this 
religion, which was originally inseparable from the love of one‘s 
fellowman and concern for justice, would not find in this ethics itself the 
place of its semantic birth and thence the significance of its non-in-
difference for the infinite difference of the One, instead of owing it to the 
non-satisfaction of knowing. A radical distinction which would impose 
itself between religion and relation!
54
 
 
From this, relation, ethics and language as the semantic element would be the key 
words for our initial re-consideration of religion and the challenge of the 
interpretation of the Word of God in a coming-of-age.   With regard to these 
elements, religion is still the relation between men or beings, however, in a mature 
age, human being faces the inifinite Other and his intellectual honesty towards this 
Other in a different way.  
 
Therefore, we argue that religion is in a paradoxical situation under the 
ethical structure of responsibility.   Religion itself is the relation between human 
beings and, in the meantime, religion also stands in relation to a radical exteriority, 
the Other, or the third party of human relationship.  This, then, is the reason why 
religion has both the transcendent and the immanent nature in human relationship.   
This duality consistently guarantees and ensures the role of justice in the dialogue 
between human beings.   It is precisely because of this dual feature of religion that 
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man could manifest his own subjectivity and extend both his intention and action in a 
furthest sense without violently invading the other.   In sum, there is an infinite Other 
as the third party to make sure the existence of social justice in the human 
relationships.   
 
It is of importance, then, to concentrate on the change of religion, and on the 
meaning of this change, against the background of modernity and post-modernity.   
Morgan provides an important insight about this change, when he notes, 
 
What Levinas will advocate is a new sense of religion and of God, where 
the weight falls on the face-to-face and its ethical character. This is one 
meaning of atheism, an acknowledgment of God that is not a belief in the 
existence of a transcendent God.
55
 
 
We cannot interpret Levinas‘s atheism in a literal way, or in a negative sense because 
it does not mean that God does not exist.   This is not the question that Levinas 
intends to discuss, nor does our thesis.   The essence of Levinasian atheism is to 
remind people to detect the origin of religion and of one‘s faith.   It means to locate 
oneself in an acknowledgment of each face-to-face relationship in this world in the 
context that each individual subject has found his own subjectivity, his own 
responsibility, and the limit of this responsibility, from which my freedom and the 
freedom of the other can be limited.   For example, the word ‗revelation‘ does not 
play the same role as it did before but it could be elucidated in terms of a concrete 
ethico-religious content in the ‗here and now‘ with the relevation of other in the  face 
to face relationship.   
 
§ 5.3.3    Religion and Its Ethical Significance 
 
Levinas writes in Entre Nous, ‗(T)ranscendence: this term is used without any 
theological presupposition.   It is, to the contrary, the excession of life that is 
presupposed by theologies.‘56  In other words, it is the excessive aspect of life that 
makes theology possible, but not the other way around.  This reminds us two points. 
First, the transcendent cannot be identified with religion itself.  Second, the 
transcendent manifests itself in the surplus aspect of life, which is the origin of 
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religion.   From this, we intend to clarify that even though the forms and the 
emphasis of religions has changed, the transcendent as the essence of religion 
remains unchanged.   Moreover, the surplus aspect of life is closely related to the 
ethical foundation of life itself, otherwise this ‗surplus‘ would be only an idea in 
vain.    
 
This, then, brings us to the question: what is the role of religion today? Can 
we say that the ultimate end of religion is equivalent to the supreme nature of 
morality? If the answer is positive, then can we propose that there is an ‗invisible 
religion‘ that presupposes the moral faith in the multiple backgrounds of human 
society? The concept of ‗invisible religion‘, of course, is borrowed from the concept 
of the ‗invisible church‘.   The original meaning of this concept can be traced back to 
Augustine‘s thinking about the true reality of God and reality.   Augustine holds that 
the visible reflects the invisible of the true reality and applies this idea (that is 
influenced by Platonic idea of the higher Form as cause of the existence of the lower 
form) into his thoughts of Church.
57
  Augustine‘s opinion on the ‗invisible church‘ 
was adopted by the Protestant Reformation as to distinguish itself from Catholic 
Church as the ‗visible‘ church.   Schleiermacher, for instance, specifically discusses 
this distinction in his work The Christian Faith, remarking, 
 
There as for us the invisible Church as a fellowship (and in our reading of 
these matters the conception of fellowship is given greater prominence 
than ever) is mediated through the visible. [...] In the one case, reaching 
over and abstracting from the confused multiplicity of particular acts (our 
neighbour, too, contemplating us in exactly the same way), we each of us 
enter into a mutually strengthening and supporting union with the 
innermost impulses of the other, and thus constitute an element of the 
invisible Church; in the other, we enter into a fellowship of these very 
particular acts and forms of self-expression, so as uniformly to occupy a 
common area with those who have closest affinity with ourselves and to 
repel what is alien — and thus constitute an element of the visible 
Church.
58
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Roger Haight explains Schleiermacher's point of view, ‗The invisible church is the 
divine dimension of the church, the effects of grace or of the work of God as Spirit 
within the empirical organization. [...] In fact, the dimensions of the visible and 
invisible church are also at work in a single individual person.‘59  
 
We can distinguish two features of the ‗invisible church‘.   First, the invisible 
church stresses the innermost impulse of each subject in the fellowship of the divine 
dimension of transcendence.   Second, each single individual person can be the 
constituent part of the invisible church.   Thus, the invisible church indicates a 
duality between private manifestation and public communication.   These two 
aspects require both the foundation of morality and the transcendence of this 
foundation at the same time.   When a person questions the meaning of ultimate 
reality, he stands in front of this reality as a moral man, but, in the meantime, he also 
seeks for an answer that is beyond morality.   At this moment, he is also a religious 
man 
60
  The connection between the moral man and the religious man, however, is in 
a tension. This tension is precisely what is entailed in and through ethical 
responsibility.  We may call it as ‗invisible religion‘.   Buber describes this situation 
in I and Thou, and its historical implications, noting, 
 
The man is not freed from responsibility; he has exchanged the torment of 
the finite, pursuit of effects, for the motive power of the infinite, he has 
got the mighty responsibility of love for the whole untraceable world-
event, for the profound belonging to the world before the Face of God.
61
 
 
From this, the religious, or, more precisely, the spiritual meaning in the private 
manifestation is what is embedded in the public communication of ethical relation. 
We cannot carry out the relationship of invisible religion and ethics in detail in our 
thesis, but the emphasis of the relationship between the invisible religion and ethics 
makes it clear that morality cannot be identified with religion, while it also cannot be 
separated from the transcendental divine.   We need to pay attention that a 
progressive relation lies in this emphasis.   In other words, we need to distinguish 
three things: the ‗morality‘ that is referred to in a normal or general sense of people 
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following the moral regulations or rules in their daily life; the ‗religion‘ that is 
referred to, in Bonhoeffer‘s sense, that has been changed nowadays; and the 
transcendental divine that is referred to the ultimate Goodness that is prior to the 
freedom of our choices.   As Levinas points out and stresses, 
 
This antecedence of responsibility to freedom would satisfy the Goodness 
of the Good: the necessity that the Good choose me first before I can be in 
a position to choose, that is, welcome its choice. That is my pre-originary 
susceptiveness.
62
 
 
From this, it does not mean that the Good replaces God, which would lead to the 
‗death of God‘. On the contrary, it is this Goodness of Good that maintains or 
purifies the divine foundation of human‘s relation to God.  
 
The ethical significance of the invisible religion lies in that the religious 
transcendence is not only to be found in the doctrines but also in fellowship in a 
responsible community.   In other words, it is the manifestation of the responsible 
relationship between human being that makes the ultimate reality or God visible.   
This is not a proof of the existence of God, but a pursuit of the ‗trace‘ of God in man.   
Thus, it is no longer the problem whether ‗God is dead‘ or not, but the question about 
‗the life of God‘ in man‘s response when ‗God who comes to mind‘.63  It also needs 
to pay attention to the fact that to find out the ethical significance in religion is not to 
reduce religion into ethics or replace religion with ethics but to clarify the moral 
foundation of religion as the original consideration about faith and the divine element 
of moral relationship as the other-oriented consideration about man‘s subjectivity 
itself. 
 
§ 5.3.4    Responsibility and Religions 
 
Religiosity and the human morality of goodness, then, still retain after the so-called 
‗end‘ of theodicy. The problem, therefore, is not about the justification of the 
doctrine of theodicy itself anymore, but about the meaning of theodicy and its 
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manifestation in social relationship.  An answer to this question would be found in 
the discussion on the relationship between responsibility and religions. 
 
Levinas explicitly states this relationship in his Difficult Freedom, 
 
A truth is universal when it applies to every reasonable being. A religion 
is universal when it is open to all. In this sense, the Judaism that links the 
Divine to the moral has always aspired to be universal. But the revelation 
of morality, which discovers a human society, also discovers the place of 
election, which, in this universal society, returns to the person who 
receives this revelation. This election is made up not of privileges but of 
responsibility.
64
 
 
Clearly, Levinas argues the importance of the duality of particularity and 
universalism from Judaism and stresses that the election itself comprises the taking 
up of responsibility.   We will not expand our discussion about the issue of election 
of Judaism and its relation to responsibility.   The reason why we quote this passage 
is that when a person chooses to believe in a religion or in a specific creed, or in a 
word, when this person is in the faith, he is already in a process of selection.   This is 
a process that includes the action of selection and being selected.   The action of 
selection refers to the responsibility from one‘s subjectivity that may be in 
accordance with what he believes in, while the action of being selected refers to the 
transcendental Otherness of the other that is alien to what the subjectivity is as it is.   
 
Consequently, responsibility is prior to the knowledge of what the people 
believe in and the actions of faith because it conditions the coming-into-being of 
one‘s subjectivity and of one‘s action of choosing which is based on one‘s 
subjectivity.   In other words, ‗moral subjectivity as responsibility occurs as a 
reconditioning of ―for-itself‖ selfhood (immanence) into a for-the-other moral self 
responsibility.‘65 
 
Responsibility, therefore, actually means to be a responsible subjectivity, 
rather than do responsible things in specific situations according to moral rules or 
regulations.   Thus, to be a responsible subjectivity means, in fact, to believe in the 
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order of moral faith as the invisible religion.   This invisible religion, as a 
fundamental humanity, does not belong to any religious belief but is the condition of 
them.   The essential element of exploring the essence of religion and relationship 
between religions has to be non-religious in this sense because it is the prior 
condition for all religions, which is also what Levinas means by an ethical 
commitment to ‗atheism‘.   This condition is the ethical responsibility for one 
another.   To stress this condition is to reveal the fact that each religion in this world 
has their own reasons to be itself and to regard the others as alien.   Thus it follows 
that the condition of responsibility reveals at the same time the limits of each religion 
and the relationships between these religions.   Furthermore, this condition is also 
entailed the dialogue between these religions in order to understand each other.    
 
 
SECTION FOUR 
RE-THINKING RESPONSIBILITY (II): WESTERN AND CHINESE PERSPECTIVES  
ON RELIGION, ETHICS AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
In the previous section we found that plurality is an essential dimension of not only 
dialogue, ethics, and responsibility but of religions too.   A discussion on the other is 
inseparable from a study on religion and between religions as well as the 
development of the concept of responsibility.  In this concluding section of our 
study, therefore,  we will analyze the role of religion in the ethical structure of 
responsibility, paying particular attention to this structure from a Chinese perspective 
in order to find out the similarities and the differences about the way in which 
responsibility is understood and addressed in Chinese and Western philosophy. 
 
§ 5.4.1  The Importance of an Analysis of the Ethical Structure of Responsibility 
from Western and Chinese Perspectives 
 
Chinese philosophy is usually regarded as the ‗Other‘ to Western Philosophy.   From 
this point of view, each of their respective reflections on and considerations of ‗the 
Other‘ are often believed to be poles apart.   Whether this is a true belief, or not, 
depends on an examination of both Chinese and Western reflections on ‗the Other‘ 
and their respective understandings of responsibility and ‗the Other‘.   
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It is, of course, true to note that, in recent times there has emerged a tendency 
towards globalization, wherein various cultures have encountered with each other 
quite frequently and in many different areas.   This necessitates a quest to find out 
the spirit that is embedded in these cultures.   There is, however, a possible danger 
that lies behind the phenomenon of globalization.   This problem is that when people 
who come from different cultural backgrounds want to communicate and understand 
each other, they tend to establish a platform that is based on agreed similarities in 
their different backgrounds.   When people become used to these similarities, 
however, the differences behind their background are neglected, while they still exist.   
When this globalized tendency progresses, these differences may bring in 
misunderstandings, even obstacles in communication.   Thus, it would be significant 
to examine the issue of responsibility under this context to detect how to balance the 
‗similarities‘ and ‗difference‘ between different cultures.   Furthermore, this 
encounter of West and East also will remind us to be aware of the original 
boundaries as well as the approaches that we have applied to research these 
boundaries.   Compared to the emphasis of ontology and the question of ‗what the 
good is‘ in Western thoughts, Chinese thoughts stress ethics and the question of ‗how 
to become good‘. 66   Thus a focus on what Chinese philosophy has to say on 
responsibility would be a good example to begin with.   
 
At the beginning of this section, we need to define the scope of our 
discussion on Chinese philosophy.   Generally speaking, there are three main schools 
in traditional Chinese thought: Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism with other 
minor schools, like Legalism, Mohism and Logicians.   We will discuss a branch of 
Confucianism in this section: Neo-Confucianism (宋明理學, Song Ming Li Xue), 
which was developed mainly from Mencian philosophy during the Song Dynasty and 
Ming Dynasty.   A distinct feature of Neo-Confucianism is that it attempts to 
synthesize the other two ways of Chinese thinking, Taoism and Buddhism, into a 
metaphysical framework.   Another feature of Neo-Confucianism is that it mainly 
concerns the importance of self-cultivation in the society and the harmonious 
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relationship with heaven.
67
  For Neo-Confucianism, the self-cultivation is the basis 
for the understanding and communication with the Other, on the one hand, and it also 
will establish and enlarge the Other, on the other hand. 
 
Before we move on to the detailed discussion, it would be helpful to have a 
brief review of the concept of self-cultivation in Chinese thought as an important 
background.   There is a long history on the moral self-cultivation in Confucian 
tradition.   Confucius (孔子, 551–479 BCE, Kong zi) is usually regarded as the first 
to stress and teach ethical issues to his disciples in the form of dialogue.   Mencius (
孟子, 403–221 BCE, Meng zi) systematically developed Confucius‘s ethical thought 
and emphasize the role of human nature and self-cultivation.   Zhu xi (朱熹,1130–
1200) and Wang yangming (王陽明, 1472–1529) are two prominent representative 
figures of Confucian moral tradition in Song Dynasty and Ming Dynasty.   Zhu xi 
was the leading figure of the rational school of Neo-Confucianism in China while 
Wang yangming, after Zhu xi, is the most important Neo-Confucian who is opposed 
to Zhu xi‘s rationalist dualism.   In Qing Dynasty, Neo-Confucianism has been 
critically developed by Yan yuan (颜元, 1635–1704) and Dai zhen (戴震, 1724–
1777).   Both of them stress the practical application of moral principles, rather than 
the spiritual cultivation of the self, and they also emphasize the rational investigation 
of the external world, rather than the introspective self-examination of human desire.   
 
For the remainder of  this section, therefore, we will, firstly, analyse the role 
of sensitivity as a beginning of self-cultivation and will investigate how the innate 
knowledge is developed into moral language; secondly, we will specifically discuss 
the role of self in Neo-Confucianism and its relation to the issue of the other; lastly, 
we will explain the concept Ren as co-humanity and its relation to responsibility.   
 
                                                 
67
 As Tu Wei-ming analyzes: ‗Only Confucianism among the Three Teachings unequivocally asserts 
that society is both necessary and intrinsically valuable for self-realization. Taoism and Ch‘an do not 
seem to have attached much importance to human relations.‘ See, Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought, 
Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 8th ed., 1997), p. 
26. 
 235 
Our discussion will concentrate on the lineage of Confucius, Mencius and 
Wang Yangming.   Though Confucius was the first to stress the moral self-
cultivation in social life, he did not provide specific ideas on human nature.   
Correspondingly, Mencius firstly and systematically presented his ideas about human 
nature.   His fundamental tenet is that human nature is good and that people will keep 
and develop this goodness or kindness when they carry out the self-cultivation based 
on the ‗virtue‘ (德, De).   The response between people is an important component in 
the process of self-cultivation.    This response is not only in the linguistic form but 
also in action.   There is a well-known case or moral thought experiment that is used 
by Mencius: the reaction of a person who suddenly sees a child about to fall into a 
well.   By means of analyzing the reaction of the person in this sudden case, Mencius 
intends to find out the most fundamental element in humanity in general and the 
origin of humanity from human nature in particular.    For Mencius, it is the 
unbearable pity for the suffering of the other that shows the innate compassionate 
impulse, which is the beginning of humanity, as the moral ‗seed‘ or ‗sprout‘.    These 
seeds or sprouts, however, need to be cultivated in order to grow into a mature and 
stable situation.   Based on this background, Mencius further developed four 
essential virtues corresponding to four seeds.   The feeling of commiseration 
corresponds to the seed of humanity; the awareness of shame and dislike is the seed 
of righteousness; the sentiment of respect and reverence corresponds to the seed of 
propriety; and the sense of right and wrong corresponds to the seed of wisdom.
68
 
From this it follows that Mencius‘s argument of human nature is founded  on a 
natural and developmental view of human mentality because the moral seeds are to 
be developed both from the inner mental ability and from the external environment 
with his use of analogical language.    
 
Wang Yangming is both an inheritor and a defender of Confucianism, 
especially from the line of Mencian moral philosophy.   Living at the time that 
Daoism and Buddhism had been flourishing, Wang integrally synthesizes the 
distinctive theory of human nature from these two schools with Mencius‘s thinking 
of self-cultivation in order to develop a comprehensive perspective on the unity of 
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knowledge and action.   In other words, Wang intends to go beyond the questions of 
‗what human nature is‘, ‗what the good is‘, and ‗how human nature is good‘; rather, 
he, and other Neo-Confucians at that time, attempts to provide a new horizon for 
reflection on the cultivation of one‘s mind and its relation to the external things.   If 
we use the words of Western philosophical context, Wang intends to illustrate how to 
develop the moral subjectivity, rather than to propose a systematic theory of 
morality.   In the last section of this chapter, we will explore Confucian moral theory 
that is based on the lineage of Confucius, Mencius and Wang as a whole, and find 
out the corresponding elements of language, the self and the Other, and the concept 
of Ren in the ethical structure of responsibility as we proposed in previous section.   
 
§ 5.4.2 From Innate Knowledge to Moral Language 
 
By comparison to Confucius and Mencius the emphasis on the unity of knowledge 
and action is a distinctive feature of  Wang‘s thinking because he detects the lack of 
moral foundation on human nature in Confucius‘s moral teaching and the lack of 
moral practice in Mencius‘ introspective moral self-examination. Wang, in other 
words, proposes to find out the balance between moral knowledge and action.   This 
is a topic that have been discussed in both Western and Chinese intellectual tradition.   
Again, a distinguishing feature of Wang‘s approach to other theories is his emphasis 
on the role of basic human desires and affections, rather than the rational intellect 
aspect in one‘s moral decision.    
 
The issue that Wang addresses, therefore, is this.   Even though the questions 
of ‗what the good is‘ and ‗what human nature is‘ have been discussed for centuries, 
our knowledge about these questioins cannot guarantee that we always do the right 
things.   There are at least two opinions on this issue.   The first opinion is that 
people do not have sufficient rational knowledge about these questions which leads 
to the failure of moral action.   The second opinion is that, even though we have 
acknowledged the knowledge of morality,  other aspects of our ‗selves‘, other than 
such a rational aspect, interfes with this knowledge when we make moral decisions.   
Wang holds the second opinion and attempts to take both rational and emotional 
aspects of the ‗self‘ into acount.   Based on this dual but integral consideration of 
self, Wang distinguishes knowledge into the ‗innate knowldge‘ and ‗ordinary 
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knowledge‘.69  As Philip J. Ivonhoe interprets, the former refers to the ‗knowledge of 
something‘ while the latter refers to the ‗knowledge about something‘. 70   The 
knowledge of something cannot function properly without the unity with action in a 
self.   The knowledge about something, however, can be separated from the action of 
the self as this knowledge is external for the self as an projected object.   In other 
words, the first opinion about the insufficiency of knowledge in man‘s moral action 
refers to ‗knowledge about something‘.   For Wang, this is not a ‗real knowledge‘ in 
moral life.   ‗Knowledge of something‘ indicates the process of internalizing the 
virtue into the moral self-cultivation.   Thus, when the subject encounters a sudden 
event and needs to respond to this event, this subject uses his innate knowledge 
rather than the ordinary knowledge in this situation.   The response itself is an action 
that complete the ethical signification of moral knowledge.   And this response is 
based on the sincerity of one‘s innate moral mind.   
 
For the perspective of Neo-Confucianism, the sincerity of one‘s innate moral 
mind is derived from human sensitivity, which refers to the ability of feeling, 
experiencing, sympathizing one‘s selfhood and its influence on the moral will.   The 
Chinese concpet Ch‘i (氣) (as the vital force, or vital power) refers to this ability.71 
Ch‘i is a concept that is difficult to be explained analytically because of its immanent 
integrity of spirit and matter.
72
  As one  commentator, however, puts it,  ‗[Ch‘i] 
provide[s] […] a metaphorical mode of knowing, and epistemological attempt to 
address the multidimensional nature of reality by comparison, allusion, and 
suggestion.‘73   Ch‘i, then, is a comprehensive concept of innate knowledge that 
synthesizes both the intellect and the sensitivity of one‘s mind in one‘s own moral 
self-cultivation.   Ch‘i also manifests one‘s subjectivity in the process of ‗perception 
                                                 
69
 Philip J. Ivanhoe uses ‗real knowledge‘ to refer to ‗personal experience and brings together both 
cognitive and affective types of knowing.‘ See, Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, p.62. 
However, based on the context of Wang‘s theory, which is developed from his articulation of mind 
and its relation to external things and the nature, I prefer to use the concept ‗innate knowledge‘ that 
Chen Lai uses in the table of contents in his book You Wu Zhi Jing,《有無之境》, (Peking: Peking 
University Press, 2007). 
70
 Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, p. 62. 
71
 See Wing-tsit Chan, trans. And comp., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy ( Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 784. Also, see, Tu, p. 37. 
72
 We will not discuss this concept in detail in this section while Ch‘i is an important concept to 
understand the tradition of Chinese intellect and its difference with Western dichotomy of spirit and 
matter. More related discussion can be found in Tu, pp. 37–47. 
73
 Tu, p. 37. 
 238 
and response‘ (感應, Gan Ying)74, which at the same time shows sincerity as well.   
In fact, perception and response happen at the same time but they do not happen in 
two sequent stages.   It is precisely this spontaneity that defines the role of sensitivity 
and sincerity in one‘s will.    
 
We can use Mencius‘s example to explain further this point.    A person sees 
that a child is about to fall into a deep well.   Mencius stresses that the unbearable 
pity for the suffering of this child is the ‗seed‘ or ‗sprout‘ of humanity, which proves 
that human nature is primarily good.   This formulation, nevertheless, cannot 
thoroughly explain the difference of the reactions.   When this person faces this 
event, the foremost reaction shows the reflection of this person‘s most genuine 
moral-self.   The period of time is too short for a person to consider and weigh up 
this situation, according to one‘s evaluation from his past experience and memory.   
Thus, the different reactions from different people directly show the different moral 
subjectivity and one‘s sensitivity to the suffering of the Other.   In other words, from 
these reactions we can detect the process of inner transformation of one‘s Ch‘i: the 
rational measure and sensory feeling do not function separately but have been 
internalized into the moral subjectivity.   Moral self-cultivation, therefore, is not 
merely about ‗what the good is‘ and  ‗what human nature is‘ but about ‗who this 
moral subjectivity is‘ and ‗how this moral subjectivity responses to the suffering of 
the Other sincerely‘.   
 
The stress on the manifestation of one‘s innate knowledge, nonetheless, does 
not indicate that the main argument of Neo-Confucianism is subjectivistic.   As we 
have discussed above in Mencius‘s example, when the person faces this event, he is 
not only a bystander but also a witness who is part of this event.   The emphasis of 
the sensitivity in the moral subjectivity in Neo-Confucianism, especially in Wang‘s 
thinking, demonstrates the concern of sincerity as ‗telling the truth‘.   The reason lies 
in two aspects.   First, sensitivity plays an important role in being sensitive to the gap 
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between one‘s perception of inner morality and social norms in one‘s subjectivity; 
namely, it refers to the problem of identity between ‗the private I‘ and ‗the public I‘.   
The task of moral self-cultivation for Neo-Confucianism is to bridge the distance 
between these two Is, which, in turn, is the manifestation of sincerity.
75
  Second, 
when the I face another person, sensitivity also plays crucial role in being sensitive to 
the gap between ‗my subjectivity‘ and ‗the other‘s subjectivity‘.   Another task of 
moral self-cultivation, then, is to learn how to respond to the other‘s experience and 
to find out the proper location of myself in the relation to this other and in the society 
as well.   
 
Given this backdrop, language, especially in the form of dialogue, shows how 
the I locates one‘s self in the society and participates in it.   We can find many 
examples in the conversation between Confucius and his disciples that illustrate this 
in the Analects.   It looks like that the analects of Confucius is similar to the 
dialogues of Plato.   Indeed, both Confucius and Plato concern themselves with 
similar ethical and political issues: Confucius stresses Ren as humanness or 
humanity, while Plato emphasizes ‗justice‘ in his Republic, which are both presented 
in the form of dialogues.   The intention and the methodology that lie behind their 
dialogues, however, are dissimilar.   Briefly speaking, Plato presents his ideas 
through the characters in his dialogues based on his theory of Forms.   The plots of 
the dialogues are constructed, both deliberately and dialectically, in order to show the 
inner dilemmas of one interlocutor‘s words and prove the validity of the other 
interlocutor‘s ideas in the dialogue.   Confucius also presents his ethical thoughts in 
dialogues between Master and disciples based on his instructive teaching.    The 
main form of the dialogues, nevertheless, is to raise questions by the disciples, which 
would be answered or responded to, step by step, by Confucius.   This is an inter-
subjective relationship because Confucius answers or responds to his specific 
disciples‘ concrete questions in the dialogues.   This is an exchangeable and 
communal process in which both can clarify and deepen the answer of a particular 
question, and can provide different answers for the same question, if it is raised by 
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different disciples.   From this, we can find out that, even though Ren is the key 
concept of Confucius, there are various forms or manifestation of Ren in various 
situations.   Instead of conceptually stressing the idea of Ren in dialogues, by 
pointing out the improper arguments of his disciples, Confucius prefers to provide a 
response according to the interlocutors‘ personhood and to help him to improve his 
ability of self-realization of Ren.   Compared to Plato, then, generally speaking, 
Confucius‘ concern is with how the idea of Ren can be both internalized in a person 
through this person‘s self-cultivation and externalized in human social relationship 
via dialogues, rather than to abstract the Form or Idea from various phenomenon and 
experience in different dialogues.   In sum, Confucius‘s approach accentuates the 
mutual response in the communal form of teaching and learning between the minds 
of two subjectivities.   
 
In this section, we have noted the meaning of innate knowledge and its 
distinction with ordinary knowledge; and, secondly, pointed out the importance of 
sensitivity and its relation to sincerity; and, thirdly, illustrated the way in which 
Confucius uses moral language in his analects by comparing this with the dialogic 
method of Plato.   From this, we can see that self-cultivation, rather than conceptual 
pursuit of moral idea plays the essential role in Coufucian tradition.   In next section, 
therefore, we will discuss further the role of self in moral cultivation by examining 
the relationship between ‗to be oneself‘ and ‗having no self‘.   
 
§ 5.4.3  From „To be Oneself‟ and „Having no Self‟  
 
As Tu Weiming notes, there are two distinctive approaches to or features of moral 
self-realization emphasized in East Asian thought.
76
   Firstly, each human being can 
attain self-transformation, in the form of sageliness in Confucianism, or Buddhahood 
in Buddhism, and True person in Taoism, based on one‘s inherent human nature and 
one‘s own self effort.   Secondly, this process of self-cultivation is ceaseless.   Tu 
also points out that the dimension of transcendent reality  would be problematic for 
East Asian thought, and this finds its roots in the dichotomies that lie behind the 
Western and Chinese tradition of intellect.   And this tradition will directly determine 
the difference of perspective and methodology of Western and Chinese thinking on 
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the examination of the self and its relation to the Other.   Compared to the 
dichotomies of body and mind, sacred and profane, creator and creature in Western 
tradition, Chinese tradition takes much count of the dichotomies of inner and outer, 
substance and function, and Heaven and man.
77
 
 
Thus in Chinese thought, the problem of self does not merely focus on the 
‗self‘, but the ‗self‘ is considered at the beginning as a site to explore the 
transcendent reality, especially from the self-feeling and self-knowledge.   In other 
words, the problem of self in Chinese tradition is an ethico-religious problem, rather 
than an ontological and epistemological problem.   Similar to, though not completely 
the same as Bonhoeffer‘s and Levinas‘s ethical ideas, the core of Chinese thinking, 
including the three main schools, does not focus on the ‗what‘ and ‗how‘ questions, 
but on the ‗who‘ question.   The question of ‗who‘ raised by Confucians, then, is 
‗Who is the Confucian Self?‘  
 
In order to answer this question, it requires man to eliminate the duality of 
rational and emotional aspects in one‘s self and manifest the genuine nature of the 
self by self-transcendence in human relationship.   In the tradition of Confucianism, 
Confucius advocates self-overcoming (克己, ke ji) and Mencius stresses the control 
of ‗small self‘ (小體, xiao ti) through cultivation of the ‗Great self‘ (大體, da ti).   
Literally interpreted, the small self refers to the physical, private and independent 
self, while the great self refers to the social, relational and interdependent self.   
There is further significance, however, about this pair of concepts. As The Doctrine 
of the Mean (中庸, zhong yong) records, 
It is only he who is possessed of the most complete authenticity
78
 that can 
exist  under Heaven, who can give its full development to his nature.   
Able to give its  full development to his own nature, he can do the same to 
the nature of others.    Able to give its full development to the nature of 
others, he can give their full  development to the natures of animals and 
things.   Able to give their full  development to the natures of creatures 
and things, he can assist the  transforming and nourishing powers of 
Heaven and Earth.
79
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The self is the centre, in Confucian tradition, like the centre of a radial circle.   This 
centre, however, would be transformed in relation to the encounter with others in the 
course of self-examination, self-cultivation and self-transcendence.   Thus, in this 
context, the ‗small self‘ is the first step to be oneself, but in order to transform into 
the ‗great self‘, the self must experience the second step of ‗having no self‘, which 
means to abdicate the centre for the other.    
 
‗Having no self‘ is also a concept that used by Taoism and Buddhism to 
illustrate the emptiness of the self and of this world, but it is one that stresses the 
problem of self-possession, rather than professing a nihilistic teaching.   Confucius‘ 
self-overcoming indicates the elimination of selfishness and of one‘s persistence on 
the self.   Wang Yangming‘s argument of ‗having no self‘ also covers these two 
aspects, but he further emphasizes the selflessness and detachment in human 
relationship, which is quite close to Levinas‘s discussion on ‗separation‘ as we have 
discussed in chapter four.   As we have argued in that chapter, to separate with the 
Other is the first step to know the genuine boundary between the self and the Other.   
In other words, only after one has already found his self-identity from this 
separation, known his self-determined way and been honest with himself, can he 
move on, as Wang proposes, to the stage of ‗having no self‘.    
 
At this stage, an ethico-religious question raised by Tu which is important for 
the problem of the self: ‗What kind of person can really experience a sense of inner 
freedom and thus claim to be autonomous?‘80   Freedom, indeed, is difficult, as 
Levinas discussed in his book Difficult Freedom.   The difficulties emerge from the 
dynamic and changing boundaries of the dichotomies with regard to various 
situations when facing concrete subjects.   This is why the Confucian tradition has to 
seek the substantial foundation of the self in order to apprehend the other in the first 
step.  Neo-Confucianism, like Taoism and Buddhism, nevertheless, also lays much 
stress on the role of ‗no-self‘.   Wang holds that the ‗no-self‘ can be regarded as the 
reality of the non-self-possessing as well as the self-cultivation of the diminishing.   
The purpose of  seeking the ‗having no self‘ is, however, to achieve the 
unconstrained mind from diminishing the self-centredness.  Thus far, the 
                                                 
80
 Tu, p. 78. 
 243 
unconstrained mind with the attitude of ‗no-self‘ has the inner freedom to welcome 
the Other and, in the meantime, to be true to oneself.  
 
See within this light, the other cannot be a ‗wholly other‘ because even 
though in the first step the other is separated from my self and, then, in the second 
step the self welcomes the other, only when this other participates in my selfhood 
does this other make sense for the relationship between the self and the other.   This 
participation of the other in my selfhood is the third step: forming one body with the 
other.   Now, this ‗one body‘ should not be equated to the Being (of selves) in 
Heidegger‘s thinking because this ‗one body‘ maintains the independency of the self 
and the other while, at the same time, guarantees the interdependency of the self and 
the other in the first and the second steps respectively.   This third step is to stress the 
in-depth relationship to oneself and the other.   In the book Chuang Tzu (庄子, 
Zhuang zi), the second chapter ‗The Adjust of Controversies‘81, Chuang Tzu writes, 
‗Heaven, Earth, and I were produced together, and all things and I are one.‘82   This 
One, nonetheless, is based on Chuang Tzu‘s relativistic thinking which neglects the 
differentiation inherent in things.   Wang‘s ‗forming one body with the other‘ 
stresses the responsibility and the sense of a calling or of a mission of the self for the 
other.   This one body is also a ‗great self‘ in a broader and deeper sense, which 
maintains the independency of each subjectivity in this body.   It seems that this idea 
also lays too much stress on the role of self but neglects the transcendent reality.   
We could, however, interpret it from Bonhoeffer‘s inquiry of non-religious 
interpretation of Christianity.   In the coming-of-age or in the societies of non-
Christian background, the forms of divinity has been changed.   In the traditional 
sense, the historical Jesus was regarded as the incarnated God and moralized as a 
witness of human‘s words and action in order to save those who believed in him.   In 
Confucian sense, the ‗great self‘ has both the immanent and transcendent 
characteristics to make each subject responsible to one‘s self and to the other.   
 
As paradoxical as it may sound, there is a profound affinity in the relationship 
between ‗to be oneself‘ and ‗having no self‘, as well as a developmental  relationship 
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between the ‗small self‘ and ‗great self‘ in different stages.   By clarifying the role of 
self in this way, we could genuinely comprehend myself and the other and establish 
‗one body with the other‘.   From this, we can apply this Confucian idea, especially 
in Neo-Confucian thought, to briefly explain the problem of ‗the unbearable pity for 
the suffering of the other‘ at the end of this section.   For Wang, this ‗one body‘ does 
not only include the self and the other people, but also cover everything in this 
universe.   Even a grass or a stone is one part of the ‗great body‘.   If I hurt my little 
finger, I will feel painful.   If we take the grass as a part of the ‗great body‘ in the 
universe, then the damage of the glassland will directly or indirectly affect 
everyone‘s life.   In other words, to destroy the glassland is, at the same time, to hurt 
myself.   The ‗suffering‘ of the glassland also would be my ‗suffering‘ because we 
are in a ‗great body‘.   Thus, to protect the glassland, or to be responsible for it is 
equal to being  responsible for ourselves.    
 
This might remind many of Dostoevsky‘s words that everyone of us is 
responsible for everyone else in every way, and the I most of all.   In his work, he 
also asks himself,  
 
how can I possibly be responsible for all? Everyone would laugh in my 
face.    Can I, for instance, be responsible for you?‘ [The answer in this 
novel is:] ‗You may well not know it, […] since the whole world has long 
been going on a different line, since we consider the veriest lies as truth 
and demand the same lies from others.   Here I have for once in my life 
acted sincerely and, well, you all look upon me as a madman.   Though 
you are friendly to me, yet, you see, you all laugh at me.
83
   
 
Similar to Dostoevsky, Wang holds that ‗to be responsible for all‘ is the essence of 
Ren.   Therefore, in next section, we will examine in detail the relationship between 
Ren and Responsibility.   
 
§ 5.4.4. From Ren to Responsibility 
 
There are various English translations for the concept of Ren: benevolent love (H.H. 
Dubs); love (Derk Bodde); humanness or humanity (W.T. Chan); human-heartedness 
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(E. R. Hughes); Goodness (Arthur Waley); Virtue (H.G. Creel) and co-humanity, and 
several more. We could find out its original meaning from the Chinese character Ren 
(仁). This character is comprises two characters, the left signifying humanity (人, 
ren), and the right, two (二, er).   We, therefore, choose ‗co-humanity‘ as the English 
translation in our thesis because it stresses the human relatedness while in fact the 
meaning of Ren is multifaceted in Confucius‘ Analects and in other Confucian 
thinkers‘ works.   
 
In Analects chapter 12 (顏淵, Yan Yuan) paragraph 22, Fan chi asked about 
Ren.   The Master said, ‗It is to love all men.‘ While, in chapter 4 (里仁, Li Ren) 
paragraph 3, The Master said, ‗It is only the man of Ren, who can love, or hate, the 
others.‘  It seems these two dialogues indicate different opinions on Ren.   The 
former points out that love is the essence of Ren, while latter implies that only man 
of Ren has discriminability in his assessment of the others.   We cannot go into detail 
on this topic in this section, but it is of importance to note that this tension between 
love and discrimination reveals the primary concern on justice in Confucian 
tradition.   Love is the fundamental feature of Ren, while the ‗love with distinction‘ 
also shows that Confucius critically concerns the moral qualities in different levels of 
self-cultivation of people.   
 
This concern is also reflected in the cultivation of the distinctive relationship 
with the other.   ‗Five Cardinal Relationship‘ is the ethical structure of ancient 
Chinese society, and which is still important today.   It refers to the social hierarchy 
of ruler and ruled, parents and children, husband and wife, sibling relationship and 
friendship.   This social hierarchy is the model of moral hierarchy in Chinese society.   
The Great Learning (大學, Da Xue) also provides a practical eight entry steps in 
order to fulfill this ethical structure, especially the last four steps: from the 
cultivation of oneself to the peace of the world.
84
  Furthermore, from these entry 
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 Eight entry steps: 1) Investigation of things (格物); 2) Extention utmost of one‘s knowledge (致知); 
3) Sincerity in one‘s thought (誠意); 4) Rectification of one‘s heart (正心); 5) Cultivation of a person 
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steps, we can find out a feature of Chinese ethical wisdom that the word and deed are 
to be manifested at the same time: the ultimate self-transformation of moral 
knowledge cannot do without carrying out the communal action of moral thinking. 
 
The basic purpose of the unity of knowledge and action, therefore, is to fully 
realize the primordial awareness in one‘s mind.   This primordial awareness, in 
Chinese, is Liang Zhi (良知), which is the beginning of innate knowledge for Wang 
Yangming.   As Tu concludes, the process from the primorcial awareness to innate 
knowledge is the unification of consciousness and conscience.   Thus, 
 
To Yangming, consciousness as cognition and conscience as affection are 
not two separable functions of the mind.   Rather, they are integral aspects 
of a dynamic process whereby man becomes aware of himself as a moral 
being.
85
 
 
The extension of this innate knowledge to the other is an altruistic concern for others.  
This concern, nevertheless, is not an altruism because, as we have argued, the centre 
still lies in the subjectivity of the self.  This altruistic concern is corresponding to the 
concept of ‗no-self‘, which abdicates one‘s freedom to undertake the responsibility 
for the Other.   In order to illustrate this point, we use Tu‘s translation of Analects 
about Ren: 
 
a man of humanity [Ren], wishing to establish his own character, also 
establishes the character of others, and wishing to fully manifest himself, 
also helps others to fully manifest themselves.   The ability to take what is 
near at hand as an example may be called the method of realizing Ren‘.86 
 
The thinking of Ren has been developed into a more deliberated form in Neo-
Confucianism.   The ethico-religious interpretation of Ren in Neo-Confucianism 
stresses the relationship between subjectivity and sensitivity, which is distinct in 
Wang Yangming‘s concept ‗innate knowledge‘.   As Tu has pointed out, in order to 
deepen one‘s subjectivity, it is necessary both to broaden and to deepen one‘s 
                                                                                                                                          
(修身); 6) Regulation of one‘s family (齊家); 7) The ordering well of one‘s state (治國); 8) Whole 
world (kingdom) made tranquil and happy (平天下). 
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 Confucius‘s Analects, chapter 6, Yong Ye, paragraph 30. Quote from Tu, p. 88. 
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sensitivity.
87
  The emphasis of the sensitivity, then, can be understood as the 
preparation of the welcome to the Other, as an example.   This, indeed, is paradoxical 
becausein order to welcome the other, one has to transform one‘s self-centre; in order 
to attain the level of no-self, one has to establish and master the self first.   This 
process is an unceasing approach to the sincerity of oneself and responsibility for the 
other, which is also a self-transformation from the finite to the infinite.   
 
Thus, we could aptly use Levinas‘s corresponding words as the conclusion 
for this section from his work Otherwise Than Being: 
 
That the way the Infinite passes the finite and passes itself has an ethical 
meaning is not something that results from a project to construct the 
‗transcendental foundation‘ of ethical experience.  The ethical is the field 
outlined by the paradox of an Infinite in relationship with the finite 
without being belied in this relationship.
88
 
 
As Levinas also writes in his work God, Death and Time, ‗the awakened subjectivity 
were equivalent to the infinite in the finite.‘89  
 
There are three distinct but related issues that we have addressed in this 
chapter.   The first, and most important issue, is the way of awakening the 
subjectivity of a human being in relation to the Other.   The awakening is a 
complicated process, about which we have argued that the role of the other and 
language are two indispensable elements that help to realize this process in the 
ethical structure of responsibility.   Religion, etymologically, is the obligation and 
bond that is inherent in the primordial form of human relationship.   The 
transcendent dimension of religion, therefore, cannot be realized without the 
manifestation of the ethical significance between subjectivities.   It is the response 
that is expressed in the form of language, without merely depending on one‘s 
experience and memory, that awakes the subjectivity of the self to welcome the 
subjectivity of the other.    
 
The second most important issue that we addressed is the relationship 
between ethics, what is meant by ‗non-(religious)‘ religion and the notion of ‗in-
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(finity)‘.   As Manning summarizes, ‗(T)he identification of revelation with ethical 
command has tremendous consequences for Levinas‘s interpretation of what 
religious language means and how it should be conceived of and employed.‘90  The 
transformation from the Biblical words to the ethical command provides us, as we 
have argued, with a possible answer to Bonhoeffer‘s inquiry of non-religious 
interpretation of Christianity.   There is, however, a deeper link between the prefixes 
of ‗non-‘ and ‗in-‘ in the concepts of ‗non-religious‘ religion and ‗in-finity‘.     This 
connection indicates the religio-ethical turn both in the ontological and in the 
epistemological sense.   From an ontological point of view, the ‗non-‘ shows that the 
forms of the manifestation of the divine are no longer in the traditional forms for 
religion, while the ‗in-‘ shows that the realization of the divine is now moving in the 
infinite claim of the Other in ethical demands.   
 
The third issue is the relationship between the infinite and the finite, which  
We examined by way of a comparison of the ethical structure of responsibility 
between Western perspective and Chinese perspective, especially on the self-
cultivation from Neo-Confucianism.  This issue is the continued and expanded 
discussion of the second one, noting the differentiation in the ‗great body‘ which 
maintains the independency of the self and also opens the possibility for the inter-
dependency of the self and the other which is based on the transformation between 
the self and the no-self.   In some sense, this extension of the self-centre looks like 
the reverse of Levinas‘s other-orientation, however, both of these two perspectives 
stress the role of responsibility in human-relatedness.   The difference, therefore, lies 
in that Neo-Confucian opinion holds that the self-cultivation of the subjectivity is 
prior because it is the foundation of the self to welcome the other, while the 
Levinasian opinion holds that the Other is the genuine awakening element for the 
self-realization of my subjectivity.   The starting points of these two perspectives are 
not the same, but both of these two arguments lead to the same end: the awakening 
of the primordial awareness of subjectivity as responsibility before the other, for the 
other and towards the other.   In this regard, different understandings of what 
constitutes the subjectivity of the subject and the alterity of the other enhance, rather 
than diminish the understanding of responsibility and the Other in Western and 
Chinese thought.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
What is responsibility? This is the central question that that both Bonhoeffer and 
Levinas raised and addressed in their thought and which we too attempted to raise 
and respond too in this study. In other words, this critical question is not a question 
that can be answered by providing a definition, or an explanation with illustrated 
examples, or even through theoretical analyses of moral norms and laws precisely 
because it is an unceasing question or demand, as both Bonhoeffer and Levinas 
argue, that reminds us or alerts us to every word we say, every act we do, every 
decision we make, even every idea we think in our everyday life.  This is also the 
reason that we argued in this study that in order to address this question, we have to 
consider a dynamic and an ethically-oriented structure to responsibility which is 
manifested via two indispensable elements, namely, ‗the other‘ and ‗language‘.  The 
structure of ethical responsibility, then, is like a triangle in that when we research one 
angle of this triangle, we need to consider the other two angles.  This does not imply 
that every human relationship is shaped by this triangle, but a responsible human 
relationship cannot be shaped stably without considering each of these three 
interlacing elements.   
 
The three elements of responsibility, the other, and language that are present 
in ethical responsibility, then, are distinct but related.  They are mutually related to 
each other in that subjectivity owns the uniqueness of that responsibility to the other, 
and the disproportion between the Other and the self is precisely responsibility as 
moral consciousness, represented in and through the expression of the face of the 
Other in an ethical relationship of language.  Because of their interconnection, the 
awakening of the subjectivity presents itself in the language that is spoken to the 
Other.  This is why Levinas is correct to insist that he is addressing a ‗phenomenon‘, 
but it is a phenomenon that cannot be seen or permitted to be seen in a philosophical 
position that privileges and prioritizes consciousness and its objectivities (Husserlian 
phenomenology) or the question of the meaning of Being that either manifests in the 
mineness of Dasein or in self-sameness of language as the house of Being 
(Heideggerean ontology).   In other words, it is in language that we find the spiritual 
order of morality, and it is in language that we also find entailed an ethically 
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irreducible freedom of the Other, which goes beyond Barthian Totaliter aliter.  The 
relationships between these three essential elements raise three important 
implications and considerations.   
 
Firstly, responsibility precedes and conditions the freedom of the subjectivity 
that exists between the self and the Other.  Secondly, responsibility for the Other 
demands the self‘s genuine response in the way of hearing and answering.   Thirdly, 
and lastly, language plays an integral role in one being‘s receptiveness to an 
absolutely other being which conditions the very possibilities of understanding one 
another. 
 
§ 1 Responsibility, Freedom, Subjectivity and the Other 
 
Turning to the first aspect: responsibility precedes and conditions the freedom of the 
subjectivity that exists between the self and the Other.  To meet the Other is, at the 
same time, to see his face, which is also a process to hear an ‗invisible‘ voice from 
exteriority.  In Levinas‘ words, ‗to speak, at the same time as knowing the Other, is 
making oneself known to him.  The Other [however] is not only known, he is greeted 
(salué).‘1 The distance between this ‗face-to-face‘, therefore, is the distance between 
‗speaking and hearing‘.  This distance guarantees the absolute alterity of the Other 
which, on the one hand, would not be absorbed by my own identity, but which, on 
the other hand, call into question my freedom to understand what I hear and my 
freedom to respond to the Other in a sincere way.
2
 What Levinas wants to clarify and 
emphasise, then, is that it is imperative, for ethical reasons, not to fuse (or confuse) 
different horizons between the Same and the Other. 
 
This position, however, gives rise to the following critical question.  If my 
experience of the Other comes from absolute alterity, how can this Otherness as a 
stranger be thought? When I face a stranger, it is impossible for me to know him or 
to understand him.  What I can do is to ‗be drawn into intrigue with the Other‘, to 
confront the face of this Other.
3
 In order to address this question we have to 
                                                 
1
 DF, p.7, my emphasis. 
2
 See, de Boer, p. 12. 
3
 Ibid., p. 131. 
 251 
distinguish the natural existence of the I and the Other and the encounter of the face 
in the relating of the I and the Other.  The former refers to the relationship in a 
natural state and the latter refers to the relationship in a responsible state.  In the 
responsible state, both the I and the Other are conscious of the boundary between 
them.  Levinas‘s speaking of responsibility-prior-to-freedom should be discussed 
against the background of this boundary.  That is to say, the I cannot set this 
boundary, but it can encounter this boundary, and so, in this sense, this boundary is 
given to the I.  In other words, ‗encounter does not mean that my freedom is 
restricted but that I am awakened to responsibility.‘4 This is why responsibility is 
always my responsibility, which limits my freedom. 
 
The discussion on my freedom and my responsibility can be examined in 
light of a distinction between self-consciousness and moral consciousness.  In one‘s 
moral consciousness, the Other is not a new edition of myself, n nonetheless, in order 
to know the Other as the Other is, we still need to keep self-consciousness to keep 
the boundary between the I and the Other at the same time.  Self-consciousness, in 
this sense, therefore, is in the centre of moral consciousness.  Both self-
consciousness and moral consciousness deal with ‗for-itself‘ responsibility in an 
immanent sense and with ‗for-the-other‘ responsibility in a transcendent sense.  ‗This 
is somewhat like the difference between a person whose personality fills the room 
and another whose personality creates the room.‘ 5  The first one is to take the 
responsibility from the Other, in this case, the Other‘s responsibility transforms into 
my responsibility; and the second one is to take the responsibility for the Other, or to 
remind the Other to take his own responsibility when my responsibility is defined. 
 
The significance of the Other, then, lies in its disturbance of the self-
sufficient ego.  This exterior disturbance helps to deepen my interiority and the 
Other‘s interiority as well.  This is why the boundary that exists between the 
exteriority and interiority of the face to face relationship represents the responsibility 
that precedes and conditions the freedom of the individuality between the self and 
the Other. 
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5
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§ 2 Responsibility for the Other and Dialogue 
 
Turning to the second aspect: the responsibility for the Other demands of a  genuine 
response from the self in the way of and through hearing and answering. 
 
From Socrates to Hegel, philosophers have worked on the ideal of language 
and how language expresses the content of consciousness.
6
 There is, nevertheless, a 
more important feature of language that lies in what has not been expressed from the 
content of our consciousness.  We need to hear and then answer.  This process of 
hearing and answering can be explored via ‗speaking‘ because ‗speaking‘ links these 
two.  We can analyse this process from two perspectives.  The first perspective is to 
speak ‗about‘ something.  The second perspective is the intention of the behaviour of 
this ‗speaking‘.  The intention of ‗speaking‘ and what this ‗speaking‘ speaks about, 
therefore, are two different things.  To understand language we have to be aware of 
both perspectives; otherwise, one can understand what is said, but never understand 
the reason why the speaker said it.
7
 
 
From ‗speaking‘ we can move to analyse ‗dialogue‘.  Dialogue is a form of 
speaking.  It is not monologue, rather the topic of a dialogue is open to discovery by 
the participants (conversants).  Thus the aim of dialogue is not to locate the common 
ground, but the truth in difference.  It fosters an understanding of otherness, 
particularity, and uniqueness.
8
 This is a dialogue-before-the dialogue.
9
 In this sense, 
our purpose in dialouge is not to deconstruct language itself, but to ‗demythologise‘ 
the world as it truly is via language.
10
 Until now, the discussion of language has been 
focused on an ontological approach.  When we bring in the Other, who speaks to the 
I or who makes the I hear, then the inter-action of this communication  shifts the 
ontological approach to an ethical-transcendental-dialogical approach.  In other 
words, we move ‗from intentionality to sincerity.‘11 
 
                                                 
6
 See, DF, p. 207. 
7
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Levinas used two words to represent these two approaches.  For the 
ontological approach, he calls this type of language ‗the Said‘ (le Dit); and, for the 
ethical one, he calls it ‗the Saying.‘ (le Dire).  Thus the earlier theme of thinking on 
the Other and the Self can be incorporated into the linguistic philosophical theme of 
the Saying and the Said.
12
 The said corresponds to the presupposition or pre-
understanding of the self-sufficient ego before he speaks.  The saying refers to an 
inter-subjective hearing and answering in a proximate and substitutive way. 
 
This proximate and substitutive way is derived from the problem that when 
the I and the Other communicate, the I cannot avoid different opinions from the 
Other.  Thus the question arises, what should the I do so that they can have sincere 
communication? For Levinas, proximity and substitution further describes 
‗responsibility as the highest form of passivity.‘13 In this regard, a feature of dialogue 
is that the I can not only attempt to understand what the Other says but also accept 
the reason why the Other says so.  To accept this reason, however,  is not necessarily 
to accept the content or standpoint of the Other‘s opinion. 
 
Following this train of thought, substitution in relation to responsibility is to 
be responsible for the freedom of others.  Is this kind of responsibility, then, too 
passive? Levinas does indeed emphasise the passivity or receptivity of responsibility, 
but this passivity is not completely passive because it is actively restrained in the 
mutual responsible understanding of language.  This leads to the third aspect of our 
topic. 
 
§ 3 Language and the Possibility of Human Self-Understanding  
 
Our human self-understanding of ourselves is bound up with the way we understand 
others, but how is it possible to understand others? In response to this question, 
Levinas argues that Language in one being‘s receptiveness to an absolutely other 
being is that which conditions the very possibilities of understanding one another. 
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Language is essentially a communal platform for living beings to deliver their 
expressions.  The speakers who use language, however, make the role of language 
deviate from its originally neutral stance.  The reason is that ‗the Other speaks to me 
from above as he calls me to responsibility.‘14 When the Other speaks to me, he 
already has his intentions in his mind and waits for my response.  This proposing of a 
speech and waiting for a response is already a de-dominated behaviour from the 
Other.  This process has an ethical significance and this significance is embodied in 
the ethical order of the words that are used in this communication.  From this point 
of view, we can see why dialogue is not enough and why we need to seek the 
dialogue-prior-to-dialogue because two indispensable elements, the Said that is 
decided from the I and the Saying that speaks towards the Other, are both required to 
determine the ethical significance of a dialogue. 
 
This means, however, that there is always a ‗time-lag‘ between the said and 
the saying as the said is the precondition for the saying and Saying is the completion 
and a new start of the Said.  This is why Levinas points out that apart from what can 
be expressed via language, we also need to explore what has not been expressed but 
still bears ethical significance.  This is also ‗a metaphysical depth dimension of 
language, […] for [a] dialogue in which the interlocutors do not lecture or dominate 
each other but do each other justice.‘15 
 
These three aspects link closely as a circle in Levinas elaboration of the idea 
of ‗difficult freedom‘, which opens up new possibilities, new possibilities that are 
derived from the self‘s response to and responsibility for the Other, achievable in 
ethical language.  This ethical language as discourse can, therefore,   
 
lift itself out of its eternal contest and return to the human lips that speak 
it, in order to fly from man to man and judge history, instead of remaining 
a symptom or an effect or a ruse.  This is the word of a discourse that 
begins absolutely in the person in possession of it, and moves towards 
another who is absolutely separate.
16
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Through this absolute separation, the distance between the Other and the self is 
established, which transfers responsibility as moral consciousness from access to an 
external being, the Other, by means of language that is both to be given and to give 
to responsibility and justice. 
 
In a discourse, we will have the speaker, the hearer and the topic of this 
discourse, and all of the above three essential elements, responsibility, the Other, and 
language, are found in that very discourse, for, when we speak about something we 
are always speaking to someone.
17
  This depth-dimension of language both implies 
and represents an ethical transcendence of responsibility between the I and the Other.  
It shows the self-limitation in the discourse as a responsibility for the Other‘s 
freedom.  Responsibility is not a limitation on one‘s own freedom or of one‘s own 
freedom because it is the very ethical condition of the existence of that freedom.  
Freedom shows or reveals itself in a negative way, but the significance of this 
negation is positive; or, in other words, it is goodness.  In Levinas‘ words,  
 
 no one is good voluntarily […] because the attachment to the Good 
precedes the choosing of this Good. […] The Good is good precisely 
because it chooses you and grips you before you have had the time to 
praise your eyes to it.
18
  
 
Without locating our freedom in such a paradoxical way,  the danger of the 
possibility of taking our violent and subjective understanding of goodness and justice 
as real goodness is all to apparent (as history, as Levinas and Bonhoeffer knew all 
too well knew, demonstrates).   
 
Today, we confront multiple beliefs and we have multiple ways of expressing 
those beliefs.  There are tensions that are derived from this multiplicity.  These 
tensions lie in the conflicts between men, the opposition of the same and the Other, 
even the opposition in my ego and my super-ego in conscious and unconscious 
factors (Freud), in ideological and non-ideological factors (Marx), in will to power 
and will to truth (Nietzche) in moral discourse.  All of these tensions make necessay, 
again, to reconsider the relationship between freedom and responsibility, especially 
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from an ethical and linguistic perspective.  In order to truly understand the Other‘s 
beliefs, we need to explore, as Levinas remarks, ‗a multiplicity of coherent 
discourses that embraces them all, which is precisely the universal order.‘19 This 
means exploring the identification between an individual‘s free expression of truth 
and the constitution of the universal state.   All of this implies that to be responsible 
is to take the responsibility for the responsibility of the Other; and to speak 
responsibly is to hear and to answer the language for the language of the Other.  All 
of these would occur and only occur when two flesh and blood human beings meet 
face-to-face through their vulnerability and morality.
20
 To overlook such 
vulnerability and morality is to overlook humanity itself.  The only way, then, for 
humankind to find out its own way of understanding the universe, is to look inwards 
that is, at the same time, a look outwards to realise the inter-connectedness of 
humanity, language, responsibility and otherness.
21
 As T.S. Eliot puts it eloquently, 
in the second poem from his Four Quartets, completed in early 1940 and reflecting 
on time and disorder within nature when humanity deviates itself from the pursuit of 
the Divine. 
 
You say I am repeating  
Something I have said before. I shall say it again. 
            Shall I say it again? In order to arrive there,  
            To arrive where you are, to get from where you are not,      
                   You must go by a way wherein there is no ecstasy.  
            In order to arrive at what you do not know      
                    You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance.  
            In order to possess what you do not possess                              
                    You must go by the way of dispossession.  
            In order to arrive at what you are not      
                     You must go through the way in which you are not.  
           And what you do not know is the only thing you know  
           And what you own is what you do not own  
           And where you are is where you are not. 
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